On the role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises by Cruz de Echeverria Loebell, Nicole
1 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the role of deduction in reasoning from 
uncertain premises 
 
Nicole Cruz de Echeverria Loebell 
Ph.D./doctoral thesis 
 
Written in the context of a co-tutorship/joint degree at Birkbeck, University of 
London, London, UK, and École Pratique des Hautes Études, PSL, Paris, France  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal supervisor at Birkbeck, University of London: Prof. Mike Oaksford 
Principal supervisor at EPHE, PSL: Maître de Conférences HDR Jean Baratgin 
External supervisor: Prof. David Over 
 
 
Examiners for Birkbeck, University of London: 
Internal: Prof. Dorothy Edgington, Birkbeck, University of London 
External: Prof. Nick Chater, University of Warwick 
 
Examiners for EPHE, PSL: 
Prof. Shira Elqayam, De Montfort University 
Directeur de recherche du CNRS Wim De Neys, Université Paris Descartes 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Abstract  
(French version follows below) 
The probabilistic approach to reasoning hypothesizes that most reasoning, both in everyday 
life and in science, takes place in contexts of uncertainty. The central deductive concepts of 
classical logic, consistency and validity, can be generalised to cover uncertain degrees of 
belief. Binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, where the probability judgments 
for two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory. 
Binary validity can be generalised to probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference is 
p-valid if and only if the uncertainty of its conclusion cannot be coherently greater than the 
sum of the uncertainties of its premises. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in 
formal logic does not imply that people will use deduction in a probabilistic way. The role of 
deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises was investigated across ten experiments and 
23 inferences of differing complexity. The results provide evidence that coherence and p-
validity are not just abstract formalisms, but that people follow the normative constraints set 
by them in their reasoning. It made no qualitative difference whether the premises were certain 
or uncertain, but certainty could be interpreted as the endpoint of a common scale for degrees 
of belief. The findings are evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity 
as computational level principles for reasoning. They have implications for the interpretation 
of past findings on the roles of deduction and degrees of belief. And they offer a perspective 
for generating new research hypotheses in the interface between deductive and inductive 
reasoning. 
 
Keywords: Reasoning; deduction; probabilistic approach; coherence; p-validity 
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Résumé 
L’approche probabiliste du raisonnement émet l’hypothèse que la plupart des raisonnements, 
aussi bien dans la vie quotidienne qu’en science, se réalisent dans des contextes d’incertitude. 
Les concepts déductifs centraux de la logique classique, consistance et validité, peuvent être 
généralisés afin d’englober des degrés de croyance incertains. La consistance binaire peut être 
généralisée à travers la dénomination de cohérence, lorsque les jugements de probabilité à 
deux affirmations sont cohérents seulement s’ils respectent les axiomes de la théorie de la 
probabilité. La validité binaire peut se généraliser comme validité probabiliste (validité-p), 
lorsqu’une interférence est valide-p seulement si l’incertitude de sa conclusion ne peut être de 
façon cohérente plus grande que la somme des incertitudes de ses prémisses. Cependant le fait 
que cette généralisation soit possible dans une logique formelle n’implique pas le fait que les 
gens utilisent la déduction de manière probabiliste. Le rôle de la déduction dans le 
raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines a été étudié à travers dix expériences et 23 
inférences de complexités différentes. Les résultats mettent en évidence le fait que la 
cohérence et la validité-p ne sont pas juste des formalismes abstraits, mais que les gens vont 
suivre les contraintes normatives établies par eux dans leur raisonnement. Que les prémisses 
soient certaines ou incertaines n’a pas créé de différence qualitative, mais la certitude pourrait 
être interprétée comme l’aboutissement d’une échelle commune de degrés de croyance. Les 
observations sont la preuve de la pertinence descriptive de la cohérence et de la validité-p 
comme principes de niveau de calcul pour le raisonnement. Ils ont des implications pour 
l’interprétation d’observations antérieures sur les rôles de la déduction et des degrés de 
croyance. Enfin, ils offrent une perspective pour générer de nouvelles hypothèses de recherche 
quant à l’interface entre raisonnement déductif et inductif.  
 
Mots clés: Raisonnement; déduction; approche probabiliste; cohérence; validité-p 
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RÉSUMÉ LONG 
(English version follows below) 
 
 
Contexte théorique 
 
L’approche probabiliste du raisonnement 
L’approche probabiliste en psychologie du raisonnement (Evans, 2006; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2013; Over, 2016; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009, 2010; Politzer & 
Baratgin, 2016) est basée sur l’hypothèse fondamentale que la plupart des raisonnements, 
aussi bien dans la vie quotidienne qu’en science, se réalisent dans des contextes incertains. 
L’incertitude, ou degrés de croyance, dans les énoncés à partir desquels nous raisonnons ne 
peut être modélisée dans la logique classique, qui est binaire dans la mesure où elle représente 
seulement ce qui est assurément vrai ou faux. Cependant cette incertitude peut être modélisée 
dans la théorie des probabilités. Il y a une abondance de preuves empiriques qui démontrent 
que les gens tendent à raisonner à partir de prémisses incertaines même lorsqu’il leur ait donné 
l’instruction d’assumer que les prémisses sont certaines (Byrne, 1989; George, 1997; Liu, Lo, 
& Wu, 1996; Stevenson & Over, 1995; Thompson, 1994).  
Dans la logique classique, un conditionnel, si p alors q, est interprété comme le 
conditionnel matériel, qui est équivalent à non-p ou q. Mais dans l’approche probabiliste cette 
vision est rejetée, et il est à la place proposée une interprétation probabiliste des conditionnels. 
La probabilité d’un conditionnel P(si p alors q), n’est pas proposée pour correspondre à 
P(non-p ou q), mais à la probabilité conditionnelle de q considérant p, P(q|p). Cette relation, 
P(si p alors q) = P(q|p), est appelée l’Équation (Edgington, 1995). Avoir un degré de croyance 
dans un conditionnel est considéré différent que d’avoir un degré de croyance concernant un 
fait dans le monde. Le projet est que les gens arrivent à P(q|p), non pas en ayant d’abord des 
degrés spécifiques de croyance en P(p & q) et en P(p), prenant ensuite leur ratio, P(q|p) = 
P(p& q)/P(p), mais à travers un test de Ramsey (Ramsey, 1929/1990; Stalnaker, 1968). Il 
s’agit d’une simulation mentale dans laquelle les gens supposent hypothétiquement 
l’antécédent p du conditionnel, réalisent les changements nécessaires quant à leurs croyances 
pour préserver la consistance, et évaluent la probabilité de q selon cette supposition.  
L’interprétation conditionnelle matérielle de conditionnels entraîne des conséquences 
contre-intuitives qui sont évitées par l’Equation. On peut prendre en exemple le conditionnel « 
Si l’on lance cette pièce non biaisée elle va atterrir côté face ». Intuitivement, la probabilité de 
ce conditionnel est .5, qui correspond à la probabilité conditionnelle pour la pièce non biaisée 
d’atterrir côté face si elle est lancée. Mais si l’on imagine que la pièce est dans une boîte en 
verre dans un musée, nous sommes alors presque certains que nous n’allons pas la lancer. Le 
conditionnel matériel est vrai dès que l’antécédent du conditionnel est faux. De ce fait, le plus 
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confiant l’on devient que nous n’allons pas jeter la pièce, le plus probable il sera que si on la 
lance elle atterrisse côté face, selon l’interprétation conditionnelle matérielle. Mais cela paraît 
absurde.  
Un conditionnel basé sur l’Équation a été appelé le conditionnel probabilité (Adams, 
1998), conditionnel suppositionnel (Edgington, 2014), et événement conditionnel (de Finetti, 
1937/1980). Il y est fait référence dans cette thèse en tant que conditionnel probabilité. 
L’hypothèse selon laquelle l’interprétation modale des conditionnels qu’ont les gens 
correspond au conditionnel probabilité a reçu un large soutien empirique (Barrouillet & 
Gauffroy, 2015; Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; 
Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003; Politzer, Over, & Baratgin, 2010).  
 
Le rôle de la déduction dans le raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines 
Avec l’avènement du paradigme probabiliste, la question du rôle, si elle en joue un, de la 
déduction dans le raisonnement, s’est posée à nouveau (Evans, 2012; Evans & Over, 2013). 
Cette thèse soutient que la réponse à cette question dépend en partie de la manière de définir la 
déduction. La définition de déduction dans la logique classique est binaire, et produit ce que de 
Finetti appelle « la logique de la certitude » (de Finetti, 1972; Elqayam & Over, 2013). Quand 
les prémisses sont présumées certaines, la conclusion d’une inférence valide classiquement 
doit être certaine également. Mais imaginons que les gens aient des degrés incertains de 
croyance dans les prémisses d’une inférence. Quel degré de croyance serait raisonnable qu’ils 
aient en la conclusion ? La logique classique ne peut pas répondre à cette question, du fait que 
cela ne peut s’appliquer au raisonnement en contexte d’incertitude. Si l’on retient sa définition 
binaire de la déduction, l’hypothèse centrale de l’approche probabiliste, selon laquelle la 
plupart des raisonnements se réalisent à partir de prémisses incertaines, implique que la 
déduction a seulement un petit rôle à jouer dans la plupart des situations de raisonnement 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007). 
Utilisant la définition classique de la déduction, un certain nombres d’études empiriques 
ont trouvé un effet de la déduction dans les tâches de raisonnement, en plus de ce qui a été 
appelé un effet de « croyance » (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010; Klauer, Beller, & 
Hütter, 2010; Markovits, Brisson, & Chantal, 2015; Rips, 2001; Singmann & Klauer, 2011; 
Thompson, 1994; Trippas, Thompson, & Handley, 2017). En particulier, les gens acceptent 
plus souvent la conclusion d’inférences valides qu’invalides, en plus d’accepter des 
conclusions vraisemblables plus fréquemment que celles invraisemblables. Ce dernier effet 
cité a été appelé biais de la croyance, constituant un écart par rapport à la réponse normative 
selon les instructions logiques binaires.  
Les observations d’effets à la fois de « logique » et de « croyance » dans les 
raisonnements a contribué au développement de théories à deux composantes (Evans, 2006; 
Klauer et al., 2010; Markovits et al., 2015; Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005). 
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Quand ces théories adoptent un processus binaire logique qui est contrasté par un processus 
« basé sur la croyance », le processus « logique » interroge l’hypothèse basique de l’approche 
probabiliste selon laquelle la plupart des raisonnements dans le monde réel se réalisent à partir 
de prémisses incertaines.  
La thèse ci-présente plaide pour une manière alternative d’expliquer les observations sur 
un effet de la déduction qui n’interroge pas la base de l’approche probabiliste. Plutôt que 
d’intégrer une composante logique binaire d’un côté et une composante probabiliste basée sur 
la croyance de l’autre, au sein d’une perspective à double composante, elle explore 
l’intégration de la logique et de la probabilité elle-même.  
Les concepts déductifs centraux de la logique classique, consistance et validité, peuvent 
être généralisés pour englober les degrés de croyance. La consistance binaire peut être 
généralisée à travers la dénomination de cohérence, et la validité binaire à travers la validité 
probabiliste, ou validité-p (Adams, 1998; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Gilio, 2002). Deux 
énoncés sont cohérents seulement s’ils peuvent être vrais tous les deux au même moment. De 
manière similaire, les jugements de probabilité sont cohérents seulement s’ils respectent les 
axiomes de la théorie de la probabilité. Par exemple, si l’on croit qu’il y a 80% de chances 
qu’il pleuve aujourd’hui, alors pour que notre supposition soit cohérente il faudrait aussi que 
l’on soit prêt à croire qu’il y a 20% de chances qu’il ne pleuve pas aujourd’hui, sinon les 
probabilités n’attendraient pas 1 en s’additionnant. Une inférence est valide seulement s’il est 
incohérent pour ses prémisses d’être vraies mais ses conclusions fausses. Cela signifie qu’une 
inférence valide maintient la vérité des prémisses aux conclusions. Pour comprendre comment 
cette définition peut être généralisée aux degrés de croyance, l’on prend le cas simple d’une 
inférence à une prémisse. Une inférence à une prémisse est valide-p seulement s’il est 
incohérent pour la probabilité de sa conclusion d’être inférieure à la probabilité de sa prémisse. 
De ce fait une inférence valide-p maintient la probabilité, tout comme une inférence binaire 
valide maintient la vérité. Les généralisations ci-dessus rendent possible l’étude de la 
déduction à partir de prémisses incertaines (Stevenson & Over, 1995), de manière à ce qu’il 
n’y ait pas besoin de qualifier la base de l’approche probabiliste.  
Avec cette notion généralisée de la déduction, beaucoup d’observations sur le biais de 
croyance peuvent être réinterprétées comme effets de cohérence. Les participants d’une 
expérience peuvent violer les instructions déductives classiques qui assument que les 
prémisses sont certaines et toutefois raisonner déductivement, en déterminant un degré de 
croyance cohérent dans la conclusion d’une inférence sur la base de sa forme logique et de 
leurs degrés incertains de croyance en les prémisses. Ne pas suivre des instructions binaires 
peut être vu comme une faute, mais ce n’est pas nécessairement une faute logique.  
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Question de recherche 
Le fait que la définition de la déduction puisse être généralisée pour englober les degrés de 
croyance n’implique pas que les gens utilisent la déduction de manière probabiliste. Il est 
possible que quand les gens réalisent une déduction ils le fassent selon la voie binaire 
classique, et que raisonner à partir de prémisses incertaines soit inductif en pratique même si 
cela n’a pas à être le cas dans la théorie. Le fait que les gens soient sensibles ou non aux 
contraintes de la cohérence et à la validité-p est une question empirique qui a seulement 
récemment commencé à être étudiée, mais qui était l’axe principal de cette thèse.  
Cette thèse étudiait le rôle de la cohérence et de la validité-p dans le raisonnement 
incertain à travers dix expériences. Des études antérieures sur la cohérence des jugements de 
probabilité de conclusion s’étaient centrées sur les syllogismes conditionnels (Evans, 
Thompson, & Over, 2015; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). Des réponses à ces inférences à 
deux prémisses se sont avérées être plus cohérentes que le niveau aléatoire, surtout pour 
l’inférence de modus ponens (MP), et moins solidement pour l’inférence de déni de 
l’antécédent (DA). Cependant, les taux de chance dans ces études étaient souvent très élevés 
(e.g. Singmann et al., 2014, Figure 3) et variaient entre les différentes inférences, rendant plus 
difficile de détecter la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire quand elle se présente, et de 
comparer cette cohérence entre inférences.  
 
 
Les observations obtenues à travers les expériences 
 
Les expériences ci-présentes ont élargi ces observations, utilisant différentes méthodologies, à 
travers 23 formes d’inférence. Ces inférences différaient dans la complexité de leur structure. 
Elles incluaient des inférences valides (déductives) et invalides (inductives), et elles 
présentaient des négations, des conjonctions, des disjonctions et des conditionnels. La plupart 
des inférences comprenant des conditionnels les considéraient interprétables comme 
conditionnels de probabilité, se basant sur l’Équation P(si p alors q) = P(q|p) (Adams, 1998; 
Edgington, 1995; Jeffrey, 1991), mais certaines expériences ont inclus des comparaisons de 
différentes interprétations de conditionnels.  
 
Réponses cohérentes au MT 
Pour ce qui est des syllogismes conditionnels, les résultats confirmaient l’observation 
antérieure de cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire pour le MP, mais ont fait le constat 
d’une cohérence fortement supérieure au niveau aléatoire également pour l’inférence de 
modus tollen (MT). Des six expériences à travers lesquelles les deux inférences ont été 
étudiées, la cohérence globale était supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans tous les cas pour le 
MP. Pour le MT, la cohérence était supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans tous les cas si ce n’est 
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dans deux d’entre eux. Le premier était l’Expérience 3, dans laquelle elle était au niveau 
aléatoire dans la tâche des énoncés mais supérieure à ce niveau dans la tâche des inférences. 
Dans l’Expérience 4, qui répliquait l’Expérience de lab 3 sur internet, la cohérence était 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans certaines conditions. Le deuxième cas se trouvait dans 
l’Expérience 7. La cohérence pour le MT était au niveau aléatoire quand il était donné aux 
participants des instructions de paradigme binaire pour présumer du caractère véridique des 
prémisses, et ensuite juger si la conclusion aussi se doit de l’être. Cela était malgré le fait que 
la cohérence pour le MT était supérieure au niveau aléatoire pour les mêmes éléments quand 
été données des instructions probabilistes (Expérience 6).  
Ces découvertes constituent la preuve solide d’une sensibilité de base aux contraintes de 
la cohérence pour le MT. Elles fournissent aussi directement une preuve de l’adéquation 
descriptive de la proposition selon laquelle les contraintes de la déduction ne sont pas limitées 
au cas spécial dans lequel il est présumé que les prémisses sont certaines.  
La méthodologie des Expériences 5 à 7 a permis, non seulement d’évaluer si les 
jugements de probabilité de conclusion sont cohérents au-dessus du niveau aléatoire, mais 
aussi de réaliser des comparaisons quantitatives de cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire 
entre inférences. Cela a été réalisé à travers un design qui assimilait le taux de hasard de la 
cohérence à travers les inférences et les conditions. Les expériences ont révélé que malgré le 
fait que les réponses au MT étaient généralement cohérentes au-dessus du niveau aléatoire, la 
cohérence était plus faible pour le MT que pour le MP, conformément à la littérature utilisant 
les instructions de paradigme binaire. Dans l’approche probabiliste, la différence dans 
l’acceptation des deux inférences peut être expliquée comme étant le résultat d’un 
raisonnement dynamique (Oaksford & Chater, 2013). Plus spécifiquement, le MT peut parfois 
être vu comme une instance d’une inférence reductio ad absurdum. La prémisse catégorique 
non-q nie un élément de la prémisse conditionnelle si p alors q, avec le résultat selon lequel un 
fort degré de croyance dans les deux prémisses est incompatible avec un fort degré de 
croyance dans l’élément p de la conclusion. Mais le conflit entre si p alors q, non-q, et p peut 
être résolu de différentes manières. Dépendant du contexte personnel de croyances, une 
personne pourrait voir si p alors q et non-q comme une raison pour ne pas croire p, 
conformément au MT, alors qu’une autre personne pourrait voir non-q et p comme une raison 
pour ne pas croire si p alors q, se livrant au raisonnement dynamique. La logique elle-même 
ne nous dit pas quel énoncé devrait être écarté, de sorte que sans instructions pour présumer 
que les deux prémisses sont certaines, le choix peut être fait sur des fondements inductifs. 
Cette perspective permet d’expliquer l’asymétrie entre le MP et le MT de manière rationnelle.  
 
Réponses changeantes à l’AC et à la NA  
Les résultats de cohérence pour les syllogismes conditionnels affirmation du conséquent (AC) 
et négation de l’antécédent (NA) étaient plus équivoques. Dans l’Expérience 3, la cohérence 
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pour les deux inférences était supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans la tâche des énoncés, mais 
pas dans la tâche des inférences. Dans l’Expérience 4 la cohérence était supérieure au niveau 
aléatoire pour les deux inférences ainsi que pour les deux conditions de tâche. Toutefois, la 
cohérence pour les deux inférences était inférieure au niveau aléatoire dans l’Expérience 5, et 
au niveau aléatoire dans les Expériences 6 et 7. Dans l’Expérience 8, la cohérence était 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire pour la NA (cette expérience n’incluait pas l’AC). Laissant de 
côté les tâches d’énoncés des Expériences 3 et 4, cela signifie que la cohérence pour l’AC était 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans une expérience sur cinq, et la cohérence pour la NA était 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans deux expériences sur six. Un manque de cohérence 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire pour ces deux inférences est difficile à interpréter, mais il 
pourrait être expliqué par une interprétation biconditionnelle de la prémisse conditionnelle. 
Plus spécifiquement, les matériaux utilisés peuvent avoir suggéré aux participants que 
l’antécédent et le conséquent du conditionnel était corrélés positivement. Conformément à 
cela, une analyse des données de l’Expérience 3 a montré que la cohérence était supérieure au 
niveau aléatoire dans l’hypothèse d’une interprétation biconditionnelle pour les mêmes 
réponses et que la cohérence était au niveau aléatoire dans l’hypothèse d’une interprétation 
conditionnelle. Pour pouvoir interpréter les résultats de cohérence pour ces inférences, les 
deux interprétations devraient être dissociées, contrôlant explicitement la corrélation entre 
antécédent et conséquent. Bien qu’une telle expérience ait été hors de la portée de cette thèse, 
le fait qu’il soit nécessaire d’interpréter les observations sur l’AC et la NA est néanmoins une 
perspective plus précise et moins pessimiste que la suggestion d’études antérieures selon 
laquelle les réponses sont généralement incohérentes pour ces inférences (e.g. Singmann et al., 
2014). 
Des études supplémentaires sur l’AC et la NA, mais aussi sur le MP, le MT, et d’autres 
inférences à deux prémisses, pourraient évaluer dans quelle mesure les réponses incohérentes 
sont des réponses qui surestiment ou sous-estiment la probabilité de la conclusion, au vu des 
probabilités attribuées aux prémisses, et à quel point cela dépend des risques et bénéfices 
suggérés par les matériaux (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). L’hypothèse selon laquelle il peut y 
avoir une confiance excessive en la conclusion d’une inférence valide ne pouvait même pas 
être formulée dans le paradigme binaire. Mais cette hypothèse peut prolonger l’étude des 
effets de suppression, rendant nécessaire la distinction entre la suppression de la conclusion 
d’une inférence, et la suppression de l’inférence elle-même (Over & Cruz, 2018). 
 
Conditionnels, introduction du ou, et biais de la conjonction  
Les Expériences 1 et 2 n’ont pas seulement prolongé les résultats de cohérence à d’autres 
inférences, mais ont aussi fourni des informations sur les sens des énoncés composants, et sur 
les facteurs impliqués dans le raisonnement avec eux. Une analyse de l’inférence ou-à-si a 
démontré que les réponses des gens étaient cohérentes au-dessus du niveau aléatoire dans 
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l’hypothèse où ils interprètent le conditionnel dans la conclusion comme le conditionnel 
probabilité, mais ils étaient cohérentes au-dessous du niveau aléatoire dans l’hypothèse où ils 
interprètent le conditionnel dans la conclusion comme le conditionnel matériel, qui est 
équivalent à non-p ou q. Cela constitue une forme de preuve novatrice pour l’interprétation des 
conditionnels en termes de l’Équation.   
La cohérence était sérieusement supérieure au niveau aléatoire à travers quatre variantes 
de l’inférence d’introduction du ou, suggérant que malgré le fait que cela puisse être 
pragmatiquement malheureux, dans le cadre d’instructions de paradigme binaire, d’indiquer p 
ou q quand l’on pourrait être plus informatif et précis en indiquant p, les gens considèrent 
aisément l’inférence comme étant valide quand ils sont directement interrogés sur leur degrés 
de croyance quant à la prémisse et la conclusion. Cela est en conformité avec l’idée que les 
plus bas taux d’adhésion trouvés pour l’inférence dans le cadre d’instructions de paradigme 
binaire sont dus à des effets pragmatiques (Cruz, Over, & Oaksford, 2017; Orenes & Johnson-
Laird, 2012), contrairement à la récente proposition d’une révision de la théorie des modèles 
mentaux où l’inférence est en fait invalide (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015). 
De plus, l’Expérience 2 a montré que malgré le fait que les réponses étaient cohérentes 
pour et-élimination lorsque été utilisés des matériaux neutres (voir aussi Politzer & Baratgin, 
2016, pour une concordance des preuves), la cohérence pour la même inférence s’effondrait 
lorsque été utilisés les matériaux connus pour causer le biais de la conjonction (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). Cela en dépit de la tâche visiblement transparente de déduire la probabilité 
de p de la probabilité de p & q. Les observations soulignent la force, mais également la portée 
limitée, de l’erreur.  
 
Comparer la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire entre inférences  
Il a été souligné dans la thèse qu’il est difficile de faire des comparaisons quantitatives de 
cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire entre inférences quand les taux de hasard des 
inférences ne sont pas équivalents. Cela est dû au fait que le taux de hasard est soustrait au 
taux observé de cohérence pour obtenir la mesure de la cohérence supérieure au niveau 
aléatoire. Plus le taux de hasard est élevé, plus la probabilité de détecter la cohérence 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire quand elle est présente est faible, c’est-à-dire plus faible est la 
sensibilité du test pour la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire. Le taux de hasard 
correspond à la largeur de l’intervalle de cohérence, qui à son tour dépend de la forme de 
l’inférence, de la validité ou non de l’inférence, et des probabilités de la prémisse. Il est 
possible d’étudier s’il y a ou non cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire pour différentes 
formes d’inférences sans maintenir constant le taux de hasard (Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & 
Over, 2015; Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 2014), mais des comparaisons 
supplémentaires paraissent difficiles à interpréter.  
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Dans les Expériences 5 à 7, la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire s’est révélée plus 
comparable, à travers 12 inférences, en utilisant deux méthodes. Dans la première, il a été 
donné aux participants une série de probabilités de prémisse, chacune d’entre elle présentée 
avec un nombre de probabilités de conclusion. La tâche à réaliser était de donner une réponse 
binaire quant à la possibilité d’avoir une probabilité de conclusion binaire, au vu des 
probabilités de prémisse. Dans la deuxième méthode, il a été donné à nouveau aux participants 
une série de probabilités de prémisse, et ils étaient interrogés sur le fait que la probabilité de la 
conclusion puisse ou non être supérieure, ainsi que sur le fait qu’elle puisse ou non être 
inférieure, à la probabilité de prémisse (dans le case d’inférences à une prémisse) ou à 50% 
(dans le cas d’inférences à deux prémisses). Ces formats de réponse binaire ont établi le taux 
de hasard d’une réponse cohérente à 50% à travers toutes les inférences.  
En utilisant ces méthodes, il a été découvert que l’inférence pour laquelle la cohérence 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire était la plus élevée était la contradiction non de morgan, suivie 
de près par le MP. Excepté pour l’AC et la Na dont nous avons parlé, la cohérence pour le 
reste des inférences était moins élevée mais toujours supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans 
l’ensemble. Deux intrus ont été les inférences à partir de ou-à-si et à partir de si-à-ou. La 
cohérence était au niveau aléatoire pour ou-à-si dans l’Expérience 5, pour si-à-ou dans 
l’Expérience 6, et pour les deux dans l’Expérience 7 (qui utilisait des instructions de 
paradigme binaire). Si l’on laisse de côté les tâches d’énoncés des Expériences 3 et 4, et que 
l’on considère seulement les tâches d’inférences dans ces expériences, cela signifie que la 
cohérence pour ou-à-si et si-à-ou était supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans quatre expériences 
sur six. Ces inférences comprennent des négations au début de la prémisse ou de la conclusion, 
ayant pu les rendre plus difficiles à traiter. Les réponses aux deux inférences étaient 
supérieures au niveau aléatoire quand elles étaient mesurées à travers les positions de la 
négation dans l’Expérience 1, mais des études supplémentaires seraient nécessaire pour établir 
la raison pour laquelle la cohérence était quelque peu moins fiable pour ces inférences.  
Une étape supplémentaire serait aussi d’examiner plus en détail ce qui fait que les 
inférences de non de morgan et de MP se distinguent en termes de taux élevés de réponses 
cohérentes. Par exemple, il pourrait être testé si les contradictions en général sont détectées 
plus aisément que les autres relations logiques, ou s’il s’agit de quelque chose spécifique à la 
négation de non de morgan.  
De manière générale, l’observation que, à travers l’étude des inférences, la cohérence 
était supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans la grande majorité des cas, et que les échecs de 
cohérence étaient l’exception plus que la règle, apporte un appui supplémentaire solide à 
l’hypothèse que les gens sont sensibles, au même degré, aux contraintes de la cohérence plus 
qu’aux contraintes de la consistance.  
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L’effet d’une tâche d’inférence explicite et la mémoire de travail 
Les expériences 3 et 4 ont prolongé les résultats d’ Evans et al. (2015) sur le rôle d’une tâche 
d’inférence explicite pour la cohérence. De manière assez surprenante, la cohérence était déjà 
supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans la grande majorité des cas dans les tâches d’énoncés : 
quand il était donné aux gens les énoncés qui composaient les inférences dans un ordre 
aléatoire une par une sur l’écran. Une tâche d’inférence explicite, dans laquelle les énoncés 
étaient disposés dans des inférences, et les inférences présentées une par une sur l’écran, a eu 
tendance à augmenter la cohérence dans le petit nombre de cas pour lesquels elle n’était pas 
déjà supérieure au niveau aléatoire. Toutefois, une exception s’est présentée dans l’Expérience 
3 pour l’AC et la NA, où la cohérence était supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans les tâches 
d’énoncés mais au niveau aléatoire dans les tâches d’inférences. Cela peut être dû au fait que 
dans certains cas, les facteurs pragmatiques liés à l’assertabilité d’un énoncé comme 
conclusion tirée d’autres énoncés, ou à la relation entre énoncés qui sont difficiles à intégrer 
du fait de la présence de négations, peut donner lieu à des réductions de cohérence qui ne se 
manifesteraient pas quand les énoncés sont considérés isolément. Une autre possibilité est liée 
au fait que mettre les conditionnels dans une tâche d’inférence explicite AC ou NA a tendance 
à renforcer l’interprétation biconditionnelle, puisque sinon les inférences sont invalides. Mais 
l’observation réalisée pourrait aussi simplement refléter le fait que différents groupes étaient 
présents dans les tâches d’énoncés et d’inférences, et certains peuvent avoir interprété les 
matériaux pour l’AC et la NA comme impliquant une corrélation entre antécédant et 
conséquent, alors que d’autres non. D’autres réplications seraient nécessaires pour juger de la 
fiabilité de cette observation.  
Les Expériences 3 et 4 ont aussi inclus une tâche d’inférence avec une charge de mémoire 
travail. Les réponses en cette condition ont généralement peu différé de celles de la tâche 
d’inférence sans charge de mémoire travail. Mais là où elles différaient, la condition de charge 
était associée à des taux de cohérence plus faibles, suggérant que la différence entre la tâche 
d’énoncés et celle d’inférences peut être due en partie à la différence de demandes qu’elles 
présentent quant à la mémoire travail pour calibrer les croyances à travers les énoncés. 
Toutefois, le faible effet de la condition de charge est conforme à l’observation faite que la 
cohérence était dans la plupart des cas déjà supérieure au niveau aléatoire dans la tâche 
d’énoncés, de sorte que la tâche d’inférences avait peu à ajouter qui puisse être perturbé.  
La tendance générale suggère que les gens ont peut-être une tendance implicite, 
spontanée, à établir une cohérence entre croyances, mais que dans des situations dans 
lesquelles cela échoue, une tâche d’inférence explicite, dans laquelle tous les renseignements 
pertinents sont disponibles simultanément sur l’écran, et les gens peuvent concentrer leur 
attention directement sur les relations entre eux, peut se révéler utile. Dans tous les cas, 
l’inférence explicite est nécessaire lorsque s’établissent des relations entre des matériaux 
nouveaux pour lesquels aucune croyance n’est encore disponible.  
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Prémisses certaines vs. incertaines, instructions probabilistes vs. de paradigme binaire  
Les Expériences 6 et 7 ont permis de comparer la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire 
pour des inférences aux prémisses certaines vs. aux prémisses incertaines, et pour des 
inférences avec des instructions probabilistes vs. avec des instructions de paradigme binaire, 
en utilisant les mêmes inférences, matériaux, et formes de réponses. Il n’y a pas eu de preuve 
que la cohérence est plus faible quand les prémisses sont incertaines, ou que la cohérence est 
plus faible quand sont utilisées des instructions probabilistes plutôt que des instructions de 
paradigme binaire. Cela apporte une preuve nouvelle et solide quant au fait que la déduction à 
partir de prémisses incertaines est possible, et n’est pas limitée au raisonnement à partir de la 
certitude. Une vérité certaine et une fausseté certaine n’ont pas semblé être différentes 
qualitativement des degrés de croyance incertains, mais semblent plutôt être les extrémités sur 
une échelle commune.   
 
Facteurs sans effet systématique sur la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire 
Outre l’observation que la cohérence ne différait pas entre prémisses certaines et incertaines, 
ou entre instructions probabilistes et de paradigme binaire, les Expériences 3 et 4 n’ont trouvé 
aucune preuve d’une différence systématique entre les réponses des gens aux tâches de 
raisonnement étudiées sur l’internet et dans une configuration de labo, rendant plus aisée la 
généralisation entre elles, ainsi qu’entre les expériences conduites dans cette thèse et les 
résultats antérieurs d’ Evans et al. (2015). De plus, l’Expérience 5 n’a trouvé aucune preuve 
d’une différence dans la cohérence de réponse en fonction de s’il était demandé aux gens de 
juger si la conclusion tombait ou non dans l’intervalle de cohérence. A travers les expériences, 
il n’a également pas semblé avoir de différence systématique dans la cohérence des réponses 
entre les inférences à une ou à deux prémisses. Les différences de cohérence entre inférences 
ont plutôt paru être basées sur des facteurs plus spécifiques, comme le fait qu’elles contiennent 
ou non des négations ou qu’elles puissent être interprétées de différentes manières. Enfin, les 
expériences n’ont donné aucune preuve du fait que la cohérence diffère entre inférences 
valides et invalides, i.e. entre inférences déductives et inductives. Ce résultat est sensé puisque 
les contraintes de cohérence sont valables pour les deux types d’inférences, et les inférences 
déductives ont seulement des contraintes plus fortes pour les bords inferieurs de leurs limites 
d’intervalle. Les résultats négatifs mentionnés ci-dessus peuvent aider à interpréter et à 
préciser les observations positives de ces expériences.  
 
La précision des degrés de croyance des gens 
Les intervalles de cohérences sont généralement mesurés en utilisant des probabilités de point, 
mais il n’y avait aucune preuve que les degrés de croyance des gens ne soient pas si rigoureux. 
L’expérience 3 a mesuré la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire en utilisant les intervalles 
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à point exact, et l’a comparé avec la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire pour laquelle les 
limites d’intervalles avaient été élargies de 5% et 10%, accroissant donc le taux de hasard de la 
cohérence du même montant. Cela a rendu l’échelle de mesure plus grossière sans la rendre 
nécessairement plus accommodante. La cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire augmentait 
quand s’élargissait l’échelle de 5%, i.e. quand le nombre de points sur l’échelle se réduisait de 
101 à 10, principalement pour l’équivalence de de morgan et la contradiction de non de 
morgan, pour lesquels l’intervalle de cohérence de la conclusion est une valeur de point. Cela 
a eu peu d’effet sur les autres inférences dont les intervalles de cohérence étaient déjà plus 
grands dès le début. Augmenter la grossièreté de 10% n’a pas eu d’effet supplémentaire. Dans 
l’Expérience 5, la question de la précision des degrés de croyance des gens a été évaluée de 
manière différente, en comparant la cohérence de réponse pour les probabilités de conclusion 
qui étaient clairement à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur de l’intervalle, avec les probabilités de 
conclusion qui étaient à la limite de l’intervalle. La cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire 
était plus grande pour les probabilités de conclusion clairement d’un côté de l’intervalle, et cet 
effet n’était pas limité à de morgan et non de morgan mais présent généralement à travers les 
inférences.  
Il paraît sensé que les degrés de croyance soient généralement plus grossiers que les 
probabilités de point, étant donné la nature incertaine d’une grande part de l’information que 
l’on reçoit dans les situations quotidiennes, et les limites de notre mémoire travail quant aux 
événements passés (c.f. Sanborn & Chater, 2016). La thèse ci-présente a proposé deux 
méthodes pour quantifier cette précision, ou imprécision, dans les croyances des gens. Cette 
précision va surement varier dans différentes situations et domaines d’expertise. Mais la 
capacité à la mesurer pour un contexte donné, utilisant les outils de la théorie de la probabilité, 
peut être utile pour interpréter les observations expérimentales, et paraît bloquer d’un des 
arguments amené par les partisans des systèmes de niveau de calcul qui sont eux-mêmes plus 
grossiers que la théorie de la probabilité, comme la théorie du classement, ou l’usage 
d’expressions verbales, de probabilité qualitative (Khemlani, Lotstein, & Johnson-Laird, 2014; 
Politzer & Baratgin, 2016; Spohn, 2013). De telles échelles de mesure alternatives ont un 
degré de grossièreté intégré, fixe, décidé a priori, son usage rendant impossible la mesure 
empirique de la grossièreté réelle des degrés de croyance.  
 
La variance des distributions de croyances  
En plus d’évaluer la sensibilité des gens à la position des intervalles de cohérence, les 
Expériences 3, 4, 8 et 9 ont examiné les intuitions des gens quant à la largeur des intervalles. 
Les Expériences 3 et 4 ont inclus une évaluation quant à la présence ou non d’une variance des 
réponses plus grande quand l’intervalle de cohérence était grand que quand il était réduit, en 
utilisant l’information de probabilité de prémisse pour estimer la largeur d’intervalle. 
L’hypothèse était que la variance de réponse serait plus grande quand l’intervalle serait plus 
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grand, mais aucune relation n’a été trouvée entre les deux. L’Expérience 8 évaluait si la 
confiance des gens en l’exactitude de leurs jugements de probabilité de conclusion (Thompson 
& Johnson, 2014) variait en fonction de la largeur d’intervalle. Si la confiance était plus faible 
pour les intervalles plus grands, cela pourrait suggérer que les gens cherchent une seule 
réponse optimale parmi une distribution, e.g. correspondant au moyen de distribution, qui est 
plus difficile à trouver quand il y a beaucoup d’options. Si la confiance était plus grande pour 
les intervalles plus grands, cela pourrait suggérer que les gens se concentrent sur la tâche de 
rendre leurs réponses cohérentes, ce qui est plus aisé quand le nombre d’options de réponses 
cohérentes est plus élevé. Mais encore une fois aucune relation n’a été trouvée entre les deux. 
L’Expérience 9 a aidé à interpréter les résultats de l’Expérience 8, en suggérant que 
l’absence de relation entre la confiance de réponse et la largeur d’intervalle n’était pas due à 
un manque de sensibilité pour les paramètres déterminant la variance de distribution. A la 
place, il semble que les gens, dans un premier temps, suivent la contrainte déductive de la 
cohérence, essayant de donner des réponses qui se trouvent dans l’intervalle ; mais que si 
l’intervalle est assez large, alors des considérations inductives peuvent ou non réduire 
davantage le choix de réponse. Cette interprétation avait aussi été suggérée par une inspection 
de la distribution de réponses pour chaque inférence. Quand l’intervalle était réduit, la 
distribution de réponses était elle-aussi réduite et paraissait suivre de près l’emplacement de 
l’intervalle. Quand l’intervalle était large, la distribution de réponses était uniforme dans 
certains cas, suggérant que les gens essayaient surtout d’être cohérents, ne réduisant pas 
davantage leurs réponses de façon particulière. Mais dans d’autres cas la distribution de 
réponses était fortement biaisée vers la limite d’un intervalle, ou même multimodale, 
suggérant que des critères inductifs supplémentaires jouaient un rôle important dans la 
réduction des réponses supplémentaires de différentes manières. Les distributions de réponses 
calculées dans l’Expérience 10 ont généré des impressions similaires. De manière générale, 
ces observations ont éclairé les rôles complémentaires de la déduction et l’induction dans le 
raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines.  
 
La validité-p importe au-delà de la cohérence   
Il peut être difficile d’évaluer le rôle de la validité-p au-delà du rôle de la cohérence dans le 
raisonnement, parce que les contraintes normatives pertinentes se basent sur la cohérence dans 
les deux cas. Dans cette thèse il a été proposé de décrire la validité-p, i.e. le maintien de 
probabilité, comme une caractéristique des intervalles de cohérence. La validité-p peut être 
utilisée pour catégoriser les inférences en deux groupes (déductives et inductives) selon si 
leurs intervalles de cohérence maintiennent ou non la probabilité des prémisses à la 
conclusion. A travers cette caractérisation, la question n’est pas de savoir si les gens respectent 
ou non les contraintes normatives de la validité-p dans leurs jugements de probabilité de 
conclusion, parce que ces contraintes normatives sont établies par la cohérence. La question 
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est plutôt d’établir dans quelle mesure la distinction marquée par la validité-p entre les deux 
groupes d’inférences importe aux gens.  
A travers les expériences, il n’y a pas eu de preuve que les gens distinguent les inférences 
valides-p (déductives) des inférences invalides-p (inductives) en termes de l’effort qu’ils 
investissent pour les élaborer, car la cohérence supérieure au niveau aléatoire ne différait pas 
systématiquement entre inférences valides-p et invalides-p. Cependant l’Expérience 10 a 
montré que les gens distinguaient entre inférences déductives et inductives dans leurs 
jugements de qualité d’inférence. Les inférences déductives qui maintenaient la probabilité 
étaient jugées plus correctes que les inférences inductives qui ne le faisaient pas. De plus, la 
validité-p était considérée comme spéciale parmi les différents niveaux de maintien de 
probabilité étudiés, avec des formes de maintien de probabilité qui étaient plus strictes que la 
validité-p n’ayant qu’un impact négligeable sur les jugements de qualité. Cela corroborait 
empiriquement le traitement spécial donné depuis longtemps à la distinction entre déduction et 
induction dans la littérature philosophique.  
L’Expérience 10 a aussi amené une distinction, pour les inférences inductives, entre les 
cas suivants. Les inférences dont l’intervalle de cohérence est l’intervalle d’unité non-
informatif (comme les paradoxes du conditionnel matériel); les inférences avec un intervalle 
de cohérence qui ne maintient pas fortement la probabilité mais est contraint de manière 
différente par les prémisses (comme l’AC); et les inférences avec une conclusion qui est la 
négation de la conclusion d’une inférence valide, de sorte que la conclusion est impossible 
quand les prémisses sont certaines, et la conclusion est très improbable quand les prémisses 
sont très probables. Il serait intéressant d’approfondir dans quelle mesure ces distinctions plus 
rigoureuses jouent un rôle dans les évaluations de qualité d’inférence des gens.  
Il vaudrait aussi la peine de développer d’autres manières d’évaluer dans quelle mesure, 
et dans quels contextes, les gens traitent différemment les inférences déductives et inductives 
(c.f. Trippas, Handley, Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016). De manière générale on peut s’attendre à ce 
que la différence importe dans certains contextes, mais pas dans d’autres. Le maintien de 
probabilité ajoute de la fiabilité à la probabilité de conclusion d’une inférence à travers les cas 
individuels. Cette fiabilité peut être importante dans les situations où, comme dans les 
matériaux expérimentaux, l’enjeu est grand et un examen approfondi est nécessaire pour ne 
pas tirer trop vite des conclusions. Mais dans d’autres contextes il serait peut-être plus utile de 
répondre rapidement, sans hésiter de tirer des conclusions, e.g. parce que seule une réponse 
approximative est nécessaire ou possible au vu de l’information disponible, et le raisonneur 
doit avancer pour aborder la tâche suivante. Si l’on s’appuyait uniquement sur la déduction 
pour raisonner quotidiennement, même si cela est probabiliste, l’on pourrait régulièrement être 
bloqué en l’absence de critères suffisants pour tirer des conclusions. De plus, comme traité en 
relation avec les Expériences 8 et 9, la déduction et l’induction paraissent souvent travailler de 
concert. Ainsi, au lieu d’interroger dans quels contextes la déduction est pertinente, il serait 
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peut-être plus utile d’interroger comment les différentes contributions de la déduction et de 
l’induction peuvent être mesurées dans des contextes de raisonnement où elles jouent toutes 
deux un rôle.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Les notions de déduction binaires de la logique classique logique, consistance et validité, 
peuvent être généralisées pour englober les degrés de croyance. La consistance peut être 
généralisée comme cohérence, et la validité comme validité-p. Mais le fait que cette 
généralisation soit possible dans la logique formelle n’implique pas que les gens utilisent la 
déduction de manière probabiliste. La recherche présentée dans cette thèse étudiait le rôle de la 
déduction dans le raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines à travers dix expériences. Elle 
a trouvé des preuves que la cohérence et la validité-p ne sont pas juste des formalismes 
abstraits, mais que les gens suivent les contraintes normatives qu’ils fixent dans leur 
raisonnement. Cela fournit des preuves quant à l’adéquation descriptive de la cohérence et de 
la validité-p comme principes de niveau de calcul définissant les tâches à accomplir au sein 
d’un raisonnement. Cela a des implications quant à l’interprétation d’observations antérieures 
dans la littérature sur les rôles de la déduction et des degrés de croyance, et offre une 
perspective pour générer de nouvelles hypothèses de recherche sur l’interface entre 
raisonnement déductif et inductif.  
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SUMMARY 
 
 
Theoretical background 
 
The probabilistic approach to reasoning 
The probabilistic approach in the psychology of reasoning (Evans, 2006; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2013; Over, 2016; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009, 2010; Politzer & 
Baratgin, 2016) is based on the fundamental hypothesis that most reasoning, in both everyday 
life and in science, takes place in contexts of uncertainty. The uncertainty, or degrees of belief, 
in the statements from which we reason cannot be modelled in classical logic, which is binary 
in that it represents only what is definitely true or false. But this uncertainty can be modelled 
in probability theory. There is ample empirical evidence that people tend to reason from 
uncertain premises even when instructed to assume the premises to be certain (Byrne, 1989; 
George, 1997; Liu, Lo, & Wu, 1996; Stevenson & Over, 1995; Thompson, 1994). 
In classical logic, a conditional, if p then q, is interpreted as the material conditional, 
which is equivalent to not-p or q. But in the probabilistic approach this view is rejected, and it 
is instead proposed that conditionals are interpreted probabilistically. The probability of a 
conditional, P(if p then q), is proposed to correspond, not to P(not-p or q), but instead to the 
conditional probability of q given p, P(q|p). This relationship, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), is called 
the Equation (Edgington, 1995). To have a degree of belief in a conditional is considered 
different from having a degree of belief about a matter of fact in the world. The proposal is 
that people arrive at P(q|p), not by first having some specific degrees of belief in P(p & q) and 
in P(p), and then taking their ratio, P(q|p) = P(p& q)/P(p), but instead through a Ramsey test 
(Ramsey, 1929/1990; Stalnaker, 1968). This is a mental simulation in which people 
hypothetically suppose the antecedent p of the conditional, make any necessary changes to 
their beliefs to preserve consistency, and assess the probability of q under this supposition.  
The material conditional interpretation of conditionals leads to counterintuitive 
consequences that are avoided by the Equation. For example, consider the conditional "If we 
toss this fair coin, it will land heads." Intuitively, the probability of this conditional is .5, 
which corresponds to the conditional probability of the fair coin landing heads, given that it is 
tossed. But suppose the coin is in a glass box in a museum, and we are almost certain that we 
are not going to toss it. The material conditional is true whenever the antecedent of the 
conditional is false. As a result, the more confident we become that we will not toss the coin, 
the more probable it will be that if we do toss it, it will land heads, according to the material 
conditional interpretation. But this seems absurd.  
A conditional based on the Equation has been called the probability conditional (Adams, 
1998), suppositional conditional (Edgington, 2014), and conditional event (de Finetti, 
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1937/1980). It is referred to as the probability conditional in this thesis. The hypothesis that 
people's modal interpretation of conditionals corresponds to the probability conditional has 
received wide empirical support (Barrouillet & Gauffroy, 2015; Evans, Handley, & Over, 
2003; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003; Politzer, 
Over, & Baratgin, 2010).  
 
The role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises 
With the advent of the probabilistic paradigm, the question of what role, if any, deduction 
plays in reasoning, arose anew (Evans, 2012; Evans & Over, 2013). The present thesis argues 
that the answer to this question depends in part on how deduction is defined. The definition of 
deduction from classical logic is binary, and produces what de Finetti called "the logic of 
certainty" (de Finetti, 1972; Elqayam & Over, 2013). When the premises are assumed to be 
certain, the conclusion of a classically valid inference must be certain as well. But suppose 
people have uncertain degrees of belief in the premises of an inference. What degree of belief 
would be reasonable for them to have in the conclusion? Classical logic cannot answer this 
question, for it cannot be applied to reasoning under uncertainty. If we retain its binary 
definition of deduction, the central hypothesis of the probabilistic approach, that most 
reasoning takes place from uncertain premises, implies that deduction has only a small role to 
play in most reasoning situations (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). 
Using the classical definition of deduction, a number of empirical studies have found an 
effect of deduction in reasoning tasks, in addition to what has been called an effect of "belief" 
(Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010; Klauer, Beller, & Hütter, 2010; Markovits, Brisson, 
& Chantal, 2015; Rips, 2001; Singmann & Klauer, 2011; Thompson, 1994; Trippas, 
Thompson, & Handley, 2017). In particular, people more often accept the conclusion of valid 
than of invalid inferences, in addition to accepting believable conclusions more often than 
unbelievable ones. The latter effect has been called belief bias, as it constitutes a departure 
from the normative response under binary logical instructions.  
The findings of effects of both "logic" and "belief" in reasoning have contributed to the 
development of dual-component theories (Evans, 2006; Klauer et al., 2010; Markovits et al., 
2015; Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005). When these theories assume a binary 
logical process that is contrasted with a "belief based" process, the "logical" process questions 
the basic hypothesis in the probabilistic approach that most real world reasoning is from 
uncertain premises. 
The present thesis argues for an alternative way of accounting for the findings on an 
effect of deduction that does not question the basis of the probabilistic approach. Rather than 
integrating a binary logical component on the one side, and a probabilistic, belief based 
component on the other, into a dual-component framework, it explores the integration of logic 
and probability itself.  
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The central deductive concepts of classical logic, consistency and validity, can be 
generalised to cover degrees of belief. Binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, 
and binary validity to probabilistic validity, or p-validity for short (Adams, 1998; Coletti & 
Scozzafava, 2002; Gilio, 2002). Two statements are consistent if and only if they can both be 
true at the same time. Similarly, probability judgments are coherent if and only if they respect 
the axioms of probability theory. For example, if we believe it is 80% likely to rain today, then 
for our beliefs to be coherent, we would also have to be willing to believe it 20% likely not to 
rain today, otherwise the probabilities would not sum to 1. An inference is valid if and only if 
it would be inconsistent for its premises to be true but its conclusion false. This means that a 
valid inference preserves truth from premises to conclusion. To see how this definition can be 
generalised to degrees of belief, consider the simple case of a one-premise inference. A one-
premise inference is p-valid if and only if it would be incoherent for the probability of its 
conclusion to be lower than the probability of its premise. Hence a p-valid inference is 
probability preserving just like a binary valid inference is truth preserving. The above 
generalisations make it possible to study deduction from uncertain premises (Stevenson & 
Over, 1995), so that there is no need to qualify the basis of the probabilistic approach.  
With this generalised notion of deduction, many findings on belief bias can be 
reinterpreted as effects of coherence. Participants in an experiment may be violating the 
classical deductive instructions to assume the premises to be certain, and nonetheless be 
reasoning deductively, by estimating a coherent degree of belief in the conclusion of an 
inference on the basis of its logical form and of their uncertain degrees of belief in the 
premises. Not to follow binary instructions can be said to be a fault, but it is not necessarily a 
logical one.  
 
Research question 
The fact that the definition of deduction can be generalised to cover degrees of belief does not 
imply that people actually use deduction in a probabilistic way. It could still be that when 
people engage in deduction, they do so in the classical binary way, and that reasoning from 
uncertain premises is inductive in practice even when it does not have to be so in theory. 
Whether people are sensitive to the constraints of coherence and of p-validity is an empirical 
question that has only recently started to be investigated, but which was the main focus of this 
thesis. 
The thesis investigated the role of coherence and p-validity in uncertain reasoning 
through ten experiments. Previous studies of the coherence of people's conclusion probability 
judgments had focussed on conditional syllogisms (Evans, Thompson, & Over, 2015; 
Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). Responses to these two-premise inferences were found to 
be coherent above chance levels mainly for the inference of modus ponens (MP), and less 
reliably for denial of the antecedent (DA) inference. However, the chance rates in these 
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studies were often very high (e.g. Singmann et al., 2014, Figure 3) and varied between 
inferences, making it more difficult to detect above-chance coherence when it is there, and to 
compare this coherence between inferences.  
 
 
The findings obtained across experiments 
 
The present experiments extended these findings, using different methodologies, across 23 
inference forms. These inferences differed in their structural complexity. They included valid 
(deductive) and invalid (inductive) inferences, and they featured negations, conjunctions, 
disjunctions, and conditionals. Most of the inferences containing conditionals assumed them to 
be interpreted as probability conditionals, based on the Equation P(if p then q) = P(q|p) 
(Adams, 1998; Edgington, 1995; Jeffrey, 1991), but some experiments included comparisons 
of different interpretations of conditionals. 
 
Coherent responses to MT 
For conditional syllogisms, the results corroborated the earlier finding of above-chance 
coherence for MP, but found coherence to be reliably above chance levels for the inference of 
modus tollens (MT) as well. Of the six experiments in which both inferences were 
investigated, overall coherence was above chance in all cases for MP. For MT, coherence was 
above chance levels in all but two instances. The first was in Experiment 3, where it was at 
chance levels in the statements task but above chance levels in the inferences task. In 
Experiment 4, which replicated lab Experiment 3 on the internet, coherence was above chance 
levels across conditions. The second instance was in Experiment 7. Coherence for MT was at 
chance levels when participants were given binary paradigm instructions to assume the 
premises to be true, and then judge whether the conclusion also has to be true. This was in 
spite of the fact that coherence for MT was above chance levels for the same materials when 
given probabilistic instructions (Experiment 6).  
These findings constitute strong evidence for a basic sensitivity to coherence constraints 
for MT. They also provide direct evidence for the descriptive adequacy of the proposal that the 
constraints of deduction are not limited to the special case in which premises are assumed to 
be certain.  
The methodology of Experiments 5 to 7 made it possible, not only to assess whether or 
not conclusion probability judgments are coherent above chance levels, but also to make 
quantitative comparisons of above-chance coherence between inferences. This was 
accomplished by a design that equated the chance rate of coherence across inferences and 
conditions. The experiments revealed that although responses to MT were generally coherent 
above chance levels, coherence was lower for MT than for MP, in line with the literature using 
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binary paradigm instructions. In the probabilistic approach, the difference in the acceptance of 
the two inferences can be explained as a result of dynamic reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 
2013). Specifically, MT can sometimes be viewed as an instance of a reductio ad absurdum 
inference. The categorical premise not-q negates an element of the conditional premise if p 
then q, with the result that a high degree of belief in both premises is incompatible with a high 
degree of belief in the element p of the conclusion. But the conflict between if p then q, not-q, 
and p can be resolved in different ways. Depending on background beliefs, one person could 
see if p then q and not-q as a reason to disbelieve p, in line with MT, while another person 
could see not-q and p as a reason to disbelieve if p then q, engaging in dynamic reasoning. 
Logic does not itself tell us which statement should give way, so that without instructions to 
assume that both premises are certain, the choice can be made on inductive grounds. This 
perspective makes it possible to account for the asymmetry between MP and MT in a rational 
way.  
 
Changing responses to AC and DA 
The coherence findings for the conditional syllogisms affirmation of the consequent (AC) and 
denial of the antecedent (DA) were more equivocal. In Experiment 3, coherence for both 
inferences was above chance levels in the statements task, but not in the inferences task. In 
Experiment 4 coherence was above chance levels for both inferences and both task conditions. 
However, coherence for both inferences was below chance in Experiment 5, and at chance in 
Experiments 6 and 7. In Experiment 8, coherence was above chance for DA (this experiment 
did not include AC). Leaving aside the statements tasks of Experiments 3 and 4, this means 
that coherence for AC was above chance in one out of five experiments, and coherence for DA 
was above chance in two out of six experiments. A lack of above-chance coherence for these 
two inferences is difficult to interpret, but it could be explained by a biconditional 
interpretation of the conditional premise. More specifically, the materials used may have 
suggested to participants that the antecedent and consequent of the conditional were positively 
correlated. In line with this, an analysis of the data in Experiment 3 showed that coherence 
was above chance levels under the assumption of a biconditional interpretation for the same 
responses that coherence was at chance levels under the assumption of a conditional 
interpretation. To be able to interpret the coherence results for these inferences, the two 
interpretations would therefore have to be disentangled, by controlling explicitly for the 
correlation between antecedent and consequent. Although such an experiment was beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the fact that it is needed to interpret the findings on AC and DA is 
nonetheless a more precise, and less pessimistic, standpoint than the suggestion from previous 
studies that responses are generally incoherent for these inferences (e.g. Singmann et al., 
2014).  
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Further studies of AC and DA, but also of MP, MT, and further two-premise inferences, 
could assess to what extent incoherent responses are responses that overestimate or 
underestimate the probability of the conclusion, given the probabilities assigned to the 
premises, and to what extent this depends on the risks and benefits suggested by the materials 
(Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). The hypothesis that there can be overconfidence in the 
conclusion of a valid inference could not even be formulated in the binary paradigm. But this 
hypothesis can extend the study of suppression effects, making it necessary to distinguish 
between the suppression of the conclusion of an inference, and the suppression of the 
inference itself (Over & Cruz, 2018).  
 
Conditionals, or-introduction, and the conjunction fallacy 
Experiments 1 and 2 not only extended the coherence results to further inferences, but also 
provided information about the meanings of the component statements, and of factors involved 
in reasoning with them. An analysis of the or-to-if inference showed that people's responses 
were coherent above chance levels under the assumption that they interpret the conditional in 
the conclusion as the probability conditional, whereas they were incoherent below chance 
levels under the assumption that they interpret the conditional as the material conditional, 
which is equivalent to not-p or q. This constitutes a novel form of evidence for the 
interpretation of conditionals in terms of the Equation.  
Coherence was reliably above chance levels across four variants of the inference of or-
introduction, suggesting that although it may be pragmatically infelicitous, under binary 
paradigm instructions, to state p or q when one could be more informative and precise by 
stating p, people readily treat the inference as valid when asked directly about their degrees of 
belief in premise and conclusion. This is in accordance with the view that the lower 
endorsement rates found for the inference under binary paradigm instructions are due to 
pragmatic effects (Cruz, Over, & Oaksford, 2017; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012), contrary to 
the recent proposal in a revision of mental model theory that the inference is in fact invalid 
(Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015).  
Further, Experiment 2 showed that although responses were reliably coherent for and-
elimination when using neutral materials (see also Politzer & Baratgin, 2016, for converging 
evidence), coherence for the same inference broke down when using the materials known to 
cause the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This was in spite of the 
apparently transparent task of explicitly inferring the probability of p from the probability of p 
& q. The finding underlines the strength, and at the same time the limited scope, of the fallacy.  
 
Comparing above-chance coherence between inferences 
It was pointed out in the thesis that it is difficult to make quantitative comparisons of above-
chance coherence between inferences when the chance rates of the inferences are not equal. 
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The reason is that the chance rate is subtracted from the observed coherence rate to obtain the 
measure of above-chance coherence. The larger the chance rate, the lower the probability of 
detecting above-chance coherence when it is there; that is, the lower the sensitivity of the test 
for above-chance coherence. The chance rate corresponds to the width of the coherence 
interval, which in turn depends on the form of the inference, on whether the inference is valid 
or invalid, and on the premise probabilities. It is possible to study whether there is above-
chance coherence for various inference forms without holding the chance rate constant (Cruz, 
Baratgin, Oaksford, & Over, 2015; Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 2014), but further 
comparisons seem difficult to interpret.  
In Experiments 5 to 7, above-chance coherence was made more comparable, across 12 
inferences, using two methods. In the first, participants were given a set of premise 
probabilities, each of which was presented with a number of conclusion probabilities. The task 
was to give a binary response as to whether a given conclusion probability was possible or not, 
given the premise probabilities. In the second method, participants were again given a set of 
premise probabilities, and were asked whether the probability of the conclusion could be 
higher, and whether it could be lower, than the probability of the premise (in the case of one-
premise inferences) or than 50% (in the case of two-premise inferences). These binary 
response formats rendered the chance rate of a coherent response 50% across all inferences.  
Using these methods, it was found that the inference for which above-chance coherence 
was highest was the contradiction not de morgan, followed closely by MP. Except for AC and 
DA discussed above, coherence for the remaining inferences was lower but still generally 
above chance. Two oddballs were the inferences from or-to-if and from if-to-or. Coherence 
was at chance levels for or-to-if in Experiment 5, for if-to-or in Experiment 6, and for both in 
Experiment 7 (which used binary paradigm instructions). Leaving aside the statements task of 
Experiments 3 and 4, and considering only the inferences task in those experiments, this 
means that coherence for or-to-if and if-to-or was above chance in four out of six experiments.  
These inferences contain negations at the start of the premise or of the conclusion, and this 
could have made them more difficult to process. Responses to both inferences were above 
chance when measured across positions of the negation in Experiment 1, but further studies 
would be necessary to establish why coherence was somewhat less reliable for these 
inferences.  
A further step would also be to investigate in more detail what makes the inferences of 
not de morgan and MP stand out in terms of the high rates of coherent responses to them. For 
example, one could test whether contradictions in general are detected more easily than other 
logical relations, or whether it is something specific to the negation of de morgan that is at 
play.  
Generally, the finding that, across the inferences investigated, coherence was above 
chance levels in the great majority of cases, and failures of coherence were the exception 
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rather than the rule, provides strong additional support for the hypothesis that people are 
sensitive, at some level, to the constraints of coherence over and above the binary constraints 
of consistency.  
 
The effect of an explicit inference task and working memory 
Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results of Evans et al. (2015) on the role of an explicit 
inference task for coherence. Somewhat surprisingly, coherence was already above chance 
levels in the large majority of cases in the statements task: when people were given the 
statements that made up the inferences in random order one at a time on the screen. An 
explicit inference task, in which the statements were arranged into inferences, and each 
inference presented one at a time on the screen, tended to increase coherence in the few cases 
in which it was not already above chance. However, there was an exception in Experiment 3 
for AC and DA, where coherence was above chance in the statements task but at chance levels 
in the inferences task. It may be that in some cases, pragmatic factors related to the 
assertability of a statement as a conclusion drawn from other statements, or to the relation 
between statements that are difficult to integrate due to the presence of negations, can lead to 
reductions in coherence that would not arise when the statements are considered in isolation. 
Another possibility is that putting the conditionals in an explicit AC or DA inference task 
tends to increase the biconditional interpretation, since otherwise the inferences are invalid. 
But the finding could also simply reflect the fact that different groups were in the statements 
and inferences task, and some may have interpreted the materials for AC and DA as implying 
a correlation between antecedent and consequent, and others not. Further replications would 
be needed to establish the reliability of this finding. 
Experiments 3 and 4 also included an inferences task with working memory load. 
Responses in this condition generally differed little from those in the inferences task without 
working memory load. But where they differed, the load condition was associated with lower 
coherence rates, suggesting that the difference between the statements and the inferences task 
may be due in part to the differing demands they pose on working memory for calibrating 
beliefs across statements. However, the weak effect of the load condition is in line with the 
finding that coherence was in most cases already above chance in the statements task, so that 
the inferences task had only little to add that could be disrupted.  
The overall pattern suggests that people may have an implicit, spontaneous tendency to 
establish coherence between beliefs, but that in situations in which this fails, an explicit 
inference task, in which all relevant pieces of information are available simultaneously on the 
screen, and people can focus their attention directly on the relations between them, tends to be 
helpful. In any case, explicit inference is necessary when establishing relations between novel 
materials for which no beliefs are yet available.  
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Certain vs. uncertain premises, probabilistic vs. binary paradigm instructions 
Experiments 6 and 7 made it possible to compare above-chance coherence for inferences with 
certain vs. uncertain premises, and for inferences with probabilistic vs. binary paradigm 
instructions, using the same inferences, materials, and response format. There was no evidence 
that coherence is lower when the premises are uncertain, nor that coherence is lower when 
probabilistic rather than binary paradigm instructions are used. This provides a novel, strong 
form of evidence that deduction from uncertain premises is possible, and is not restricted to 
reasoning from certainty. Certain truth and certain falsity did not appear qualitatively different 
from uncertain degrees of belief, but rather as endpoints on a common scale. 
 
Factors with no systematic effect on above-chance coherence 
In addition to the finding that coherence did not differ between certain and uncertain premises, 
nor between probabilistic and binary paradigm instructions, Experiments 3 and 4 found no 
evidence of a systematic difference in people's responses to the reasoning tasks studied in an 
internet and in a lab setting, making it easier to generalise results between them, as well as 
between the experiments conducted in this thesis and the earlier lab results from Evans et al. 
(2015). In addition, Experiment 5 found no evidence for a difference in response coherence as 
a function of whether people were asked to judge whether a conclusion fell inside or outside 
the coherence interval. Across experiments, there also seemed to be no systematic difference 
in response coherence between one- and two-premise inferences. The differences in coherence 
between inferences rather appeared to be based on more specific factors, such as whether they 
contained negations or could be interpreted in alternative ways. Finally, across experiments 
there was no evidence that coherence differed between valid and invalid, i.e. between 
deductive and inductive, inferences. This result makes sense given that the constraints of 
coherence hold for both inference types, and deductive inferences merely have stronger 
constraints on the lower limits of their interval boundaries. The above negative results can help 
interpret and add precision to the positive findings observed in these experiments.  
 
The precision of people's degrees of belief  
Coherence intervals are usually measured using point probabilities, but there was evidence that 
people's degrees of belief are not that fine grained. Experiment 3 measured above-chance 
coherence using the exact point intervals, and compared this with above-chance coherence in 
which the interval boundaries were widened by 5% and by 10%, thereby widening the chance 
rate of coherence by a corresponding amount. This made the measurement scale coarser 
without making it necessarily more lenient. Above-chance coherence increased when 
widening the scale by 5%, i. e. when the number of points on the scale was reduced from 101 
to 10, mainly for the equivalence of de morgan and the contradiction of not de morgan, for 
which the conclusion coherence interval is a point value. It had only little effect on the other 
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inferences whose coherence intervals were already wider from the beginning.  Increasing the 
coarseness by 10% had no incremental effect. In Experiment 5, the question of the precision of 
people's degrees of belief was assessed in a different way, comparing response coherence for 
conclusion probabilities that were clearly inside or outside the interval, with conclusion 
probabilities that were at the interval edge. Above-chance coherence was higher for conclusion 
probabilities clearly on one side of the interval, and this effect was not restricted to de morgan 
and not de morgan but held more generally across inferences.  
It seems to make sense for degrees of belief to be generally coarser than point 
probabilities, given the uncertain nature of much of the information we receive in everyday 
situations, and the limits of our working memory for past instances of an event (c.f. Sanborn & 
Chater, 2016). The present thesis proposed two methods of quantifying this precision, or 
fuzziness, in people's beliefs. This precision will likely vary across content domains and 
domain expertise. But the ability to measure it for a given context, using the tools of 
probability theory, can be useful for interpreting experimental findings, and seems to disable 
one of the arguments brought forward by advocates of computational level systems that are 
themselves coarser than probability theory, like ranking theory, or the use of verbal, 
qualitative probability expressions (Khemlani, Lotstein, & Johnson-Laird, 2015; Politzer & 
Baratgin, 2016; Spohn, 2013). Such alternative measurement scales have a built-in, fixed 
degree of coarseness that is decided a priori, the use of which makes it impossible to measure 
the actual coarseness of degrees of belief empirically. 
 
The variance of belief distributions 
In addition to assessing people's sensitivity to the location of coherence intervals, Experiments 
3, 4, 8, and 9 examined people's intuitions about interval width. Experiments 3 and 4 included 
an assessment of whether the variance of responses was larger when the coherence interval 
was wide than when it was narrow, using premise probability information to estimate interval 
width. The hypothesis was that response variance would be higher when the interval was 
wider, but no relation was found between the two. Experiment 8 assessed whether people's 
confidence in the correctness of their conclusion probability judgments (Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014) varied as a function of interval width. If confidence was lower for wider 
intervals, this might suggest that people are looking for a single optimal response within a 
distribution, e.g. corresponding to the distribution mean, which is more difficult to find when 
there are many options. If confidence was higher for wider intervals, this might suggest that 
people are focussing on the task of rendering their responses coherent, which is easier when 
the number of coherent response options is larger. But again no relation was found between 
the two.  
Experiment 9 helped interpret the results of Experiment 8, by suggesting that the absence 
of a relation between response confidence and interval width was not due to a lack of 
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sensitivity for parameters determining distribution variance. Instead, it seems as if people, in 
the first instance, follow the deductive constraint of coherence, trying to give responses that 
fall within the interval; but that if the interval is wide enough, then inductive considerations 
may or may not narrow down the choice of response further. This interpretation was also 
suggested by an inspection of the distribution of responses for each inference. When the 
interval was narrow, the distribution of responses was also narrow and seemed to follow the 
location of the interval closely. When the interval was wide, the distribution of responses was 
flat in some cases, suggesting that people were mainly trying to be coherent, without 
narrowing down their responses further in any specific way. But in other cases the distribution 
of responses was strongly skewed towards one interval edge, or even multimodal, suggesting 
that additional inductive criteria were playing a strong role in narrowing down people's 
responses further in various ways. The response distributions computed in Experiment 10 led 
to similar impressions. Generally, these findings shed further light on the complementary roles 
of deduction and induction in reasoning from uncertain premises. 
 
P-validity matters over and above coherence 
It can be difficult to assess the role of p-validity over and above the role of coherence in 
reasoning, because the relevant normative constraints are based on coherence in both cases. In 
this thesis it was proposed to describe p-validity, i.e. probability preservation, as a feature of 
coherence intervals. P-validity can be used to categorise inferences into two groups (deductive 
and inductive) according on whether or not their coherence intervals preserve probability from 
premises to conclusion. With this characterisation, the question is not whether people respect 
the normative constraints of p-validity in their conclusion probability judgments, because 
these normative constraints are set by coherence. The question is rather to what extent the 
distinction marked by p-validity between the two groups of inferences matters to people.  
Across experiments, there was no evidence that people distinguish between p-valid 
(deductive) and p-invalid (inductive) inferences in terms of the effort they invest in drawing 
them, because above-chance coherence did not differ systematically between p-valid and p-
invalid inferences. But Experiment 10 showed that people did distinguish between deductive 
and inductive inferences in their judgments of inference quality. Deductive inferences that 
preserved probability were judged more correct than inductive inferences that did not. Further, 
p-validity was treated as special among the different levels of probability preservation studied, 
with forms of probability preservation that were stricter than p-validity having only a 
negligible further impact on quality judgments. This corroborated empirically the special 
treatment long given to the distinction between deduction and induction in the philosophical 
literature.   
Experiment 10 also drew a distinction, for the inductive inferences, between the 
following cases. Inferences whose coherence interval is the uninformative unit interval (like 
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the paradoxes of the material conditional); inferences with a coherence interval that is not high 
probability preserving but is constrained in a different way by the premises (such as AC); and 
inferences with a conclusion that is the negation of the conclusion of a valid inference, so that 
the conclusion is impossible when the premises are certain, and the conclusion is very 
improbable when the premises are very probable. It would be interesting to investigate further 
to what extent these more fine-grained distinctions play a role in people's evaluations of 
inference quality.  
It would also be worth developing further ways of assessing to what extent, and in which 
contexts, people treat deductive and inductive inferences differently (c.f. Trippas, Handley, 
Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016). In general one can expect the difference to matter in some 
contexts, but not in others. Probability preservation adds reliability to the conclusion 
probability of an inference across individual instances. This reliability may be important in 
situations when, as in some of the experimental materials, much is at stake and careful 
consideration is called for to avoid jumping to conclusions. But in other contexts it may be 
more helpful to respond quickly, without hesitating to jump to conclusions, e.g. because only 
an approximate answer is needed or possible given the available information, and the reasoner 
must move on to address the next task. If we relied only on deduction in everyday reasoning, 
even if it is probabilistic, we might regularly freeze in the absence of sufficient criteria for 
drawing any conclusion. Moreover, as discussed in relation to Experiments 8 and 9, deduction 
and induction often seem to work hand in hand. Thus, instead of asking in which contexts 
deduction is relevant, it may be more useful to ask how the different contributions of 
deduction and induction can be measured in reasoning contexts in which they both play a role. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The binary deductive notions of classical logical logic, consistency and validity, can be 
generalised to cover degrees of belief. Consistency can be generalised to coherence, and 
validity to p-validity. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in formal logic does not 
imply that people will actually use deduction in a probabilistic way. The research presented in 
this thesis investigated the role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises through ten 
experiments. It found evidence that coherence and p-validity are not just abstract formalisms, 
but that people follow the normative constraints set by them in their reasoning. This is 
evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity as computational level 
principles defining the tasks people set out to accomplish when reasoning. It has implications 
for the interpretation of past findings in the literature on the roles of deduction and degrees of 
belief, and it offers a perspective for generating new research hypotheses in the interface 
between deductive and inductive reasoning. 
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TYPES OF REASONING 
 
The present thesis is concerned with a specific form of thinking: reasoning. To reason is to 
produce one mental representation, called a conclusion, from one or more other mental 
representations, called premises. One says that the conclusion follows, or is inferred, from the 
premises, and the process of doing this is called drawing, or making, an inference. Reasoning 
can be distinguished from other forms of thinking, like associative thinking, in being directed: 
the relations between mental representations that it establishes are not always symmetrical. 
Reasoning can be distinguished from other forms of directed thinking, like creating a story, by 
the fact that it can be judged by epistemic norms: it makes sense to say that a reasoning 
outcome is correct or incorrect, whereas one could not say this of a story. An invented story 
can be of high or low artistic quality, realistic or unrealistic, interesting or boring, but not 
correct or incorrect. The premises and conclusion of an inference represent pieces of 
information, and the information in the conclusion is warranted to a higher or lower degree 
given the combined information in the premises. 
Different forms of reasoning can be distinguished based on the type of relation 
established between premises and conclusion. The most common distinction made is that 
between deductive and inductive reasoning. An inference is deductive if and only if in each 
case in which the premises are true, or have a probability of 1, the conclusion is also true, or 
has a probability of 1. Said in another way, an inference is deductive if and only if it would be 
inconsistent for the premises to be true but the conclusion false. This feature of inferences has 
been called certainty preservation (Adams, 1996). An example of a deductive inference is 
Modus Ponens (MP): "If it is raining, the road will be muddy. It is raining. Therefore, the road 
will be muddy." Whenever you are certain that the two premises of this inference are true, you 
can also be certain that the conclusion is true, so that your certainty is preserved when going 
from the premises to the conclusion. 
An inference is inductive if and only if it does not have the above property. That is, if it is 
not inconsistent for the premises to be true but the conclusion false. A conclusion can then still 
be likely given the truth of the premises, but it does not necessarily follow from the premises. 
An example of an inductive inference is: "It is raining. Therefore, the road will be muddy." 
The presence of rain can make it more likely that the road will be muddy, but does not 
necessarily imply that it will be muddy. After all, the road could be paved. 
Inductive reasoning can be distinguished further into abductive reasoning and other forms 
of inductive reasoning. An inference is abductive if the truth of its conclusion is a good 
explanation for the truth of its premises. This explanation is often such that it postulates a 
causal link between premises and conclusion (Douven, 2011; Evans, Handley, Hadjichristidis, 
Thompson, Over, & Bennett, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2016; Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & 
Fischer, 2007). An example of an abductive inference is "The road is muddy. Therefore, it 
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rained". Other forms of inductive reasoning include category induction, e.g. "If a relatively 
large object moves steadily and swiftly along the road in the distance, it is probably a car ", 
enumerative induction, e.g. "On each occasion in which it has rained in the past, the road was 
muddy. Therefore, every time it rains, the road will be muddy", and analogical reasoning, e.g. 
"Cars are to roads like boats are to rivers".   
This thesis will concern reasoning from declarative statements as premises to declarative 
statements as conclusions. These are statements providing information about events, e.g. "It is 
raining", as opposed to other speech acts, such as asking questions, e.g. "Is it raining?" But 
inferences concerning information about events can be of two kinds. They can be concerned 
with whether an event is the case, given that some other event is the case, or with whether an 
event should be the case, given that some other event is the case. Typically only the former are 
called declarative, whereas the latter are deontic. Deontic statements are statements about what 
is permissible and obligatory, e.g. in the context of a moral judgment or a legal rule. In this 
context, it is correct to infer that if a person should perform some action, then the person is 
allowed to perform the action. And if the person is not allowed to perform the action, then it is 
false that she should perform it. These inferences can be judged correct or incorrect without 
committing oneself to any specific moral or legal ideas, and it is in this sense that they can be 
viewed as declarative. This thesis is concerned only with declarative statements in the narrow 
sense: statements about what is the case or not, like "It is raining".  
 
 
TYPES OF STATEMENTS 
 
Statements like "It is raining" are often called atomic or categorical because they do not have 
components that are declarative sentences. But they can be combined, as components, to form 
compound statements by using connectives, some of which are logical. The logical 
connectives investigated in this thesis are not, and, or, and if, or more technically, negations, 
conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals. Formally, atomic statements are often 
represented through single letters like p and q (though p and q are variables that can also 
represent any complex statement). Negations can then be represented as not-p, conjunctions as 
p & q, disjunctions as p or q, and conditionals as if p then q.  
The correctness, or incorrectness, of inferences depends on the meanings we ascribe to 
the connectives. A typical way of characterising the meaning of the logical connectives is 
through a specification of the conditions under which the compound statements formed with 
the connectives are true. In classical logic, compound statements constructed with the above 
logical connectives are truth functional. Their truth or falsity is a function of the truth or falsity 
of their component statements. The simplest case is that of negation: not-p is true if and only if 
p is false. The truth conditions of the other compound statements can be conveniently 
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described in a truth table, which simply lists the truth or falsity of the compound statement for 
every possible combination of the truth or falsity of its components (Kneale & Kneale, 1962, 
p. 531). The truth tables for conjunction, disjunction, and conditionals in classical logic are 
shown in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1. The truth tables for conjunction, 
disjunction, and the conditional in classical 
logic. 
 p & q p or q if p then q 
p, q T T T 
p, not-q F T F 
not-p, q F T T 
not-p, not-q F F T 
Note. "&" stands for and. 
 
Table 1.1 shows that a conjunction is true whenever both of its elements p and q are true, 
and false otherwise. A disjunction is true in all cases except when p and q are both false, and a 
conditional is true in all cases except when p is true but q is false. This classical logical 
characterisation of the conditional is called the material conditional. The association of the 
truth table patterns in Table 1.1 with the natural language words and, or, and if, was 
established because, out of the 64 possible truth tables that can be built as a function of the 
truth or falsity of two statements p and q, those tables seemed to resemble most closely the 
meaning of these words. Elements of classical logic go back to Aristotle and other Greek 
philosophers, but it was specified more fully in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries for the 
formalization of mathematical reasoning (Kneale & Kneale, 1962, Chs VIII-IX; Van 
Heijenoort, 1967). The exact relation between its formal connectives and the corresponding 
words of natural language has been a substantial research topic in philosophy, linguistics, and 
the psychology of reasoning.  
There is now wide agreement in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology that at least the 
core meanings of natural language negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions, can be 
characterised through the truth tables used for them in classical logic, at least to a reasonable 
approximation (Douven, 2016). But this is far from true for conditionals. The natural language 
interpretation of conditionals has been a matter of controversy since Greek philosophers first 
started to study it (Kneale & Kneale, 1962, pp. 128-138). The situation is illustrated by a quote 
(from about 330 B.C.) attributed to the Hellenistic poet Callimachus: "Even the crows on the 
rooftops are cawing over the question as to which conditionals are true" (Kneale & Kneale, 
1962, p. 128, see also Adams, 1998, pp. 4, 114). Different accounts of conditionals will be 
introduced below, but for the moment, suffice to say that none of the current main accounts of 
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conditionals proposes them to be represented as material conditionals (Baratgin, Douven, 
Evans, Oaksford, Over, & Politzer, 2015; Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015).   
The question of how conditionals are interpreted is complicated by the fact that they can 
be divided into different types, and it is not clear whether the formulation of a unified account 
of all types of conditionals is possible (Bennett, 2003; Douven, 2016). The most important 
distinction made is between indicative conditionals on the one hand, and subjunctive or 
counterfactual conditionals on the other. Indicative conditionals are usually in the indicative 
mood, and are usually used in situations in which the antecedent is not known or believed to 
be false, e.g. "If it rained today, then the road is muddy". Subjunctives or counterfactuals are 
usually in the subjunctive mood, and are usually used in situations where the antecedent is 
either in the future, e.g. "If it were to rain tomorrow, then the road would be muddy", or the 
antecedent is known or believed to be false, e.g. "If it had rained yesterday, then the road 
would have been muddy".  
A second relevant distinction is between singular and general conditionals. As the names 
suggest, singular conditionals refer to specific single events, e.g. "If it rains today, then this 
section of the road will be muddy", and general conditionals refer to classes of events, e.g. "If 
it rains, then roads are muddy". Generals are often described as "counterfactual supporting" 
(Edgington, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2010a). When a general conditional has high 
probability, there is a corresponding counterfactual that also has high probability, precisely 
because the relation described in the conditional holds in general, and not only on a specific 
occasion in which the antecedent happened to be true. There is currently little empirical 
research relating indicatives and counterfactuals (Cruz & Oberauer, 2014; Oaksford & Chater, 
2013; Over, 2017; Pfeifer & Stöckle-Shobel, 2015; Thompson & Byrne, 2002), and more 
specific relations between the above two classifications still have to be established.  
The present thesis will focus on singular indicative conditionals, and the use of the term 
"conditionals" will refer to singular indicatives unless otherwise specified.  
Conditionals, singular and general, are central to the psychology of reasoning not only 
because the question of which inferences are valid depends on how the statements within 
them, including any conditionals, are interpreted, but also because every inference can be 
rephrased as a conditional, in which the antecedent p represents the premise (or if there is 
more than one premise, the conjunction of premises), and the consequent q represents the 
conclusion, and every conditional, if p then q, can be supported by an inference from p to q. 
Accounts of reasoning and of conditionals are therefore closely linked (Over & Baratgin, 
2017).  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
A very influential and useful system of classification of research questions in experimental 
psychology is that by David Marr (1982). Drawing on an analogy to computer science, Marr 
distinguished three levels of analysis of a research topic: The computational, the algorithmic, 
and the implementational. The computational level of analysis asks what a person (or more 
generally a system) is aiming to do: what the person defines as the correct output to any given 
input. For example, if the person has the goal of finding the sum of two numbers, then the 
function of addition defines the correct output. If they wanted to find the difference of two 
numbers, a different function would apply. In reasoning research, this question translates into 
that of what people define as the correct conclusion in a reasoning problem: what normative 
principles they adhere to when deciding whether the conclusion of an inference is correct, or 
justified. For example, whether the normative principles people use when stating that an 
inference is correct or incorrect can be better modelled by classical logic or by probability 
logic (Oaksford & Chater, 2012).  
The algorithmic level of analysis asks how the person carries out what they want to do: 
which representations and processes are used to get from the input to the output. Using the 
example of arithmetic, the person could sum up two numbers by adding their elements from 
right to left, and "carrying over" to the next position any amounts that sum to 1 or more at a 
given position. Or they could sum the two numbers from left to right, first adding the large 
components of the numbers, and then successively adding the smaller components. In 
reasoning research, the algorithmic level question is that of which mental representations and 
processes people use when reasoning, in which order these processes occur and how they 
interact. For example, people could arrive at the conclusion of an inference by building 
semantic representations of the premises in a way similar to truth tables. Then they could 
combine these semantic representations in a way similar to constructing a truth table for their 
conjunction, and then check whether the resulting representation is that of the conclusion 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Alternatively, people could arrive at the conclusion by 
successively applying syntactic rules to the premises, and checking whether in this way the 
premises can be successively transformed until they become the conclusion (Braine & 
O'Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994).  
At the implementational level, the question is how the representations and processes 
defined at the algorithmic level are implemented physically. In the arithmetic example, the 
sum could be implemented using a calculator or using paper and pencil. In the case of 
reasoning, the question is how reasoning processes are implemented in the brain (De Neys, 
Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Goel, 2007, 2009; Oaksford, 2015; Prado, Chadha, & Booth, 2011).  
The work in this thesis is focussed at the computational level of analysis. The general 
question is whether deduction plays a significant role in reasoning from uncertain premises. 
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When people evaluate the correctness of an inference on the basis of uncertain information, to 
what extent does it make a difference to them whether the inference is deductive? The two 
central deductive concepts in classical logic are consistency and validity. Two statements are 
consistent when they can both be true at the same time, and an inference is valid when as 
described above, it is inconsistent for the premises to be true but the conclusion false, so that it 
preserves certainty from premises to conclusion. These classical logical definitions are binary: 
they can only represent a statement as true or false, with no room for degrees of belief in 
between. This thesis describes a generalisation of consistency and validity to cover uncertain 
degrees of belief (Adams, 1998; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Gilio, 2002) and investigates the 
role of these generalised concepts in reasoning. Consistency can be generalised to coherence, 
and validity to probabilistic validity, or p-validity for short. These extended definitions, 
described in more detail below, are studied within the framework of the probabilistic 
approach to the psychology of reasoning (Evans & Over, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; 
Over & Cruz, 2018; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009). 
The investigation of the role of coherence and p-validity in reasoning from uncertain 
premises was accomplished using a specific probabilistic interpretation of the conditional, the 
probability conditional (Adams, 1998; Jeffrey, 1991), and new empirical evidence for this 
interpretation was obtained. However, most of the findings hold equally for the material 
conditional interpretation. This is because the valid inferences for the probability conditional 
are a subset of the valid inferences for the material conditional, so the material conditional 
generally poses weaker constraints on the conclusion. 
 
 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
After this introductory section, the remainder of the thesis is divided into three further parts, 
covering eight chapters. Part 2, ranging through Chapters 2 to 4, provides an overview of 
philosophical and psychological accounts of reasoning and of the meaning of conditionals. It 
also describes how consistency and validity can be generalised to cover degrees of belief, why 
this is relevant for the interpretation of research findings and for the generation of new 
hypotheses within the probabilistic approach, and how the role of coherence and p-validity 
will be studied empirically in the subsequent chapters.  
Part 3 is dedicated to the report of 10 experiments, covering Chapters 5 to 8. Chapter 5 
presents four experiments that extend previous research on coherence to a range of further 
inferences of differing complexity, assessing whether people's responses are sensitive to the 
constraints of coherence more often than expected by chance. These experiments also examine 
the limits of people's sensitivity to coherence as a function of working memory load and as a 
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function of specific materials that have been found, in other settings, to lead to the incoherence 
of the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  
Chapter 6 reports three experiments that go beyond a binary assessment of whether or not 
the responses to an inference are coherent above chance levels, to a quantitative assessment of 
the extent to which responses are coherent above chance levels. It does so for the same 
inferences as those studied in Experiments 3 and 4 of Chapter 5. These experiments also 
assess whether the degree of above-chance coherence changes as a function of factors like the 
validity and the complexity of inferences. Further, these experiments make a direct 
comparison of coherence for responses under binary instructions (to assess whether the 
conclusion has to be true given the truth of the premises), and probabilistic instructions (to 
assess the probability of the conclusion, given the probabilities of the premises) using the 
same inferences, materials, and response format. 
Chapter 7 describes two experiments that focus on people's sensitivity to the degree to 
which the probabilities of the premises constrain the probability of the conclusion to a 
coherent range of possible values.  
Chapter 8 presents one experiment that focuses on the extent to which people are 
sensitive to the distinction between valid and invalid, i.e. between deductive and inductive 
inferences, over and above any sensitivity to coherence constraints for both types of 
inferences. 
Finally, part 4 of the thesis, covering Chapter 9, provides a general discussion that 
summarises and relates the results of the 10 experiments to one another, outlines conclusions 
that can be drawn from these results, and how they can inform hypotheses for future research 
on different aspects of reasoning from uncertain premises.  
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CHAPTER 2. BINARY THEORIES OF REASONING AND THEIR ACCOUNTS OF 
CONDITIONALS 
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CLASSICAL LOGIC 
 
Philosophers, and later psychologists, long thought of classical logic as the correct normative 
system for human reasoning. This view can be traced back at least as far as Kant (1781/1998). 
When outlining the principles of classical logic of the time, and providing an account of 
relations between them and basic laws of thought, Kant argued that the field of formal logic 
was completed and so not open to change.  
This view of classical logic as something definite and immutable started to change 
drastically with the surge in developments in logic and mathematics in the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries, leading to a range of different proposals that extended or revised classical logic in 
various ways, allowing the expression of a wider variety of concepts. Some of the new logical 
systems actually conflicted with classical binary logic (Edgington, 1995; Priest, 2008; Van 
Heijenoort, 1967).  
In the philosophical literature on reasoning, classical logic, as rigorously developed into a 
truth functional system, was initially retained as the normative system for reasoning with the 
logical connectives "and", "or", "not", and "if". But researchers increasingly argued this logic 
did not fully capture their intuitions about conditionals in natural language (Bennett, 2003; 
Edgington, 1995).  
 
 
THE MATERIAL CONDITIONAL 
 
The conditional in classical logic is called the material conditional. Like all connectives in 
classical logic, it is truth functional, which means that its truth conditions can be fully 
described as a function of the truth conditions of its component statements. For example, 
consider the conditional "If it rained, then the road was muddy". If this conditional is material, 
then its truth or falsity can be fully determined by knowing the truth or falsity of its 
components "It rains" and "The road is muddy".  The conditional is true when it rained and the 
road was muddy; false when it rained but the road was not muddy; true when it did not rain 
and the road was muddy; and true when it did not rain and the road was not muddy. These four 
logical possibilities for combining the truth or falsity of rain with the truth or falsity of the 
road being muddy are represented in the truth table of the material conditional, shown in Table 
2.1. One can see that this conditional is true in every case except that in which its antecedent is 
true and its consequent false. This interpretation of the conditional is therefore equivalent to 
not both p and not-q. It is also equivalent to the disjunction not-p or q.  
The fact that the material conditional is truth functional, and so can be fully described 
through its truth table, makes it a relatively simple and clear interpretation of conditionals, and 
one that can easily be connected with other logical connectives to form more compound 
56 
 
sentences (e.g.:  "If it rained then the road was muddy, and if the road was muddy then he got 
delayed"). This simplicity makes the material conditional attractive theoretically, providing a 
reason for trying to retain it, and for attempting to explain away aspects in which it seems 
implausible as a meaning for everyday conditionals.  
 
Table 2.1. The truth table 
for the material conditional.  
 p  q 
p, q T 
p, not-q F 
not-p, q T 
not-p, not-q T 
Note. T stands for "true" 
and F for "false". The 
horseshoe symbol  
represents the material 
conditional. 
 
One major aspect that makes the material conditional implausible as an account of natural 
language conditionals is that it is true whenever the consequent is true, and whenever the 
antecedent is false. Suppose some random road is dry. Then referring to this road, the 
following inferences are valid if the conditional in their conclusion is material: 
(1) "The road is dry. Therefore if it rains, then the road is dry" 
(2) "I will drive into town tomorrow morning. Therefore, if the car gets stuck in the mud, 
then I will drive into town tomorrow morning." 
But intuitively both seem rather implausible. One could go further and use inferences that 
seem contradictory: "The road is dry. Therefore if the road is wet, then it is dry". The strong 
implausibility of these two inferences, q, therefore if p then q, and not-p, therefore if p then q, 
has led them to be called paradoxes of the material conditional. 
To circumvent the counterintuitive implications of using the material conditional to 
characterise natural language conditionals, the material conditional has been complemented 
with pragmatic principles about how people use it in communication and everyday reasoning 
situations. In this way, a distinction was drawn between the meaning of a statement on the one 
hand, and the assertability, or acceptability, of the statement in a particular communicative 
context on the other. A prominent attempt to retain the material conditional account of 
conditionals, while providing an explanation for the above paradoxes in terms of pragmatic 
aspects of communication, was offered by Paul Grice. 
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THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF THE MATERIAL CONDITIONAL PLUS 
CONDITIONS OF ASSERTABILITY: GRICE AND JACKSON 
 
 
Grice 
 
Grice (1989) held that the meaning people ascribe to conditionals if p then q is that of the 
material conditional p  q, and that therefore the two paradoxes above are valid inferences. He 
argued that the reason for why the paradoxes appear incorrect is not semantic but pragmatic. 
For Grice, it is pragmatically infelicitous to assert the paradoxes because they violate a general 
principle of being cooperative when communicating with others, as one would be expected to 
in a conversation. He characterised this cooperative principle as "Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." Grice argued that this general 
principle can be fulfilled by observing a set of more specific principles, or maxims, that fall 
into four categories:  
- Category of quantity: Be as informative as is required for the purposes of the exchange, 
but not more informative than is required. 
- Category of quality: Try to be truthful (e.g. by not saying what you think is false or for 
which you lack evidence). 
- Category of relation: Be relevant.  
- Category of manner: Make your contribution clear, orderly, and brief. This relates not to 
what is said but to how it is said.  
Grice thought that in general people tend to follow these maxims, e.g. as a habit acquired 
through socialisation. But he also held that, by following them, conversations and 
communication more generally could be conceived as a special case of purposive, rational 
behaviour. Following the maxims makes it possible for us to understand each other even when 
what we aim to convey in a conversation is not always made fully explicit through the 
semantic content of what we say. Some of the things we aim to convey may be implicit, but 
our conversation partners can draw on the cooperative principle and its maxims to infer what 
we implicate in addition to what we overtly say. For example, when El Padrino talked about 
making someone an offer that they could not refuse, he was not implicating that it was a 
generous offer, but was rather making a threat that was too dangerous to ignore. His 
conversational implicature worked because his conversation partners knew what he was 
implicating in what he said, and he knew that they knew.  
However, what is implicated by an utterance in a conversation can also be used with the 
aim to be misleading. For example, if, asked about Mary's whereabouts, we reply "She's in the 
library or in town", our hearers may infer that we do not know which of these two possibilities 
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is the case, for if we knew that she was, for instance, in town in a pub, it would have been 
more informative to say so directly. If we know she is in the pub and want to cover for her, 
then our response is not untruthful, but it violates the maxim of informativeness.  
Grice held that although the natural language conditional if p then q is the material 
conditional, and so is true whenever p is false or q is true, it would be misleading to assert if p 
then q in a conversation in situations in which we could be more informative by asserting q 
directly, or not-p directly. Hence for Grice the paradoxes are valid, but it is infelicitous to 
assert them because they violate the maxim of informativeness.  
In addition to the paradoxes, Grice (1989) discussed a number of further problems for his 
view that the natural language conditional if p then q is the material conditional. For example, 
if p then q is non-commutative, i.e. it is generally not equivalent to if q then p. This is in 
contrast to not-p or q, which is generally considered equivalent to q or not-p. A related 
problem is that the use of if p then q often seems similar to that of an inference from premises 
p to a conclusion q (see Bennett, 2003; and Over & Baratgin, 2017, on the inference ticket 
account of conditionals), and is also often used as the major premise of a MP inference. In 
neither case does it seem relevant to take into account the two possibilities of the truth table 
for the material conditional in which the antecedent is false. A third problem discussed by 
Grice is that the intuitive result of negating a conditional, if p then q, does not seem to be that 
of the negation of a material conditional, p & not-q, but instead that of the negation of the 
consequent of the original conditional, if p then not-q. A fourth problem for the material 
conditional is that it renders valid the inference of contraposition: if p then q, therefore if not-q 
then not-p. Contraposition can also be applied in the other direction, if not-q then not-p, 
therefore if p then q, so that for the material conditional, if p then q and if not-q then not-p are 
logically equivalent. Logically equivalent statements have the same probability, but intuitively 
we can have different degrees of confidence in each. Grice (1989) remarked that the above 
features of the use of conditionals make them appear more similar to the statement supposing 
p, (then) q, than to the statement not-p or q from the material conditional.  
Grice (1989) argued that his pragmatic account of the paradoxes in terms of the principle 
of cooperative communication was not enough to solve the additional problems for the 
material conditional that he outlined. To account for these additional problems he introduced a 
second pragmatic aspect of the use of conditionals in communication.  
Grice assumed that each logical connective has, in addition to its semantic meaning, a 
specific recurring role in practical discourse. Negation is argued to be essential for the ability 
to express many matters of fact, and is not associated with a particular use beyond this 
essential function. Conjunction can be substituted by concatenating separate sentences, but is 
useful to be able to negate groups of sentences without having to specify the truth value of 
each of its elements (e.g. not(p and q and r) as opposed to having to specify separately 
whether each of p, q, and r are the case). The role of disjunction is argued to be that of 
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entertaining preliminary possibilities when trying to find out what is the case. These 
alternative possibilities can then be ruled out successively until one remains, in a way less 
cumbersome than would be required through the use of only conjunction and negation (e.g. 
one can then state p or q or r instead of the more unwieldly not(not-p and not-q and not-r)). 
The role of conditionals in communication is argued to be similar to that of drawing 
inferences in scientific enquiry, in which one assumes p to be the case to see whether q 
follows, and may go on to assume that q is the case to see whether r follows, and so forth, 
building a chain of argument. If it then later turns out that p is the case, one can use this chain 
to infer, by MP, that q must be the case too. Grice called this use interrogative subordination, 
and represented it as a bracketing device around the antecedent, [if p then] q, indicating that 
the truth of p is common ground or has been assumed, and that one can focus one's attention 
on whether q is true under this assumption. This use of conditionals was argued to be based on 
conversational implicatures, i.e. features we can infer the speaker to have conveyed when 
asserting the material conditional, in addition to the explicit meaning stated through this 
conditional. 
Grice argued that the feature of interrogative subordination was not specific to 
conditionals, but can be applied also to conjunctions and disjunctions. For example, in a 
conversation about the disjunction p or q, it could be common ground that p is highly 
probable, and the discussion could then focus on whether it is reasonable to believe that the 
disjunct q is highly probable too.  
Grice's suggestion that conditionals are used in discourse to follow chains of questions, in 
a way similar to research questions, and that people do so by assuming the antecedent is 
common ground, and focussing on whether the antecedent holds under this assumption, 
arguably sounds intuitive. However, it seems less clear how this role is at the same time a role 
for the use of conditionals, and a procedure that can be applied equally to conjunctions and 
disjunctions in addition to the role Grice ascribed to them. The proposal of two elaborate 
pragmatic principles, the maxim of informativeness and the role of interrogative 
subordination, to supplement the material conditional as the semantics of natural language 
conditionals, also raises the question of what role each of these components plays in different 
situations, and whether there might be an alternative, more parsimonious way of accounting 
for conditionals.   
 
 
Jackson 
 
Like Grice, Jackson (1987) assumed that natural language conditionals are logically equivalent 
to material conditionals, but that the material conditional is supplemented with factors 
determining when it is justified to assert it in discourse. He consequently called his account 
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supplemented equivalence theory. But Jackson differed from Grice regarding the factors 
proposed to affect the assertability of conditionals.   
Jackson argued that Grice's account of the paradoxes in terms of a violation of the maxim 
of quantity (being informative) does not explain why some instantiations of the paradoxes are 
more assertable than others. For example, if we just walked along a muddy road, then it seems 
assertable to say "if it rains today, the road is muddy; and if it doesn't rain today, the road is 
muddy", simply because we know the road to be muddy. It also does not explain why 
statements that by the material conditional should be logically equivalent, like if p then q, not-
p or q, and if not-q then not-p, can differ in assertability.  
To address the above problems, Jackson argued as follows. The conditions under which 
natural language conditionals are true are those of the material conditional, but two additional 
conditions must be met for a conditional to be assertable. First, the probability of the material 
conditional must be high enough to warrant assertion, and second, this probability must be 
robust with respect to the antecedent, which means we are only justified in asserting the 
conditional if we would still have a high degree of belief in it after learning that its antecedent 
is true. On this account, the paradoxes are valid but not assertable, because the conditionals in 
the conclusion may not be robust with respect to their antecedents.  For example, if we assume 
the conditional "If it rains, then the road is dry" is a material conditional, then it is highly 
probable as long as it does not rain. But this probability is not robust with respect to its 
antecedent: the conditional becomes very improbable whenever it starts to rain. 
Jackson proposed a very similar account for the assertability of disjunctions. He argued 
that the conditions under which they are true are those of classical logic, but that a disjunction 
is only assertable when it is highly probable, and this probability is robust with respect to both 
of its disjuncts. For example, the statement "Mary is in the library or out in town" is not 
assertable when the only reason we have for its high probability is that we think Mary is in a 
pub in town. If to our surprise, we were to learn that she didn't go to the pub in the end, the 
disjunction ceases to be probable (c.f. Gilio & Over, 2012; and Over, Evans, & Elqayam, 
2010, for a similar distinction between disjunctions that are justified constructively based on 
one of their elements, and disjunctions that are non-constructively justified, and hence robust 
with respect to the probability of either of their elements taken on its own).   
Why make the assertability of conditionals robust with respect to the antecedent? Jackson 
(1987) explains that this makes it possible to use conditionals to draw MP inferences. If a 
conditional is no longer probable when we learn that its antecedent is true, then that 
conditional is not useful for drawing MP inferences.  
The proposal is that a conditional is assertable if and only if its probability, as a material 
conditional, is high and this probability is robust with respect to its antecedent. This claim can 
be described formally as the condition that, not only p(p  q) is high, but that P(p  q|p) is 
high as well. But P(p  q|p) = P(q|p). This in turn implies that, in the supplemented 
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equivalence account, a conditional is assertable if and only if P(q|p) is high. This brings the 
assertability of conditionals in Jackson's account close to that of Adams (1975), whose work 
Jackson tried to take into account when developing his proposal. Adams' account will be 
described further below.   
Jackson argued that by making the assertability of a material conditional a function of 
P(q|p), his account captures the intuition that conditionals are hypothetical rather than 
categorical statements. He considered this intuition to hold for both indicative and 
counterfactual conditionals, but incorporated it into his account in different ways for the two 
types of conditionals. Whereas for indicatives it is captured by making their assertability 
dependent on P(q|p), for counterfactuals it is captured by his endorsement of the possible 
world accounts of conditionals of Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968), described further below.  
Jackson's robustness condition can also be related to Grice's description of the role of 
conditionals as one of interrogative subordination, and the bracketing device proposed to 
implement this description.  However, whereas for Grice the bracketing device was a 
conversational implicature because it could be applied also to conjunctions and disjunctions, 
Jackson's robustness condition would be, in Grice's terms, a conventional implicature, because 
it was proposed to be specific to the use of conditionals.   
Jackson's position has been criticised on a number of points (Edgington, 1995), but a 
telling question (raised by Appiah, 1984) is what role the material conditional is playing in the 
meaning of conditionals, if the intuitive understanding and use of conditionals is already 
captured by the conditional probability. In the interest of parsimony, it would be useful to find 
a specific role for the material conditional in people's actual interpretation of conditionals, 
beyond the fact that the material conditional is theoretically simple because it is truth 
functional. Jackson's attempt to reply to this criticism appears to be based on a conflation 
between what makes a conditional true or believable, and what makes a conditional assertable 
in discourse. In his own theory Jackson stated that the (degree of) assertability of if p then q is 
equal to P(q|p), but also that if p then q is assertable if and only if P(q|p) is high, which are not 
the same (see Over & Cruz, 2018, on this difference for probability conditionals like that of 
Adams).  
 
 
POSSIBLE WORLD SEMANTICS: STALNAKER & LEWIS 
 
 
Stalnaker 
 
For Stalnaker (1968) the paradoxes of the material conditional are a reason for rejecting this 
conditional as an account of the truth conditions of the natural language conditional. For him a 
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conditional if p then q expresses a proposition that is a function of two other propositions p 
and q, but which is not a truth function of these other propositions.  
He briefly discusses the alternative that a conditional expresses a logical or casual 
connection between p and q, so that instead of looking at the truth or falsity of p and of q, we 
just look at whether there is a connection between then. If there is, we say the conditional is 
true, and if there is not, we say it is false. But he dismisses this view by noting that a 
conditional can be true in cases in which antecedent and consequent are independent, for 
example because we are convinced that the consequent is true, whatever the value of the 
antecedent.  
The account advocated by Stalnaker is based on a characterisation of conditionals offered 
by Ramsey (1929/1990). In a hugely influential footnote of this paper, Ramsey states: 
 
"If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding 
p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q; [. . .] 
We can say they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. If p turns out false, 
these degrees of belief are rendered void." 
 
Stalnaker points out that Ramsey's suggestion, known as the Ramsey test, covers only cases in 
which we have no fixed prior degree of belief in p.  But he notes that it readily applies also to 
situations in which we believe p to be certain, because we can then go on to assess our degree 
of belief in q directly. Further, Stalnaker extends the Ramsey test to counterfactuals by 
including the provision that when p is added hypothetically to our stock of beliefs, we make 
any necessary adjustments to these beliefs to maintain consistency, before proceeding to assess 
our degree of belief in q. 
Stalnaker wished to complement this epistemological account of how we decide whether 
or not to believe a conditional statement, with an ontological analogue of whether or not a 
conditional statement is true. To this end, he drew on the concept of a possible world, 
suggesting that it is the ontological analogue of a hypothetical belief. By drawing on possible 
worlds, Stalnaker departed from classical logic, which had been used by Jackson and Grice, 
and proposed an extension of modal logic (Kripke, 1963) as an alternative
1
 (see also Adams, 
1996, footnote 9).  
Roughly, a possible world can be viewed as a hypothetical state of affairs in the world. If 
a statement is true, then it is not just conceivable hypothetically but holds in the actual world. 
If a statement is false, then it does not hold in the actual world but it may hold in a 
hypothetical alternative state of affairs, i.e. it may hold in a counterfactual world. A logical 
                                                          
1
 It is an extension of modal logic for the following reasons. Modal logic provides a way of expressing 
what is true in the actual world, in all possible worlds, or in at least one, unspecified world. The addition 
of the conditional proposed by Stalnaker makes it possible to express also what is true in particular, 
non-actual possible worlds. That is, it makes it possible to express counterfactual statements. 
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tautology is a statement that is true in all possible worlds, and a contradiction a statement that 
is false in all possible worlds (i.e. a contradiction refers to an isolated impossible world). 
Stalnaker assumed that all worlds that are possible, or accessible, with respect to the 
actual world, can be ordered in terms of their similarity to the actual world. The actual world is 
most similar to itself, and the ordering of the other worlds is a total ordering, i.e. there is a 
single closest world β to the actual world α, and a single closest world γ to world β, and so on, 
with no ties. This is in contrast to Lewis (1973), who did allow ties, so that two or more 
worlds could be equally close to the actual world.  
Using the above features of possible worlds, a conditional in Stalnaker's account is true if 
and only if the closest possible world to the actual world in which the antecedent is true, is a 
world in which the consequent is also true. If the consequent is false in the closest possible 
world to the actual world in which the antecedent is true, then the conditional is false. And if 
there is no possible world in which the antecedent is true, then the conditional is vacuously 
true.  
The above implies that in Stalnaker's system, a conditional is always true or false – but 
the question of when it is true and when false depends not on the truth or falsity of its 
component statements in the actual world (as for the truth functional material conditional), but 
on the truth or falsity of the consequent in the closest possible world to the actual world (if 
there is one) in which the antecedent is true.  
The extended modal logic in which Stalnaker's conditional is embedded differs from 
classical logic not only in the fact that it can express possibility/impossibility in addition to 
truth and falsity, but also with regard to which inferences containing conditionals are valid. In 
particular, the paradoxes of the material conditional are invalid, and so do not need to be 
explained away as in the systems of Grice and Jackson. For example, suppose I am sitting at 
my computer and writing. What is the truth value of "If I were walking, then I would be 
writing"? In the closest possible world, to the actual world, in which I am walking, I am not 
writing. This conditional is then false on Stalnaker's analysis, as it is intuitively. 
 
Table 2.2. Examples of inferences that are invalid in the modal logical 
systems of Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973), but valid in classical 
logic. 
 Name Form 
1 Strengthening the antecedent if p then rif p & q then r 
2 Transitivity if p then q, if q then rif p then r 
3 Contraposition  if p then q  if not-q then not-p 
Note.  = "therefore".  
 
64 
 
Further inferences that are valid in classical logic but invalid in Stalnaker's system are 
strengthening of the antecedent, transitivity, and contraposition, shown in Table 2.2.  
Note that the above inferences all have conditionals in the conclusion. If the antecedents 
of these conditionals were moved to the premises, then the resulting inferences would still be 
valid in Stalnaker's system (c.f. Edgington, 1995, p. 286). Thus if p then r, p & q, therefore r is 
a trivially valid inference whose second premise guarantees that the relation between p and r is 
robust with respect to q. The inference if p then q, if q then r, p, therefore r, is similar to 
transitivity and still valid; and modus tollens (MT): if p then q, not-q, therefore not-p remains 
valid.   
 
 
Lewis 
 
The possible world semantics of Lewis (1973) is very similar to that of Stalnaker (1968), and 
it leads to the same changes in the validity of inferences shown in Table 2.2. The main 
difference between the two systems is that as mentioned above, Lewis did not assume there to 
be an absolute ordering of worlds, with a single closest world to the actual world in every 
instance. Instead, he allowed there to be sets of worlds with the same degree of similarity to 
the actual world. He described these sets of worlds as nested spheres with the actual world at 
the centre, in a way similar to a planetary system. The smallest sphere around the actual world 
would contain the alternative possible worlds most similar to it, and successively larger 
spheres would contain successively more dissimilar worlds. He described the similarity 
relation between spheres as resembling topological altitude regions in a map, with worlds 
within the same sphere being equally similar to the actual world, and worlds in a larger sphere 
being more distant from the actual world by the same amount, creating an ordinal rather than 
interval scale.  
A further difference between the systems of Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) is that 
Stalnaker used it to represent both indicative and counterfactual conditionals in a unified 
approach, thinking of the difference between the two types of conditionals as pragmatic and 
not very consequential. In contrast, Lewis applied his possible world semantics only to 
counterfactuals, viewing indicatives as material conditionals in a way similar to that of Grice 
(Lewis, 1976). A third difference is that, although formally the Stalnaker conditional is 
equivalent to a special case of the Lewis conditional in which there is a unique closest sphere 
(the so-called limit assumption in Lewis) and every sphere contains a single world, the two 
conditionals differ in the theoretical background in which they are placed. Stalnaker viewed 
his conditional as an ontological analogue of the epistemological conditional expressed by the 
Ramsey test, whereas Lewis viewed his conditional more in the tradition of the material 
conditional.  
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Specifically, Lewis described his counterfactual conditional as a variably strict 
conditional, vs(not-p or q)
2
. Lewis' application of this conditional not just to single possible 
worlds, as in Stalnaker, but to whole sets of possible worlds, allowed Lewis to formulate two 
versions of it, one version for "would" counterfactuals, as in "If it had rained today, the road 
would have been muddy", and another version for "might" counterfactuals, e.g. "If it had 
rained today, the road might have been muddy".  
To establish whether a would-counterfactual is true, we search for the smallest sphere S 
that contains at least one world in which the antecedent p is true, i.e. that contains at least one 
p-world. Then the would-counterfactual is true if and only if in all the worlds of this sphere S, 
either p is false or p & q is true. To establish whether a might-counterfactual is true, we again 
search for the smallest sphere S that contains at least one p-world. Then the might-
counterfactual is true if and only if there is at least one world in the sphere S in which either p 
is false or p & q is true. If there are no accessible spheres in which p is true, then both 
counterfactuals are vacuously true. Would-counterfactuals can be represented as vs-
necessarily(not-p or q), and might-counterfactuals as vs-possibly(not-p or q). The distinction 
between would- and might-counterfactuals mirrors the distinction between cases in which we 
are certain that a conditional is true, and cases in which we just have an uncertain degree of 
belief that it is true.  
One criticism of possible world accounts like those of Lewis and Stalnaker is that it is not 
clear how similarity between worlds can be measured, particularly if these worlds are not 
observable objects or events in this world but abstract possibilities. This is in spite of the fact 
that ordinary people do sometimes have intuitions about differences in closeness between 
counterfactual possibilities, for example experiencing more regret or frustration when they 
"just" failed to catch the train than if they were late by a larger amount of time (Byrne, 2016). 
Another criticism is based on a proof by Lewis (1976), which is described below.  
 
 
THE TRIVIALITY RESULTS 
 
Stalnaker (1970) sought to connect his possible worlds account of when a conditional is true 
or false (Stalnaker, 1968) with an account of people's degree of belief conditionals. Following 
the Ramsey test, he argued that the probability of the conditional if p then q in his logical 
system was the conditional probability of q given p, P(if p then q) = P(q|p). This equality is so 
important in probabilistic theories of conditionals that it has simply been called the Equation 
(Edgington, 1995). But Lewis (1976) later proved that the Equation does not hold in systems 
like his and Stalnaker's, in which the conditional is a proposition that is always true or false at 
each possible world. He proved that the Equation could only hold for conditionals like his and 
                                                          
2
 See Cariani & Rips, 2017, for a recent reasoning account using this conditional. 
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Stalnaker's in certain "trivial" cases, e.g. when the conditional is if p then p. This led his and 
related proofs to be known as the "triviality results". 
The proof has also been termed the "bombshell" (Edgington, 1995) because of its 
significance for theories about the meaning of conditionals. It shows that there is no fully truth 
conditional
3
 account of if p then q which is such that P(if p then q) = P(q|p) for any coherent 
probability assignments to p and to q. Hence if our degree of belief in conditionals is in 
accordance with the Equation and the Ramsey test, then conditionals cannot be such full 
propositions. 
To illustrate the argument of the proof, consider for example the truth table in Table 2.3, 
for a conditional about a fair coin: "If the coin is flipped (F), then it will land heads (H)". 
Suppose the coin is unlikely to be flipped, so that P(F & H) = P(F & not-H) = .1, and P(not-F 
& H) = P(not-F & not-H) = .4. 
 
Table 2.3. Truth table for 
the example about a coin 
flip. 
F, H .1 
F, not-H .1 
not-F, H .4 
not-F, not-H .4 
  
What is the probability of this conditional? Given that the coin is fair, the intuitive answer 
is that P(if F then H) = P(H|F) = .5. This is the result we get when we consider only the cases 
of the truth table in which F is true: .1/(.1+.1) = .5. If the conditional were material, we would 
instead have P(if F then H) = P(not-F or H) = .1 + .4 + .4 = .9. If the conditional is a Stalnaker 
or Lewis conditional, then it will be either true or false in the two false-antecedent cases, 
depending on whether F & H or F & not-H is the closest possible world to the not-F worlds. 
As an illustration, suppose the F & not-H world is certain to be the closest possible world to 
both not-F worlds. Then P(if F then H) = .1. As this example illustrates, there are cases in 
which neither the probability of the material conditional nor the probability of the 
Stalnaker/Lewis conditionals matches the intuitively correct answer of .5 given by the 
conditional probability.   
                                                          
3
 A truth conditional statement is one that is always either true or false for each case of its truth table, 
i.e. for each combination of the truth or falsity of its component statements. It differs from a truth 
functional statement in that the value it takes (true or false) is not uniquely determined by the truth 
values of its component statements. For example, for the Stalnaker and Lewis conditionals, it will 
depend on whether or not the consequent is true in the closest possible world to the actual world in 
which the antecedent is true (c.f. Adams, 1998, Ch. 8).  
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Generally, the conditional probability P(q|p) depends only on the cases of the truth table 
in which p is true: if we fix the probability of those two cases, we fix P(q|p). In contrast, the 
probability of a full proposition, be it a material conditional or a Stalnaker/Lewis conditional, 
is affected also by the cases of the truth table in which p if false. The two interpretations will 
therefore only necessarily agree in "trivial" cases, as when the conditional is a logical truth 
(Lewis, 1976; see also Bennett, 2003; and Edgington, 1995, for reviews of further triviality 
proofs by a number of authors).  
The triviality results entail that, if we want to hold on to the Equation as the basis for the 
interpretation of natural language conditionals, we must conclude that conditionals are not 
propositions with full truth conditions. Lewis (1976, p. 305) said he had no conclusive 
objection to this conclusion, but rather an inconclusive one: "The hypothesis requires too 
much of a fresh start. It burdens us with too much work still to be done, and wastes too much 
that has been done already." But as we will see below, long before Lewis wrote those words, 
de Finetti had made the "fresh start", and other researchers have continued to develop his 
ideas, based on the Equation. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC THEORIES OF REASONING AND PROBABILITY 
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The triviality results contributed to the development of probabilistic accounts of conditionals, 
first in philosophy and then later in psychology. The general change from classical binary 
logic to probability logic as the normative, computational level framework for modelling what 
people set out to accomplish when engaged in reasoning, has been described as a paradigm 
shift (Over, 2009). With its origins in philosophy (Adams, 1998; de Finetti, 1936/1995; 
Jeffrey, 1991; Ramsey, 1926/1990), the new probabilistic paradigm in psychology (Evans, 
2006; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2013; Over, 2016; Pfeifer & 
Kleiter, 2009, 2010; Politzer & Baratgin, 2016) is based on the fundamental hypothesis that 
most reasoning, both in everyday life and in science, is from premises that are uncertain. The 
uncertainty, or degrees of belief, in the statements from which we reason cannot be modelled 
in classical or modal logic. But it can be in probability theory.  
In the probabilistic approach advocated here, it is proposed that the probability of singular 
indicative conditionals is given by the Equation, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), with the consequence, 
by the triviality results, that conditionals are not propositions with full objective truth 
conditions. To have a certain degree of belief in a conditional is considered different from 
having a certain degree of belief about a matter of fact in the world (Edgington, 1995). The 
proposal is that people arrive at this conditional probability, not by first having some specific 
degrees of belief in P(p & q) and in P(p), and then taking their ratio, P(q|p) = P(p& q)/P(p), but 
instead through a Ramsey test (Ramsey, 1929/1990; Stalnaker, 1968). That is, a mental 
simulation in which people hypothetically suppose the antecedent p of the conditional, if p 
then q, make any necessary changes to their beliefs to preserve consistency, and assess the 
probability of q under this supposition.  
Yet another central aspect of the probabilistic approach is that it shares the computational 
level framework of probability theory with neighbouring areas of research, covering not just 
deductive but also inductive reasoning, as well as judgment and decision making, 
argumentation, and learning (Elqayam & Over, 2013; Hadjichristidis, Sloman, & Over, 2014; 
Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2013; Zhao & Osherson, 2014) leading to a 
stronger integration and cross-pollination of these fields. All these points about the 
probabilistic approach are described in more detail in what follows. 
 
 
WHY REPRESENT DEGREES OF BELIEF WITH PROBABILITIES? 
 
Some authors have argued that probability theory is too precise and fine-grained to serve as a 
realistic representation of degrees of belief, which are intuitively more coarse or vague than 
point-probabilities (Khemlani, Lotstein, & Johnson-Laird, 2015; Politzer & Baratgin, 2016; 
Spohn, 2013). But although degrees of belief can definitely be coarse grained, and may also 
change in precision with context, it is difficult to ascertain this precision a priori. If we choose 
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a more coarse-grained system, e.g. a Likert scale with 5 subdivisions, then we will not be able 
to tell whether a scale with 7 or 10 subdivisions would still have measured meaningful 
differences in people's degrees of belief. The use of probability theory to represent and 
measure degrees of belief does not imply a commitment to the idea that people will have 
analogues of point probabilities in their minds for every statement they may be confronted 
with. Probability theory can instead be treated as an approximation with which to work. As 
such, it has the unique advantage of making it possible to measure the coarseness of people's 
degrees of belief empirically for a given context, instead of having to presuppose a certain 
degree of coarseness from the outset. Similarly, there may well be cases in which the use of 
ordinal instead of interval scales to measure beliefs will reflect more closely the kind of 
relationships people establish between their beliefs. But we cannot find out unless we use a 
measurement system precise enough to capture both probabilities and ranks. For example, 
Tversky & Kahneman's (1979) hugely influential prospect theory about relations between 
degrees of belief and utilities would arguably have been much more difficult to develop if 
degrees of belief had been represented as ranks rather than probabilities. This argument was 
followed up further in some of the experiments of the thesis.   
 
 
WHICH INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY? 
 
In pure mathematics, the term "probability" simply refers to a non-negative, additive set 
function that takes a maximum value of 1. But this definition, while clear and precise, does not 
help us understand how the term is applied to the world, e.g. in empirical research, by 
insurance companies, or in everyday assertions like "Jane will probably catch her flight" 
(Kyburg & Smokler, 1980). There have been three main proposals for connecting the 
mathematical function with its use in statements about world: the empirical or frequentist, the 
logical, and the subjective (Kyburg & Smokler, 1980; see also Hájek, 2012).  
 
 
The frequentist interpretation 
 
In its first formulation, the empirical or frequentist conception identified probability with the 
limit of a relative frequency (Reichenbach, 1949; Venn, 1886; von Mises, 1951). The 
probability of a coin landing heads was held to be equal to the limit of the relative frequency 
of heads among the tosses, as the number tosses is increased towards infinity (Kyburg & 
Smokler, 1980). This interpretation runs into problems, for instance because it is difficult to 
explain the step from a sample frequency to a probability without a further conception of 
probability that is not itself based on frequencies (de Finetti, 1937/1980, p. 110; Hájek, 2012). 
71 
 
An alternative version of the frequentist interpretation is as a theoretical concept that receives 
its meaning through the rules or procedures through which it is applied (Braithwaite, 1953), in 
particular the rules for rejecting a statistical hypothesis given the evidence of a sample with 
specific characteristics (Fisher, 1956; Neyman, 1952).  
Common to the above versions of the frequentist, empirical position is that a probability 
statement is an assertion about the world, like an assertion about length or weight, which can 
be true or false. The evidence for it is observational: in order to find out whether a probability 
statement is true or false, we must conduct an empirical investigation. This investigation will 
lead to one or more sample frequencies, e.g. a coin cannot be tossed indefinitely, and so will 
not usually terminate with certainty, but with a probability judgment, in some other sense, 
about the objective frequency (Kyburg & Smokler, 1980).  
 
 
The logical interpretation 
 
In contrast, the logical conception of probability holds that probabilities are not empirical but 
logical statements: statements about the logical relation between a hypothesis (one statement) 
and a body of knowledge or evidence (another statement or set of statements) (Kyburg & 
Smokler, 1980). Crucially, it argues that for a hypothesis and body of evidence, there is a 
single probability value that the hypothesis can take, given the evidence (Carnap, 1950/1962; 
Hintikka, 1965; Keynes, 1921). For example, Carnap (1950/1962) built an axiomatic system 
for probability theory based on this logical interpretation, and always hoped there could be a 
set of axioms that would rule out all but one acceptable probability function given a body of 
evidence. But he never found a set of intuitively acceptable axioms that led to this result 
(Kyburg & Smokler, 1980).  
 
 
The subjectivist interpretation 
 
The subjectivist conception probability is similar to the logical one, but differs from the latter 
in holding that there is no single probability function that is rationally acceptable, given some 
body of evidence. In the subjectivist view, probabilities represent degrees of belief. A 
hypothesis can be assigned any probability between 0 and 1, given a body of evidence, 
depending on the inclination of the person whose degrees of belief the probability represents. 
But this does not mean that there are no rational constraints on people's degrees of belief. The 
subjectivist theory of probability is a logical theory in the sense that only certain combinations 
of degrees of belief in related statements are admissible (Kyburg & Smokler, 1980). In line 
with this, the founders of subjective probability theory described it as the logic of partial belief 
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(Ramsey, 1926/1990), and as the logic of uncertainty (de Finetti, 1972), and contrasted it with 
classical logic as the logic of full belief or of certainty.  
The constraints on the relations between people's degrees of belief in related statements 
are given by coherence (de Finetti, 1937/1980; Ramsey, 1926/1990), which is a generalisation 
of logical consistency to cover degrees of belief. The probabilities of two statements are 
coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory.
4
 For example, if we 
believe it's 80% likely to rain today, then to be coherent, we would also have to be willing to 
believe it's 20% likely not to rain today, otherwise the probabilities used to represent our 
degrees of belief would not sum to 1. The logical conception of probability also includes the 
constraint of coherence, but in the subjectivist interpretation coherence it is the only normative 
constraint (Kyburg & Smokler, 1980).  
The relation between the three notions of probability can be illustrated with an urn 
example. Imagine there is an urn with a number of balls inside, some of which have a blue dot 
and others not. Imagine we draw a ball at random. What is the probability that this ball will 
have a blue dot? On the frequentist interpretation, we would first have to draw a series of balls 
before we could make an estimate based on the relative frequency of balls with blue dots in 
our sample. Questions about the probabilities of single events do not make sense unless they 
can be related to similar events (or chains of events) for which frequency information is 
available. On the logical interpretation, we could argue as follows. Given that the only 
evidence we have is that some of the balls have a blue dot and others do not, it is rational to 
apply the principle of indifference and say, as our best guess, that the probability of drawing a 
ball with a blue dot is .5. On the subjectivist interpretation, we could use the same principle 
and also respond .5. But our neighbour could object, pointing out that the balls with no blue 
dot may have a green, red, or orange dot instead. Applying the principle of indifference to this 
new partition of the parameter space, it would be reasonable to respond that the probability of 
drawing a ball with a blue dot is .25. Our neighbour could add that the original partition is not 
more or less correct than the new partition, as both depend on the subjective question of how 
the domain of the problem is interpreted. However, on a subjectivist interpretation our 
neighbour and ourselves would nonetheless converge in our probability judgments as we 
sampled more and more balls from the urn, as long as we both conformed to probability theory 
and so made coherent judgments (Howson & Urbach, 2006). 
The present thesis follows the subjectivist interpretation of probability, studying people's 
degrees of belief and the extent to which these are subject to the constraints of coherence. But 
the subject matter and results of the thesis do not presuppose a subjectivist interpretation of 
                                                          
4
 There are different axiomatic systems for probability theory even within the subjectivist view (Adams, 
1998, Appendix 1; De Finetti, 1937/1980, pp. 60-61), but unless otherwise specified in this thesis, the 
axioms can be taken as those of Kolmogorov: (1) non-negativity: P(p)  0; (2) normalisation: 
P(tautologies) = 1; (3) finite additivity: P(p or q) = P(p) + P(q) for all p and q that are logically 
incompatible, i.e. that are disjunct (Hájek, 2012).  
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probability in order to be meaningful. Within a frequentist or logical perspective, people can 
still have degrees of belief, and the relation between degrees of belief and coherence 
constraints may be of interest independently of the relation between degrees of belief and 
probabilities.  
 
 
HOW CAN WE MEASURE DEGREES OF BELIEF, AND WHY WOULD WE WANT 
THEM TO BE COHERENT?  
 
Ramsey (1926/1990) pointed out that to explore the subjectivist view of probability theory, we 
need to be able to assign probabilities to beliefs, and so we need a method with which to 
measure degrees of belief. One option he entertained is to imagine that there is a feeling 
attached to each belief, e.g. a feeling of conviction, such that the stronger our conviction, the 
stronger this feeling will be. But this would be inconvenient for the task of measuring beliefs 
because it is difficult to attach numbers to feelings, and it also seemed false to him because we 
usually don't feel strongly for things in which our conviction is so firm that we take them for 
granted (e.g. that the earth is not flat). The alternative he proposed was to examine a causal 
connection between beliefs and actions, assuming that the stronger we are convinced of 
something, the more willing we will be to act on it.  
 
 
Measuring beliefs by measuring actions 
 
Ramsey (1926/1990) argued that the established way of measuring a person's beliefs would be 
to propose a bet and see what the lowest odds are that the person would accept. He considered 
this method sound, but not sufficiently general, and necessarily inexact. His reason was that 
larger and larger amounts of money could have diminishing marginal utility, as could very 
small amounts, and that a person may be especially eager or reluctant to bet (see also 
Elqayam, 2016, for further problems with taking the betting analogy more literally).  
To construct a more general and precise form of measuring degrees of belief, Ramsey 
(1926/1990) proposed a betting-like scenario in which people are not asked how much they 
would be prepared to bet, nor assumed to accept a fair bet with a zero net gain. Instead, people 
are simply asked which of two options they would prefer. He started off by assuming, as a 
useful approximation, that people's actions are determined by their desires and opinions. With 
desires he meant things that we want in general, which could be something for our own 
pleasure of for the pleasure of someone else, or anything else. He called the things people 
want "goods", and assumed that people act in such a way as to make most likely the realisation 
of these goods, given their beliefs (see Adams, 1998, Chapter 9, for a similar assumption). 
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Ramsey (1926/1990) proposed beginning with some statement that is itself neutral with 
respect to people's desires, e.g. "The coin came up tails" describing the outcome of a coin flip 
with no bet attached to it. The idea is that two situations differing only in whether a neutral 
statement is true or false will be equally desirable or undesirable.  
A neutral statement like the above can be used to build an anchor on a scale for degrees 
of belief. A person's degree of belief in a neutral statement p is said to be .5 when the person 
has no preference between the options (1) A if p is true, B if p is false, and (2) B if p is true, A 
if p is false, and the person just has a preference between A and B. Here p could be the 
outcome of a coin flip, A could be e.g. a cup of coffee, and B could be no coffee. This would 
be equivalent to being indifferent between a bet on (1) and a bet on (2) for the same stakes. 
With such an anchor for degrees of belief in hand, one can then proceed to measure 
differences in preferences between options. Given a neutral proposition p with degree of belief 
.5, the difference between options A and B on the one hand, and options C and D on the other, 
is said to be equal when a person has no preference between the options (1) A if p is true, D if 
p is false, and (2) B if p is true, C if p is false. And if the difference between A and B is equal 
to that between C and D, then the value of A minus B will equal the value of C minus D.  
To measure a person's degree of belief in a statement p, one can then proceed as follows. 
If the person is indifferent between the options (1) A for certain and (2) B if p is true, and C if 
p is false, then the person's degree of belief in p can be said to equal the ratio of the difference 
between A and C to the difference between B and C. The conditional probability P(q|p) is 
measured in a similar way. Suppose a person is indifferent between the options (1) A if p is 
true, B if p is false, and (2) C if p and q are both true, D if p is true but q is false, B if p is false. 
Then the person's conditional probability of q given p is the ratio of the difference between A 
and D to the difference between C and D.  
In general, once an anchor for a degree of belief of .5 is established, one can develop a 
measure of preferences and a measure of degrees of belief at the same time. If a person is 
indifferent between two options that are known to have the same value, then the probabilities 
of the two options must differ; and if the person is indifferent between two options that are 
known to have the same probability, then the values of the options must differ. Using the 
above procedure, Ramsey (1926/1990) arrives at a ratio scale for degrees of belief, and at an 
interval scale for preferences. 
Further, Ramsey (1926/1990) derives the axioms of probability theory from his system, 
proving that they must be true for any coherent set of degrees of belief. He thus states (p. 78):  
 
"We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial belief reveals that 
the laws of probability are laws of consistency, an extension to partial beliefs of 
formal logic, the logic of consistency. They do not depend for their meaning on any 
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degree of belief in a proposition being uniquely determined as the rational one; they 
merely distinguish those sets of beliefs which obey them as consistent ones." 
 
 
Dutch book arguments 
 
Ramsey (1926/1990) observed that if people's degrees of beliefs are not consistent with 
probability theory, i.e. are not coherent, then their preferences would be such that a Dutch 
book could be made against them. A Dutch book is a set of bets on related statements that will 
necessarily lead to a net loss to one side whatever the outcome of the bets. For example, 
suppose we think it is 80% likely to rain today, but also 80% likely not to rain today, thereby 
violating probability theory. Then we should have no preference between (1) a bet on rain, and 
(2) a bet on not-rain, each for the price of .8 giving us 1 if we win, and 0 otherwise. Because 
the price of .8 corresponds to our beliefs, the two bets are fair taken individually, in the sense 
of being associated with a zero expected gain or loss. But if we accept them together, we will 
pay 1.6 and receive 1, and so lose .6 no matter what happens.   
De Finetti (1937/1980) also showed that the axioms of probability theory can be derived 
from the assumption of coherent degrees of belief, and that if people's beliefs are incoherent, a 
Dutch book can be made against them. His theory of how to measure degrees of belief is 
perhaps less intuitive than Ramsey's because it starts out with a Dutch book scenario 
concerning preferences that is then related to degrees of belief in a later step, whereas Ramsey 
develops a way of measuring preferences and beliefs in terms of one another. But de Finetti's 
Dutch book argument is much more elaborated than that of Ramsey. Whereas Ramsey 
mentioned that if people's degrees of belief are incoherent, a Dutch book could be made 
against them, de Finetti proved this formally in what came to be known as the Dutch book 
theorem. The Dutch book theorem was later complemented by a Converse Dutch book 
theorem (Khemeni, 1955; Lehman, 1955), which showed that if people's degrees of belief 
follow the axioms of probability theory, then no Dutch book can be made against them.  
Together the two Dutch book theorems make a strong case for why coherent degrees of 
belief are something worth trying to have, not just for the internal value of preserving a 
generalised notion of logical consistency (Howson & Urbach, 2006), but also for the applied 
purpose of being able to choose actions that increase our chances of achieving our goals. This 
applied aspect has sometimes been criticised e.g. for presupposing money to have linear value, 
or that people will find fair bets with a zero net gain to either side acceptable (Elqayam, 2016; 
Vineberg, 2016). But as Ramsey (1926/1990) argued, the Dutch book scenario can be taken as 
an illustration of a more general relation between coherent degrees of belief and goals. 
Ramsey said that in a sense we are making bets all the time. For example, when we go to the 
train station we are betting that the train will come, and if our degree of belief in this were not 
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high enough, we would "decline the bet" and stay at home. Stalnaker (1970, p. 67) made a 
similar argument: "If you find gambling games a narrow and unsuitable basis on which to 
build the interpretation of a belief function, consider a 'bet' as any action in the face of 
uncertainty, and the 'odds' as the ratio of the value of what you risk by taking the action to the 
value of what you hope to gain, should the uncertain event turn out in your favor." 
 
 
COHERENCE AND P-VALIDITY: DEDUCTION FROM UNCERTAIN PREMISES  
 
Coherence can be said to be a deductive concept because it puts constraints on the probability 
values that are logically possible for a statement, given the probability of a related statement or 
set of statements. In contrast, inductive relations rather suggest one or more probability values 
as the most plausible or useful among those which are possible. The constraints of coherence 
depend on the formal logical relations between statements, but also on their probabilities, 
which may change depending on the content and contexts of the statements at hand. Inductive 
relations, for example of conceptual similarity or causal strength, seem to depend in a more 
fundamental way on content and context.  
In an inference, the coherence constraints that the premise (or premises) places on the 
probability of the conclusion can vary in strength, depending on the logical form of the 
argument and on the premise probabilities. The premises of some inferences pose no 
constraints at all on the probability of the conclusion, and so are called probabilistically 
uninformative. Typical examples – assuming a Stalnaker/Lewis or probabilistic interpretation 
of conditionals – are transitivity, if p then q, if q then r, therefore if p then r, contraposition, if 
p then q, therefore if not-q then not-p, and the paradoxes of the material conditional (see 
Edgington, 1995, p. 286, for a discussion). For example, the conclusion of "I am in the lab, 
therefore if I am not in the lab but in the cafe, then I am drinking a coffee" can take any value 
in a probabilistic account, depending on how likely I would be to drink a coffee if I were to go 
to the cafe. There are other inferences whose conclusion probability is constrained to a certain 
interval, given the form of the inference and the premise probabilities. Examples of these are 
inferences describing set-subset relations, like: I am in the cafe, therefore I am in the cafe and I 
am drinking a coffee. Here P(conclusion)  P(premise) by coherence. There are still other 
inferences where the conclusion probability is fixed to a point value, given their logical form 
and the premise probabilities. For example, "It will rain today, therefore it will not rain today" 
can only be coherent if the probability of the conclusion is the complement of the probability 
of the premise, so that if P(rain) = .8, P(not-rain) is fixed to .2.  
It was mentioned above that coherence is a generalisation of logical consistency to cover 
uncertain degrees of belief. Next to logical consistency, a second central deductive concept is 
logical validity. An inference is classically valid if and only if there is no consistent truth value 
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assignment to premises and conclusion in which the premises are true but the conclusion false 
(Adams, 1998). Thus an inference is valid when it preserves truth, or certainty, from premises 
to conclusion. The definition of validity categorises inferences into two sets: those that are 
certainty preserving, or deductive, and those that are not certainty preserving, or inductive.  
 A one-premise inference is probabilistically valid, or p-valid for short, if and only if 
there are no coherent probability assignments to premise and conclusion in which the 
probability of the conclusion is lower than the probability of the premise. Hence p-validity is 
probability preserving just as classical validity is certainty preserving. To generalise the 
definition of p-validity to any number of premises, it is useful to draw on a specific concept of 
uncertainty. Let the uncertainty, in this sense, of a statement equal one minus its probability, 
U(p) = 1 – P(p). Then an inference is p-valid if and only if there are no coherent probability 
assignments to premises and conclusion in which the uncertainty of the conclusion is larger 
than the sum of the uncertainties of the premises (Adams, 1998). Classical validity can be seen 
as a special case of p-validity in which the premises are assumed to be certain. 
One can see from the above definitions that the computation of p-validity presupposes 
coherence, just as the computation of classical validity presupposes consistency. The general 
definition of p-validity draws on the concept of uncertainty, which is defined in term of 
probabilities, and a probability is defined as a function that respects the axioms of probability 
theory. This makes it impossible, by definition, for the conclusion of an inference to violate 
coherence but respect p-validity.  
Researchers focussing on coherence have sometimes criticised p-validity on the basis that 
there are situations in which a conclusion violates coherence but appears to conform to p-
validity (Baratgin & Politzer, 2016). One can take this view only if one leaves out the first part 
of the definition of p-validity, keeping only the uncertainty sum rule, according to which the 
uncertainty of the conclusion should not exceed the sum of the uncertainties of the premises. 
The part left out indicates that the uncertainty sum rule is applied to probabilities, which by 
definition must respect coherence, and so must be coherently assigned to premises and 
conclusion. As an example, consider the MP inference:  
 
If it rains today, the road will be muddy 
It rains today 
Therefore, the road will be muddy. 
 
Let us assume we think P(if rain then muddy) = .8, and P(rain) = .6. Then the minimum 
coherent probability we can assign to the conclusion is P(if rain then muddy)P(rain) = .8*.6 = 
.48. The maximum coherent probability we can assign to the conclusion is P(if rain then 
muddy)P(rain) + (1- P(rain)) = .48 + .4 = .88. Thus, for these premise probabilities, the 
coherence interval for the conclusion of MP is [.48, .88]. Now, if we view p-validity as 
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nothing more than the uncertainty sum rule, without taking into account that it is a rule about 
probability functions, which must, by definition, respect coherence, then we could argue as 
follows. To conform to p-validity, it would be enough to assign to the conclusion any 
probability whose uncertainty is not greater than the sum of the uncertainties of the premises. 
Since the sum of the uncertainties of the premises is .2 + .4 = .6, and an uncertainty of .6 
corresponds to a probability of .4, this means we could assign to the conclusion any 
probability between .4 and 1. The problem then is that probabilities from .4 to .47 are 
incoherent, as are probabilities from .89 to 1. However, this problem does not arise when we 
take into account that p-validity presupposes coherence, just like classical validity presupposes 
consistency.  
 
Table 3.1. Probability preservation properties of inferences, based on Adams (1996). 
 Name Description 
1 Probabilistically 
uninformative 
Any conclusion probability is coherent. 
2 Probabilistically 
informative 
The conclusion is constrained to any point or interval narrower 
than the unit interval. 
3 Certainty preserving 
(classical validity) 
It is incoherent for the premises to be certain but the conclusion 
uncertain. 
4 High probability 
preserving (p-
validity) 
It is incoherent for the uncertainty of the conclusion to be 
greater than the sum of the uncertainties of the premises. 
5 Positive probability 
preserving  
It is incoherent for the probabilities of the premises to be 
positive but the conclusion zero. 
6 Minimum probability 
preserving 
It is incoherent for the probability of the conclusion to be lower 
than the lowest premise probability. 
 
Similarly to classical validity, p-validity classifies inferences into two sets: inferences in 
which coherence intervals preserve probability and that are therefore deductive, and inferences 
in which coherence intervals do not preserve probability and that are therefore inductive. The 
role of p-validity of classifying inferences on the basis of features of their coherence intervals 
is similar to the role of probabilistic informativeness, and both could be placed on a scale 
describing the degree to which inferences are bound by deductive constraints. Adams (1996) 
described further features of probability preservation among valid inferences, which could be 
placed on the same scale. These features are shown in Table 3.1, numbered in increasing 
degree of strictness. The stricter probability preservation properties imply the less strict ones, 
but not the other way around. Inferences that are minimum probability preserving are also 
positive and high probability preserving as well as certainty preserving, inferences that are 
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high probability preserving are also certainty preserving, etc. Features 1 and 2 are not in fact 
probability preserving, but they represent less strict ways in which the premises constrain, or 
in the case of 1 do not constrain, the probability of the conclusion. The six features will be 
returned to in Experiment 10 below. 
Coherence alone does not allow us to distinguish between deductive and inductive 
inferences. It tells us only what the coherence interval is in each case, but not why the 
coherence intervals of some inferences preserve probability, while those of others do not. This 
means that although p-validity presupposes coherence, the two have complementary, non-
overlapping roles.  
Overall, the generalisation of binary consistency to coherence, and of binary validity to p-
validity, makes it possible to model not only reasoning from uncertain premises in general, but 
also deductive reasoning from uncertain premises in particular (Ramsey (1926/1990, p. 82; 
Stevenson & Over, 1995).  
 
 
PROBABILITY CONDITIONALS 
 
As mentioned earlier, the question of which inferences are deductive and which inductive 
depends on the meaning of the statements in them, and most importantly on the meaning of 
any conditionals in them. The conditional advocated in the probabilistic approach is based on 
the Equation, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), and has been called the probability conditional (Adams, 
1998), suppositional conditional (Edgington, 2014), and conditional event (de Finetti, 
1937/1980). It is sometimes symbolised as q|p (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009). The term "probability 
conditional" is used here simply to refer to a conditional that satisfies the Equation. In 
particular, a probability conditional q|p does not have the same semantic meaning as if p then 
the probability of q is high (a mistake made by Goodwin, 2014; see Over & Cruz, 2018).  
The valid and invalid inferences for both the probability conditional and the Stalnaker 
(1968) conditional exactly coincide for conditionals of the form if p then q where neither p nor 
q contain a conditional. For example, transitivity, contraposition, the paradoxes of the material 
conditional, and other inferences like or-to-if (p or q, therefore if not-p then q) are all valid in 
classical logic for the material conditional, but invalid in systems like that of Stalnaker (1968) 
and like that of Adams (1998) for Stalnaker-type conditionals and the probability conditional. 
These systems differ of course in that degrees of belief can be modelled only in the 
probabilistic approach, but they also differ in how they treat conditionals embedded in other 
conditionals, and conditionals building compounds with negations, conjunctions and 
disjunctions (Edgington, 1995, p. 273). Such more complex conditional statements are 
straightforward to represent in Stalnaker's (1968) system, in which conditionals are full 
propositions, but they are the focus of research, with different proposals being currently 
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developed, in the probabilistic approach (Bradley, 2012; Gilio, Over, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo, 
2016; Stalnaker & Jeffrey, 1994).   
Next to the Equation and its psychological implementation in the Ramsey test, it is useful 
to characterise conditionals through a truth table, which in the case of the probability 
conditional shows the probabilities that the conditional can take as a function of each possible 
combination of the truth or falsity of its components. De Finetti (1936/1995) held that the 
indicative conditional if p then q is true when both p and q are true, is false when p is true but 
q is false, and is void, or not specified, when p is false. The de Finetti table is shown in Table 
3.2, where 1 = true and 0 = false.   
 
Table 3.2. The de Finetti table  
for the probability conditional. 
 q|p 
p, q 1 
p, not-q 0 
not-p, q Void 
not-p, not-q Void 
 
This table was initially described in the psychology of reasoning as the defective truth table, 
on the grounds that it does not correspond to the predictions for the material conditional of 
classical logic (Evans, 1972; see Over & Baratgin, 2017, for a discussion). De Finetti 
(1936/1995) appears to have thought of "true" and "false" as referring to objective truth values 
in his table, but he escapes the triviality results because the "void" entry in the false-antecedent 
cases is not an objective truth value. Probability conditionals can also be regarded as "true" , 
or "false", in pragmatic, or pleonastic, uses of these terms. For example, a person might assert 
a conditional as "true" simply to express a high degree of belief in it, "beyond reasonable 
doubt", or because they endorse it as a convention or a matter of personal taste, as in "if you 
make gazpacho, you use olive oil", while someone who does not like olive oil might reject this 
as "false". A further use of "true" for conditionals is to refer to logical truths, like if p then p. 
This conditional is true in a logical sense, independently of whether p refers to a physical fact 
that could be observed (Over & Cruz, 2018).  
De Finetti drew an analogy between indicative conditionals and conditional bets. Suppose 
we bet that "if it is raining, the match is cancelled". When it is raining and the match is 
cancelled, we win the bet, and when it is raining and the match goes ahead, we lose the bet. 
But if it does not rain, the bet gets called off, with no one winning or losing. Going outside and 
seeing that it is a clear sunny day, we do not assert the sentence "if it is raining, the match is 
cancelled". Ramsey (1929/1990, p. 155) agreed that in this case the indicative conditional is 
"void", and added that it ceases to mean anything to us, "except as a question about what 
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follows from certain laws or hypotheses" (see Cruz & Oberauer, 2014, on general 
conditionals). In this case, we might instead take an interest in the counterfactual "if it had 
rained, the match would have been cancelled".  
Jeffrey (1991) asked which probability could be assigned to the false-antecedent cases of 
a probability conditional, so that the expected value of the conditional as a whole follows the 
Equation. He proved that this had to be the conditional probability itself. The resulting Jeffrey 
table is shown in Table 3.3. This table, like de Finetti's, sidesteps the triviality results because 
the conditional is not objectively true or false in false-antecedent cases. The 1 and 0 in the 
table can be interpreted as objective or subjective, but it makes no difference to the overall 
probability of the conditional.  
 
Table 3.3. The Jeffrey table  
for the probability conditional. 
 q|p 
p & q 1 
p & not-q 0 
not-p & q P(q|p) 
not-p & not-q P(q|p) 
 
Specifying P(q|p) as the value of a probability conditional in false-antecedent cases makes 
it possible to model counterfactuals. Counterfactuals were impossible to represent in the de 
Finetti table, which was limited to the description of indicatives as void, and it was also 
difficult in Adams' (1998) specification of the probability conditional, in which the false-
antecedent cases of the truth table were either left empty, or were given the value 1 per 
convention. Adams needed such a convention because (following Kolmogorov strictly) he 
defined conditional probabilities as derived from the ratio formula, P(q|p) = P(p & q)|P(p), 
with the consequence that conditionals are undefined when their antecedents are known to be 
false. Such a convention is not needed when conditional probabilities are instead considered 
primitive in the formal system, as in de Finetti's approach. For de Finetti all probabilities are in 
fact conditional probabilities, either conditional on a specific statement, or more generally 
conditional on background knowledge k. The Equation would then more precisely be written 
P(if p then q) = P(q|p, k). One can then turn the ratio formula around and define conjunctions 
in terms of conditional probabilities, P(p & q) = p(p)P(q|p). And outside the formal system, 
one can use the psychological procedure of the Ramsey test to fix the conditional probabilities.  
It can be argued that when people are asked to evaluate the probability of a conditional 
for false-antecedent cases, they may attempt to solve the task by switching from an evaluation 
of the indicative to an evaluation of the corresponding counterfactual. Drawing an analogy 
once more between conditionals and bets, in the false-antecedent cases in which the bet is 
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called off, we receive our money back, which for a fair bet corresponds to our degree of belief 
in the conditional (Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002).  
The Jeffrey table prevents misunderstandings that come from focusing on the de Finetti 
table alone, without considering it together with the Equation and the Ramsey test (Byrne & 
Johnson-Laird, 2009; Douven, 2015a; Gilio et al., 2016). For example, the conditional if p 
then p has the intuitive probability of 1 in the false-antecedent cases of the Jeffrey table, and 
not the undifferentiated void value it would have in the false-antecedent cases of the de Finetti 
table (Baratgin, Over, & Politzer, 2013). Nonetheless, the Jeffrey table can be considered a 
specification and extension the de Finetti table, and several contemporary researchers in the de 
Finetti tradition adopt the Jeffrey table as a basis of their approach (Coletti & Scozzafava, 
2002; Over & Baratgin, 2017; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009).  
 
 
CONDITIONALS AND VALIDITY 
 
It was mentioned above that inferences like contraposition and the paradoxes are valid for the 
material conditional but invalid for the probability conditional. This has led to the suggestion 
that the inferences that are valid in probability logic are a subset of the inferences that are valid 
in classical logic (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009, Figure 1). However, this characterisation can be 
misleading because it raises the question of whether the dividing line between deductive and 
inductive inferences in classical logic is different from that in probability logic. When P(q|p) is 
specified through the Ramsey test and so is considered primitive within the logical system, 
and is thus defined also in cases in which the antecedent has probability zero, the dividing line 
between deductive and inductive inferences is in fact the same. Among the inferences that can 
be represented in classical logic (i.e. those that do not contain probability conditionals), all 
inferences that are certainty preserving in classical logic are also certainty and high probability 
preserving in probability logic, and all inferences that are certainty preserving in probability 
logic are also certainty preserving in classical logic. But with the probability conditional, 
probability logic can represent a set of further inferences that could not even be expressed in 
classical logic. Among these further inferences, some are certainty and high probability 
preserving, and others not. The inferences that are certainty and high probability preserving in 
probability logic are a proper subset of the corresponding (but not identical) inferences that 
would be certainty preserving in classical logic, if the probability conditionals they contain 
were replaced with material conditionals. For example, the paradox of the material 
conditional: "not-rain, therefore not-rain or muddy", where "not-rain or muddy" represents the 
material conditional, is certainty preserving in classical logic, and it is also certainty and high 
probability preserving in probability logic, as a case of the inference of or-introduction. In 
contrast, the corresponding inference "not-rain, therefore muddy|rain" where "muddy|rain" 
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represents the probability conditional, is neither certainty nor high probability preserving – but 
it cannot even be formulated in classical logic.  
The misleading suggestion that the dividing line between deductive and inductive 
inferences may be different in classical and probability logic comes from applying the same 
term "conditional", to two concepts that are not equivalent, the material conditional not-p or q 
and the probability conditional q|p. Referring to both as conditionals is of course difficult to 
avoid, especially given that there is no universal agreement among researchers on the 
meaning(s) of natural language conditionals. But it is nonetheless necessary to treat the two 
concepts as formally distinct, in which case classical and probability logic coincide in their 
dividing line, and so in their definition of deduction.  
A further point on the relation between conditionals and validity is that when the 
conditional probability in the Equation is specified through the Ramsey test and so is 
considered primitive in the formal system, certainty preservation (classical validity) and high 
probability preservation (p-validity) coincide (Adams, 1996, 1998; Gilio, 2002). They only 
diverge in Adams' (1998) system because of the default assumption made in it that 
conditionals with zero antecedents have probability 1. This assumption has as a consequence 
that, although inferences like the paradox of the material conditional, not-p, therefore if p then 
q, are not high probability preserving, they are nonetheless certainty preserving because in the 
special case in which the premise has probability 1, P(not-p) = 1, the antecedent p of the 
conditional in the conclusion has probability zero, rendering the probability of the conditional 
as a whole equal to 1 by default. When the conditional probability is instead primitive, the 
conclusion in this inference can have any probability when the probability of the premise is 1. 
The value that the conclusion probability will take in any particular instance will be 
determined by a Ramsey test, and correspond to the conditional probability itself, as given in 
the Jeffrey table. Because of the equivalence in the set of inferences that are classically valid 
and that are p-valid for conditionals based on the Jeffrey table, the terms "validity" and "p-
validity" will be used interchangeably in the thesis unless otherwise specified.  
 
 
UNCERTAIN REASONING BEYOND DEDUCTION: DYNAMIC REASONING  
 
A further aspect of the probabilistic approach is its application to reasoning beyond deduction, 
even on a probabilistic interpretation of the term. This is the field of dynamic reasoning, 
reasoning over time, in contrast to the focus on static reasoning that had characterised the 
earlier, binary approach (Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2011; Baratgin & Politzer, 2010; Douven, 
2012; Hadjichristidis et al., 2014; Hartmann & Rafiee-Rad, 2014; Oaksford & Chater, 2013). 
An important question in the probabilistic approach is how people change their degrees of 
belief over time after learning new information (Oaksford & Chater, 2013; Over, 2016).  
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Imagine you want to assess whether a certain substance is acid. At time 1, you have some 
suspicion that it might be acid, and you buy a piece of litmus paper to test this. At time 1 you 
may also have an idea of the likelihood that the litmus paper turns red, given that it is an acid, 
and the likelihood that it turns red, given that it is not an acid. You can then infer, still at time 
1, a degree of belief that the substance is an acid, given that the litmus paper turns red, using 
Bayes theorem: 
 
𝑃1(𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑|𝑅𝑒𝑑) =  
𝑃1(𝑅𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑)𝑃1(𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑)
𝑃1(𝑅𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑)𝑃1(𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑) + 𝑃1(𝑅𝑒𝑑|𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑)𝑃1(𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑)
. 
 
(you would come to the same result by using a Ramsey test, in which you hypothetically 
assume that the litmus paper turned red and assessed how likely the substance is to be an acid 
under this assumption). Bayes theorem describes relationships between static beliefs: beliefs 
that are held at a single point in time. 
When you then get home after buying the litmus paper and actually perform the litmus 
test at time 2, you can update your degree of belief that the substance is an acid using Bayesian 
conditionalisation, by making your degree of belief that the substance is acid at time 2 equal 
your degree of belief at time 1 that it is acid, given that the litmus paper turned red: P2(Acid) = 
P1(Acid|Red) (Hadjichristidis et al., 2014; Oaksford & Chater, 2013; Over, 2016).  
Bayes theorem only depends on the axioms of probability theory (Chater & Oaksford, 
2012), but because Bayesian conditionalisation describes relationships between beliefs over 
time, it makes two important further assumptions, which are to some extent idealisations 
(Adams, 1998). The first is that the information you learn at time 2 becomes certain for you. 
Often the information we learn will be less than certain. For example, it could be that you are 
making the test under dim light. If the information you learn is not certain, then you can 
update your belief that the substance is acid using Jeffrey conditionalisation: P2(Acid) = 
P1(Acid|Red)P2(Red) + P1(Acid|not-red)P2(not-red). One can see that this equality reduces to 
the total probability theorem if its components are all represented at the same time point, i.e. if 
P1(Acid|Red) = P2(Acid|Red), and P1(Acid|not-red) = P2(Acid|not-red). 
This points to the second additional assumption, made both in Bayesian and in Jeffrey 
conditionalisation. It is that when you learn the new information at time 2, you learn only it, 
and your other beliefs remain invariant. However, it could be that when you see whether the 
litmus paper turned red or not, you also see that it is beyond its "use by" date. In such a case 
not only your probability that the substance is an acid, given that the paper turns red will 
change from time 1 to time 2, but also your probability that the paper turns red, given that the 
substance is an acid, and your probability that it turns red given that the substance is not an 
acid. When invariance does not hold, we are in a situation of non-monotonic reasoning. 
Alternative criteria for updating our beliefs in this case may be given by imaging (Baratgin & 
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Politzer, 2010; Lewis, 1976; Over, 2017; Zhao & Osherson, 2014), or by minimising the 
Kullback-Leibler divergence (Hartmann & Rafie-Raad, 2014). But there are no hard and fast 
criteria in this case, and it is an interesting question in itself when it is justified to assume that 
invariance holds, and when not (Oaksford & Chater, 2013; Zhao & Osherson, 2014). 
  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE PROBABILISTIC APPROACH 
 
There is vast evidence that people tend to reason from uncertain premises, even when asked to 
assume the premises to be certain for the sake of argument. The role of uncertainty, or degrees 
of belief, goes beyond the field of reasoning and has gained prominence in accounts of a range 
of cognitive processes from perception and language processing (Chater & Manning, 2006; 
Kersten & Yuille, 2003) to learning and argumentation (Bramley, Dayan, Griffiths, & 
Lagnado, 2017; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), in what has been 
called the probabilistic turn in cognitive science (Chater, Oaksford, Hahn, & Heit, 2010; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007, Ch. 4).   
 
 
Evidence for reasoning from uncertain premises 
 
In the area of deductive reasoning, most studies have focussed on three specific groups of 
inferences or tasks: conditional syllogisms, categorical syllogisms, and the Wason selection 
task (Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2001, 2007). Conditional syllogisms are four 
inferences with a conditional or major premise, a categorical or minor premise that asserts or 
denies one of the components of the conditional premise, and a conclusion that asserts or 
denies the other component of the conditional. They are: Modus ponens (MP, if p then q, p, 
therefore q), Modus tollens (MT, if p then q, not-q, therefore not-p), Affirmation of the 
consequent (AC, if p then q, q, therefore p) and Denial of the antecedent (DA, if p then q, not-
p, therefore not-q). MP and MT are deductively valid, whereas AC and DA are not.  
Conditional syllogisms are represented in sentential logic, so that the p and q referred to 
stand for whole sentences. In contrast, categorical syllogisms are represented in quantified 
predicate logic. In predicate logic, the sentences are broken down into smaller units, similar to 
objects and descriptions of those objects. For example, instead of representing "The road is 
muddy" as p, one could represent it as Mr, where M is a predicate, or description, of the object 
r. Such more fine grained constructions are quantified if one says that the property M applies 
not just to the individual object r, but to one or more members of a set of objects, which we 
could call x. For example, x could be the set of roads in our district. One can then say things 
like "for all x, Mx", which would mean "all roads in our district are muddy". Categorical 
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syllogisms are inferences in predicate logic that have two premises and a conclusion, each 
containing two terms, with the premises sharing one term and the conclusion referring to the 
other two terms, i.e. to the terms that occurred only in one premise. Both premises and 
conclusion contain quantifiers like "all", "some", "none" and "some not". For example: "All 
roads that are wet are muddy. All roads that are muddy are impassable. Therefore, all roads 
that are wet are impassable."   
In the original version of the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968), participants are shown 
four cards, each with a number on one side and a letter on the other, e.g. D, 3, B, 7. 
Participants are then asked which cards need to be turned over to determine whether the 
conditional rule "if there is a D on one side, then there is a 3 on the other" is true or false of the 
four cards.  
The task posed to participants in the Wason selection task is conceptually ambiguous, and 
can be interpreted in a deductive or inductive way (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Manktelow 
& Over, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 1996, 2003; c.f. Crupi, Tentori, & Lombardi, 2009; 
Klayman & Ha, 1987). It is also not studied in this thesis. Further, all the inferences 
investigated in the thesis can be expressed in sentential logic. The following exposition 
therefore focusses on reasoning with conditional syllogisms.  
Early findings on conditional syllogisms, using binary paradigm instructions to assume 
the premises are true, to then judge whether the conclusion also has to be true, found that 
people do not simply accept the valid MP and MT, and reject the invalid AC and DA. The 
acceptance rates for MP tend to be at ceiling, and people tend to accept valid inferences more 
often than invalid ones. But people also accept the two invalid inferences with non-negligible 
frequency, and tend to accept the forward inferences (MP and DA) more often than the 
backward inferences (MT and AC) (Evans & Over, 2004; Klauer, Beller, & Hütter, 2010; 
Oberauer, 2006). However, the latter difference can be reduced or reversed when accounting 
for negation effects (Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1995), i.e. for findings suggesting that it is 
more difficult for people to process inferences that contain negations (Evans & Handley, 1999; 
Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000).  
A further series of findings that deviate from the expectations of classical logic more 
directly suggests people treat the premises of conditional syllogisms as uncertain, even when 
instructed to assume them to be true with certainty. It was found that people accept the valid 
inferences of MP and MT less often when given an additional premise that casts doubt on the 
conditional premise, e.g. by pointing to a precondition that must be met for the conditional 
premise to hold (Byrne, 1989) or suggesting that the conditional is more or less likely to hold 
(Stevenson & Over, 1995; see also Over, 1993), and also if the conditional premise itself is 
varied, explicitly or through the choice of its content, in a way that varies P(q|p) (George, 
1997; Liu, Lo, & Wu, 1996). Further studies showed that while the endorsement rates of MP 
and MT were most affected by P(q|p), those of AC and DA were most affected by P(p|q) 
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(Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Thompson, 1994) which makes sense because AC 
and DA would be equivalent to MP and MT, respectively, if the conditional premise if p then 
q were swapped with its converse, if q then p.  
The above findings were called suppression effects, suggesting that people suppress the 
inferences when their degree of belief in the premises decreases. In line with the above results, 
both the number of different counterexamples to the conclusion (instances of p & not-q for MP 
and MT, and instances of not-p & q for AC and DA), and the overall frequency of 
counterexamples, was found to play a role in creating suppression effects. This makes sense 
from a probabilistic point of view, because both types of information are correlated and both 
undermine the probability of the conclusion. From a binary paradigm point of view, a single 
counterexample, or any probability lower than 1 in the premises, would be expected to render 
the conclusion false with certainty. The question of whether one type of undermining evidence 
comes first and is an indicator of the other, seems to depend on whether participants receive 
classical binary or probabilistic instructions (De Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2003; Geiger 
& Oberauer, 2007; Markovits, Lortie-Forgues, & Brunet, 2010). 
From a probabilistic point of view, it is rash to call these findings suppression effects. 
This is because the inference itself is only suppressed if people's conclusion probability is 
lower than the lower bound of the coherence interval for the inference – or in a generalisation 
of the term suppression, then also if it is higher than the upper bound of the interval (Over & 
Cruz, 2018). Consider a MP inference in which P(if p then q) = P(p) = .1. Then by coherence, 
the probability of the conclusion must lie in the interval [.01, .11], and any conclusion 
probability above or below this interval would suppress the logical constraints of MP.  
A similar finding to suppression effects is that of belief bias, the tendency to accept a 
conclusion more often when it is believable given the premises, regardless of whether it 
follows logically from the truth of the premises (Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009). In the 
probabilistic approach this could again be a reasonable response in cases in which the 
unbelievable premises yield a low coherence interval for the conclusion. Such a response 
would of course be incorrect when binary paradigm instructions are given to assume the 
premises, however implausible or arbitrary. But participants might not follow such 
instructions and yet they might still be engaged in a deductive reasoning process, following 
the logic of partial belief or of uncertainty. Further research will be necessary to establish 
whether people suppress, not only the conclusion of an inference, but the inference itself, and 
respond on the basis of belief bias in a way that violates the logical constraints of coherence.  
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Evidence for the probability conditional 
 
The psychological hypothesis that people's degrees of belief in conditionals will follow the 
Equation is called the conditional probability hypothesis (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003). 
There is strong converging evidence for this hypothesis. When in classical truth table tasks 
people are given the four cases of the truth table, and are asked for each case whether it 
renders the conditional true, false, or whether the case is irrelevant for the truth or falsity of the 
conditional, people's modal response pattern corresponds to the de Finetti table (Baratgin et 
al., 2013; Evans, 1972; Johnson-Laird & Tagart, 1969; see Evans & Over, 2004, for a review). 
And when in probabilistic truth table tasks people are asked to judge the probability of the 
conditional given information about the frequency of each truth table case, people's modal 
response closely matches the conditional probability (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007; 
Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer, Geiger, Fischer, & Weidenfeld, 2007; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 
2003).  
A minority response found in these studies corresponded to the conjunction of p & q, 
whereas the response corresponding to the material conditional was virtually absent. The 
minority conjunctive response was not reliable, but decreased with practice on the task 
(Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011), with general cognitive ability (Evans et al., 
2007), with children's age (Barrouillet & Gauffroy, 2015) and when real world materials were 
used (Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 
2014) – in each case being replaced not with the material conditional, but with the probability 
conditional response.  
A further minority response pattern sometimes found is that of the probability 
biconditional, if p then q & if q then p, which has P((p & q)|(p or q)) as its probability (Fugard, 
Pfeifer, et al., 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2013, 2017; Over, 2017). This pattern might be 
relevant to the study of some general conditionals, e.g. "if an animal is a bird, then it can fly". 
Another possibility for general conditionals is that, not only must P(q|p) be high, but P(q|not-
p) must be low. P(q|p) – P(q|not-p) is termed delta-p (Allan, 1980), and it is logically related to 
another probability biconditional, if p then q & if not-p then not-q, since P(q|not-p) = 1 – 
P(not-q|not-p). Appendix A gives the Jeffrey tables for these two biconditionals. These 
interpretations appear to occur more often when conditionals describe causal relations, but the 
evidence for their presence is not reliable (Dieussaert, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2002; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2013; Oberauer, Geiger, et al., 2007; Oberauer, Weidenfeld, et al., 2007; 
Singmann et al., 2014). It may be that when they occur in causal conditionals this is because 
the conditionals are interpreted as general conditionals about law-like relations, and that in 
these cases people's degree of belief in them is similar to a judgment of causal power (Cheng, 
1997; c.f. Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2010). But further research on the distinction between 
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singular and general conditionals is necessary to address this question (Cruz & Oberauer, 
2014).  
Further evidence for the Equation draws on the betting scenario introduced by de Finetti 
(1937/1980) and Ramsey (1926/1990) as a way of measuring subjective probability. Studies 
comparing people's probability judgments with people's judgments about bets on conditionals 
found a close correspondence between the two (Baratgin et al., 2013; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 
2003; Politzer, Over, & Baratgin, 2010). 
Current work on the meaning of conditionals within the probabilistic approach is 
investigating to what extent the scope of the conditional probability hypothesis extends to 
general conditionals (Cruz & Oberauer, 2014; Oaksford & Chater, 2017; Over, 2017); to 
counterfactuals (Over et al., 2007; Pfeifer & Stöckle-Schobel, 2015, September; Sloman & 
Lagnado, 2005); to compounds of conditionals (Bradley, 2012; Gilio et al., 2016; Gilio & 
Sanfilippo, 2014; Stalnaker & Jeffrey, 1994; Van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Elqayam, & Over, 
2015); and to missing-link conditionals, in which the antecedent and consequent are 
independent (Cruz, Over, Oaksford, & Baratgin, 2016; Douven, 2015b; Oberauer, Weidenfeld, 
et al., 2007; Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2016). However, this thesis will focus on 
singular indicative conditionals without missing links.  
The following section provides a brief overview of current psychological theories that 
draw on alternative interpretations of conditionals, or that integrate probabilistic elements into 
a broader dual-process framework, and discuss how they relate to the probabilistic approach. 
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This section begins with a description of mental model theory (MMT) (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991, 2002; Johnson-Laird et al., 2015), one of the most influential psychological 
theories of reasoning for the past decades. It is mostly considered an alternative to the 
probabilistic approach, though there are features of the two approaches that have been 
integrated with one another (Evans, 2006; Geiger & Oberauer, 2010; Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 
2004; Manktelow & Over, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 2010b). MMT is referred to at points in 
the interpretation of results in the thesis, but the thesis as a whole arguably has a stronger 
bearing on dual-process theories (De Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Markovits, 
Brunet, Thompson, & Brisson, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2011; Sloman, 1996; Trippas, 
Thompson, & Handley, 2017; Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005), or dual-
component theories more generally (Klauer et al., 2010; Singmann et al., 2014). This section 
goes on to describe some of the proposals of dual-component theories, before it concludes 
with an outline of the hypotheses.  
  
 
MENTAL MODEL THEORY 
 
MMT has been applied to reasoning in a range of deductive (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 
1999; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, & Caverni, 
1999; Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999) and inductive (Johnson-Laird, 1994) tasks, including 
ones about spatial relationships (Ragni & Knauff, 2013) and about causality (Khemlani, 
Barbey, & Johnson-Laird, 2014). It has sometimes been criticised because the MMT 
specifications for these tasks can appear independent, task specific accounts (Baratgin et al., 
2015). But the general assumptions of the theory may be summarised as follows.  
People reason by making and manipulating isomorphic representations of aspects of the 
reasoning domain, called models. In the theory's earlier account of deductive reasoning with 
sentence particles like if, and, or, and not (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 2002), each model refers to a logical possibility for a statement, corresponding to the 
truth table cases that make the statement true in classical logic. For example, a conjunction is 
true in one possibility, that in which both p and q are true, so it is represented with one model: 
p     q 
The inclusive disjunction is true in three possibilities, so it is represented with three models: 
p 
       q 
p     q 
Note that the above mental models do not explicitly represent negations. But they can be 
fleshed out into fully explicit models, which also include information about which statements 
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are false at each possibility in which the statement as a whole is true. For the disjunction this 
yields: 
      p not-q 
not-p                    q 
      p       q 
The logical possibilities in which the statement as a whole is false (in the case of the 
disjunction the not-p, not-q possibility) are generally not included in any models. The 
assumption that people tend to represent what is true in a model, rather than what is false, and 
that they represent the models that render a statement true but not those that render a statement 
false, is called the principle of truth in MMT. Logically, the fully explicit models are 
equivalent to the disjunctive normal form for the statement. For example, this form for the 
disjunction p or q is (p & not-q) or (not-p & q) or (p & q).  
 
 
Conditionals in MMT 
 
The initial mental model for conditionals is represented as a conjunction, followed by an 
implicit model represented as an ellipsis: 
p     q 
... 
The implicit model symbolises that there are further possibilities in which the statement could 
be true, that are not yet fleshed out. The fully explicit model for the conditional is equivalent to 
the cases of the truth table in which the material conditional is true: 
      p       q 
not-p       q 
not-p not-q 
Consequently these models are the same as the models for not-p or q.  
The above models represent what the theory calls the basic meanings of conjunctions, 
disjunctions and conditionals. These are the meanings people are thought to give to the 
statements when their contents are "abstract", or arbitrary. For example, a basic conditional 
about figures drawn on a black board could be "If there is a circle then there is a square". The 
theory posits that these meanings can change through semantic and pragmatic modulation, i.e. 
through features of the content or context (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2010; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 2002). For example, "If it rained then it poured" would be represented only by two 
models: 
it rained              it poured 
it did not-rain     it did not pour  
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with the model "it did not rain, it poured" ruled out by the content, which indicates that 
pouring is a form of raining. Modulation is assumed to rule out models and also annotate 
models with extra information, e.g. about temporal or causal order, but it is assumed not to 
lead to the addition of models (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2010). 
It is argued that although the meanings of basic conditionals, conjunctions and 
disjunctions are truth functional, and have the same truth conditions as in classical logic, the 
meanings of these statement types after semantic and pragmatic modulation is not truth 
functional, so that overall, conditionals and other statement types are not truth functional in the 
theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). There are two difficulties with this assumption. The 
first is that MMT categorically endorsed the paradoxes of the material conditional as logically 
valid inferences (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002), but the validity of these inferences 
(plus the inference from the truth of p and falsity of q to the falsity of if p then q) entails truth 
functionality (Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005). The second is that when and how semantic and 
pragmatic modulation affects the meaning of conditionals, and other statement types, is not 
clearly specified. Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2010, p. 66; see also Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
2002, p. 674) are explicit on this point: "One consequence of modulation is that conditionals 
have an indefinite number of meanings – ten sets of possibilities and a variety of relations 
between the antecedent if-clause and the consequent then-clause." The result is that when 
modulation is taken into account, any experimental finding can be explained, and none can be 
predicted. There has consequently been little research testing the theory's account of non-basic 
conditionals other than by proponents of the theory (for a recent example see Orenes & 
Johnson-Laird, 2012).   
Proponents of MMT (Barrouillet, Gauffroy, & Lecas, 2008; Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 
2010) have argued that one of the interpretations of conditionals posited by the theory 
corresponds to the de Finetti table, and so explains people's responses in truth table tasks. 
They held that the de Finetti response pattern for conditionals, if p then q, may be based on the 
initial mental model in which only the p & q possibility is represented explicitly, and the other 
two possibilities remain implicit (denoted by the ellipsis). Being implicit, these two 
possibilities are considered irrelevant, while at the same time the p & not-q possibility is 
somehow acknowledged as the only case that makes the conditional false.   
However, this position seems inconsistent with other parts of MMT. If the implicit 
possibilities for the conditional are treated as irrelevant, then implicit possibilities should also 
be treated as irrelevant in conjunctions and disjunctions, which would change their meanings 
(for example, the not-p, q model should then be judged irrelevant, and not false, for 
conjunctions). And if the p, not-q model for the conditional is fleshed out alongside the p, q 
model, then this would violate the principle of truth. There is no mechanism within MMT for 
distinguishing between false and irrelevant cases (Oberauer & Oaksford, 2008), and it is 
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generally difficult to find a representation for a statement that is not a full proposition using 
the propositional tools for representing mental models. 
 
 
Reasoning with conditional syllogisms in MMT 
 
The earlier version of MMT (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) assumed that when people draw 
inferences with conditionals in conditional syllogisms, they first build mental models for the 
two premises, and then integrate these models. The integration is done by adding the models 
of one premise to the models of the other, and removing any models that are inconsistent. Next 
people take a few (typically one or two) of the logical possibilities in which the combined 
models are true, and assess whether the conclusion is true in these possibilities. If it is, the 
process stops, and they take the inference to be deductively valid. If it is not, the process also 
stops, and they take the inference to be invalid. But if the conclusion does not feature in the 
premises, and people have enough time and resources, then they look at further models of the 
premises, possibly fleshing them out into fully explicit models, to see whether they can find a 
counterexample to their initial conclusion. A counterexample is a logical possibility in which 
the premises are true but the conclusion false. Markovits & Barrouillet (2002) proposed that 
counterexamples are based not just on abstract logical possibilities, but are retrieved from long 
term memory, with ease of retrieval varying with the specific content of the conditional (c.f. 
Cummins, 1995). 
The above procedure implies that, if people flesh out all the models of the premises, and 
modulation is not an issue, then they will respond exactly in the way predicted by the rules of 
classical logic. But the theory posits that people make errors because they fail to take into 
account relevant logical possibilities. For instance, they might not flesh out mental models into 
fully explicit models, or not flesh out the negations within a model. This is assumed to occur 
mainly because of working memory limitations, and it implies that the more models are 
required to fully flesh out the premises of an inference, the more difficult the inference will be.  
Work in developmental psychology (e.g. Barrouillet & Gauffroy, 2015; Barrouillet & 
Lecas, 1999; Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002) suggested a developmental trend in the 
interpretation of conditionals, going from a conjunctive interpretation in young children, over 
a biconditional interpretation, to a conditional interpretation in adults – with the conditional 
interpretation being in accordance with the material conditional under binary paradigm 
instructions, and in accordance with the probability conditional under probabilistic 
instructions. MMT proposed that this trend comes about because, when people flesh out the 
initial conjunctive model of the conditional, they first add the not-p, not-q model that yields a 
biconditional interpretation, and only afterwards add the not-p, q model that results in the 
conditional interpretation. There is no rationale within the theory for this specific ordering 
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(e.g. why is the not-p, not-q model added before and not after the not-p, q model?), but the 
interpretation of the developmental trend, in the successive addition of models, corresponds to 
a situation in which increasing numbers of models are considered, in line with the predictions 
of the theory.  
The above ordering can also be used to explain the pattern of responses in the conditional 
inference task. A conjunctive interpretation of the conditional in which the ellipsis is forgotten 
would lead to the acceptance of MP and AC. The addition of the not-p, not-q model would 
lead to the acceptance of all four inferences, and the subsequent addition of the not-p, q model 
would result in participants accepting MP and MT and rejecting AC and DA. This account of 
conditional syllogisms has found some support in the literature, but mostly when combined 
with an additional assumption about conditionals that is not part of MMT, called directionality 
(Barrouillet, Grosset, & Lecas, 2000; Evans et al., 2005; Oberauer, 2006). This is the 
assumption that people tend to process a conditional in direction from antecedent to 
consequent, and that the outcome of processing the conditional can differ if it is instead carried 
out from consequent to antecedent. Directionality is hard to explain within MMT when 
reasoning with basic conditionals, but it is a feature that follows from the Ramsey test (see 
also Verschueren et al., 2005).  
 
 
Mental models and probabilities 
 
MMT was extended early on to cover situations in which the premises are not certain but only 
probable to a higher or lower degree. It proposed that by default models are equiprobable, so 
that the probability of a statement corresponds to the proportion of models that make the 
statement true. But it was also held that people are able to assign distinct probabilities to 
models. In simple cases, they could do this by creating repetitions of models of the same kind, 
and letting the proportion of models of each kind stand for their probability. In more complex 
cases, tags with numerical probabilities could be added to the models (Geiger & Oberauer, 
2010; Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 2004; Johnson-Laird et al., 1999). Conditional probabilities 
can be represented by using the subset principle, in which a person focuses on the subset of 
models in which the denominator is true, and assesses the proportion of models in this subset 
in which the numerator is also true (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999). This procedure seems 
functionally equivalent to a Ramsey test. Later on Khemlani et al. (2015) also described a way 
of representing subjective probabilities, using a scale set a priori to have eight subdivisions, on 
which positive and negative evidence for a statement could be averaged (see also Juslin, 
Nilsson, & Winman, 2009, on the averaging hypothesis). But MMT never proposed a rational 
procedure for transferring premise probabilities to conclusion probabilities for relations more 
complex than that of a set to a subset.  
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New MMT 
 
Johnson-Laird and colleagues (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015; see also Johnson-Laird & Ragni, 
2017, July; Khemlani, Hinterecker, & Johnson-Laird, 2017) have recently proposed a radical 
revision of MMT, in which the paradoxes of the material conditional, but also other classically 
valid inferences, notably or-introduction, p, therefore p or q, are declared invalid in the theory. 
The revision is based on a change in the meanings of and, or, and if. They are still represented 
by the same models, but whereas before a statement was true when one of the possibilities 
used to represent it was actually the case, now a statement is held to be equivalent to the 
conjunction of those possibilities. For example, as pointed out above, the disjunction p or q 
was at first fully represented, in effect, as its disjunctive normal form, (p & not-q) or (not-p & 
q) or (p & q). But it is now taken to be equivalent to the conjunction of possibilities: possibly 
(p & not-q) & possibly (not-p & q) & possibly (p & q). One consequence of this change is that 
the paradox of the material conditional not-p, therefore if p then q, is argued to be invalid, 
because the model used to represent not-p does not guarantee that all the models used to 
represent the material conditional are possible. Or-introduction is declared invalid for the same 
reason: the model for p does not establish that the three models for the disjunction are 
possible.  
The revision arguably has the advantage that the highly counterintuitive paradoxes are no 
longer considered valid. But it apparently entails inconsistent and counterintuitive 
consequences that make it not worth pursuing (for overviews see Baratgin et al., 2015; Cruz, 
Over, & Oaksford, 2017; Oaksford, Over, & Cruz, 2018). For example, if or-introduction is 
invalid, then so is and-elimination, p & q, therefore p, because the two inferences can be 
derived from one another by De Morgan's rules. But and-elimination remains valid in the 
revised MMT, as the models of the premise do establish that the model for the conclusion is 
possible. The claim that or-introduction is invalid may be based on experiments with binary 
paradigm instructions, showing that it is then endorsed less often than other valid inferences 
(e.g. Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012). But under probabilistic instructions, asking people 
directly about their degrees of belief, or-introduction is accepted to the same degree as and-
elimination, and to a much higher degree than the paradoxes of the material conditional (Cruz 
et al., 2017). Further, if p, therefore p or q is invalid, then the premise p should be consistent 
with the negation of the conclusion, not-(p or q), which is equivalent by De Morgan's rules to 
not-p & not-q. But MMT continues to consider two statements consistent when they have at 
least one model in common, and p does not share any model with not-p & not-q (Baratgin et 
al., 2015). 
It is also not clear what Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) mean when they state that or-
introduction is invalid "in MMT". An inference is valid or invalid within a specific logical 
system. This might be classical logic, probability logic, or a new logic defined for MMT. But 
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the theory would have to specify either a known logical system on which it bases itself when 
making assertions about validity, or specify its own provably consistent system, or substitute 
for "validity" a non-logical term to characterise inferences, e.g. "endorsed often by most 
people". In the current formulation of the theory, it is unclear whether the proposals made 
about validity are at the computational or the algorithmic level (c.f. Oaksford et al., 2018).  
MMT is referred to at points in the interpretation of the results of the thesis, but there are 
perhaps two main reasons why the theory has no strong bearing on the work of the thesis as a 
whole. The first is that the mental model account of reasoning with probabilities has not yet 
been specified for relations more complex than that between a set and a subset. This means 
that it is not clear, for example, how the probabilities of two-premise inferences, like the 
conditional syllogisms, could be transferred in a principled way to the conclusion. The second 
is that the current revision of MMT raises many questions that make it difficult to derive 
predictions from it. However, the revision is still under development, and removing the 
apparent inconsistencies may be a part of that process, with the implications for reasoning 
from uncertain premises becoming clearer over time.  
 
 
DUAL-COMPONENT THEORIES 
 
This thesis uses the term "dual-component theories" to refer summarily to dual-process 
theories of thinking (De Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2011; 
Trippas et al., 2017; Verschueren et al., 2005), and to theories postulating two factors in 
reasoning that do not map clearly onto the dual-process distinction, for example two sources of 
information used for reasoning (Klauer et al., 2010; Singmann & Klauer, 2011; Singmann et 
al., 2014), or two strategies in reasoning (Markovits, Brisson, & Chantal, 2015).  
Arguably the most central assumption of dual-process theories is that reasoning, or 
cognition more generally, takes place at two levels of awareness, reflexivity, or overt attention. 
In line with this, type 1 processes have often been described as intuitive and type 2 processes 
as reflective (Evans, 2010).   
The distinction between intuitive and reflective processes is drawn at the algorithmic 
level, i.e. it is concerned with people's awareness of the representations and processes that they 
use in reasoning, rather than with the nature of the task they set out to solve when engaged in 
reasoning. As such, it is orthogonal to the probabilistic approach, whose proposals have until 
now been focussed at the computational level (Oaksford & Chater, 2012). One can see this in 
the example of Evans' dual process theory, which, as he points out, started off in the binary 
paradigm and then evolved into the probabilistic one (Evans, 2012, p. 21). However, once in 
the probabilistic approach, dual-process theories can of course contribute greatly to it, and 
provide much needed algorithmic level proposals to complement the computational level ones 
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(Bonnefon, 2013; Elqayam & Over, 2013). There seems to be ample evidence for a distinction 
between intuitive and reflective processes, not least in the form of the evidence that cognitive 
processes differ in their dependence on working memory and attention resources (Evans, 
2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
A further distinction often made in dual-process theories (Evans, 2003; 2012, p. 16; 
Trippas et al., 2017; Verschueren et al., 2005), though also studied its own right (Klauer et al., 
2010; Markovits et al., 2015; Singmann & Klauer, 2011), is between "deductive", "logical", or 
"form-based" reasoning on the one hand, and "inductive", "probabilistic", or "belief based" 
reasoning on the other. This is a distinction at the computational level, as it concerns the 
norms defining correct inferences, or definitions of the task, that people use in reasoning. In 
what follows, the distinction between intuitive and reflective reasoning will be called levels of 
reasoning, and the distinction between "logical" and "probabilistic" reasoning will be called 
forms of reasoning. A question raised in this thesis concerns the consequences for the above 
forms of reasoning of generalising deduction to degrees of belief, so that logical reasoning can 
itself be probabilistic.  
 
 
"Logic" vs. "belief" in dual-component theories 
 
Evans (2012, p. 22) argued that when dual process theories were first developed in the binary 
paradigm, they "originally attempted to find a theoretical basis for the observed competition 
between logical and non-logical processing in paradigms such as syllogistic belief bias" (see 
also Evans et al., 2009, p. 78). As mentioned above, belief bias refers to the finding that, under 
binary paradigm instructions, people's evaluations of the conclusions of inferences seem to be 
influenced not only by whether the inferences are deductively valid or not, but also by whether 
the conclusions, given the premises, or the conclusions taken on their own, are believable or 
unbelievable. By allocating the "logical" responses, in the sense of classical binary logic, to 
type 2 processing, and the "belief based" responses to type 1 processing, the perceived 
discrepancy between the two could arguably be accounted for. 
Evans' earlier dual-process account (Evans, 2003, 2006) proposed that type 1 processes 
are heuristic and draw on evolved behavioural tendencies, mechanisms of associative learning 
and world knowledge (c.f. Sloman, 1996; 2014). Type 1 processes were said to be responsible 
for building a semantic representation of the premises, and if possible cue an initial 
conclusion. This initial conclusion was supposed to be based on a single mental representation 
relevant for the task. Type 2 processes were proposed to be rule-based and have the exclusive 
ability to compute deductive relations. Also, only type 2 processes were said to draw on 
working memory resources, allowing people to reason about abstract and novel materials. The 
role of type 2 processes was to potentially intervene to revise the initial response, depending 
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on whether or not the initial response satisficed, or worked well enough, for the purposes of 
the task. This form of interaction between type 1 and type 2 processes is called default-
interventionism. In later versions of the theory, the only defining difference between type 1 
and type 2 processes was proposed to be the involvement of working memory, with the 
concomitant ability to solve novel reasoning tasks (Evans, 2017; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
The dual-source model of Klauer, Singmann, and colleagues (Klauer et al., 2010; 
Singmann & Klauer, 2011; Singmann et al., 2014) also draws a contrast between a binary 
"logic based" and a probabilistic "belief based" component in reasoning, but it is concerned 
with forms and not levels of reasoning, and so is not a dual-process theory. Drawing on earlier 
work by Liu et al. (1996), it proposed that people use two sources of evidence, or information, 
when evaluating conditional syllogisms: logical form and prior knowledge (Klauer et al., 
2010). The form component was measured as the observed pattern of acceptance of the four 
conditional syllogisms under binary paradigm instructions. The knowledge component was 
measured by drawing on accounts of conditional syllogisms within the probabilistic approach 
(Oaksford et al., 2000; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009).  
The conceptual distinction between two sources of information in reasoning, one based 
on logical form and the other on premise content, seems perfectly consistent with the 
probabilistic approach, where logical form can be related to coherence constraints, and 
premise content to premise probabilities. Such a mapping between accounts is more difficult 
in later formulations of the theory, in which the form component is identified with deductive 
reasoning, and the knowledge component with inductive reasoning (Singmann & Klauer, 
2011). The mapping is also more difficult when considering how the components are 
measured. The probabilistic theories used to model the knowledge component are defined at 
the computational level, and are logical theories in a wide sense. These theories set coherence 
constraints on deductive reasoning. The context and content of the premises can be used to 
refine these constraints further up to a point value for the conclusion (Oaksford et al., 2000). 
From this perspective, it is not clear what is being measured by the form component that is not 
already entailed by the knowledge component (c.f. Singmann et al., 2014).  
The dual-strategy account of Markovits et al. (2015), originally formulated within a dual-
process framework (Verschueren et al., 2005) but then generalised, again contrasts a "logic 
based" component with a "belief based" component. The "logic based" component is 
characterised as a binary deductive reasoning strategy based on the search for specific 
counterexamples to a conclusion, as proposed in MMT. The "belief based" component is 
characterised as an inductive, statistical strategy, based on estimating the overall frequency of 
counterexamples to a conclusion. The theory proposes that people use the statistical strategy 
by default, but that the choice between strategies also depends on factors such as task 
instructions, cognitive capacity, and metacognitive control (Markovits et al., 2013).  
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An argument emphasised in this thesis is that the dichotomy between "logic" and belief" 
in dual-component theories is unnecessary once logic is generalised to cover degrees of belief.  
Given that this generalisation exists, it is worth exploring its implications for the components 
proposed to be involved in reasoning.  
 
 
Breaking the association of "logic" to type 2 and "belief" to type 1 processes 
 
The allocation of binary "logic" to type 2 processes, and probabilistic "belief" to type 1 
processes, was broken up by findings from Handley, Trippas and colleagues (Handley, 
Newstead, & Trippas, 2011; Trippas et al., 2017). Building on earlier work by Rips (2001), 
they showed that in belief bias tasks, not only does the believability of an inference interfere 
with judgments of validity, but the validity of an inference also interferes with judgments of 
believability. For simple logical inferences, validity was even found to interfere more with 
judgments of believability than believability interfered with judgments of validity (Handley et 
al., 2011; Trippas et al., 2017). This is contrary to the default-interventionist assumption that 
the computation of logical structure is limited to reflective type 2 processes. If the response 
cued by type 1 processes is never logical, then it is hard to explain why when the instructions 
ask for a believability and not a validity judgment, validity still has an influence on people's 
responses. The authors proposed that instead, intuitive and reflective processes operate in 
parallel. Both intuitive and reflective processes are said to cue responses based on both logical 
structure and beliefs (Handley & Trippas, 2015). The resulting redundancy is considered 
advantageous because it is said to lead to more robust responses in non-conflict cases. In cases 
of conflict between responses based on logical structure and responses based on beliefs, the 
prevailing response type is said to be a function of the complexity of the computations 
required for each. For example, it is held that simple logical relations like MP interfere more 
with belief based responses than do more complex relations like MT (Trippas et al., 2017).  
In the above proposal it does not seem clear what role is being fulfilled by dividing "logic 
based" and "belief based" computations into heuristic and reflective ones. But more generally, 
the theory shares with the dual-component theories described earlier the assumption of a 
dichotomy between binary logic on the one side, and probabilistic beliefs on the other. This 
seems entirely unnecessary from the perspective of the probabilistic approach given that logic 
can also be probabilistic.  
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Breaking the "logic" vs. "belief" dichotomy itself 
 
The binary paradigm dichotomy between "logic" and "belief" is left aside in the dual-process 
theory of De Neys (De Neys, 2012, 2014). De Neys takes into account that both classical logic 
and probability theory are general, computational level frameworks for reasoning, and refers 
to them summarily as "logic". This use of the term was also advocated by Ramsey 
(1926/1990) and de Finetti (1972), who referred to probability theory as the "logic of partial 
belief" and the "logic of uncertainty", respectively. Logical computations in this generalised 
sense are contrasted with heuristics based on semantic and stereotypical associations (De 
Neys, 2012), making it possible to extend the study of dual-processes to tasks in which what is 
considered a bias refers to a departure from the principles of probability theory, as in studies of 
the conjunction fallacy, base rate neglect, or the bat and ball problem (De Neys, 2014).  
In a series of experiments, De Neys and colleagues found evidence that people are 
sensitive to the principles of both binary logic and probability theory in an apparently 
intuitive, implicit way, even when this is not reflected in their overt responses. For example, in 
experimental conditions in which a logic based response conflicts with a heuristic based 
response and people's response sides with the heuristic, people nonetheless show longer 
response times (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), lower confidence in their responses (De Neys, 
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011), a higher skin conductance response (De Neys, Moyens, & 
Vansteenwegen, 2010), and higher activation in the anterior cingulate cortex, involved in error 
monitoring (De Neys et al., 2008). These effects did not depend on reasoning accuracy (De 
Neys et al., 2010), and were not affected by working memory load (Franssens & De Neys, 
2009), suggesting that the detection of a conflict between logical and heuristic responses is 
implicit and effortless. The effortlessness of conflict detection in turn suggests that 
interindividual differences in response choice appear to be based, not on the ability to detect a 
conflict between a logical and a heuristic response, but on the ability to inhibit the heuristic 
response (De Neys et al., 2008; see also Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010, on interpreting belief 
bias as a response bias). These findings provide further evidence against a default-
interventionist account of the interaction between type 1 and type 2 processes, at least when 
associating "beliefs" with the former and "logic" with the later.  
From a theoretical perspective, De Neys (2012) argued that, in default-interventionist 
accounts, it is hard to explain how reflective type 2 processes can determine whether the 
initial, intuitive response is good enough for the task at hand, or whether there should be 
intervention to revise it, without already being engaged, at least to some extent, from the 
beginning. But for parallel processing accounts arguing that reflective processes are indeed 
engaged from the beginning, it may be hard to explain why this parallel engagement is not a 
waste of resources. He proposed a third option, called a logical intuition model, in which 
intuitive type 1 processes can cue both logical responses – in a wider sense that includes 
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responses conforming to probability theory – and heuristic responses based on semantic and 
stereotypical associations. Reflective type 2 processes come into play when there is a conflict 
between an intuitive logical and an intuitive heuristic response. The role of type 2 processes 
then seems to be to try to resolve this conflict to keep the individual functioning, even if the 
result will not invariably favour the logic based response (De Neys, 2012; c.f. Oaksford & 
Chater, 2011; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Trippas et al., 2017).  
The above proposal is in line with the dual-process theory proposed by Oaksford, Chater 
and colleagues (Oaksford & Chater, 2011, 2012; Oaksford & Hall, 2016). Their account is 
fully probabilistic, and posits that the main difference between intuitive and reflective 
processing is that the first relies on long-term memory and the second on working memory. 
The role of working memory in this single function, dual-process account is similar to that in 
the present account of Evans (Evans & Stanovitch, 2013): it makes it possible to selectively 
restrict the information considered when making an inference to fulfil specific task goals, and 
engage in hypothetical and counterfactual thinking (Oaksford & Chater, 2012).  
Deviations of people's responses from the conclusions sanctioned by probability theory 
are said to arise for instance when people draw on information from long term memory to 
determine their degree of belief in the premises. They might thereby include information that 
is not part of the premises, or that misses something that is part of the premises, with 
corresponding differences in their degree of belief in the conclusion (Oaksford & Chater, 
2012). Divergences from probabilistic principles are also said to occur when, due to working 
memory limitations, people forget relevant information in the process of drawing inferences, 
or distort their degrees of belief in premises and conclusion when attempting to verbalise them 
using the discrete tools of language (Oaksford & Hall, 2016). But the verbalisation of people's 
inferential processes brings with it the advantage that they can be recorded and shared with 
others, who can then help us consider alternative interpretations and solutions in rational 
discourse (Oaksford & Hall, 2016).   
Leaving aside the binary paradigm contrast between "logic" and "belief" makes it 
possible for dual-component theories to be integrated with the probabilistic approach, offering 
new ways of interpreting findings and formulating research questions. For example, belief bias 
can be reinterpreted as an effect of deductive reasoning from uncertain premises, in spite of 
instructions to artificially assume the premises to be certain. It is then an open question 
whether people show belief bias in a wider sense, in which they move outside of probabilistic 
deduction by violating coherence constraints. Similarly, it could be assessed whether 
differences in responses under binary paradigm vs. probabilistic instructions can be usefully 
understood as concerning the difference between certainty preservation and probability 
preservation, rather than between deduction and induction.  
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Generalising deduction to inferences from degrees of belief has possible implications for dual-
component theories of thinking, but before investigating these, it is necessary to examine 
whether this generalisation is descriptively adequate. That deduction can be generalised to 
probabilities in formal logic (Ramsey, 1926/1990, p. 82) does not of course imply that people 
will actually use deduction in a probabilistic way. The role of coherence and p-validity in 
people's reasoning has only started to be investigated empirically (Evans, Thompson, & Over, 
2015; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005, 2009; Singmann et al., 2014), but this investigation is the focus 
of the following ten experiments.  
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METHODOLOGICAL POINTS RELEVANT ACROSS EXPERIMENTS 
 
 
Above-chance coherence 
 
The main dependent variable in most of the experiments of the thesis was above-chance 
coherence, i. e. the extent to which the observed rate of coherent responses was higher than 
expected by chance. It was computed using a method introduced by Evans et al. (2015; see 
also Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009; Politzer & Baratgin, 2016). The observed rate of coherence 
responses was computed by creating a binary variable taking the value 1 when a response was 
coherent, and the value 0 when it was incoherent. For the one-premise inferences investigated 
here, the response to a valid inference is coherent when the probability assigned to the 
conclusion is equal to or higher than the probability assigned to the premise. Conversely, for 
the one-premise inferences investigated, the response to an invalid inference is coherent when 
the probability assigned to the conclusion is equal to or lower than the probability assigned to 
the premise.  
This binary variable for observed coherence was then compared to a variable representing 
the chance rate of a coherent response, chance coherence. On the assumption that a random 
response can fall equally likely on any point of the probability scale, the probability of 
complying to coherence by chance corresponds to the width of the coherence interval. This is 
a simplifying assumption, for probability estimates could be based on sampling procedures 
that lead to higher chance rates for extreme cases (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006), and 
otherwise random responses could still show response tendencies towards the middle or the 
extreme of the scale. However, we considered a uniform distribution of chance rates a 
sufficiently accurate approximation to allow an assessment of the hypotheses at hand. On this 
assumption, if a person assigns for instance a probability of .6 to the premise of the valid 
inference of or-introduction, then the probability they assign to the conclusion is coherent if it 
falls within the interval between .6 and 1. Because the width of this interval is .4, the chance 
rate of conforming to coherence in this case is also .4. The values for above-chance coherence 
were obtained by subtracting the values for chance coherence from those for observed 
coherence for each participant and condition.  
 
 
Linear mixed models 
 
Above-chance coherence was used as the dependent variable in a series of linear mixed 
models. Linear mixed models (LMMs) can be considered a special case of multilevel linear 
models (MLMs), which are themselves generalizations of regression models (and hence also 
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of ANOVA's). In a MLM, the variance in the data can be partitioned into different levels of 
aggregation. For example, at level 1 could be the variance in individual responses of a student, 
at level 2 the variance in mean responses of the students in a classroom, and at level 3 the 
variance in mean responses of the classrooms in a school (Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot, 
2018; Snijders & Bosker, 2012; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Being able to distinguish variance in the data at different levels of aggregation is 
important when the variance within a unit (e. g. within individuals, or within classrooms) is 
smaller than the variance between units. For example, when different responses of the same 
person are more similar to each other than they are to the responses of a different person, or 
when test results are more similar for students within the same classroom than for students of 
different classrooms. When this is the case, the independence of errors assumption for 
ordinary linear regression is violated. As a result, analysing the data at the individual level 
without taking its hierarchical structure into account can lead to dramatical alpha error 
inflation rates, because the analysis is based on too many degrees of freedom that are not truly 
independent (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Moreover, possible differences in the pattern of the data between levels of aggregation 
can make it impossible to extrapolate conclusions from one level to another. An example is the 
ecological fallacy of drawing conclusions at the level of individuals on the basis of data 
patterns measured at the level of groups (Robinson, 1950; see also Te Grotenhuis, Eisinga, & 
Subramanian, 2011). Consider the case of the relationship between local language 
performance and number of years living in a location, for students in different cities of that 
location. Assume we have contingency tables summarising this relationship for each city. The 
correlation between language performance and language exposure at the individual level will 
be based on the data within each contingency table. In contrast, the same correlation at the city 
level will be based on the marginals of each table. But the marginals of a contingency table do 
not uniquely determine the values within it (Robinson, 1950). Therefore the correlation at the 
individual level can be positive, while the correlation at the city level may be negative (e. g. if 
people arriving more recently to the location tend to live in larger cities, where average values 
of language proficiency are higher) (Te Grotenhuis et al., 2011). The fact that a statistical 
correlation can be positive at one level of aggregation and negative at another has been 
referred to as Simpson's paradox, or Simpson's reversals (Malinas & Bigelow, 2016).  
Discussions of the ecological fallacy, or of Simpson's paradox, sometimes revolve around 
the question of which level of aggregation is the most adequate to draw on for data 
interpretation. But when the pattern in the data is different at different levels of aggregation, 
this can be interesting in itself, and the different levels can be analysed and related, instead of 
having to choose between them. This can be done with MLM.  
In a MLM, the assumption of independence of errors is not required. The degree to which 
the variance within units of analysis is smaller than that between units is instead included 
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explicitly in the model. This is done by allowing the intercepts (means) and slopes (IV-DV 
relationships) for the regression equation at one level (e. g. students) to vary at the next highest 
level of aggregation (e. g. classrooms). This variability is then modelled by treating the 
intercept and slope for the regression equation at one level as the DVs in a regression equation 
at the next highest level. For example, if one is measuring student achievement (individual 
level DV) as a function of student motivation (individual level IV), then one can allow mean 
student achievement (intercept), as well as the relation between student achievement and 
student motivation (slope), to vary between classrooms.  
A MLM allows predictors to be included at each level of analysis. For example, student 
achievement could be predicted by student motivation at the individual level, by teacher 
emphasis on homework at the class level, and by school poverty at the school level. It is 
possible to assess cross-level interactions, for example, the interaction between teacher 
emphasis on homework and student motivation in predicting student achievement. And it is 
possible to assess interactions between an intercept and a slope, as opposed to only 
interactions between slopes. For example, the relationship between student achievement and 
student motivation may vary as a function of school poverty level (Tabachnich & Fidell, 
2007). Overall, this means that MLMs not only allow one to avoid errors in interpretation 
resulting from not taking the nested structure of the data into account, but they also make it 
possible to test hypotheses that could not be formulated in ordinary regression or ANOVA 
analyses.  
The present work draws on a special case of multilevel linear models (MLM): linear 
mixed models (LMM). These are models in which the variance in the data is partitioned into 
different levels of aggregation, but not all higher level units are nested within each other. For 
example, assume a school takes pupils from different neighbourhoods. Then the students of 
this school will be nested within classrooms, and within neighbourhoods, but the classrooms 
and the neighbourhoods will not themselves be nested – they are instead said to be crossed 
(Hox et al., 2018, Ch. 9; Snijders & Bosker, 2012, Ch. 13).  
The modelling of crossed random effects is useful in situations like the above example, in 
which students are nested in classrooms but also in neighbourhoods, or when students attend 
more than one school during the time period assessed by a study. But an important further 
field of application is to experimental settings in which individual responses are nested within 
participants and within items, but the participants and the items are not themselves nested. 
Using a LMM in this case makes it possible to treat both participants and items as random 
variables, and therefore to increase the generalizability of the results without having to 
compute separate by participant and by item analyses (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; 
Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). This is the context in which the method is used in the present 
thesis. 
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Because MLMs are more complicated to compute, and sometimes to interpret, than 
ordinary linear regression or ANOVA, it makes sense to ask when it is worth the effort. In 
earlier work on the topic, it was often recommended that researchers explicitly check whether 
the hierarchical structure of the data actually makes a difference in the case of the sample at 
hand. If for each level of aggregation, the variance within groups is not smaller than that 
between groups (and hence the so called intra-class correlation is low), then it was considered 
sufficient to analyse the data using ordinary linear regression or ANOVA. Similarly, if the 
inclusion of a random intercept or slope in the model did not significantly improve model fit, 
or its effect was not large enough to be statistically significant, then it was considered 
unnecessary to include it (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
More recently, it has been instead recommended that researchers include in the model the 
maximum random effect structure justified by the design (Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, 
& Tily, 2013). This is because there are cases in which a random effect is too small to be 
statistically significant, but its exclusion nonetheless leads to significant biases in the pattern 
of results and their interpretation. The present thesis follows these more recent 
recommendations.  
For the experimental designs used, this means that random intercepts for participants and 
for item scenarios were included in the model when possible. It was not possible to do so in 
each analysis because there were cases in which the ratio of participants to model parameters 
would have been too small – particularly in follow-up tests to interaction effects. When it was 
possible to include one random intercept but not both, the intercept for participants was given 
priority. It was generally not possible to include random slopes, because there were generally 
no, or not sufficient, repeated observations within each cell of the design. In most cases, each 
participant provided a single response for each design cell, and similarly, each item scenario 
was associated with a single design cell per participant. This allowed the inclusion of further 
experimental variables in the design without making an experiment prohibitively long. 
However, it had the drawback that any variance in slopes could not be distinguished from the 
error variance, and so could not be modelled separately. In the words of Barr: "If observations 
are not replicated (i.e., there is only a single observation per unit per cell), random slope 
variance cannot be distinguished from random error variance and thus random slopes need not 
be included" (Barr, 2013, p. 1; see also Baayen et al., 2008). 
Perhaps partly because of the ability of MLMs to differentiate more precisely between 
sources of variation, it is not yet straightforward to compute measures of explained variance, 
or of effect size, in MLMs. An immediate difficulty arises when it comes to determining the 
sample size to use for such a computation, because sample sizes mostly differ between each 
level of aggregation. Further, MLMs assume that the data has been obtained by successive 
random sampling: sampling a number of groups from a population of potential groups, and 
then sampling a number of individuals from each group. When under these circumstances a 
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variable added to the model explains variance at level 1, it can also be expected to explain 
some variance at level 2. If the amount of explained variance at each level differs from that 
expected by the assumption of successive random sampling, this can lead to the occurrence of 
negative values for explained variance, which do not make sense (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).  
Various correction formulas have been developed for this, but it appears that all still 
sometimes lead to counterintuitive results (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). For this reason the 
present work will restrict itself to providing confidence intervals for statistical results and their 
graphical representation. 
Two further technical decision points in the use of MLM are the estimation method and 
the type of covariance matrix. The present analyses used Maximum Likelihood estimation 
(ML), as opposed to restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation (reML). ML is considered to 
be more robust and to yield more precise estimates than reML, although reML is considered to 
yield more unbiased estimates. But the principal reason for choosing ML over reML was that 
only ML allows the statistical comparison of nested models using likelihood ratio tests. This is 
useful when an effect is only marginally significant. The effect can then not only be tested 
individually within a given model, but also by comparing the fit of two nested models, one 
with and one without the effect included.  In general, marginal effects on both sides of the 
significance threshold were complemented with likelihood ratio tests and an inspection of 
confidence intervals, and were interpreted with caution.  
The covariance structure used in the analyses was always unstructured, reflecting the fact 
that no prior assumptions were made about its form. In all analyses, predictors were centred 
around their grand mean to avoid issues of collinearity when computing interactions.  
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: IFS AND ORS
5
 
 
The first studies investigating whether people's probability judgments are coherent above 
chance levels focussed on conditional syllogisms (Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 2014). 
They found people to be coherent above chance levels for MP and to a lesser degree for DA, 
but not for MT and AC. On the other hand, studies on whether people's assessment of the 
probability of a (simple or complex) statement and of its negation sum up to 1 have found 
strong evidence for coherence (e. g. Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016; Klauer et al., 2010). The 
difference in these two groups of findings may be explained as an effect of task complexity: 
That a probability and its complement sum to 1 is a basic principle of probability theory, 
which can be applied to the more complex case of deriving a conclusion probability for a two-
                                                          
5
 The majority of the data from this experiment was published using an ANOVA analysis in a 
collaborative paper with Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford, and David Over (Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & 
Over, 2015).  
111 
 
premise inference. If people are sensitive to the constraint of coherence but fail to comply with 
it when task complexity increases, then one would expect response coherence to be more 
reliably above chance level for simpler one-premise inferences. Unlike two-premise 
inferences, one-premise inferences do not require the integration of premise probabilities. This 
simplifies their coherence intervals, which, for the inferences studied in this experiment, go 
either from the probability of the premise to 1 (in the case of p-valid inferences) or from the 
probability of the premise to 0 (in the case of p-invalid inferences).  
This experiment assessed the coherence of responses to the eight one-premise 
inferences in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1. The inferences used in Experiment 1. 
 Name Form 
1 OrIf1 p or q, therefore if not-p then q 
2 OfIf2 not-p or q, therefore if p then q 
3 IfOr1 if p then q, therefore not-p or q 
4 IfOr2 if not-p then q, therefore p or q 
5 OrI1 p, therefore p or q 
6 OrI2 not-p, therefore not-p or q 
7 OrI3 q, therefore p or q 
8 OrI4 q, therefore not-p or q 
 
Inferences 1 and 2 are logically equivalent, as are inferences 3 and 4, as well as 
inferences 5 to 8, respectively. However, the equivalence of inferences 5 and 6 on the one 
hand, with inferences 7 and 8 on the other, presupposes the fact that the disjunction p or q is 
commutative, so that p or q = q or p. Apart from this, the sets of equivalent inferences differ 
only in the position of the negation they contain. The positions of the negation used are those 
for which the largest negation effects have been reported in the literature (Espino & Byrne, 
2013; Oberauer et al., 2011). The above variants of equivalent inferences were introduced in 
order to control for negation and order effects.   
Inferences 1 and 2 are logically equivalent or-to-if inferences, going from a disjunction to 
a conditional. When the natural language conditional in these inferences is interpreted as the 
material conditional, the premise and the conclusion are equivalent, and then judgments are 
only coherent when the premise and the conclusion are assigned the same probability, P(if p 
then q) = P(not-p or q). When the conditional is interpreted as the probability conditional, P(if 
p then q) = P(q|p), judgments are coherent when they conform to the relation P(q|p)  P(not-p 
or q); that is, when the probability of the conclusion is equal to or lower than the probability of 
the premise. 
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Inferences 3 and 4 are logically equivalent if-to-or inferences, going from a conditional to 
a disjunction. Under the assumption that if p then q is equivalent to the material conditional, 
premise and conclusion again have the same probability P(if p then q) = P(not-p or q),  and 
any other probability judgment is incoherent. Under the assumption that if p then q is the 
probability conditional, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), it follows from the axioms of probability 
theory that P(q|p)  P(not-p or q), and probability judgments must conform to this relation to 
be coherent. Hence the relation that must hold for the inferences to be coherent is the same for 
inferences 3 & 4 as for inferences 1 & 2. The difference is that in the first two the conditional 
is the conclusion, and in the second two the conditional is the premise. 
Overall, this implies that if one interprets the conditional as the probability conditional, 
the if-to-or inference is coherent when the probability of the conclusion is equal to or higher 
than the probability of the premise, and the or-to-if inference is coherent when the probability 
of the conclusion is equal to or lower than the probability of the premise.  
The difference in the conditions for coherence of the two inferences is reflected in the fact 
that under a probability conditional interpretation, the if-to-or inference is p-valid, whereas the 
or-to-if inference is p-invalid and can even be a quite weak inference. Consider an instance of 
inference 5. We might have a high degree of confidence that our bicycle is outside our 
apartment in Paris where we left it. That should, if we are coherent in the or-introduction 
inference, give us a high degree of confidence that our bicycle is outside our apartment in 
Paris or in Antarctica. But we do not have any confidence that, if our bicycle is not outside our 
apartment in Paris, then it is in Antarctica. It is much more reasonable to infer that, if our bike 
is not there, it is somewhere else in Paris after being stolen. Gilio and Over (2012) have an 
analysis of when inferences 1 & 2 are, and are not, reasonable inferences to make, and Over, 
Evans, & Elqayam (2010) have supporting findings.  
Inferences 5 and 6 are equivalent forms of the p-valid inference of or-introduction. As 
such, any probability assignment to the conclusion is coherent when it is equal to or higher 
than the probability of the premise. This is analogous to the treatment of the inference in 
classical logic, where the conclusion validly follows from the premise if and only if it is true in 
every instance in which the premise is true. Inferences 7 and 8 are also equivalent forms of or-
introduction, and differ from inferences 5 and 6 only with regard to whether the statement in 
the premise refers to the first or the second element of the disjunctive conclusion. The results 
for inferences 7 and 8 were not reported in Cruz et al. (2015) due to space constraints. 
Studies within the binary paradigm found that people endorse or-introduction less often 
than other logically valid inferences (Braine, Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Orenes & Johnson-
Laird, 2012; Rips, 1983). This finding has generally been explained as a pragmatic effect: 
people are unwilling to draw the inference because it would be misleading in a conversation to 
say p or q when one can make the more informative statement p (Grice, 1989; see also Bar-
Hillel & Neter, 1993; Fugard, Pfeifer, & Mayerhofer, 2011; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012; 
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Tversky & Köhler, 1994;). If we map the response "true" to "P(conclusion) = 1" and the 
response "false" to "P(conclusion) = 0", then the failure to endorse or-introduction can be said 
to reveal incoherence in reasoning about it. However, as argued by Cruz et al. (2015), the 
probabilistic approach predicts that this incoherence is likely to be reduced when people are 
asked directly for their degree of belief in the conclusion, given their degree of belief in the 
premise, as opposed to stating whether the conclusion necessarily has to be true assuming the 
truth of the premise. This is because asking directly about a person's degrees of belief may 
lessen pragmatic effects based on what is, or is not, misleading in an open conversation with 
another person (including an experimenter). One prediction for this experiment is thus that 
people's responses for or-introduction will be coherent above chance levels. 
Because the question of whether people's responses to the or-to-if inference are coherent 
depends on how the conditional is interpreted, this experiment not only investigates response 
coherence in general. It also tells us something about the modal interpretation of the 
conditional. If people's judgments are highly incoherent for one interpretation, yet highly 
coherent for another, there is an argument in favour of the interpretation that renders their 
judgments coherent.  
Thus, this experiment made an assessment of whether people's judgments for the 
inference forms of Table 5.1 are coherent above chance levels, and a comparison between the 
material conditional and the probability conditional interpretation of natural language 
conditionals. A third question investigated was whether people's sensitivity to coherence is 
something that requires an explicit focus of attention on the statements in an inference 
(Oberauer, 2013), with explicit reasoning about what the probability of a premise statement 
implies for the probability of a conclusion statement; or whether the establishment of 
coherence is something that occurs spontaneously and implicitly, even in the absence of an 
explicit reasoning task (Evans et al., 2015).  
To assess the third question, participants were divided into an inferences group and a 
statements group. Participants in the inferences group were shown all the statements 
composing an inference (i. e. the premises and the conclusion of the inference) together on the 
same screen. They received the explicit instruction to reason about the implications of the 
probability of the premise for the probability of the conclusion. In the statements group, the 
statements that had served as premise and conclusion for the inferences group were presented 
one at a time on the screen, in random order. Participants in this group were simply asked to 
rate their degree of belief in each statement.   
Evans et al. (2015) used a similar manipulation in a lab experiment with conditional 
syllogisms, and found that responses were more often coherent above chance levels in the 
inferences group than in the statements group. A small difference between the experimental 
design in Evans et al. and the present experiment was that in Evans et al., participants in the 
statements group were not shown all statements in random order. Instead, the statements were 
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first sorted into two groups: a group of conditional statements on the one side, and a group 
containing the antecedents and consequents of these conditionals (which in the inferences 
group served as the minor premises and conclusions of inferences) on the other. Participants 
were asked to rate the probabilities of the statements within each statement group separately.  
This task grouping variable assessed whether the effect of task found in Evans et al. 
(2015) could be replicated in an internet experiment using simpler one-premise inferences. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 1140 participants from English speaking countries completed the online experiment 
in exchange for € 1. Among them, 566 completed one of the eight booklets of the inferences 
group, and 305 completed one of the two booklets of the statements group. Participants were 
removed from the sample if they indicated being younger than 18 or having only "basic" 
English language skills, if they provided the same responses across all trials, or if they had one 
or more trial response times of 2 seconds or less. The final sample had the following 
characteristics for each group. The inferences group consisted of 456 participants. Their 
median age was 33 (range (18-78), and they reported a variety of levels of formal educational 
training. The final sample for the statements group consisted of 204 participants. Their median 
age was 36 (range 18-72), and they also reported a variety of levels of formal educational 
training.  
 
Material and design 
Participants were shown a short scenario describing a person, and then presented with a series 
of statements about the person. In the statements group, these statements appeared one at a 
time on the screen, in random order for each participant. In the inferences group, the 
statements were presented in pairs as premises and conclusions of explicit inferences. 
Participants in the statements group were asked to judge how confident they were in each 
statement, by typing in a percentage between 0% ("no confidence at all") and 100% 
("complete confidence"). Participants in the inferences group were asked to judge how 
confident they were in the premise of the argument, and then how confident they were in the 
conclusion, given the premise. Participants in the inferences group used the same percentage 
scale as those in the statements group to provide their answers.  
Two scenarios were varied between participants: The Linda scenario (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983) with the standard description of Linda, and a scenario describing a person 
conforming to a stereotype quite unlike that of Linda. The frame below shows a sample trial in 
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the statements group and in the inferences group, using the Linda scenario. The complete list 
of materials can be found in Appendix B.  
In the inferences group, participants judged each inference twice with different contents. 
One of the contents was typical for the scenario, and the other atypical. The allocation of 
scenario contents to inferences was counterbalanced across participants, leading to eight 
different booklets, four for each scenario. In the statements group, each participant rated the 
entire set of contents created for the relevant scenario, leading to two booklets, one for each 
scenario. In order to compensate for the difference in sample size between groups resulting 
from the different number of booklets in each group, a weight was placed on the otherwise 
random procedure for assigning participants to booklets, such that participants were twice as 
likely to receive any one of the booklets of the statements group than any one of the booklets 
of the inferences group. This resulted in sample sizes of n = 305 and n = 566 for the statements 
and inferences group, respectively.  
 
Statements group: 
Now consider the following statement about Linda: 
Please indicate how much confidence you would have in this statement. Please give a 
percentage rating from 0% (no confidence at all) to 100% (complete confidence). 
"Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green Party" 
 
Inferences group: 
Now consider the following argument about Linda: 
Next to A please indicate how much confidence you would have in the premise of the 
argument. Next to B please indicate how much confidence you would have in the conclusion, 
given the premise. Please give a percentage rating from 0% (no confidence at all) to 100% 
(complete confidence).  
A. "Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green Party." 
B. "Therefore, if Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then she votes for the Green Party." 
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place online using the platform CrowdFlower (c. f. Peer, Brandimarte, 
Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). On the first screen participants viewed the instructions and a 
sample trial. The next screen showed the scenario within which the statements, or respectively 
the inferences, were to be assessed. These then followed, presented one at a time on the 
screen. A further screen asked for demographical information, and a final screen provided 
debriefing information. The median duration of the experiment was 5.63 minutes in the 
inferences group, and 4.75 minutes in the statements group.   
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Results and discussion 
 
The values of observed and chance rate coherence are shown in Figure 5.1 for each inference 
and group. The corresponding values of above-chance coherence are shown in Figure 5.2. 
Above-chance coherence was entered as the dependent variable in a linear mixed model with 
group (statements, inferences) and inference (the 8 inferences of Table 5.1) as predictors. The 
model included random intercepts for participants and for scenarios.  
 
Figure 5.1. Observed and chance rate coherence for the eight inferences of Experiment 1, 
separately for each group. Error bars represent 95% CIs. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Above-chance coherence for the eight inferences of Experiment 1, separately for 
each group. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
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Overall responses were coherent 15% more often than expected by chance (F(1, 423.048, 
p = .002). Above-chance coherence did not differ between the two experimental groups 
(EMMstat  = .150, EMMinf  = .158, F(1, 561.790) = .422, p = .516). However, above-chance 
coherence differed between inferences (F(7, 13172.182) = 161.275, p < .001), and the size of 
the effect of inference differed between groups (F(7, 13172.182) = 3.618, p = .001).  
To examine further the interaction between inference and group, a series of inference 
specific analyses were performed. The comparisons included a random intercept for 
participants, but not for scenarios, because the more complex models that included a random 
intercept for scenarios failed to converge for the smaller sample sizes involved. 
For inference 1, coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .348, F(1, 492.682) = 
614.773, p < .001), and the extent of this effect did not differ between the statements and the 
inferences group (EMMstat = .363, EMMinf  = .332, F(1, 492.682) = 1.230, p = .268). For 
inference 2, coherence was also above chance levels (EMM = .342, F(1, 501.100) = 615.381, p 
< .001), and above-chance coherence did not differ between groups (EMMstat = .347, EMMinf  = 
.337, F(1, 501.100) = .135, p = .714).  
For inference 3 coherence was again above-chance levels (EMM = .040, F(1, 530.644) = 
10.373, p = .001), and above-chance coherence did not differ between groups (EMMstat  = .049, 
EMMinf = .031, F(1, 530.644) = .530, p = .467). The same pattern was observed for inference 
4: coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .166, F(1, 540.080) = 228.343, p < .001), and 
did not differ between groups (EMMstat = .161, EMMinf = .170, F(1, 540.080) = .200, p = .655).  
Inference 5 followed the same pattern: coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .109, 
F(1, 524.932) = 71.740, p < .001), and was similar for both groups (EMMstat  = .111, EMMinf = 
.107, F(1, 524.932) = .029, p = .866). Inference 6 was an exception to the above. Overall 
coherence was not significantly higher than expected by chance (EMM = .015, F(1, 520.720) = 
1.815, p = .178), but it differed between the two groups (EMMstat  = -.027, EMMinf = .058, F(1, 
520.720) = 13.739, p < .001). Follow-up analyses showed that responses were at chance level 
in the statements group (F(1, 204) = 2.554, p = .112), but were above chance in the inferences 
group (F(1, 456) = 14.827, p < .001).  
Inferences 7 and 8 followed a similar pattern as inferences 1 to 5. For inference 7, 
coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .147, F(1, 539.761) = 195.851, p < .001), and did 
not differ between groups (For inference 7: EMMstat  = .155, EMMinf = .140, F(1, 539.761) = 
.455, p = .500). For inference 8, coherence was also above chance levels (EMM = .066, F(1, 
570.824) = 32.081, p < .001), and was marginally, but not significantly, higher in the 
inferences group than in the statements group (EMMstat = .044, EMMinf = .088, F(1, 570.824) = 
.059, p = .059).  
Overall, for 7 of the 8 inferences responses were coherent above chance levels in both the 
statements and the inferences group, and the presence of an explicit inference task did not 
increase coherence further. For inference 6, coherence was at chance level in the statements 
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group but above chance level in the inferences group. Hence, in the one case out of eight in 
which coherence was not already above chance levels when judging the probability of 
statements in isolation, the presence of an explicit inference task did increase response 
coherence. This pattern of results is in accordance with that of Evans et al. (2015). The main 
difference seems to be that for the simpler one-premise inferences studied here, coherence was 
already above chance levels in most cases in the statements group, leaving less room for 
observing an effect of an explicit inference task.   
The confidence intervals in Figure 5.2 suggest that above-chance coherence was similar 
for the two equivalent inferences 1 and 2, but differed more strongly e. g. between the 
equivalent inferences 3 and 4. However, it would be difficult to interpret such differences in 
the current experiment. This is because the chance rate for a coherent response depended on 
the probability participants assigned to the premise, and so differed between inferences. The 
higher the chance rate, the more difficult it becomes to detect above-chance coherence when it 
is there. For example, Figure 5.2 shows that above-chance coherence was highest for 
inferences 1 and 2; but Figure 5.1 reveals that this was mainly because inferences 1 and 2 had 
a lower chance rate coherence, even though their observed coherence rate was similar to that 
of other inferences. Similarly, Figure 5.1 shows that the highest rate of observed coherence 
was found for inferences 1, 4 and 7; but differences in their chance rates meant that the rate of 
above-chance coherence, shown in Figure 5.2, differed strongly between the three inferences. 
This comparability issue will be discussed in more detail in Experiments 3 and 4. Ways to 
render coherence comparisons between inferences possible are explored in experiments 5 to 7.   
A further analysis was conducted for inferences 1 and 2: the or-to-if inferences p or q, 
therefore if not-p then q, and not-p or q, therefore if p then q. This analysis compared the 
material and the probability conditionals as accounts of people's modal understanding of 
conditionals. Above-chance coherence was computed again, but this time excluding from the 
probability interval for a coherent conclusion the cases in which premise and conclusion were 
assigned the same probability.  
It had been mentioned above that the coherence interval for the material conditional is 
respected only when the conditional and the disjunction have the same probability, whereas 
the coherence interval for the probability conditional is respected only when the probability of 
the conditional is equal to or lower than the probability of the disjunction. In this new 
computation of coherence, the overlapping area between the two intervals is excluded, so that 
a response is categorised as coherent only when it is coherent from the perspective of the 
probability conditional and incoherent from the perspective of the material conditional.  
If people follow a material conditional interpretation for inferences 1 and 2, then the 
mean difference between the premise and conclusion probability is expected to be zero. There 
may be some scattering of probabilities above and below zero, but no systematic drift in any 
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direction. In an analysis using the above new measure of coherence, one would therefore 
predict no effect of coherence, i. e. one would expect coherence to be at chance levels.  
If people follow a probability conditional interpretation for inferences 1 and 2, then one 
would predict probability assignments to the conclusion that are equal to or lower than the 
probabilities assigned to the premise. In an analysis using the above new measure of 
coherence, one would expect the effect of coherence to be weaker because it would exclude 
the subset of coherent responses for which premise and conclusion were assigned the same 
probability. It would even be compatible with a probability conditional interpretation that the 
effect of coherence ceases to be significant. In the latter case the analysis would be 
uninformative to the question at hand. However, a remaining effect of coherence in the 
expected direction would constitute specific evidence for a probability conditional 
interpretation and against a material conditional interpretation of the conditional.  
A linear mixed model on the new measure of above-chance coherence, with inference (1, 
2) and group (statements, inferences) as predictors, and participants as random intercepts, 
showed that responses were coherent 35% more often than expected by chance (F(1, 530.676) 
= 771.528, p < .001). No other effects were significant (all Fs < 1. For the effect of inference: 
EMM1 = .348, EMM2 = .342, F(1, 2761.313) = .147, p = .702. For the effect of group: EMMstat 
= .355, EMMinf = .334. For the interaction between inference and group, F(1, 2761.313) = 
.524, p = .469).  
Overall, coherence was above chance levels when considering as coherent only those 
responses that are coherent for the probability conditional and incoherent for the material 
conditional interpretation of the conditional.  
 
 
General discussion 
 
The present experiment extended the method introduced by Evans et al. (2015) for computing 
the extent to which people's conclusion probability judgments are coherent above the level that 
would be expected by chance (see also Politzer et al., 2016, for similar considerations 
developed independently for qualitative probability judgements). Evans et al. as well as 
Singmann et al. (2014) applied this method to conditional syllogisms, and found people to be 
coherent above chance levels mainly for MP (see Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009, for earlier 
convergent findings). Evans et al. argued that the special standing of MP in assessments of 
response coherence makes sense within the probabilistic approach. It is the inference at the 
centre of Bayes rule, and by extension, at the centre of dynamic reasoning by 
conditionalization. However, the ability to establish coherence between assertions is central to 
reasoning and decision making as a whole, as illustrated by the fact that it guarantees the 
avoidance of Dutch books (Vineberg, 2016). As such, it is far more general than the ability to 
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reason in accordance with Bayes rule. There is therefore a case for exploring people's 
sensitivity to coherence further before concluding that it may be restricted to the use of 
specific inferences like MP.  
The present experiment assessed above-chance coherence for a series of simpler one-
premise inferences, rather than for the conditional syllogisms. Replicating Evans et al. (2015), 
it had two task conditions. In the inferences task participants were asked to judge, for each 
inference, the probability of the premise, and the probability of the conclusion given the 
premise. In the statements task the statements that constituted the premises and conclusions in 
the inferences task were presented in isolation, one at a time in random order. Coherence was 
found to be above chance levels in 7 out of 8 cases in the statements task. In the one case in 
which coherence was at chance levels in the statements task, coherence was above chance 
levels in the inferences task. It is interesting that in this one case, not-p or q from not-p, the 
inference has a negation as its premise, which is also present as a component of its conclusion.  
This pattern of results suggests a much more optimistic picture of people's sensitivity to 
coherence constraints than had been obtained in the study of the more complex conditional 
syllogisms. The results suggest that people have a spontaneous tendency to give coherent 
responses; and that in cases in which coherence is not established automatically – for instance 
due to the presence of negations or of more complex inferential structures – it is increased 
through the context of an explicit inference task (see De Neys, 2012, and Trippas, Handley, 
Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016, for similar arguments about the role of inference complexity for 
detecting sensitivity to deductive constraints). 
As mentioned above, it was not feasible in this experiment to compare the degree of 
above-chance coherence between individual inferences. However, it is notable that in the 
statements group, responses were coherent above chance levels in three of the four versions of 
the or-introduction inference, and that in the inferences group responses were coherent above 
chance levels for all four versions. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that under 
probabilistic instructions, the pragmatic awkwardness of drawing the inference is reduced 
because people are asked directly about their beliefs. As a result, people seem to treat the 
inference as valid just as they do other less controversially valid inferences. This finding also 
goes counter to the proposal in a recent revision of mental model theory (Johnson-Laird et al., 
2015) that the lower endorsement rates of the inference under binary instructions reflect the 
fact that the inference is actually invalid. If the inference were considered invalid, one would 
expect it to be rejected across a variety of experimental conditions, and not only in contexts in 
which there are strong alternative pragmatic reasons for the rejection (see Politzer et al., 2016, 
and Cruz et al., 2017, for further evidence that, under probabilistic instructions, or-introduction 
is endorsed to a similarly high degree as other, less controversially valid inferences).  
An additional analysis showed that responses were coherent above chance levels under 
the assumption that the natural language conditional is interpreted as the probability 
121 
 
conditional, but incoherent above chance levels under the assumption that the conditional is 
interpreted as the material conditional. This constitutes a strong and new form of evidence for 
the descriptive adequacy of the probability conditional and against that of the material 
conditional. 
The experiment that follows below explores whether an effect of increased coherence 
under an inferences task relative to a statements task, found in cases in which responses were 
not already coherent to begin with, can be extended to contexts in which people have been 
found to be pervasively incoherent, specifically that of the conjunction fallacy. 
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EXPERIMENT 2:  
IFS, ANDS, AND THE CONJUNCTION FALLACY
6
 
 
 
Overview of the conjunction fallacy 
 
The conjunction fallacy refers to the judgment that P(p & q) > P(p), which is not possible in 
classical probability theory because p & q is a subset of p. So for instance, the set of people 
who are bank tellers and feminists is equal to or smaller than the set of people who are bank 
tellers, because some bank tellers may be feminists and others not.  
This scenario about bank tellers and feminists, also used in Experiment 1, was the initial 
context in which the fallacy was found by Tversky & Kahneman (1983), who coined the term. 
The original format of the task was one of a list of around eight statements: the two critical 
ones about being a bank teller (B), and being a bank teller and active in the feminist movement 
(B & F), and six filler items. The task was to rank the probability of the statements from the 
most to the least likely. But the basic finding was replicated when the task was to judge the 
probability of each statement, or to judge which of two arguments was better, one stating that 
(B) is more likely due to set-inclusion relations, and the other stating that (B & F) is more 
likely due to its higher representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The latter makes the 
set-inclusion relation between the two statements entirely explicit. The finding was also 
replicated when the statement "she is a bank teller" was replaced with "she is a bank teller 
whether or not she is active in the feminist movement" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) or when 
participants were given the three options B & F, B & not-F, and B (Bonini, Tentori, & 
Osherson, 2004), thus avoiding the possibility that people might interpret B as B & not-F. 
Further, the finding was replicated when the terms "probability" and "conjunction" were not 
mentioned, and participants were simply asked to choose the most likely of a sequences of 
throws of a die, given a particular constellation of the die sides (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; 
see also Politzer & Noveck, 1991, and Tentori et al., 2004, on the roles of terminology and 
pragmatic implicatures). The incidence of the fallacy was sometimes reduced, but still present, 
in betting contexts and when participants had sophisticated knowledge of statistics (Bonini et 
al., 2004; Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).    
The finding of the conjunction fallacy generated an explosion of further studies and 
attempts to provide an explanation for it. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) themselves attributed 
it to the use of the heuristics of representativeness and availability. They distinguished two 
situations in which the fallacy occurs: when there is a model or situation (e. g. the description 
of Linda's personality) that is highly representative of one element of the conjunction (A) and 
                                                          
6
 The data from this experiment was published using an ANOVA analysis in a collaborative paper with 
Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford, and David Over (Cruz et al., 2015). 
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highly unrepresentative of the other (B) (the M-A paradigm); and when A and B are not 
necessarily related to a specific model or situation, but there is a causal, correlational or 
otherwise explanatory relation between the two elements of the conjunction A and B (the A-B 
paradigm). In line with this, the incidence of the fallacy was greatly reduced in M-A situations 
when the scenario description was omitted (e. g. it was only stated that Linda is a 31 year old 
person), and it was greatly reduced in A-B situations when the causal link between A and B 
was severed, while leaving the probability of each constant. For example, in one scenario 
participants were told that two unrelated individuals were randomly selected among 
respondents of a representative health survey. Participants were asked about the probability 
that the first person has had one or more heart attacks, and that the second person is over 55 
years old. Even though being over 55 years old is associated with a higher probability of 
having had one or more heart attacks, this association plays no role when the features of age 
and of medical history for heart attacks refer to different individuals. 
The authors argued that natural, spontaneous assessments e. g. of similarity, 
representativeness, or causal relations can bias probability judgments in three ways. They can 
be used explicitly as heuristics for solving the task, they can exert an influence by providing an 
anchor or association that diverts the probability judgment, or people may find it difficult to 
distinguish between the natural assessment triggered by the materials and the assessment 
required by the task. 
Two accounts of the fallacy that may at least partly be considered specifications or 
extensions of the explanation brought forward by Tversky & Kahneman (1983), are that of 
Crupi, Fitelson, & Tentori (2008), and that of von Sydow (2017). Crupi et al. argued that the 
fallacy may arise because the answer to the question about the probability of the statements is 
biased by the availability of an answer to another question: that of inductive Bayesian 
confirmation. The evidence about the personality of Linda provides better inductive 
confirmation of the hypothesis B & F than it does of the hypothesis B (where inductive 
confirmation is a measure assessing the extent to which a person increases their belief in a 
hypothesis after learning the evidence, compared to before obtaining the evidence). Von 
Sydow (2017) argues that the fallacy can be accounted for by the idea that people sometimes 
compute probabilities in an intensional as opposed to extensional way. With an intensional 
reading, there is a specific data pattern that is approximated best by the hypothesis of a 
conjunction, and another data pattern that is approximated best by the hypothesis of one of the 
elements of the conjunction. But the two hypotheses refer to separate concepts and are not 
nested. Along these lines, the data describing the personality of Linda fits, or confirms (Crupi 
et al., 2008) more the B & F hypothesis than the B hypothesis, regardless of the fact that from 
an extensional perspective, B & F is a subset of the B.  
An account that looks at the incoherence of the conjunction error from a different 
perspective, offering a defence of the in principle rational processes of probability estimation 
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that lead to it, is that of Costello & Watts (2014). They propose that the findings on the 
conjunction fallacy, as well as on other biases in probability judgment like the disjunction 
fallacy, subadditivity and conservatism, can be explained as resulting from probability 
estimates that follow probability theory but are subject to random noise. This noise is larger 
for composite than for simple events, and it can be cancelled out through specific algebraic 
computations. The authors provide impressive empirical evidence for the precise predictions 
made by their theory. They have also extended the account to reasoning with conditional 
probabilities (Costello & Watts, 2016a) and to findings previously argued to support the 
approach of quantum probability theory (Costello & Watts, 2017; see also Sanborn & Chater, 
2016, for a related perspective). Although the probability theory plus noise account may not 
explain all instances of the fallacy, the relevance of its findings goes beyond it and builds a 
counterweight to the findings of the fallacy, which accounts suggesting people have no 
sensitivity to the principles of probability theory are in need to explain.      
Two accounts that depart more strongly from the original interpretation of the findings 
are the frequentist (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Giggerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) and the 
quantum probability account (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, & 
Yearsley, 2017). In brief, the frequentist argument is that people are naturally equipped to 
reason in accordance with the principles of probability theory when probabilities are presented 
as natural frequencies, but not when they are presented as single event probabilities. Contrary 
to this proposal, several studies have shown that the frequentist format does not always lead to 
lower fallacy rates, and that it can promote biases of its own. The effect of the frequency 
format has been explained as resulting from a more transparent description of the nested set 
relations involved in the problem, and it has been shown that such transparency in the problem 
structure, with corresponding reductions in fallacy rates, can be achieved in other ways than 
through frequency formats (Evans, Handley, Perham, Over, & Thompson, 2000; Sloman, 
Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 2003; Tentori et al., 2004).  
The quantum probability perspective is that the conjunction effect is not in fact a fallacy, 
but a consequence of the contextual representation of events. It argues that the probability of B 
in the context of its conjunction with F may not be the same as the probability of B presented 
on its own. If we hear the statement that Linda is a bank teller, this may initially seem very 
improbable, but if we first hear that she is a feminist and then that she is a bank teller, we may 
be more amenable to the fact that bank tellers come in many shapes and sizes. This is an order 
effect, which could also be described as a failure of invariance in dynamic reasoning 
(Oaksford, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2013).  It is argued to occur when people reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem space, e. g. because of processing limitations. The predictions 
of the theory for unreduced problem spaces are equivalent to those of classical probability 
theory. One strength of the quantum approach is that it allows the formulation of precise 
predictions about the size of contextual effects when they occur. However, there currently 
125 
 
seem to be no clear criteria for predicting when contextual effects will occur and when not. 
Further, the normative, computational level foundation for the quantum approach seems less 
clear than for classical probability theory, particularly with respect to coherence and the 
avoidance of Dutch books (Hahn, 2014). Given this uncertain foundation and the fact that the 
findings used to support it can also be explained within classical probability theory (Costello 
& Watts, 2016b, 2017; Kellen, Singmann, & Batchelder, 2017), it seems as though more 
arguments are needed to appreciate the benefits of the arguably less parsimonious quantum 
approach.  
Tversky & Kahneman (1983), and Crupi et al. (2008) further argue that a finding hard to 
explain within accounts positing that the conjunction effect is not a fallacy, is that participants 
in experiments usually do not defend their conjunction effect answers when debriefed about 
the normative solution in classical probability theory. They instead usually concede having 
made an error, and seem to experience some regret for it. This was one of the reasons for why 
Tversky and Kahneman described it as a fallacy rather than as a misunderstanding. 
 
 
Ifs and ands 
 
The present experiment addresses this last point, concerning the conditions under which the 
normative solution in classical probability theory is transparent. It is not directly concerned 
with a comparison of explanations for the conjunction fallacy, but rather with factors that 
might increase the coherence of reasoning in the special case of this fallacy, in which the 
modal answer is an incoherent one.  
In addition, this experiment extends the study of conditionals and disjunctions reported in 
Experiment 1 to conditionals and conjunctions. It looks at whether it makes a difference to 
people whether an inference from and to if has one premise: p & q, therefore if p then q, or 
two premises: p, q, therefore if p then q. Normatively the coherence intervals differ for the two 
cases. For the one-premise case, the interval for the conclusion lies between the probability of 
the premise and 1. For the two-premise case, the interval is more complex. Assuming the 
conditional is defined through the Equation, it is given by:  
 
P(q|p)  [ max{0, (P(p) + P(q) – 1)/P(p)}, min{P(q)/P(p), 1}] 
 
Depending on the premise probabilities, the minimum value of this interval may lie above 0, 
and the maximum value may lie below 1. This means that conclusion probability judgments 
for this inference can be incoherent in two directions, resulting in either underconfidence or 
overconfidence. In contrast, in the one-premise version it is only possible to be incoherent by 
being underconfident in the conclusion. 
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The above interval presupposes an interpretation of conditionals based on the Equation. 
But the coherence bounds for this interpretation are stronger than those for the material 
conditional. Therefore, any response that is coherent for the above interpretation is also 
coherent for the material conditional interpretation.   
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from the University of Orsay, France, took part in the experiment on a 
voluntary basis. Their mean age was 20 years (range 18-24). They had different majors, 
although the majority studied biology or medicine. All participants were French native 
speakers. 
 
Material and design 
The material and design were similar to those of Experiment 1. However, only the Linda 
scenario was used, and because the original inferences contained no negations, no variation of 
the inferences on the basis of the position of negated terms was introduced. The four 
inferences investigated are shown in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2. The inferences used in Experiment 2. 
 Name Form 
1 and-to-if (one premise) p & q  if p then q 
2 and-to-if (two premises) p, q  if p then q 
3 and-elimination (prototypical) p & q  p 
4 and-elimination (counter-prototypical) p & q  q 
 
The and-to-if inferences (also called centering, Cruz et al., 2016; Over & Cruz, 2018), 
served to assess whether response coherence differed as a function of whether the inference 
from a conjunction to a conditional had one or two premises; in particular, whether coherence 
was lower in the two-premise version than in the one-premise version. This may occur because 
the more complex interval for the two-premise version requires the integration of two premise 
probabilities p, and q, taking into account the minimum and maximum degree to which p and 
q may overlap, or co-occur. In contrast, in the simpler interval of the one-premise version, a 
fixed co-occurrence of p and q is already given as the probability of the premise, and so no 
integration is required. These two inference versions are shown again in Table 5.3 in the 
context of the Linda scenario. The inferences had contents that seemed likely given the 
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scenario description, to encourage higher premise probability judgments and so lower 
probabilities of conforming to coherence just by chance.   
The and-elimination inferences of Table 5.2 served to assess whether the incoherence of 
the conjunction fallacy is reduced when people are asked to make an explicit inference from 
one of the statements involved in the fallacy to the other. Inferences 3 and 4 are shown again 
in Table 5.3 embedded in the content of the Linda scenario. One can see that inference 3 has 
prototypical content, and inference 4 has counter-prototypical content for the scenario. The 
experiment included six further inferences that are not relevant for the present study, and are 
not reported further.  
 
Table 5.3. The four inferences of the experiment embedded in the Linda scenario. 
1 Linda votes in the municipal elections and she votes for the Socialist Party. Therefore, if 
Linda votes in the municipal elections, then she votes for the Socialist Party. 
2 Linda votes in the municipal elections. Linda votes for the Socialist Party. Therefore, if 
Linda votes in the municipal elections, then she votes for the Socialist Party. 
3 Linda is a feminist and she works in a bank. Therefore, Linda is a feminist. 
4 Linda is a feminist and she works in a bank. Therefore, Linda works in a bank. 
 
As in Experiment 1, the inferences were presented under two task conditions: a 
statements task and an inferences task. In the statements task the statements appeared as single 
items on a list, and participants were asked to judge how much confidence they would have in 
each statement. In the inferences task, the statements were arranged into the premises and 
conclusion of inferences, and each inference was presented on a separate page. Participants 
were asked to judge how much confidence they would have in the premise of the inference, 
and how much confidence they would have in the conclusion, given the premise. Participants 
in both groups provided their answers by writing a percentage number into a box next to each 
relevant statement, ranging between 0 ("no confidence at all"), to 100 ("complete 
confidence"). Four booklets were created for each task condition, which varied only in the 
order in which the statements resp. the inferences were presented.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in the university library in small groups of up to four participants. 
They worked at their own pace, and took 10 to 15 minutes to complete.  
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Results and discussion 
 
The data was analysed using linear mixed models with above-chance coherence as the 
dependent variable, and with inference and task as predictors. Given the relatively low ratio of 
participants to data points, the only random effects included in the models were random 
intercepts for participants.  
 
And-to-if inferences 
The first analysis looked at the and-to-if inference, and assessed whether the more complex 
coherence interval for the two-premise version than for the one-premise version was 
associated with a higher frequency of coherent responses for the latter than for the former. The 
results are shown in the left panel of Figure 5.3. A linear mixed model for the effects of 
inference and task on above-chance coherence showed that overall, responses were 42% more 
likely than expected by change (EMM = .417, F(1, 80.686) = 17.931, p < .001). No other 
effects were significant (for inference: F(1, 46) = 1.028, p = .316; for task: F(1, 80.686) = 
.004, p = .941; for the interaction: F(1, 46) = .049, p = .826). There was thus no indication that 
the computation of a coherent conclusion probability was more difficult for the two-premise 
version than for the one-premise version of the inference.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Above-chance coherence for the four inferences and the two task 
conditions of Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
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And-elimination inferences 
To assess whether the frequency of occurrence of the conjunction fallacy is reduced in the 
context of an explicit inference task, a linear mixed model was computed for the effects of 
inference content and task on above-chance coherence, again with random intercepts for 
participants. The results are shown in the right panel of Figure 5.3. Overall coherence was 
again above chance levels (EMM = .216, F(1, 90.199) = 7.194, p = .009). The extent to which 
coherence was above-chance levels was larger for inference 3 with prototypical content than 
for inference 4 with counter- prototypical content (EMMtypical = .166, EMMuntypical = -.301, F(1, 
46) = 33.314, p < .001). No other effects were significant (for task: F(1, 90.199) = .661, p = 
.418; for the interaction: F(1, 46) = .126, p = .724).  
Follow-up analyses for each inference confirmed that coherence was above chance for 
inference 3 (EMM = .166, t(47) = 3.201, p = .002); but below chance for inference 4 (EMM = -
.301, t(47) = -4.328, p < .001).  
Overall, for the same logical structure responses were coherent above chance levels when 
the content of the conclusion was in accordance with the scenario, but below chance level 
when the content was untypical for the scenario, the latter being the content originally found to 
lead to the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The frequency of the fallacy 
was thereby not reduced by the presence of an explicit inference task. 
 
 
General discussion 
 
The finding that coherence for the and-to-if inferences was above chance level extends the 
findings of Experiment 1 to inferences relating conjunctions and conditionals. The observation 
that responses were coherent above chance level in the statements task, so that there was little 
opportunity for coherence to increase further in the inferences task, is in line with the findings 
of Experiment 1 as well as with Evans et al. (2015). It suggests that an explicit inference task 
can be most helpful in cases in which coherence is not already above chance levels to begin 
with. That coherence was above chance levels in the statements task suggests people may tend 
to comply with it in a spontaneous, intuitive way, even in contexts in which there is no explicit 
suggestion that it should be taken into account. This was not originally expected, but is in line 
with findings on good conformity to probabilistic principles in domains outside of reasoning, 
where tasks are carried out in a more implicit way, like perception and language 
comprehension (Fiser, Berkes, Orbán, & Lengyel, 2010; Hsu, Chater, & Vitányi, 2011). 
It also made no difference to coherence whether the inference from the conjunction to the 
conditional had one or two premises. Before drawing further conclusions from this finding, it 
would be worth assessing how far it can be generalised to other inferences, as well as to 
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situations in which people have differing knowledge of the overlap between p and q that 
would allow them to narrow down their conclusion probability estimates.  
People's responses to the and-elimination inferences were coherent at levels above chance 
when the materials did not involve a conflict between prototypicality and probability 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1983), or between informativeness about an inductive hypothesis and 
probability (Tentori, Crupi, & Russo, 2013; von Sydow, 2017). This is in line with further 
findings showing responses to be coherent for this inference when using neutral contents 
(Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005; Politzer & Baratgin, 2016; Tversky & Khaneman, 1983). However, 
when the material did have the content known to cause the fallacy, responses were incoherent 
above chance levels, and it made no difference whether the task was to rate the probability of 
each statement individually, or to draw an explicit inference from the probability of one 
statement to the probability of the other. This finding does not directly help arbitrate between 
different accounts of the fallacy, but it extends its scope to a further arguably transparent 
context (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), underlining the view that it is a deep fallacy that is hard 
to overcome.  
The following two experiments extend the study of people's intuitions about coherence 
constraints to further inferences, and to different kinds of materials. They also provide further 
discussion of the role of premise probabilities, and with them the chance rate of a coherent 
response, for the interpretation of above-chance coherence, setting the scene for an 
implementation of those discussion points in the next chapter.  
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EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4: 
INTUITION, REFLECTION, AND WORKING MEMORY 
 
Experiment 1 found people's judgments of conclusion probability to be coherent at above 
chance levels for a range of simple one-premise inferences (Cruz et al., 2015). This finding 
has been replicated and extended to further one-premise inferences, as well as to an ordinal 
response format (Politzer & Baratgin, 2016). These consistent findings suggesting that people 
are sensitive to coherence constraints appear to be at odds with the findings for conditional 
syllogisms (Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 2014; c. f. Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009), for which 
coherence at above chance levels was observed only for MP and to a lesser extent for DA.   
Evans et al. (2015) further observed that more responses were coherent in an explicit 
inference task than in a task asking participants to judge the probabilities of the statements in 
the inferences presented one at a time in random order. Specifically, they found that in the 
statements task, probability judgments were coherent at above chance levels for MP and DA, 
but were incoherent at above chance levels for MT and AC. In the inferences task, coherence 
was above-chance levels for MP, DA and also AC, whereas it remained below chance levels 
for MT. However, no significant difference in above-chance coherence between the statements 
and the inferences task was found in Experiment 1 of this thesis.  
What led to the differences between these studies? Were responses reliably coherent in 
Cruz et al. (2015) and in Politzer & Baratgin (2016) because they involved simpler inferences? 
Or was it because the chance rate of conforming to coherence in Evans et al. (2015) and in 
Singmann et al. (2014) was too large to allow a reliable detection of above-chance 
performance? Did Cruz et al. fail to find a difference between the statements and the 
inferences task because the simpler inferences they studied were already reliably coherent 
across both tasks, or was it because the study of Cruz et al. was performed on the internet, 
whereas that of Evans et al. was conducted in the lab, and the data from the internet 
experiment might have had a higher error variance? Or does the failure to replicate the effect 
of task indicate that the effect itself is not reliably present?   
These questions were addressed in two follow-up experiments. Experiment 3 was 
conducted in the lab, and Experiment 4 on the Internet. Both experiments included, in addition 
to the statements and an inferences task, a third condition in which participants worked 
through an inferences task with working memory load. The aim of this third condition was to 
assess whether the difference between the statements and the inferences task can at least in 
part be explained through lower working memory demands involved in the inferences task.  
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Experiment 3 
 
Method 
Participants. A total of 142 participants from the recruitment pool of the Department of 
Psychological Sciences of Birkbeck, University of London, completed the experiment. They 
were divided into three groups: a statements group (Group 1), an inferences group (Group 2), 
and an inferences group with working memory load (Group 3) (see the design and materials 
section for the characterisation of each group). All participants indicated at the end of the 
experiment that they had taken part seriously, as opposed to just "clicking through". Three 
participants (one from each group) were excluded because they had problems understanding 
the task; eight were excluded because they failed a catch trial asking them not to respond but 
instead to click "next" to continue with the experiment; three participants were excluded from 
the statements group because they had two or more trial reaction times of 2 seconds or less, 
and two from the inferences groups for having two or more trial reaction times of 3 seconds or 
less. Finally, one further participant was excluded for not reporting at least "good" English 
language skills. The final sample consisted of 131 participants (42 in Group 1, 50 in Group 2, 
and 39 in Group 3). Participants' median age was 24 (range 18-56). Most had some university 
education, with 64% reporting an undergraduate degree, 22% a postgraduate degree and 3% a 
doctoral degree. 8% reported having finished 12
th
 grade, and 2% having a technical/applied 
degree. Participants' median ratings of task difficulty were 24% in Group 1, 51% in Group 2, 
and 62% in Group 3.  
Materials and design. 
Inferences. The experiment investigated the 12 inferences shown in Table 5.4. These 
inferences were classified into three groups based on the complexity of the coherence intervals 
for their conclusion. The inferences of type A (inferences 1 and 2) are one-premise 
equivalences or contradictions. The coherence interval for these inferences is a point value 
equal to the probability of the premise (in the case of equivalences) or to the complement of 
the probability of the premise (in the case of contradictions). Inference 1 is called De Morgan 
(DM) and shows how a conjunction can be transformed into an equivalent disjunction. 
Inference 2, not De Morgan (nDM), is the result of deleting the negation in the premise of the 
DM inference.  
The inferences of Type B (inferences 3 to 8) are one-premise inferences describing set-
subset relations, making them p-valid in one direction and p-invalid in the other. Inferences 3, 
5 and 7 (and-elimination: &I, and-to-or: &Or, and if-to-or: IfOr) are p-valid, and the 
coherence interval for their conclusion goes from the probability of the premise (inclusive) to 
1. Inferences 4, 6 and 8 (and-introduction: &I, or-to-and: Or&, and or-to-if: OrIf) are p-
invalid, and the coherence interval for their conclusion goes from the probability of the 
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premise (inclusive) to 0. Inferences 7 and 8 (IfOr and OrIf) were also tested in Experiment 1 
(Cruz et al., 2015).  
 
Table 5.4. The inferences investigated in Experiments 3 and 4.  
Type Name Validity Form 
A. One-
premise,  
equivalence 
and 
contradiction 
1. De Morgan (DM) 1 not(p & q) not-p or not-q 
2. not De Morgan (nDM) 0 p & q  not-p or not-q 
B. One-
premise, valid 
in only one 
direction, left 
to right, or 
right to left 
3. and-elimination (&E) 1 p & q  p 
4. and-introduction (&I) 0 p  p & q 
5. and-to-or (&Or) 1 p & q  p or q 
6. or-to-and (Or&) 0 p or q  p & q 
7. if-to-or (IfOr) 1 if not-p then q  p or q 
8. or-to-if (OrIf) 0 p or q  if not-p then q 
C. Two-
premise,  
conditional 
syllogisms 
9. Modus ponens (MP) 1 if p then q, p  q 
10. Modus tollens (MT) 1 if p then q, not-q,  not-p 
11. Affirmation of the 
consequent (AC) 
0 if p then q, q,  p 
12. Denial of the 
antecedent (DA) 
0 if p then q, not-p,  not-q 
Note. "1" = "valid", "0" = "invalid", "" = "therefore". 
 
The inferences of Type C (inferences 9 to 12) are two-premise inferences. They have 
more complex coherence intervals that do not stand in a simple relation to the probabilities of 
the premises. The four inferences of this type included here are the conditional syllogisms, 
which were also investigated by Evans et al. (2015). Their intervals are displayed in Table 5.5. 
Experimental groups. Participants were divided into three groups: (1) a statements group, 
(2) an inferences group, and (3) an inferences group with a secondary working memory load 
task. Groups (1) and (2) were similar to the groups in Evans et al. (2015) and Cruz et al. 
(2015). Group (3) was introduced to assess the extent to which any benefit of having an 
explicit inference task would decrease with increasing working memory load. Groups (1) and 
(3) thus constitute alternative comparison conditions to group (2), to help ascertain more 
precisely where the difference between the inferences group and the statements group in Evans 
et al. (2015) comes from.  
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Table 5.5. The coherence intervals for the four conditional syllogisms. 
Inference Coherence interval for the conclusion 
 lower bound upper bound 
MP xy xy+(1-y) 
MT max[ (1-x-y)/(1-x), (x+y-1)/x 
] 
1 
AC 0 min[ y/x, (1-y)/(1-x) ] 
DA (1-x)(1-y) 1-x(1-y) 
Note. x = the probability of the major premise, y = the probability of 
the minor premise, min = minimum value, max = maximum value. For 
example, both MP and MT have if p then q as their major premise. But 
the minor premise for MP is p, while the minor premise for MT is not-
q. Taken from Evans et al. (2015). 
 
Inferences group. Participants in Group 2 were shown one inference at a time on the 
screen, with the premises and conclusion presented at the same time. Participants were asked 
to judge how likely it was that each premise was true, and how likely it was that the 
conclusion was true, given the likelihood of the premise(s). Participants indicated their 
probability judgments for the premise(s) and conclusion by clicking on a slider, with the 
anchors "0% likely/certainly false" and "100% likely/certainly true". The slider for the 
conclusion was shown in a different colour to set it apart from the sliders for the premises. 
This task was similar to the one used in Experiment 1. 
Statements group. Participants in Group 1 were shown the same statements that they 
would have seen in the inferences task, but one statement at a time on the screen in random 
order. For example, what would have been the first premise of MP in the inferences task could 
have been shown in trial 1, followed by unrelated statements involved in other inferences, 
followed by the conclusion of MP on trial 5, followed by more unrelated statements, followed 
by the second premise of MP on trial 8. For each statement participants were asked to judge 
how likely it was that the statement was true, using the same type of slider as for the 
inferences task.  
The randomisation procedure for the inferences group was the same as that of Experiment 
1: All participants were shown all inferences and scenarios, but only a particular pairing of 
inference with scenario, and this pairing was randomly generated for each participant. 
However, the randomisation procedure for the statements group differed between the present 
experiment and Experiment 1 above. In the present experiment, the procedure used to allocate 
scenarios randomly to inferences for each participant was the same for the statements and for 
the inferences group. It was only in a second step that the inferences for the statements group 
were separated into their component statements so that they could be displayed one at a time 
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on the screen in random order. In contrast, in Experiment 1 participants in the statements 
group received all pairings of statement type with scenario.  
The randomisation procedure in Experiment 1 was chosen with the aim of making the 
statements and the inferences group parallel in the time it took to complete the task. The faster 
processing time for each trial in the statements task was balanced by adding further trials to 
that experimental condition. The procedure used in Experiment 3 instead aimed at a parallel 
between conditions in the amount and diversity of material worked through by each 
participant, so that the only difference in the materials between the two experimental 
conditions was whether the statements were shown grouped into inferences, or one at a time in 
random order. Hence in Experiment 3, a parallel between conditions in the amount and variety 
of the materials was given priority over a parallel between conditions in task duration.  
Inferences group with working memory load. In Group 3 the inferences task was 
interleaved with a visuospatial memory task similar to the one used in studies by De Neys and 
colleagues (De Neys, 2006; Franssens & De Neys, 2009). Before each trial of the inferences 
task (which was itself identical in the conditions with and without working memory load) 
participants were shown a dot pattern for a short period of time. Participants were instructed to 
try to remember this pattern because they would be asked to reproduce it after working 
through the trial of the inferences task.  
As in Franssens & De Neys (2009), the dot pattern consisted of four dots in a 3x3 grid, 
displayed in the centre of the screen for 900 ms. At the end of the inferences task trial, an 
empty grid appeared and participants were asked to click with the mouse on the locations of 
the grid in which the dots had been.  
The dot patterns were selected randomly for each trial and participant out of a pool of 48 
patterns created by varying the possibilities in which a pattern could feature three dots on a 
single line (horizontal, vertical or diagonal). The presence of three aligned dots simplified the 
patterns, reducing the risk of a floor effect in either the memory or the reasoning task.  
A further difference between this and the other two groups concerned the presence of 
time pressure. In Groups 1 and 2 participants were instructed to take their time to think 
through the questions and answer as carefully as they could. In contrast, participants in Group 
3 were instructed to respond to the inference and the memory task as quickly but also as 
accurately as they could. The inclusion of time pressure in the instructions aimed to prevent 
participants from developing mnemonic or other strategies that could reduce the load of the 
parallel task on working memory.   
In Group 3, the percentage of correct responses to the 26 trials of the memory task ranged 
between 15.4% and 92.3% (median: 69.2%). The chance rate for a correct response in the 
memory task, that is, for identifying correctly the four locations on the 3x3 grid, is 9876 = 
1/3024 per trial. This suggests that the manipulation was successful in creating an additional 
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task for participants. The upper panel of Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of correct responses 
in the memory task. 
Premise probabilities. Previous studies investigating whether people's responses to 
conditional syllogisms are coherent above chance levels (Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 
2014) used real world materials. The researchers in those studies selected materials to elicit a 
variety of premise probabilities in 
participants, with the aim of 
generalising the results across 
premise probabilities. But a 
possible problem with this 
procedure is that it did not 
systematically consider the effect of 
premise probabilities on the chance-
rate of assigning a coherent 
probability to the conclusion. As a 
consequence, the chance rate might 
have been too large in some 
conditions to allow the reliable 
detection of above-chance 
performance. See for example 
Figure 3 of Singmann et al. (2014), 
where the chance rate was the unit 
interval for some participants and 
conditions, rendering above-chance 
coherence = 0 by definition.  
The way that premise 
probability determines the chance rate depends on the form of the inference, and in particular 
on whether the inference is p-valid or p-invalid. Consider the classification of inferences in 
Table 5.4 as of type (A), (B), or (C). Because the coherence interval for inferences of type A is 
always a point value, p-validity has no effect on the width of the interval for these inferences. 
But p-validity affects the width of the interval, and with it the chance rate, for inferences of 
type (B) and type (C).  
For inferences of type (B) the coherence interval for p-valid inferences goes from the 
probability of the premise to 1, and the coherence interval for p-invalid inferences goes from 
the probability of the premise to 0. This means that for the p-valid inferences, the lower the 
probability of the premise, the higher the chance-rate of conforming to coherence, and hence 
the harder it is to detect above-chance coherence when it is there. So a sensitive test of 
coherence for p-valid inferences of type (B) requires high premise probabilities. For the p-
 
Figure 5.4. Distribution of the proportion of correct 
responses to the memory task in Group 3. Upper 
panel: for Experiment 3; lower panel: for Experiment 
4.  
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invalid inferences the opposite relation holds: the higher the probability of the premise, the 
higher the chance-rate of conforming to coherence, and so the harder it is to detect above-
chance coherence when it is there. Therefore, a sensitive test of coherence for p-invalid 
inferences of type (B) requires low premise probabilities.  
The materials for the one-premise inferences (Types A and B) were varied with the aim 
of creating two conditions, one with high premise probability (high condition) and the other 
with low premise probability (low condition). The idea was to ensure that there is a condition 
for both p-valid and p-invalid inferences in which the test for above-chance coherence is 
highly sensitive, making it more likely that it will be sensitive enough across conditions.  
 
  
The more complex coherence intervals for the inferences of type (C) are displayed in 
Figure 5.5 as a function of their premise probabilities. One can see that for the p-valid MP and 
MT inferences, the coherence intervals are narrow – and so the sensitivity of a test for above-
chance coherence higher – when both premises have a high probability. In contrast, the 
coherence intervals for MP and MT are wide – and so the sensitivity of a test for above-chance 
 
Figure 5.5. Coherence intervals for the four conditional syllogisms: MP, MT, AC, and DA, as 
a function of their premise probabilities. The shaded areas in the graphs represent the 
coherence intervals.  
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coherence lower – when the major premise has a high probability and the minor premise a low 
probability. The opposite relation holds for the p-invalid inferences AC and DA: The 
coherence intervals for the latter two inferences are wide when both premise probabilities are 
high, whereas they are narrow when the major premise has a high probability and the minor 
premise a low probability.  
Accordingly, premise probability for the two-premise inferences was varied over two 
conditions, high-high, and high-low (with the first term in each pair referring to the probability 
of the major premise, and the second to the probability of the minor premise). The purpose of 
this variation in premise probability was again to assess the degree to which responses were 
coherent above chance levels in a way that increases the sensitivity of the test, i.e. the chances 
of finding above-chance coherence when it is there.  
Above-chance coherence was calculated following the procedure used in previous studies 
(Cruz et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015, Singmann et al., 2014): A conclusion probability 
judgment was classified as coherent if it fell within the coherence interval, and as incoherent if 
it fell outside of it. Coherent judgments were coded with 1 and incoherent judgments with 0.  
These values for observed coherence, 1 or 0, were compared to the chance rate of a coherent 
response, which was defined as being equal to the width of the coherence interval. Above-
chance coherence was computed by subtracting, for each response, the chance rate from the 
observed value for coherence. For example, if the chance rate of being coherent was 0.25 in a 
particular case, and the response was coherent, 1 – 0.25 = 0.75 would be the measure of 
above-chance coherence.  
The variation in premise probabilities made it possible to assess not only whether people 
were sensitive (at some level) to the location of the coherence interval, and therefore coherent 
above chance levels, but also whether they were sensitive to the width of the interval. This is 
because when the interval is wide, one can expect the variability of responses between 
conditions to be higher. For inferences of type A (whose coherence interval was a point value), 
response variance was predicted to be similar for high and low premise probabilities. For 
inferences of type B, response variance was predicted to be higher for valid inferences when 
premise probability is low, and higher for invalid inferences when premise probability is high. 
Similarly, for inferences of type C a higher response variance for valid inferences was 
predicted in the high-low condition, and a higher response variance for invalid inferences in 
the high-high condition.  
The above variables were entered into a mixed design with group (statements (1), 
inferences (2), inferences with working memory load (3)) as between participants variable, 
and inference (the 12 inferences of Table 5.4) and probability (high-high, high-low for the 
two-premise inferences; high, low for one-premise inferences) as within participant variables. 
The dependent variables were the mean and variance of participants' conclusion probability 
judgments, and above-chance coherence computed from these judgments. 
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Materials. The premise probabilities were varied using real-world materials, as in Evans 
et al. (2015) and Singmann et al. (2014). This means that it was not possible to have strict 
control over the value of the premise probabilities, because real world experiences will be 
different for each person, and people's probability judgments may be calibrated differently. 
Nonetheless, an attempt was made to create trends for higher or lower probability ratings 
strong enough to show an effect.  
The high and low probability contents were constructed with a view to avoiding the use 
of stereotypes about groups of people. They instead referred to objects, animals and services 
considered typical or untypical for a random, unnamed city. Below is a sample trial for the 
inferences group (Group 2), showing a MP inference in the high-high and the high-low 
condition. The full set of materials is provided in Appendix C.  
 
Berta walks through a random city and goes into a bar.                   
How likely are the following statements? 
                                                                                           
(a) high-high                                                         0% likely                  100% likely 
Premise 1:                                                           certainly false           certainly true 
If the bar has beer then it has wine.                                       (slider for Premise 1) 
Premise 2:  
The bar has beer.                                                                        (slider for Premise 2) 
Conclusion:  
Therefore, the bar has wine.                                                    (slider for Conclusion) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(b) high-low 
Premise 1: 
If the bar has a book store, then it has a place to read.           (slider for Premise 1) 
Premise 2:  
The bar has a book store.                                                          (slider for Premise 2) 
Conclusion: 
Therefore, the bar has a place to read.                                  (slider for Conclusion) 
 
 
Suppose that in the above example we indeed assign a high probability to both premises 
of inference (a), and assign a high probability to the first premise but a low probability to the 
second premise of inference (b). Then the coherence constraints of the inferences would 
demand that we assign a high conclusion probability to inference (a), but would allow us to 
assign a wide range of conclusion probabilities to inference (b).  
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Note that it is not possible to cross inference with premise probability while holding the 
type of material constant. For example, a high-high condition for MP, as shown above, will be 
a high-low condition for DA; and a high-high condition for MT will be a high-low condition 
for AC. However, if the same material is used for the high-high condition of MP as for the 
high-low condition of DA, and analogously for the other cases (pairing the materials of the 
high-high condition for MT with those of the high-low condition for AC, those of the high-low 
condition of MP with those of the high-high condition for DA, and those of the high-low 
condition for MT with those of the high-high condition for AC), then overall the materials for 
the p-valid inferences will be the same as those for the p-invalid inferences. This was the case 
in the present experiment. It meant that the same materials expected to lead to higher and less 
heterogeneous responses for MP were expected to lead to lower and less heterogeneous 
responses for DA; and the same materials that were expected to lead to more heterogeneous 
responses for MP were expected to lead to more heterogeneous responses for DA (and 
analogously for MT and AC). There is a risk that a confirmation of this prediction could be an 
artefact of the materials, but this risk can be reduced by using a wide range of materials. The 
present experiment used 12 different materials for each inference, referring to: a dog, 
restaurant, family house, tree, dove, bar, neighbourhood, bus from the local public transport 
system, cat, park, bicycle, and train station.  
As can be seen in the above example of the experimental materials, the probability 
conditions were varied within the topics. As a result, each inference was randomly allocated to 
a single scenario for each participant, and this mapping remained constant within participants 
for the different probability conditions.  
For the two-premise inferences, the variation in the topics was the same for the high-high 
condition of MP as for the high-low condition of DA; it was the same for the high-high 
condition of MT as for the high-low condition of AC, and analogously for the other 
conditions. The topic variations used for the one-premise inferences were the same for each 
one-premise inference. But the topic variations differed between the two-premise and the one-
premise inferences. The reason was that some materials that seemed natural in a given 
condition of the two-premise inferences seemed pragmatically odd in the same condition for 
the one-premise inferences, and vice versa. In particular, and interestingly, the conditionals 
used for the conditional syllogisms featured a "connection" between the antecedent p and the 
consequent q. It was mostly a causal connection, but sometimes also a conceptual or similarity 
based connection, as in the example about the bar. The reason for this was that it seemed 
impossible to create materials for the high-low condition without such a connection: if the 
probability of the antecedent and/or of the consequent is low, it seems implausible that the 
probability of the conditional itself will be high unless the conditional describes a general 
relation between antecedent and consequent that comes into play whenever the antecedent 
and/or consequent hold, even if they may not hold at that particular moment.  In contrast, for 
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the conditionals in the one-premise inferences, which stood in relation to disjunctions, the 
focus was on assuring that the antecedent p was not a subset or superset of q, but was defined 
at the same level of generality – a criterion that often failed to hold when a connection was 
present. These considerations were implemented with the aim of avoiding possible pragmatic 
infelicities in the materials (for more on the role of a "connection" in the understanding and 
use of conditionals and disjunctions, see Cruz et al., 2016; Douven, 2015b; Oberauer, 
Weidenfeld, et al, 2007; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016; Vidal & 
Baratgin, 2017).  
With 8 one-premise inferences, 4 two-premise inferences, and 2 premise probability 
conditions, the experiment for the inferences groups had 122 = 24 trials, and that for the 
statements group had (82 + 43) 2 = 56 trials. In addition, for all the groups, the experiment 
included two catch trials to make sure participants were paying attention. The catch trials were 
similar in format to the experimental trials, but the text displaying the statements to be 
evaluated was replaced with the information that it was a control trial to make sure participants 
were paying attention, and asking them not to respond with a probability judgment, but to 
instead click next to continue with the experiment.   
Procedure. The experiment took place in a quiet testing room of the Department of 
Psychological Sciences of Birkbeck, University of London. In case there were any questions, 
the experimenter was present while the participants went through the instructions and three 
practice trials with inferences different from those tested in the experiment. At the end of the 
experiment participants provided demographical information and indicated whether they had 
taken part seriously, or just "clicked through". The final page provided debriefing information. 
The entire session took approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminaries: The problem of quantitative comparability. The data analysis began 
with an assessment of some preliminary matters to determine which questions can and cannot 
be addressed in the present experiment.  
To check whether the manipulation of premise probability using real world materials was 
successful, the mean values assigned to the premises were computed for each inference and 
group. These values, together with those of the conclusion, are shown in Figures 5.6 to 5.8.  
One can see that overall, the manipulation worked in that participants tended to give 
premise probability ratings at or above .75 in the high (resp. high-high) condition and at or 
below .25 in the low (resp. high-low) condition. An exception was the ifOr inference, if not-p 
then q, therefore p or q, for which mean premise probability judgments in the high condition 
were below 50%. Note that this difference was observed across the three groups, and across 12 
scenarios shared with the other one-premise inferences. A possible explanation for it is that the 
negation in the antecedent of the conditional premise led to a failure of invariance. An 
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example of this conditional in the high condition was "If the bar does not have beer, then it has 
wine". This conditional was expected to have a high probability because the consequent has a 
high probability. But this assumption might have been wrong: It did not take into account that 
a situation in which a bar in some random city in the world has no beer is so rare, that it might 
be exceptional in ways that could also have affected the supply of wine. For example, there 
might be no beer because of a severe flood or other disaster, cutting the city off from its supply 
chain. In such a situation the supply of wine is also likely to be affected. This problem would 
have been avoided if the high condition had been one in which not only the consequent, but 
also the antecedent had a high probability, for example: "If the bar has no book store, then it 
has wine". However, a consequence of this would be that the disjunction in the conclusion, 
"The bar has a book store or it has wine" would be justified only by one of its disjuncts, i.e. it 
would be constructively justified (Gilio & Over, 2012). Such a disjunction may still have a 
high probability, but its constructive justification could bring with it complications of its own 
(e. g., it is pragmatically infelicitous to assert a disjunction only on the basis of a belief in one 
of the disjuncts, because it is then more informative to assert the disjunct directly).  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Premise and conclusion probabilities in Experiment 3 for the 
inferences of type A, separately for each group and premise probability 
condition. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
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Figure 5.7. Premise and conclusion probabilities in Experiment 3 for the inferences of type 
B, separately for each group and premise probability condition. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Premise and conclusion probabilities in Experiment 3 for the inferences of type C, 
separately for each group and premise probability condition. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
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There might be a conflict regarding which component probabilities lead to high 
probability judgments for both premise and conclusion. This might help explain past findings 
of lower endorsement rates for this inference than for other valid inferences when using a 
binary or ternary response format and binary paradigm instructions (Espino & Byrne, 2013; 
Oberauer, Geiger, & Fischer, 2010). It would be interesting to investigate this explanation 
further in a subsequent experiment. But however it is interpreted, the lower probability 
assigned to the IfOr inference has consequences for the computation of coherence. Figure 5.9 
zooms in to the probability judgments for the IfOr inference and compares them to those of its 
converse, the Orif inference p or q, therefore if not-p then q, showing the coherence values 
derived from these probabilities for each inference. 
Figure 5.9 shows that responses to both inferences tended to be coherent: for the valid 
IfOr inference, the conclusion was rated more probable than the premise, and for the invalid 
OrIf inference the conclusion was rated less probable than the premise. The degree to which 
probability judgments for the premise differed from those for the conclusion was similar for 
both inferences. Accordingly, the observed coherence rate for both inferences is almost 
identical. However, the lower ratings of premise probability for the IfOr inference imply a 
higher chance-rate of conforming to coherence for this inference, which translates into a lower 
rate of above-chance coherence - despite, as already mentioned, almost identical observed 
coherence.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Coherence information for the IfOr inference and the OrIf inference of 
Experiment 3. "P(prem)" = premise probability, "P(concl)" = conclusion probability, 
"Observed" = observed coherence, "Chance" = chance-rate coherence, and "Above" 
= above-chance coherence.   Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
Is the lower rate of above-chance coherence observed for the IfOr inference justified, or is 
it an artefact of the differences in the chance rates for the two inferences? In this case one 
could argue that it was actually justified, because the lower chance rate for the OrIf inference 
meant that it required more "effort" to arrive at the same value of observed coherence than was 
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the case for the IfOr inference. After all, an observed rate of 80% can more readily be 
considered an achievement when the chance rate is 20% than when the chance rate is 79%. On 
the other hand, an observed rate of around 80% is already quite high, knowing that 100% is 
the rate of a hypothetical perfectly coherent person. It could be that participants' responses are 
already reaching their ceiling, and that much higher coherence is not possible due to 
measurement imprecision. In that case the lower rate of above-chance coherence for the IfOr 
inference would indeed be unjustified. The difference in performance between the two 
inferences seems hard to compare given their different chance rates, and a comparison would 
have been even more difficult if the observed rates had differed more strongly. 
Figures 5.5 to 5.8 suggest that the problem in comparability was also present within 
inferences because judgments of premise probability differed between groups. This was 
confirmed by a linear mixed model for the effects of group, premise probability, and inference 
type on judgments of the probability of the first premise, with random intercepts for 
participants and scenarios: Judgments of the probability of premise 1 were higher in the 
inferences group (EMM = .631) than in the statements group (EMM = .571), F(1, 1103.54) = 
22.09, p < .001.  
For the inferences of type C, a linear mixed model for the effects of group and premise 
probability on judgments of the probability of the second premise (again with random 
intercepts for participants and items) showed the same result: probability judgments were 
higher in the inferences group than in the statements group, F(1, 368) = 8.89, p = .003, 
particularly in the low premise probability condition, where there was more space for an 
increase, F(1, 368) = 8.27, p = .004 (for the low condition: EMMgroup1 = .158; EMMgroup2 = 
.271. For the high condition: EMMgroup1 = .833; EMMgroup2 = .841).  
These results show that premise probability judgments differed between groups. This 
implies that the chance rates will differ between groups, making a quantitative comparison of 
coherence between groups difficult.  
The problem of quantitative comparability of coherence results between inferences and 
task conditions caused by unequal chance rates has not been considered in past studies 
investigating coherence statistically (Cruz et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015; Politzer & Baratgin, 
2016; Singmann et al., 2014). There may be some way of rescaling the coherence rate to 
account both for the presence of the chance rate, and for differences in the chance rate between 
conditions. If such an adjustment were possible, it would be of great value to the field because 
it would much increase the type of questions that could be answered with designs like those 
used in this experiment.  
A solution to this problem cannot be reached by computing the proportion of above-
chance coherence out of the maximum possible above-chance coherence, because this is 
equivalent to the observed coherence rate. To see why, consider that: 
above-chance coherence = observed coherence - chance rate coherence 
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maximum possible above-chance coherence = 1 - chance rate coherence 
One cannot obtain the proportion of above-chance coherence out of the maximum possible 
above-chance coherence by dividing the first by the second, because the division is done on an 
item-by-item basis, and can therefore lead to impossible outcomes. Consider the example of a 
response that did not fall in the interval (observed coherence = 0), where the chance rate was 
.8. Above-chance coherence for this item will then be 0 - .8 = -.8. Given that the chance rate 
was .8, 1 - the chance rate = .2, and so the proportion of above-chance coherence out of the 
maximum possible above-chance coherence for this item would then be -.8/.2 = -4. This is not 
a proportion and it makes no conceptual sense.  
An alternative way of arriving at the proportion of above-chance coherence out of 
maximum above-chance coherence is by rescaling the two: if we set maximum above-chance 
coherence to 1 by adding its complement (i.e., by adding the chance rate) to it, and then also 
add the chance rate to above-chance coherence, we arrive at the proportion we were looking 
for without the above problem of nonsensical values. But this is simply the observed 
coherence rate.  
A further ineffective solution, which is nonetheless of theoretical interest, is the 
following. The problem we are facing is that we want to compare coherence values corrected 
for chance-rate coherence, but where the chance rate differs between responses. This problem 
is analogous to that of computing a within subject standard error, where the variance differs 
between participants (Bakeman & McArthur, 1996, p. 587). The idea is to partial out the 
variance that is due to interindividual differences from the overall response scores, and 
compute the standard error on the resulting adjusted scores.  Formally: 
 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 =  𝑌𝑖𝑗 − (𝑌𝑖. − 𝑌..) 
 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑗 and  𝑌𝑖𝑗 are the adjusted and raw scores, respectively, 𝑌𝑖. is the mean of participant i 
across repeated measures, and 𝑌.. is the grand mean. In analogy to this, one can first subtract 
the chance rates for each response from the overall mean of the chance rate. The resulting 
difference scores can then be subtracted from the observed coherence scores to obtain adjusted 
observed coherence scores. The problem is that these adjusted scores are identical to the 
scores for above-chance coherence obtained through the Evans et al. procedure. The 
equivalence between the two methods of adjusting for the chance rate is interesting and gives 
the method of Evans et al. a wider foundation. But it does not solve the problem of 
quantitative comparability of coherence between conditions.  
Without a solution to this problem, experimental designs like that of Cruz et al. (2015), 
Evans et al. (2015), Politzer & Baratgin (2016), Singmann et al. (2014) and the present 
experiment seem to be able to make only nominal comparisons between inferences and 
conditions. That is, assessments of whether or not responses were coherent at above-chance 
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levels for a series of inferences or conditions, but not whether above-chance performance was 
higher for one inference or condition than for another.  
Nevertheless, this limitation does not undermine the conclusions drawn by Evans et al. 
(2015) on the effect of an explicit inference task. This is because, although they measured a 
quantitative increase in above-chance coherence in the inferences task compared to the 
statements task, and this quantitative change is hard to interpret, they also found a qualitative 
increase. Coherence was above-chance for two (MP, DA) out of four inferences in the 
statements task, and for three (MP, DA, AC) out of four inferences in the inferences task. At 
the same time, the finding in Evans et al. of above-chance coherence for AC in the inferences 
task is relativized by the finding of no above-chance coherence for this inference in the 
inferences task of Singmann et al. (2014).  
Against this background, it also makes sense that Cruz et al. found no effect of an explicit 
inference task in Experiments 1 and 2. All they seem to be able to assert with their design is 
whether or not coherence was above-chance levels for the inferences they investigated, and 
they found this to be the case for all inferences. Similarly, the limitations in quantitative 
comparability do not undermine the qualitative findings in Cruz et al. and Politzer et al. that 
people were reliably coherent above chance levels for a range of one-premise inferences.  
The present experiment investigates above-chance coherence in a qualitative form further, 
and complements this with a method of analysis not based on above-chance coherence. 
Above-chance coherence. The results of the coherence analysis for each inference and 
group are displayed in Figure 5.10. The left panels of the figure show the rate of observed 
coherence. The horizontal line crossing zero in these panels stands for the rate that would be 
observed if a person were never coherent, and the maximum of the scale at 1 stands for the 
rate that would be observed if a person were always coherent. The right panels show the rate 
of above-chance coherence. The horizontal line crossing the y axis at 0 in these panels 
represents the likelihood of a response being coherent just by chance. The rows of the Figure 
display the results for each group. For simplicity, it may be useful to focus first on the middle 
row: that displaying the results for the inferences group.  
Both observed and above-chance coherence were measured with three different degrees 
of precision: a measurement based on the exact boundaries of the coherence interval, one 
based on the interval boundaries +- 5%, and one based on the interval boundaries +- 10%. 
These degrees of measurement precision do not entail that the coherence assessment was more 
lenient in the +- 5% and +- 10% conditions than in the exact condition. The reason is that the 
two conditions with lower measurement precision were computed by enlarging not only the 
width of the coherence interval by 5% resp. 10%, with the trivial result that more responses 
will lie within it, but by also enlarging the chance rate of a coherent response by the same 
margin. This means that the rate of observed coherence will trivially be higher in the +- 5% 
and +- 10% conditions than in the exact condition, but the rate of above-chance coherence will 
148 
 
only be higher as well if the additional number of coherent responses resulting from a larger 
interval was higher than expected by chance.   
 
 
Figure 5.10. Mean values of observed and above-chance coherence for the 12 inferences of 
Experiment 3, separately for each group and for three levels of measurement precision (see 
text for details). The black horizontal line represents a coherence rate of 0% in the panels for 
observed coherence, and it represents the chance rate of a coherent response in the panels for 
above-chance coherence. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
One can see this clearly in Figure 5.10: in the left panels the observed coherence rate is 
higher in the conditions of lower measurement precision for all inferences, whereas in the right 
panels the above-chance coherence rate is higher mainly for inferences 1 and 2 (DM and 
nDM). This makes sense given that for DM and nDM the coherence interval is a point value: 
It therefore seems likely that we will find a cluster of responses near that point, indicating a 
sensitivity to coherence, but which do not lie exactly on the point because people's degrees of 
belief do not have the degree of precision of a point probability. For example, it seems 
unrealistic that people will think about the likelihood of rain on a particular day as being 
exactly 79%, such that they would consider it false for it to be 78% or 80%.  
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The three degrees of measurement precision can be viewed as scales with different 
numbers of subdivisions. The exact scale has 101 subdivisions, going from 0% to 100%; the 
+- 5% scale has 10 subdivisions, and the +- 10% scale has 5 subdivisions.  
In order to increase comparability to previous studies (Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 
2014), subsequent statistical analyses will be based on exact coherence unless otherwise 
specified. However, the above measurement of probability judgments for different degrees of 
precision can be used to test empirically hypotheses about the granularity or coarseness of 
people's degrees of belief. Such an empirical approach using the tools of probability theory 
seems preferable to making apriori assumptions about the coarseness of people's beliefs, 
advocated for instance in qualitative or ranking theoretical approaches (e. g. Spohn, 2013).  
To obtain an impression of the statistical pattern in the data relative to that reported in 
previous studies (Evans et al., 2015), a linear mixed model was computed for the effects of 
inference type and group on above-chance coherence, with a random intercept for participants. 
The model intercept was significant, F(1, 170.39) = 397.34, p < .001, indicating that overall 
responses were coherent around 24% more often than expected by chance (EMM = .237).  
Above-chance coherence differed between inference types, F(2, 3012.068) = 28.47, p < 
.001. It was higher for inferences of type A (EMM = .296) and B (EMM = .274) than for those 
of type C (EMM = .139) (for A vs. C: F(1, 1441) = 37.744, p < .001. For B vs. C: F(1, 
2488.125) = 44.60, p < .001). Above-chance coherence was similar between the inferences of 
types A and B (F(1, 1964.099) = .770, p = .380).  
There was no main effect of group (EMMgroup1 = .215, EMMgroup2 = .250, EMMgroup3 = 
.245; F(2, 170.391) = .85, p = .430), nor an interaction between group and inference type, F(4, 
3012.069) = .71, p = .588.  
The above results are only indicative given the quantitative comparability problem 
described above. It is therefore useful to complement them with a binary assessment, for each 
inference, of whether coherence was above chance levels or not. The confidence intervals in 
Figure 5.10 indicate that this was clearly the case for all inferences except for the infrence of 
IfOr in groups 1 and 3, as well as MT, AC and DA across groups. The results for these four 
inferences were examined in more detail in what follows.  
The group and inference specific analyses included only fixed effects, because attempts to 
include random effects led to failure of convergence in some cases. That a model for a single 
inference fails to converge when including random effects, whereas the larger model including 
all inferences did not, is understandable given that the Maximum Likelihood method used to 
compute the mixed models is approximate (in contrast to the exact ordinary least squares 
method of the ANOVA), and so requires larger sample sizes to be effective.  
For IfOr, coherence was not above chance levels in Group 1, F(1, 84) = 3.90, p = .052; or 
in Group 3, F(1, 78) = .64, p = .425. But coherence was above chance levels in Group 2, F(1, 
100) = 8.38, p = .005. The same result was obtained for MT: coherence was not above chance 
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levels in Group 1, F(1, 84) = .16, p = .690; or in Group 3, F(1, 78) = 2.43, p = .123. But 
coherence was above-chance levels in Group 2, F(1, 100) = 4.24, p = .042.  
Thus, for the two p-valid inferences IfOr and MT, coherence was above chance levels in 
the inferences task but not in the statements task. Further, the presence of an explicit inference 
task was only associated with significantly higher coherence when participants' attention to the 
task was not diverted by additional working memory load. 
This finding contrasts with that for the p-invalid inferences AC and DA. For AC, 
responses were coherent above chance levels in Group 1, F(1, 84) = 7.18, p = .009. But 
coherence was not above-chance in Group 2, F(1, 100) = .49, p = .486; or in Group 3, F(1 78) 
= .75, p = .390. The same finding was obtained for DA: responses were coherent above-
chance levels in Group 1, F(1, 84) = 21.10, p < .001; but not in Group 2, F(1, 100) = 1.32, p = 
.253; or in Group 3, F(1, 78) = .22, p = .644.  
Thus, for the p-invalid inferences AC and DA, coherence was above-chance levels in the 
statements task, but ceased to be so in the inferences task. Going back to Figure 5.8, one can 
see that this was because participants gave higher conclusion probability judgments in the 
inferences task than in the statements task for all four conditional syllogisms (see Klauer et al., 
2010, for a similar finding). Higher conclusion probability increases coherence for the p-valid 
inferences, but decreases coherence for the p-invalid inferences.  
 
 
Figure 5.11. Above-chance coherence for the inferences IfOr, MT, AC and DA of Experiment 
3, separately for each group and premise probability condition. The horizontal line in the 
panels represents the chance rate of a coherent response. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
Overall, above-chance coherence for IfOr, MT, AC, and DA was not reliably present, but 
depended on the group, specifically on whether participants received a statements or an 
inferences task. However, Figure 5.11 shows that responses to these inferences nonetheless 
tended to be coherent above chance levels in the premise probability conditions in which it 
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was easier to detect above-chance coherence when it was there. This was the high condition 
for the two p-valid inferences IfOr and MT, and the low condition for the p-invalid inferences 
AC and DA. There was thus a tendency to be coherent across groups also for IfOr, MT, AC 
and DA, though this tendency was weaker than for the other inferences.  
Taken together, responses were coherent above-chance levels across the three groups for 
8 out of 12 inferences. Among the 4 remaining inferences, coherence for the two p-valid 
inferences was above-chance levels in group 2, that is, in the inferences group without 
working memory load. This suggests that overall people were sensitive to the constraint of 
coherence even in the absence of an explicit task to draw inferences. Where sensitivity to 
coherence was less strong, it helped to have an explicit inference task for the valid inferences 
IfOr and MT, but not for the invalid inferences AC and DA.  
 The effect of group for inferences IfOr and MT suggest that one of the reasons why 
coherence was higher in the presence of an explicit inference task was the opportunity to focus 
attention on the relationships between the statements presented on the screen. Responses were 
less coherent for inferences when the statements required to be coherent were scattered across 
trials, or when it was more difficult to focus attention on the inferences because of concurrent 
working memory load.  
Why was coherence found to be less strong for IfOr, MT, AC, and DA, and why did 
coherence actually decrease with an explicit inference task for AC and DA? In the case of 
IfOr, this is likely due to the lower probability assigned to the premise, which rendered the test 
for above-chance coherence less sensitive for this inference. The lower premise probability 
assignments may be due to a failure of invariance, but this possibility would have to be 
investigated further in follow-up experiments.  
For MT, one way of explaining the lower rate of above-chance coherence is again as the 
result of a failure of invariance (Oaksford & Chater, 2013). The structure of MT can be 
compared to a reductio ad absurdum argument: a high probability of the minor premise not-q 
is incompatible with a high probability for both the conditional if p then q and its antecedent p. 
To maintain coherence after learning the minor premise, we therefore either have to assign a 
higher probability to the conclusion not-p, or a lower probability to the major premise if p then 
q. But the inference itself does not tell us which of these two probabilities to change. The 
computation of coherence presupposes that the subjective probabilities of the premises remain 
invariant when judging the probability of the conclusion. If invariance fails, then one can no 
longer capture the coherence of a response with respect to the original probabilities, and so 
cannot judge whether the response was coherent or not. One can only establish the new 
premise probabilities and judge the coherence of the response with respect to them. The extent 
to which a failure of invariance can explain lower coherence rates for MT would be important 
to investigate in further experiments. 
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Coherence for AC and DA. Consider now the results for the invalid inferences AC and 
DA. The finding that responses to these inferences were coherent at above-chance levels in the 
statements task, but ceased to be so in the inferences task, raises the possibility that the 
participants spontaneously held coherent beliefs about the likelihoods of the statements in the 
inferences, but then interpreted these statements differently in the explicit inferences task, and 
so not in line with the experimenter's assumptions when measuring coherence. Two alternative 
interpretations are considered in the following.  
The first possible interpretation is that the naturalistic materials, plus the context of an 
explicit inference, caused some participants to infer that the antecedent and consequent of the 
conditional premise covaried, so that both P(q|p) and P(p|q) should be taken as high. 
Supposing this happens, a conjunction of the probability conditionals, (if p then q) & (if q then 
p), can be formed (Gilio et al., 2016; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2014), and Table 5.6 constructed as 
its Jeffrey table (Jeffrey, 1991; see also Appendix A). There is some evidence that people 
sometimes form such a biconditional interpretation of conditionals (e.g. Baratgin et al., 2013; 
Barrouillet & Gauffroy, 2015; Fugard, Pfeifer, et al., 2011). 
Let us call the versions of AC and DA for which the major premise is this probability 
biconditional, "biconditional AC" and "biconditional DA", respectively. Table 5.7 shows the 
equations for the coherence intervals for these inferences
7
, and Figure 5.12 the location of the 
intervals for biconditional AC and biconditional DA as a function of their premise 
probabilities. Note that in contrast to the original AC and DA, biconditional AC and DA are p-
valid inferences. One can see that the intervals for the original and for the biconditional 
versions of the inferences only coincide when P(major premise) = 0, and that the intervals for 
the biconditional versions are generally stricter, that is, narrower than those of the original 
inferences. Further, when the probability of the major premise is 1, the intervals for both 
biconditional inferences are point values equal to the probability of the minor premise. 
 
Table 5.6. The Jeffrey table for the 
probability biconditional that results 
from adding the converse, if q then 
p, to the original conditional. 
p, q T 
p, not-q F 
not-p, q F 
not-p, not-q P(p & q)|P(p or q) 
Note. T = True, F = False.  
                                                          
7
 These intervals were derived by the author on the basis of example cases of minimum and maximum 
coherence bounds, computed using the software package "Check Coherence" by Andrea Capotorti and 
colleagues (Capotorti, Galli, & Vantaggi, 2003).  
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Table 5.7. The coherence intervals for biconditional AC (Bic AC) and biconditional DA (Bic 
DA). 
Name Form Coherence interval for the conclusion 
  Lower bound Upper bound 
Bic 
AC 
(if p then q)& (if q then 
p), q p 
xy if x  y, then y/x 
if x < y, then x + (1 - 
y) 
Bic 
DA 
(if p then q)& (if q then 
p), not-q  not-p 
if x + y  1, then 1 - (x + y) 
if x + y > 1, then (x + y - 1)/x 
1 - x(1 - y) 
Note.  = "therefore", x = the probability of the major premise, y = the probability of the 
minor premise. 
 
A second interpretation considered is based on the idea that people could use background 
knowledge or pragmatics to infer the converse of the conditional, if q then p, from a given 
conditional, if p then q. Supposing this occurs, people could then use the converse alone for 
inferences, leaving the original conditional premise aside as inessential (see Adams, 1998, on 
the degree of essentialness of a premise for a conclusion). In the case of AC, the resulting 
inference is a version of MP: if q then p, q, therefore p. In the case of DA, the resulting 
inference is a version of MT: if q then p, not-p, therefore not-q. The degree of belief people 
assigned to the converse could vary, but if we assume for simplicity that it is equal to the 
probability participants assigned to the original conditional premise, then the procedure 
described is equivalent to swapping the conditional with its converse, or possibly simply 
misinterpreting the conditional as the converse. There is evidence from past studies suggesting 
that people sometimes find it difficult to distinguish between a conditional and its converse, e. 
g. through the conjunctive response in truth table tasks, the treatment of "all A are B" as equal 
to "All B are A" in reasoning with categorical syllogisms, and the conflation of P(q|p) with 
P(p|q) in the judgment and decision making literature on the use of Bayes' theorem (Evans & 
Over, 1996, 2004). Let us call "converse AC" and "converse DA" the versions of AC and DA 
in which the conditional premise is substituted with its converse. 
Figure 5.13 compares the above-chance coherence participants would obtain for an 
interpretation of the conditional premise in AC and DA as the original probability conditional, 
as the probability biconditional, and as the converse of the original conditional, respectively. 
One can clearly see from the confidence intervals in the figure that an interpretation of the 
conditional premise as a biconditional renders participants' responses to both inferences 
coherent above chance levels in all groups, whereas an interpretation of the conditional 
premise as its converse does not. This suggests that a viable possibility for why coherence was 
not above chance levels in the inferences task for inferences AC and DA, was that some 
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participants interpreted the conditional premises, in the explicit versions of these inferences, as 
probability biconditionals. 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Coherence intervals for biconditional AC and biconditional DA as a function of 
their premise probabilities.  
 
 
Figure 5.13. Above-chance coherence for AC and DA of Experiment 
3, in the original version of the inferences (left), in a version in which 
the conditional premise is substituted with a biconditional (middle), 
and in a version in which the conditional premise is substituted with 
its converse, if q then p (right). Error bars show 95% CIs. 
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For example, suppose we are members of a jury, and the prosecutor makes the following 
statements as if we are to draw an inference from them: "If the defendant is the murderer, then 
the defendant's fingerprints are on the knife. The defendant's fingerprints are on the knife." It 
might then seem natural to us to interpret the above conditional assertion as a biconditional. 
After all, AC is an invalid inference, but the corresponding inference from the biconditional is 
valid, as noted above. The biconditional interpretation could also be related to the fact that the 
materials used in this experiment featured a connection, causal or conceptual, between 
antecedent and consequent, to allow the construction of the high-low premise probability 
condition. Future research could explore whether the existence of certain connections 
encourages a probability biconditional interpretation of a conditional assertion in the context 
of an explicit inference.  
Response variance. A second way of assessing people's sensitivity to coherence is by 
looking not at the frequency with which responses lie within the coherence interval, but at 
differences in the variance of responses as a function of the width of the interval. This method 
takes advantage of the premise probability manipulation used. The general prediction is that 
the variance of responses will be higher when the coherence interval is wide than when it is 
narrow.  
More concretely, for the inferences of type A the coherence interval was always a point 
value, and so response variance was predicted to be similar across premise probability 
conditions.  For the p-valid inferences of type B, response variance was predicted to be larger 
when the probability of the premise was low. In contrast, for the p-invalid inferences of type 
B, response variance was predicted to be larger when the probability of the premise was high.  
For the inferences of type C, consider the second column of Figure 5.5. The form of the 
intervals depicted there leads to the prediction that for the p-valid inferences MP and MT, 
response variance will be larger in the high-low than in the high-high condition. In contrast, 
for the p-invalid inferences AC and DA, response variance was predicted to be higher in the 
high-high than in the high-low condition.  
The variances for each condition are shown in Table 5.8. The overall pattern looks rather 
mixed, but in the inferences group the majority of the differences went in the predicted 
direction. The data were analysed in a series of F tests for equality of variances for each group. 
For the DM inference of type A, the variance of responses differed in Group 1 (F(41, 41) = 
2.566, p = .003; 95% CI [1.379, 4.774])
8
; and in Group 2 (F(49, 49) = 1.836, p = .037; 95% CI 
[1.036, 3.218]). But variances did not differ in Group 3 (F(38, 38) = 1.395, p = .310; 95% CI 
[.721, .266]). For the nDM inference of type A, variances differed in all groups (For Group 1: 
                                                          
8
 To interpret the confidence intervals, it is useful to consider that the F test assesses whether two 
variances are equal, and that they are equal when their ratio is 1. For this reason, the difference between 
the variances is significant when the confidence interval for this difference does not include the value of 
1.  
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F(41, 41) = 4.774, p < .001; 95% CI [2.566, 8.881]. For Group 2: F(49, 49) = 3.093, p < .001; 
95% CI [1.755, 5.451]. For Group 3: F(38, 38) = 6.658, p < .001; 95% CI [3.491, 12.696]).  
Thus, the variances of responses to DM and nDM differed between the high and low 
probability conditions, even though the width of their coherence intervals provided no grounds 
for this. Rather, the variation observed is likely to be due to inductive factors.  
 
Table 5.8. Variances of conclusion probability judgments in 
Experiment 3, separately for each group, inference, and premise 
probability condition.   
Inference Group 1 (n=42) Group 2 (n=50) Group 3 (n=39) 
 low high low high low high 
DM 0.050 0.128 0.145 0.079 0.147 0.105 
nDM 0.123 0.026 0.169 0.055 0.206 0.031 
&E 0.052 0.033 0.152 0.061 0.144 0.030 
&I 0.023 0.023 0.047 0.054 0.007 0.059 
&Or 0.043 0.111 0.116 0.135 0.127 0.140 
Or& 0.057 0.040 0.073 0.082 0.084 0.067 
IfOr 0.033 0.119 0.118 0.155 0.137 0.169 
OrIf 0.058 0.151 0.128 0.171 0.087 0.203 
MP 0.092 0.028 0.140 0.025 0.144 0.033 
MT 0.033 0.095 0.108 0.080 0.131 0.106 
AC 0.039 0.016 0.143 0.055 0.152 0.037 
DA 0.034 0.070 0.100 0.101 0.161 0.125 
 
For inferences of type B and C, the predictions for the effect of interval width depended 
on whether the inferences were p-valid or p-invalid. The F tests were therefore performed 
grouped by validity. For the p-valid inferences of type B, the variance in Group 1 was larger in 
the high premise probability condition (EMM = .089) than in the low premise probability 
condition (EMM = .042) (F(125, 125) = 2.099, p < .001; 95% CI [1.476, 2.986]). The variance 
in Group 2 was similar for the high (EMM = .125) and the low (EMM = .128) conditions 
(F(149, 149) = 1.024, p = .884). In Group 3 the variance also did not differ between the high 
(EMM = .126) and the low condition (EMM = .134) (F(116, 116) = 1.061, p = .752; 95% CI 
[.736, 1.529]). None of these three comparisons is in accordance with the predictions.   
For the p-invalid inferences of type B, the variance in Group 1 was larger in the high 
(EMM = .133) than in the low (EMM = .047) premise probability condition (F(125, 125) = 
2.855, p < .001; 95% CI [2.008, 4.061]). In Group 2 the variance was similar in the high 
(EMM = .111) and in the low (EMM = .085) condition (F(149, 149) = 1.299, p = .112; 95% CI 
[.941, 1.793]). In Group 3, the variance was larger in the high (EMM = .128) than in the low 
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(EMM = .062) condition (F(116, 116) = 2.074, p < .001; 95% CI [1.439, 2.990]). Thus, in 
Groups 1 and 3 where a difference was found, it went in the direction of the predictions, but 
the absence of a significant difference in Group 2 was not in accordance with the predictions.  
For the p-valid inferences of type C, variances in Group 1 were similar in the high (EMM 
= .064) and the low (EMM = .086) premise probability condition (F(83, 83) = 1.335, p .190; 
95% CI [.865, 2.059]). The variance in Group 2 was larger in the low (EMM = .151) than in 
the high (EMM = .055) condition (F(99, 99) = 2.756, p < .001; 95% CI [1.854, 4.096]). The 
variance in Group 3 was also larger in the low (EMM = .161) than in the high (EMM = .079) 
condition (F(77, 77) = 2.047, p = .002; 95% CI [1.305, 3.209]). This means that in Groups 2 
and 3 were a difference was found, it went in the direction of the predictions, but the absence 
of a significant difference in Group 1 was not in accordance with the predictions. 
For the p-invalid inferences of type C, the variance in Group 1 was larger in the high 
(EMM = .075) than in the low (EMM = .037) condition (F(83, 83) = 2.06, p = .001; 95% CI 
[1.336, 3.177]), in accordance with the predictions. In Group 2 the variance was larger in the 
low (EMM = .129) than in the high (EMM = .092) condition (F(99, 99) = 1.409, p = .090; 95% 
CI [.096, .129]), contrary to the predictions. In Group 3 the variance was also larger in the low 
(EMM = .155) than in the high (EMM = .097) condition (F(77, 77) = 1.610, p = .038; 95% CI 
[1.026, 2.524]), contrary to the predictions.  
Overall, in contrast to the consistent evidence for sensitivity to the location of coherence 
intervals shown in the analysis of above-chance coherence, there was no consistent evidence 
for sensitivity to the width of coherence intervals. The findings generally went in the direction 
of the predictions for the invalid inferences of type B and for the valid inferences of type C, 
but were contrary to the predictions for the valid inferences of type B and for the invalid 
inferences of type C. Further, there were significant differences in the variance of responses to 
the inferences 1 and 2 of type A, contrary to the predictions.  
A lack of sensitivity to the width of the coherence interval, in the presence of a sensitivity 
to its location, need not be a sign of lower conformance to coherence overall. It can also reflect 
the fact that the constraint of coherence only limits responses to a certain region of the 
probability range, and that this range must be narrowed down further using inductive criteria 
to be able to respond with a point probability as required in the instructions. It may be that 
among the cases in which people show sensitivity to the location of the interval, people also 
have sensitivity to the interval width when they perceive that there are not enough inductive 
criteria to narrow down the interval further. But that when the materials convey additional 
inductive criteria, people use them, thereby breaking up the relation between interval width 
and response variance. However, this is just a tentative explanation, and it would be good to 
see if the findings can be replicated before enquiring further about their source.  
In what relation do the results here on above-chance coherence stand to earlier studies? 
The results replicate the finding of Cruz et al. (2015) and Politzer & Baratgin (2016) that 
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people's responses are coherent above-chance levels across a wide range of inferences. They 
also replicate the findings from Cruz et al. and Evans et al. (2015) that coherence is often 
established intuitively or automatically, in the absence of an explicit reasoning task, when the 
statements among which coherence is to be established are not presented together on the 
screen, but in random order. Further, the results support and extend the finding of Evans et al. 
(2015) that, when coherence is weaker, it can be increased through an explicit reasoning task 
that allows people to focus attention on the relations between the probabilities of the 
statements in the inference. This explicit task increased coherence for AC in Evans et al. In the 
present experiment, it increased coherence for IfOR and for MT.  
The present experiment also explored possible causes for a failure of coherence. One 
factor investigated previously is the use of materials in which prototypicality conflicts with 
probability, discussed in relation to the conjunction fallacy in Experiment 2 and covered also 
in Politzer & Baratgin (2016). A further possible cause of the failure of coherence is the 
presence of negation effects leading to subadditivity, investigated by Evans et al. (2015) as 
well as in Costello & Watts (2016a). The findings in this experiment suggested three further 
possibilities. One is the failure of invariance, discussed in relation to MT. The second is the 
possibility that a failure of coherence can be an artefact caused by a high chance-rate 
coherence that renders it difficult to detect coherence above-chance levels when it is there. 
This problem likely affected above-chance coherence for the IfOr inference, although it cannot 
be ruled out that additional factors (e. g. a negation effect for the conditional in the antecedent) 
also played a role. A third possibility covered in this experiment, discussed also in Experiment 
1 in relation to the OrIf inference, is that people may interpret the statements involved in the 
inference in a way different from the interpretation the experimenter used as a basis for the 
computation of response coherence.  This may have affected responses to AC and DA, for 
which coherence was less reliable in the inferences task than in the statements task, and for 
which coherence became reliably above chance levels across tasks when computed under the 
assumption of a biconditional major premise.   
Taken together, coherence was at above-chance levels across groups for 8 of the 12 
inferences investigated, and it was above-chance levels in the inferences group for 10 of the 12 
inferences investigated. For the remaining 2 inferences, coherence was above-chance levels 
across groups under the assumption that the conditional was interpreted as the probability 
biconditional, i.e. as a statement describing a covariation between p and q. It is striking that 
coherence was at above-chance levels for the majority of the inferences even in the absence of 
an inference task, suggesting that there is a tendency for beliefs to be coherent intuitively or 
automatically. At the same time, it is encouraging that conscious reflection about the 
dependency relations between statements can increase coherence when it is weaker. 
Additionally, the specific cases in which coherence was found not to be above chance levels 
can be informative about possible factors affecting reasoning beyond an assessment of the 
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extent to which the premises constrain the probability of the conclusion, and these can inform 
hypotheses for future experiments.   
Experiment 4 investigates to what extent these findings can be replicated with a larger 
internet based sample.  
 
 
Experiment 4 
 
Experiment 4 was identical to experiment 3, with the exception that it was conducted over the 
internet instead of in the lab. Both experiments were implemented using the web based 
programme SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2014), available at www.soscisurvey.de
9
. This assured that 
the visual display of the task and the formatting of the response options were exactly the same 
in the two experiments.  
 
Method 
Participants. A total of 430 participants from English speaking countries completed the 
experiment through the online platform Prolific Academic (Peer et al., 2017). Two participants 
were excluded because they indicated at the end of the experiment that they had not taken part 
seriously, but instead just "clicked through"; two because they failed a catch trial asking them 
not to respond but to instead click "next" to continue with the experiment; fourteen were 
excluded from the statements group because they had two or more trial reaction times of 2 
secs or less; and eleven from the inferences groups for having two or more trial reaction times 
of 3 secs or less. Two participants were excluded for not reporting at least "good" English 
language skills; and finally, two further participants were excluded because their devices did 
not support JavaScript, which was relevant to assure that the display conditions of the task 
were comparable across participants. The final sample consisted of 415 participants (124 in 
Group 1, 147 in Group 2, and 144 in Group 3). Participants' median age was 30 (range 18-74). 
They had a diverse formal educational background, with 22% reporting having finished 12
th
 
grade, 10% having a technical/applied degree, 49% having an undergraduate university 
degree, and 15% a postgraduate degree or higher. Participants' median ratings of task 
difficulty were 17% in Group 1, 56% in Group 2, and 67% in Group 3.  
Materials, design, and procedure. These were the same as for Experiment 3. In Group 
3, the percentage of correct responses to the 26 trials of the memory task ranged from 15.4% 
to 100% (median: 65.4%. As for Experiment 3, the chance rate of responding correctly on any 
trial was 1/3024). The distribution of the percentage of correct responses to the memory task is 
                                                          
9
 SoSci Survey is a software for creating online experiments and surveys originally developed at the 
University of Munich, partly in cooperation with the University of Zurich. It is tailored to experimental 
research and is free of charge when used for academic as opposed to commercial or private purposes.    
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shown in the lower panel of Figure 5.4 above. One can see that the distribution was very 
similar for both experiments. 
The median duration of the experimental session was 11.5 min for group 1, 11.2 min for 
group 2, and 9.8 min for group 3.  
 
Results and discussion 
Above-chance coherence. Figure 5.14 displays the results for observed and above-
chance coherence for each inference. The overall results look very similar to those of 
Experiment 3. There was again a trivial increase in observed coherence for lower degrees of 
measurement precision, which remained present for above-chance coherence mainly in 
inferences 1 and 2. It is also of interest that in the statements task, coherence seemed to be 
above chance levels for all inferences, whereas in the inferences task above-chance coherence 
seemed to be less reliably present for IfOr and AC.   
The pattern of responses was investigated further in a linear mixed model for the effects 
of experiment (3, 4), inference type, and group on above-chance coherence, with random 
intercepts for participants. Inclusion of further random effects led to failure of convergence. 
With only two levels, experiment was treated as a fixed level-2 predictor rather than as a 
predictor at level 3.   
Overall coherence was around 24% higher than expected by chance (EMM = .235, F(1, 
706.606) = 1088.98, p < .001. There was no main effect of experiment, F(1, 706.606) = .065, 
p = .799, indicating that overall, above-chance coherence was similar for Experiment 3 (EMM 
= .237) and Experiment 4 (EMM = .233). However, there was a small main effect of group 
(F(2, 706.610) = 3.40, p = .034: Above chance coherence was higher in the inferences group 
(EMMgroup2 = .259) than in the statements group (EMMgroup1 = .215; F(1, 472.324) = 6.488, p = 
.011). Above-chance coherence for the inferences group with working memory load fell in 
between (EMMgroup3 = .230) and did not differ significantly from that of the other two groups 
(group1 vs. group 3: F(1, 451.205) = .72, p = .391. Group 2 vs. group 3: F(1, 489.724) = 
2.702, p = .101).  
As in Experiment 3, there was a main effect of inference type (F(2, 12557.108) = 41.585, 
p < .001). Above-chance coherence was higher for the inferences of type A (EMM = .290) 
than for those of type B (EMM = .251; F(1, 8189.152) = 7.04, p = .008) and of type C (EMM = 
.163; F(1, 6006) = 72.887, p < .001); and it was higher for the inferences of type B than for 
those of type C (F(1, 10373.218) = 51.81, p < .001). But this main effect was qualified by an 
interaction between inference type and experiment, F(2, 12557.108) = 8.308, p < .001. No 
other effects were significant.  
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Figure 5.14. Mean values of observed and above-chance coherence for the 12 inferences of 
Experiment 4, separately for each group and for three levels of measurement precision. The 
black horizontal line represents a coherence rate of 0% in the panels for observed coherence, 
and it represents the chance rate of a coherent response in the panels for above-chance 
coherence. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
Follow-up analyses to the interaction between inference type and experiment were 
conducted including only fixed effects, because some of the models including random effects 
failed to converge. For inferences of type A, above-chance coherence was similar for 
Experiment 3 (EMM = .296) and Experiment 4 (EMM = .285), F(1, 2184) = .271, p = .603. 
For inferences of type B, above-chance coherence was higher in Experiment 3 (EMM = .274) 
than in Experiment 4 (EMM = .227), F(1, 6551) = 9.104, p = .003. For inferences of type C, 
above-chance coherence was higher in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 3, F(1, 4368) = 
7.046, p = .009.  
Figure 5.14 suggests that the source of the interaction comes from the less reliable above-
chance coherence for ifOr in Experiment 4, and the more reliable above-chance coherence for 
MT and DA in Experiment 4. Specifically, coherence seemed to have been clearly at above-
chance levels across groups in Experiment 4 except for the inferences of IfOr and AC. The 
inferences &Or, MT, and DA were also near the horizontal line of zero above-chance 
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coherence in some conditions. Hence further specific analyses were performed for these five 
inferences. As for Experiment 3, these models included only fixed effects because the 
inclusion of random effects led to failure of convergence in some of the comparisons. 
Responses to &Or were coherent above chance levels in all groups (for Group 1: EMM = 
.275, F(1, 248) = 58.693, p < .001. For Group 2: EMM = .155, F(1, 294) = 21.780, p < .001. 
For Group 3: EMM = .096, F(1, 288) = 9.666, p = .002).  
Responses to IfOr were coherent above chance levels in Group 1 (EMM = .138, F(1, 248) 
= 20.011, p < .001). Responses remained marginally coherent above chance levels in Group 2 
(EMM = .063, F(1, 294) = 4.014, p = .046). Coherence was not above chance levels for this 
inference in Group 3 (EMM = -.014, F(1, 288) = .227, p = .634).  
Responses to MT were coherent above chance levels across groups (For Group 1: EMM = 
.176, F(1, 248) = 21.488, p < .001. For Group 2: EMM = .190, F(1, 294) = 32.751, p < .001. 
For Group 3: EMM = .119, F(1, 288) = 13.491, p < .001). 
Responses to AC were coherent above chance levels in Group 1 (EMM = .170, F(1, 248) 
= 22.308, p < .001) and in Group 2 (EMM = .061, F(1, 294) = 6.071, p = .014).  But coherence 
was not above chance levels in Group 3 (EMM = .028, F(1, 288) = 1.131, p = .288).  
Responses to DA were coherent above chance levels across groups (for Group 1: EMM = 
.158, F(1, 248) = 27.711, p < .001. For Group 2: EMM = .114, F(1, 294) = 18.316, p < .001). 
For Group 3: EMM = .073, F(1, 288) = 7.838, p = .005). 
Overall, the results show that coherence was above chance levels for all inferences in 
Groups 1 and 2, and that in Group 3 coherence ceased to be above chance levels only for ifOr 
and AC. This can be considered impressive evidence in favour of people's general sensitivity 
to the constraint of coherence.  
At the same time, the experiment replicates the lower rate of above chance coherent 
responses for IfOr and AC, found in Experiment 3. Given the strong overall evidence for 
above-chance coherence, the lower rate for these two inferences is unlikely to indicate a 
general lack of sensitivity to coherence. It seems more plausible that it is a result of inference 
specific interpretational or pragmatic factors. In the case of IfOr, the premise was again 
assigned a lower probability, leading to a higher chance rate, and a correspondingly lower rate 
of above-chance coherence. However, Experiments 3 and 4 cannot rule out that further factors 
– such as a negation effect – also play a role in the lower coherence rate for this inference. 
This possibility would have to be investigated further in experiments in which the chance rate 
is held constant across inferences. 
Figure 5.13 of Experiment 3 displayed above-chance coherence for AC and DA under 
three interpretations of the mayor premise: as the original probability conditional, if p then q, 
as a probability biconditional if p then q & if q then p, and as the converse of the original 
conditional, if q then p. The finding that responses to these inferences, which were not 
coherent above chance levels under the original conditional interpretation, would have been 
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above chance levels under a biconditional interpretation, may apply also to the present 
experiment.  
A comparison of Figures 5.10 and 5.14 suggests that the observed coherence rate was 
lower for &Or in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 3, although it remained above chance 
levels in all groups in Experiment 4. A possible reason for a lower observed coherence rate for 
this inference may be that people found it pragmatically infelicitous to infer a disjunction from 
a conjunction, because this involves making a less informative statement than one could make 
(Grice, 1989). Such a pragmatic reason would explain why the observed coherence rate 
seemed to be lower in the inferences tasks than in the statements task, and why this effect was 
not observed consistently across experiments, appearing to play a role in Experiment 4 but not 
in Experiment 3. The similar inference of or-introduction, p, therefore p or q, has been found 
to be accepted less often by participants under binary paradigm instructions, asking them to 
assume the premise to be true to then judge whether the conclusion also has to be true (Braine 
et al.,  1984; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012; Rips, 1983). However, under probabilistic 
instructions or-introduction is accepted to a similar degree as other valid inferences (Cruz et 
al., 2015; Cruz et al., 2017; Politzer & Baratgin, 2016; see also Cruz et al., 2016, for a high 
endorsement rate of and-to-or in a study with probabilistic instructions). At any rate, this 
question cannot be suitably addressed in the present experiment, given the differences in 
chance rate coherence across inferences and groups. In this experiment it can only be stated 
that whatever factors led to the lower observed coherence rate, this rate was still reliably above 
chance across groups.  
Overall, the above analysis provides strong evidence for sensitivity to the location of 
coherence intervals. The following section examines participants' sensitivity to differences in 
interval width. 
Response variance. As in Experiment 3, the question of people's sensitivity to the width 
of a coherence interval was addressed by comparing the variance in responses between 
premise probability conditions. The general prediction was that response variance would be 
larger in the conditions in which the coherence interval was large than in those in which it was 
narrow. The inference-specific predictions were the same as for Experiment 3. Table 5.9 
displays the variances for each condition. One can see that overall, the directions of the 
differences in Table 5.9 are very similar to those of Experiment 3. 
For the DM inference of type A, variances in Group 1 differed between premise 
probability conditions (F(123, 123) = 2.762, p < .001; 95% CI [1.936, 3.939]). Variances in 
Group 2 were similar between premise probability conditions (F(146, 146) = 1.455, p = .024; 
95% CI [1.051, 2.015]). Variances in Group 3 were also similar between premise probability 
conditions (F(143, 143) = 1.145, p = .418; 95% CI [.824, 1.59]). Given the prediction of no 
effect of premise probability for this inference, the results are in accordance with the 
predictions for Groups 2 and 3, but not for Group 1.  
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For the nDM inference of type A, variances differed between premise probability 
conditions in all Groups (In Group 1: (F(123, 123) = 2.833, p < .001; 95% CI [1.987, 4.041]. 
In Group 2: F(146, 146) = 6.354, p < .001; 95% CI [4.587, 8.800]. In Group 3: F(143, 143) = 
5.379, p < .001; 95% CI [3.871, 7.475]), contrary to the predictions.  
As in Experiment 3, the predictions for inferences of type B and C depended on whether 
the inferences were p-valid or p-invalid. The tests were therefore performed grouped by 
validity. For the p-valid inferences of type B, the variance in Group 1 was larger in the high 
(EMM = .067) than in the low (EMM = .039) premise probability condition (F(371, 371) = 
1.695, p < .001; 95% CI [1.382, 2.078]). In Group 2 the variance was similar in the high 
(EMM = .153) and the low (EMM = .147) condition (F(440, 440) = 1.041, p = .674; 95% CI 
[.863, 1.26]). In Group 3, the variance was also similar in the high (EMM = .158) and the low 
(EMM = .134) condition (F(431, 431) = 1.182, p = .083; 95% CI [.978, 1.428]). None of these 
three comparisons was in accordance with the predictions.  
 
Table 5.9. Variances of conclusion probability judgments in 
Experiment 4, separately for each group, inference, and premise 
probability condition.   
Inference Group 1 (n=42) Group 2 (n=50) Group 3 (n=39) 
 low high low high low high 
DM 0.028 0.077 0.165 0.113 0.127 0.111 
nDM 0.081 0.029 0.183 0.029 0.164 0.030 
&E 0.034 0.019 0.175 0.057 0.153 0.027 
&I 0.026 0.019 0.048 0.087 0.031 0.077 
&Or 0.046 0.075 0.112 0.173 0.104 0.180 
Or& 0.036 0.006 0.087 0.160 0.064 0.117 
IfOr 0.039 0.102 0.144 0.170 0.134 0.162 
OrIf 0.048 0.143 0.167 0.173 0.165 0.157 
MP 0.089 0.005 0.130 0.052 0.124 0.039 
MT 0.026 0.049 0.139 0.129 0.127 0.109 
AC 0.027 0.020 0.164 0.074 0.157 0.067 
DA 0.033 0.077 0.146 0.138 0.127 0.104 
 
For the p-invalid inferences of type B, the variance in Group 1 was larger in the high 
(EMM = .103) than in the low (EMM = .037) premise probability condition (F(371. 371) = 
2.809, p < .001; 95% CI [2.291, 3.809]). The variance in Group 2 was also larger in the high 
(EMM = .147) than in the low (EMM = .109) condition (F(440, 440) = 1.343, p = .002; 95% 
CI [1.114, 1.620]). In Group 3 the variance was also higher in the high (EMM = .137) than in 
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the low (EMM = .098) condition (F(431, 431) = 1.394, p < .001; 95% CI [1.154, 1.684]). The 
three comparisons were in accordance with the predictions.  
For the p-valid inferences of type C, the variance in Group 1 was larger in the high (EMM 
= .083) than in the low (EMM = .028) premise probability condition (F(247, 247) = 2.992, p < 
.001; 95% CI [2.329, 3.841]), contrary to the predictions. In Group 2 the variance was larger 
in the low (EMM = .164) than in the high (EMM = .096) condition (F(293, 293) = 1.719, p < 
.001; 95% CI [1.367, 2.163]), in accordance with the predictions. The variance in Group 3 was 
also larger in the low (EMM = .155) than in the high (EMM = .080) condition (F(287, 287) = 
1.931, p < .001; 95% CI [1.531, 2.435]), in accordance with the predictions.  
Finally, for the p-invalid inferences of type C, the variance in Group 1 was higher in the 
high (EMM = .068) than in the low (EMM = .030) premise probability condition (F(247, 247) 
= 2.273, p < .001; 95% CI [1.771, 2.919]) in accordance with the predictions. In Group 2 the 
variance was marginally larger in the low (EMM = .158) than in the high (EMM = .124) 
condition (F(293, 293) = 1.268, p = .043; 95% CI [1.009, 1.595]), contrary to the predictions. 
The variance in Group 3 was also larger in the low (EMM = .148) than in the high (EMM = 
.095) condition (F(287, 287) = 1.558, p < .001; 95% CI [1.236, 1.964]), contrary to the 
predictions.  
Overall, the present findings provide no consistent evidence of sensitivity to the width of 
a coherence interval. The results for DM were in accordance with the predictions in Groups 2 
and 3, but not in Group 1. The results for nDM were contrary to the predictions in all groups. 
The findings for the inferences of type B were in accordance with the predictions for the 
invalid inferences, but not for the valid inferences. And the findings for the inferences of type 
C depended on the group: for the p-valid inferences they were in accordance with the 
predictions in Groups 2 and 3, but not in Group 1. In contrast, for the p-invalid inferences the 
findings were in accordance with the predictions for Group 1 but not for Groups 2 and 3.  
The findings on response variance were very similar in Experiments 3 and 4, and they 
show a parallel to the findings on above-chance coherence. In both experiments, coherence 
among the inferences of type B was less reliable for IfOr, and in line with this, the findings on 
response variance were in accordance with the predictions for the p-invalid but not the p-valid 
inferences. Similarly, the findings on above-chance coherence for inferences of type C 
depended on the group: For the p-valid inferences responses were more reliably coherent in 
the inferences group than in the statements group, whereas for the p-invalid inferences they 
were more reliably coherent in the statements group than in the inferences group – and we find 
the exact same pattern for response variance. Although the findings provide no consistent 
evidence of a sensitivity to the width of the interval, they also suggest that in the cases in 
which the findings were in accordance with the predictions, they were systematically so, in 
that they mirrored the results on above-chance coherence, suggesting that the measure of 
response variance used did tap an aspect of sensitivity to coherence as it had intended.  
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General discussion 
 
In summary, Experiments 3 and 4 provide strong and consistent evidence that people are 
sensitive to coherence constraints both for one- and for two-premise inferences. Where 
coherence was less reliably present, it sometimes helped to have an explicit inference task, at 
least when no secondary working memory load task diverted attentional resources from it. But 
the presence of an explicit inference task was not always helpful. Whether it increases the rate 
of coherent responses or not seems to depend on interpretational and pragmatic factors. If 
people interpret the statements in the task differently from the experimenters, an explicit 
inference task can also decrease the rate of coherent responses. This can be just as informative 
as the reliable presence of coherence, because it can inform hypotheses about which 
interpretational and pragmatic factors may be playing a role in the reasoning process in 
addition to the coherence constraints investigated here.   
In contrast to the clear evidence for sensitivity to the location of a coherence interval, 
both experiments provided only equivocal evidence of sensitivity to interval width. As 
mentioned above, the lack of an effect of interval width need not be seen as evidence for a 
lower sensitivity to coherence. This is because coherence only constrains responses to an 
interval, but within this interval inductive criteria may or may not constrain responses further, 
given the content and context of the inferences. When inductive criteria have a consistent 
effect on responses across participants, the relation between interval width and response 
variance can be broken. Where no consistent inductive criteria are perceived that would 
constrain responses to a certain region of the interval, the variance of responses can be 
expected to increase with interval width. However, this is only a tentative explanation, and the 
effect of interval width still has to be investigated further, with a variety of methods, to assess 
the value of such an explanation. 
Experiments 3 and 4 investigated for which of a series of inferences coherence was above 
chance levels under different conditions. But the differences in the chance rate between 
conditions prevented the formulation of quantitative judgments about above-chance 
coherence. For example, judgments for MP were coherent above chance levels across groups. 
But were they more coherent in the inferences task than in the statements task? The inferences 
of DM and nDM were also coherent above chance levels across groups. But were they more or 
less coherent than responses to MP, or was coherence similar for the three inferences? And 
were responses to &Or really less coherent than for other one premise inferences? Such 
quantitative comparisons will be addressed in the next series of experiments.  
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EXPERIMENT 5: 
AT THE EDGE VS. THE CENTRE OF THE COHERENCE INTERVAL 
 
Experiments 1 to 4 provided strong evidence that people's responses to a range of inferences 
of differing complexity are coherent at above chance levels. Experiments 5 to 7 move beyond 
this qualitative finding to investigate the degree to which responses are coherent above chance 
levels for these inferences, and whether people are more coherent for some inferences than for 
others. For example, is coherence higher for simpler one-premise inferences than for two-
premise inferences? And does coherence differ for valid and invalid inferences?  
The latter question is important in the investigation of a role of p-validity over and above 
coherence. As mentioned earlier, the definition of p-validity necessarily rests on that of 
coherence, and this makes it difficult to test whether p-validity plays an independent role. But 
if coherence differs for valid and invalid inferences, then this difference is not something that 
can be explained from within coherence, whereas it would be accounted for naturally by p-
validity.  
The way such quantitative comparisons of coherence become possible is by holding the 
chance rate constant between inferences and conditions. This was done in experiments 5 to 7 
by using a binary response format, which rendered the chance rate equal to 50% in all cases. 
The precise task given to participants using this response format differed between Experiments 
5 and 7.  
Experiment 5 investigated questions about relative coherence between individual 
inferences, and between groups of inferences, such as those that are valid or invalid, and those 
of type A, B or C. But in addition, the experiment specifically studied the role of the location 
of the probability of the conclusion relative to the coherence interval. This was done by 
making two comparisons. The first was whether the probability of the conclusion was (a) 
clearly inside, or clearly outside, the interval, or alternatively (b) at the interval edge. The 
second was whether the probability of the conclusion was (a) inside or (b) outside of the 
interval.  
Suppose people are sensitive to coherence, but their subjective "scale" for degrees of 
belief is coarser than a point probability, as suggested by Figures 5.10 and 5.14 of 
Experiments 3 and 4, respectively. Then one can predict that people's judgments would tend to 
be more coherent when a conclusion probability was clearly inside, or clearly outside, the 
relevant coherence interval than when it was at the interval edge. If people tend to be coherent 
but have rather "coarse" degrees of belief, then this would have implications for the 
development of algorithmic level accounts in reasoning and decision making. No specific 
prediction was made for whether participants would be more, or less, coherent when assessing 
whether the conclusion probability was inside, or outside, the coherence interval.  
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Participants received an inference task in which the probabilities of both the premises and 
the conclusion were given by the experimenter. The task was to judge whether or not the 
probability of the conclusion was consistent with the probabilities of the premises.  
In contrast to Experiments 1 to 4, the task in this experiment was purely deductive. In 
Experiments 1 to 4 participants had been asked to generate their own conclusion probabilities, 
and these conclusion probabilities were constrained deductively by coherence. But coherence 
only constrained responses to a given interval, and with the exception of the inferences of DM 
and nDM, this interval was wider than a point value. Given that the task instructions asked for 
a point value as a response, it was up to inductive criteria or chance to narrow down the 
interval to a specific point. In the present experiment, in contrast, the question participants 
were asked could be fully answered using only the deductive constraints of coherence.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 136 participants from English speaking countries completed the online experiment 
in exchange for approximately £5 per hour. Participants accessed the experiment through the 
online platform Prolific Academic. Three participants were excluded because they indicated at 
the end of the experiment that they had not taken part seriously but had just "clicked through". 
Further 24 were excluded because they failed one or both of two catch trials designed to check 
whether participants were reading the materials. The final sample consisted of 109 
participants. None of them had trial reaction times of 3 seconds or less, and they all indicated 
having at least "good" English language skills. Their median age was 31 years (range: 18-73), 
and most reported having some college education: Around 26.5% indicated having finished 
12
th
 grade, 12% reported having a technical/applied degree, 44% reported an undergraduate 
degree, and 17.5% a postgraduate degree. Participants' median rating of the difficulty of the 
experiment was 74%.  
 
Design and materials 
Experiments 5, 6, and 7 investigated the same 12 inferences as Experiments 3 and 4. These 
inferences are reproduced in Table 6.1. Each inference was presented in three premise 
probability conditions. For the one-premise inferences, these were the probabilities of 1, .8 and 
.5, which were taken as possible instantiations of "certain", "high", and "medium" degrees of 
belief. For the two-premise inferences, both premises always had the same probability in order 
to simplify the task for participants. These premise probabilities were matched to those for the 
one-premise inferences not in terms of their numerical value, but in terms of the sum of their 
uncertainty (with uncertainty = 1 – probability, Adams, 1998). This implies that the conditions 
170 
 
for the one-premise inferences with a premise probability of 1, .8, and .5 corresponded to the 
conditions for the two-premise inferences in which both premises had probabilities of 1, .9, 
and .75, respectively. For example, for a two-premise inference with premise probabilities of 
.9, the sum of the uncertainties of the premises is (1 - .9) + (1 - .9) = .2, which is equal to the 
uncertainty of a one-premise inference with a premise probability of .8. For ease of exposition, 
the results section refers to a condition with a premise probability of 1, .8, and .5, even though 
strictly speaking this is only true for the one-premise inferences. For the two-premise 
inferences the conditions of 1, .8, and .5 really refer to the complement of their uncertainty 
sum rather than to their premise probability.  
 
Table 6.1. The inferences investigated in Experiments 5 to 7.  
Type Name Validity Form 
A. One-
premise,  
equivalence 
and 
contradiction 
1. De Morgan (DM) 1 not(p & q) not-p or not-q 
2. not De Morgan (nDM) 0 p & q  not-p or not-q 
B. One-
premise, valid 
in only one 
direction, left 
to right, or 
right to left 
3. and-elimination (&E) 1 p & q  p 
4. and-introduction (&I) 0 p  p & q 
5. and-to-or (&Or) 1 p & q  p or q 
6. or-to-and (Or&) 0 p or q  p & q 
7. if-to-or (IfOr) 1 if not-p then q  p or q 
8. or-to-if (OrIf) 0 p or q  if not-p then q 
C. Two-
premise,  
conditional 
syllogisms 
9. Modus ponens (MP) 1 if p then q, p  q 
10. Modus tollens (MT) 1 if p then q, not-q,  not-p 
11. Affirmation of the 
consequent (AC) 
0 if p then q, q,  p 
12. Denial of the 
antecedent (DA) 
0 if p then q, not-p,  not-q 
Note. "1" = "valid", "0" = "invalid", "" = "therefore". 
 
Within each premise probability condition, each inference was presented five times, with 
five different conclusion probabilities. These conclusion probabilities are represented as blue 
dots in Figure 6.1. The vertical black lines in the figure represent the coherence intervals for 
each premise probability condition. Notice that for the premise probabilities used, Figure 6.1 
illustrates a clear difference between the valid and invalid inferences, with the intervals for the 
probability preserving valid inferences being restricted to higher values, and those of the 
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invalid inferences taking low or more probabilistically uninformative values. Figure 6.1 also 
shows that the standardisation with respect to premise probability came at the cost of a lack of 
standardisation with respect to interval width. An exception was that all the intervals for the 
inferences of type B had equal width when the probability of the premise was .5.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. The conclusion probabilities used in Experiment 5 for each inference. The dots 
represent the conclusion probabilities, and the vertical lines represent the coherence intervals 
for each premise probability condition.  
 
The conclusion probabilities were chosen so as to lie at the centre of the interval, at its 
inner or outer edge, or clearly outside of the interval. In the latter case they were placed at the 
upper or lower end of the probability scale. Sometimes this rationale for varying conclusion 
probabilities relative to the location of the interval required fewer than five conclusion 
probabilities to be instantiated. For example, the cases in which the coherence interval 
equalled either the point value of 1 or the unit interval required only three conclusion 
probabilities: one equal to the point value resp. to the centre of the unit interval, one next to 
the point or at the top of the unit interval, and one at the bottom of the interval, around zero. In 
such cases further items were added in order to nonetheless have five items for each 
combination of inference with premise probability condition. Conversely, there were two cases 
(out of 36) that required more than five conclusion probabilities to be instantiated. One can see 
these in Figure 6.1: For inference 9 (MP), the case in which the premise probability condition 
was .5 (i. e. the case in which the sum of premise uncertainties was .5, because each premise 
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probability was .75) would have required two additional conclusion probabilities to cover the 
inner and outer edge of the lower end of the coherence interval. In this case priority was given 
to cover the upper end of the interval, in order to allow an assessment of overconfidence for 
MP. Overconfidence for this inference, unlike underconfidence, cannot be measured in the 
binary approach to reasoning, but it can be in the probabilistic approach.  
The second case in which five conclusion probabilities were not enough to cover all 
relevant positions of the interval was for inference 12 (DA) when the premise probability 
condition was .5 (i. e., in the condition in which the probability of each premise was .75, and 
so the sum of premise uncertainties was .5). Figure 6.1 shows that here one further conclusion 
probability would have been necessary to cover the inner edge of the lower bound of the 
coherence interval. In this case the outer edge of the lower bound was given priority, because 
the inner edge of the lower bound is already covered in the condition in which premise 
probability is .8.  
Overall, by fixing the number of conclusion probabilities for each combination of 
inference with premise probability to five in all cases, it was possible to capture the vast 
majority of relevant locations on the probability scale, while limiting the number of irrelevant 
additional items, and preventing some conditions from being more salient than others merely 
because of differences in their frequency of occurrence. A higher saliency for some conditions 
than others based on their frequency of occurrence could have led participants to process the 
oddball items with heightened attention, possibly leading to higher coherence (c. f. the effect 
of working memory load in Experiments 3 and 4). Differences in coherence due to the logical 
form of the inferences would then be confounded with differences in coherence due to 
saliency – a problem that is avoided by equating the number of conclusion probabilities used 
across conditions.  
Table 6.2 provides more detailed information on the conclusion probabilities used. The 
rightmost column of the table shows that one of the conclusion probabilities was always a 
point value equal to the centre of the coherence interval. The remaining four conclusion 
probabilities were randomly selected for each participant and condition out of a range of five 
values, determined by the location of the coherence interval for the respective condition, and 
by the upper and lower ends of the probability scale. For example, suppose the lower bound of 
a coherence interval for some combination of inference and premise probabilities was .6. Then 
to capture the inner edge of the lower bound of this interval, a random number between .61 
and .65 would be selected. And to capture the outer edge of this lower interval bound, a 
random number between .55 and .59 would be selected. Hence, the edges of intervals were 
captured by taking a random number within five percentage points of either side of the edge. 
An exception was when the edge of an interval was very near the lower or upper bound of the 
probability scale. This was the case for example for inference 12 (DA) in the condition in 
which the sum of premise uncertainties was .8 (see Figure 6.1). In this case the five percentage 
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point range for the outer edge of the upper interval bound would have overlapped with the five 
percentage point range for the upper end of the scale. Therefore instead of using two 
overlapping ranges, a single five percentage point range was used, which was centred between 
the upper edge of the coherence interval and the upper end of the probability scale. 
 
Table 6.2. The conclusion probabilities used in Experiment 5 for each inference 
and premise probability condition. 
Inference P(premise) Coherence 
Interval  
P(conclusion) 
1 (DM) 1 1 1, [.95,.99], [.01,.05], [.64,.68], [.31,.35] 
.8 .8 .8, [.95,.99], [.81,.85], [.75,.79], [.01,.05] 
.5 .5 .5, [.95,.99], [.51,.55], [.45,.49], [.01,.05] 
2 (nDM) 1 0 0, [.95,.99], [.01,.05], [.64,.68], [.31,.35] 
.8 .2 .2, [.95,.99], [.21,.25], [.15,.19], [.01,.05] 
.5 .5 .5, [.95,.99], [.51,.55], [.45,.49], [.01,.05] 
3 (&E),  
5 (&Or),  
7 (IfOr) 
1 1 1, [.95,.99], [.01,.05], [.64,.68], [.31,.35] 
.8 [.8,1] .9, [.95,.99], [.81,.85], [.75,.79], [.01,.05] 
.5 [.5,1] .75, [.95,.99], [.51,.55], [.45,.49], [.01,.05] 
4 (&I),  
6 (Or&),  
8 (OrIf) 
1 [0,1] .5, [.95,.99], [.01,.05], [.64,.68], [.31,.35] 
.8 [0,.8] .4, [.95,.99], [.81,.85], [.75,.79], [.01,.05] 
.5 [0,.5] .25, [.95,.99], [.51,.55], [.45,.49], [.01,.05] 
9 (MP) 1 1 1, [.95,.99], [.01,.05], [.64,.68], [.31,.35] 
 .8 [.81,.91] .86, [.94,.98], [.76,.80], [.01,.05], [.31,.35] 
 .5 [.5625,.8125] .69, [.95,.99], [.82,.86], [.76,.80], [.01,.05] 
10 (MT) 1 1 1, [.95,.99], [.01,.05], [.64,.68], [.31,.35] 
 .8 [.88,1] .94, [.95,.99], [.89,.93], [.83,.87], [.01,.05] 
 .5 [.66,1] .83, [.95,.99], [.67,.71], [.61,.65], [.01,.05] 
11 (AC) 1 [0,1] .5, [.95,.99], [.64,.68], [.31,.35], [.01,.05] 
 .8 [0,1] .5, [.95,.99], [.64,.68], [.31,.35], [.01,.05] 
 .5 [0,1] .5, [.95,.99], [.64,.68], [.31,.35], [.01,.05] 
12 (DA) 1 [0,1] .5, [.95,.99], [.64,.68], [.31,.35], [.01,.05] 
 .8 [.01,.91] .46, [.94,.98], [.86,.90], [.02,.06], [.31,.35] 
 .5 [.0625,.8125] .44, [.95,.99], [.82,.86], [.76,.80], [.01,.05] 
Note. Conclusion probabilities without brackets denote the centre of the 
respective coherence interval. Conclusion probabilities in square brackets 
represent the minimum and maximum of a range of values from which a number 
was drawn randomly for each participant and condition. 
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With 12 inferences, 3 premise probability conditions and 5 conclusion probabilities in 
each premise probability condition, the experiment had 12*3*5 = 180 trials, plus two catch 
trials to check whether participants were paying attention. The catch trials were similar in 
format to the regular trials, but the text for the premises and conclusion of the inferences was 
replaced with text stating that they were control trials to make sure participants were paying 
attention. Participants were asked not to respond, and were told that the experiment would 
continue automatically on the next page in a few seconds. The catch trails remained on screen 
for 8 seconds.  
On each trial, the inference was introduced through a short context story in which a 
protagonist expressed a given degree of belief in the premises and in the conclusion. 
Participants' task was to indicate whether or not the likelihood that the protagonist assigned to 
the conclusion was consistent with the likelihood the protagonist assigned to the premise or 
premises. Participants were asked to provide their answers using the arrows on their keyboard, 
the left arrow standing for "no" and the right arrow for "yes". On each trial a picture of two 
arrows was presented: a red arrow pointing to the left with the word "no" written on it, and a 
green arrow pointing to the right displaying the word "yes". These arrow pictures were 
sensitive to mouse clicks, so that it was also possible to respond using a mouse.  
The context stories were pseudonaturalistic. That is, they described concrete but fictitious 
situations in which it would be difficult to draw on world knowledge to judge the probabilities 
of the events involved. Further, the stories aimed to convey that the conclusions of the 
inferences were important or consequential, and that at the same time careful thinking as 
opposed to jumping to conclusions was called for. The reason for this was as follows. One of 
the purposes of the experiment was to compare coherence for valid and invalid inferences. But 
it seems implausible that the distinction between deduction and induction would be relevant in 
all contexts. A context in which it may become relevant is when it is worth being 
"conservative" because of a higher risk of drawing a conclusion that goes beyond what follows 
necessarily from the premises.  The frame below shows a sample trial for inference 1 (DM) 
and a premise probability of .8. 
The meanings of "premise" and "conclusion" were explained in the instructions. The 
experiment used six context stories on a range of topics: the research report of a team of 
zoologists, the murder of a member of parliament, an injured patient in an emergency hospital, 
a water dam with cracks, a robot mission to mars, and a cholera epidemic. The full description 
of the context stories can be found in Appendix D.  
Each context story was randomly assigned to two of the twelve inferences for each 
participant. Within each participant the 15 trials in which each inference was involved referred 
to the same overall scenario, but the events described in the scenario varied slightly between 
premise probability conditions and between the two inferences to which the scenario was 
assigned. For example, in the case of the sample scenario above, the inference made reference 
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to different patients in each premise probability condition (patients P. M., H. D., and R. S.), 
and the doctor who expressed the beliefs about the premise and conclusion probabilities 
differed between inferences (Miriam and Leslie). These changes were introduced to avoid 
carry-over effects between trials, or an attempt to establish coherence across trials when only 
coherence within a trial was assessed. 
 
Imagine you are part of a team of doctors who are working in an emergency hospital. Several 
patients are brought in by the ambulance with a variety of severe injuries. It is important that 
you act carefully on these cases because a wrong diagnosis could be fatal. You are reviewing 
their files with Miriam, another doctor in the team.  
Based on the information gathered until now: 
 
Premise:  Miriam thinks it’s 80% likely that: 
Patient P. M. does not have both a liver injury and a kidney injury. 
 
Conclusion:  Miriam thinks it’s 16% likely that:  
Patient P. M. does not have a liver injury or he does not have a kidney injury. 
 
Is the likelihood assigned to the conclusion consistent with the likelihood assigned to the 
premise? 
 
 
Procedure 
After the instructions and an example, participants went through 15 practice trials involving a 
different scenario and different inferences from those of the main experiment. The practice 
trials included five trials with the inference p, therefore not-p and a premise probability of 1, 
which were used to assess whether participants understood the instructions. At the end of the 
experiment participants provided demographical information and indicated whether they had 
taken part seriously or had just "clicked through". The last page contained debriefing 
information. The entire session took on average 18 minutes to complete.  
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the proportion of "yes" and "no" responses to the contradiction p, therefore 
not-p with a premise probability of 1, used in the practice trials. The coherent response was 
"yes" for the second conclusion probability displayed on the x axis: probability 0, and "no" for 
the remaining four conclusion probabilities. Although responses appeared to be slightly less 
coherent for the extreme conclusion probabilities of 0 and 1 than for intermediate 
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probabilities, overall responses closely conformed to the predicted pattern, suggesting that 
participants generally had no problem in understanding the instructions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Proportion of "yes" and 
"no" responses to the inference p, 
therefore not-p with a premise 
probability of 1, observed during the 
practice trials.  
Figure 6.3. Observed and above-chance coherence 
for the 12 inferences investigated in Experiment 5. 
Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
 
Overall above-chance coherence  
Following the same procedure as in the previous experiments, a "yes" response was classified 
as coherent when the conclusion probability was in the relevant coherence interval, and a "no" 
response was classified as coherent when the conclusion probability was not in the relevant 
coherence interval. Then to obtain a first impression of the results, observed and above-chance 
coherence were computed for each inference across experimental conditions. The results are 
displayed in Figure 6.3.  
One can see that the use of a constant chance rate in this experiment implied that the 
pattern of coherence between inferences remained the same for observed and above-chance 
coherence. The confidence intervals in the Figure suggest coherence was above chance levels 
for 9 of the 12 inferences. It seemed to be highest for nDM and MP, followed by DM, &E, &I, 
&Or, Or&, IfOr, and MT. In contrast, coherence appeared to be below chance levels for OrIf, 
AC, and DA. This rough ordering of above-chance coherence between inferences was 
confirmed in a series of linear mixed models. As before, the procedure for model construction 
was based on the recommendation of Barr et al. (2013) of including the maximum random 
effects structure justified by the design. Unless otherwise specified, this led to the computation 
of random coefficient models with random intercepts for participants and materials, whereas 
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attempts to include random slopes led to failure of convergence (Bates et al., 2015; Westfall et 
al., 2014).  
Above-chance coherence was higher for nDM than for MP (F(1, 377.461) = 28.865, p < 
.001). Above-chance coherence was also higher for nDM than for DM (F(1, 218) = 39.527, p 
< .001); and it was higher for MP than for MT (F(1, 218) = 18.425, p < .001). Among the 
inferences of type B, above-chance coherence did not differ between inferences &E, &Or, 
IfOr, &I, and Or& (F(4, 1256.218) = 1.860, p = .115). Above-chance coherence was higher 
for DM that of MT (F(1, 459.045) = 9.267, p = .002). But there was no difference in above-
chance coherence between MT on the one hand, and inferences &E, &Or, IfOr, &I, and Or& 
of type B on the other (F(1, 5836.966) = .614, p = .433). Further, as suggested by Figure 6.3, 
coherence was at chance levels for OrIf (F(1, 109) = 2.995, p = .086); and coherence was 
below chance levels for AC and DA (F(1, 218) = 47.478, p < .001). There was no significant 
difference in above-chance coherence between AC and DA (F(1, 218) = 2.836, p = .094).  
In summary, coherence was above-chance levels for 9 of the 12 inferences. It was highest 
for the contradiction nDM, followed by MP, followed by the equivalence DM. Above-chance 
coherence was slightly lower for MT and inferences &E, &Or, IfOr, &I, and Or& of type B. 
Coherence did not differ from chance levels for OrIf, and it was below chance for AC and DA.  
The finding that coherence was clearly above chance levels for most inferences 
investigated suggests that the cases of OrIf, AC and DA in which coherence was not above 
chance are not indicative of a general lack of sensitivity to coherence constraints. A better 
explanation for the absence of above-chance coherence in these cases may be found by 
looking at more specific features of the inferences involved. 
Responses to OrIf were found to be coherent above chance levels in Experiments 1, 3 and 
4, as well as in Politzer & Baratgin (2016). The chance-level coherence in this experiment is 
therefore not a stable finding. Further, the finding cannot be explained through the assumption 
that the materials used in the experiment suggested a biconditional interpretation of the 
conditional in the conclusion of the inference, because OrIf is invalid for both interpretations 
of the conditional. To see why, consider that the biconditional p if and only if q is equivalent to 
a conjunction of the two conditionals if p then q and if q then p. This means that by and-
elimination, the inference from the biconditional to the conditional is valid, and so P(p if and 
only if q)  P(if p then q). Hence knowing that OrIf is invalid for a conditional interpretation, 
P(p or q)  P(if p then q) it follows that it will also be invalid for a biconditional interpretation, 
P(p or q)  P(p if and only if q).  
A tentative explanation for why coherence was at chance levels for OrIf in this 
experiment, whereas it was above chance levels in other experiments, is that it reflects a 
negation effect similar to that suggested in Experiments 3 and 4 for this inference: a negated 
antecedent in the conditional of the conclusion may make it more difficult to perform a 
Ramsey test, and any result of the test may be more difficult to relate to the situation in the 
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premise, in which the statement corresponding to the antecedent of the conditional is being 
affirmed rather than negated. It may be that such negation effects are more frequent for some 
types of materials than for others. However, it is important to bear in mind that this is just one 
possible explanation proposed after observing the data, and follow-up experiments would be 
needed to test to what extent it can be upheld and acquire predictive value.  
The findings for OrIf differ from those of AC and DA. For AC and DA, responses did not 
merely fail to be coherent above chance levels, but were significantly below chance levels. 
Moreover, as for Experiments 3 and 4, the same responses that were classified as incoherent in 
the present analysis would have been classified as coherent under the assumption that the 
conditional in their major premise was interpreted as a biconditional. A biconditional 
interpretation could result when the materials used in the inferences suggest that there is a 
positive correlation between the antecedent and consequent. Evidence for a biconditional 
interpretation has been observed in previous studies at least for a subset of participants 
(Baratgin et al., 2013; Barrouillet & Gauffroy, 2015; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016; but see 
Oberauer, Weidenfeld, et al., 2007; Over et al., 2007; Singmann et al., 2014, for findings of a 
conditional as opposed to biconditional interpretation of conditionals), and such an 
interpretation would seem reasonable in cases in which the conditional expresses a causal 
relation (Oaksford & Chater, 2017; Over, 2017).  
Because there is a plausible interpretation of the finding of below-chance coherence for 
AC and DA as reflecting not a genuine lack of sensitivity to coherence, but instead an 
alternative interpretation of the sentences contained in it – and this alternative interpretation is 
backed by previous findings using different tasks and materials – AC and DA were not 
included in the subsequent analysis. The subsequent analysis looks at factors that may affect 
the frequency with which responses are coherent above chance levels for different inferences. 
If AC and DA were included in it, then effects involving them (e. g. the question of 
differences in coherence between inferences of types A, B, and C) would be difficult to 
interpret because it would not be clear whether they really reflect differences in above-chance 
coherence, or instead a mismatch between participants' interpretation of the conditional 
premises and the interpretation upon which the computation of coherence was based. The 
results for AC and DA were nonetheless depicted in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. In this way the 
information for them is not lost and it can be related to that for the other inferences.   
 In contrast, the results for OrIf were included in the analysis. These results can more 
readily be seen as a genuine failure to take coherence constraints into account, at least in cases 
in which the inferences in question contain negations. 
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Edge vs. clear 
The following two sections analyse how above-chance coherence was affected by whether the 
probability of the conclusion was at the edge of the coherence interval or clearly on one side of 
it, and by whether the probability of the conclusion was inside or outside the interval.  
The conclusion probabilities for the equivalence of DM and the contradiction of nDM 
that were "inside" the point-value coherence interval, were necessarily "at the edge", with no 
distinction between an upper and a lower edge. When the probability of the premise was 1, the 
interval for DM generally had only a lower edge and the interval for nDM only an upper edge. 
The intervals for the valid inferences of type B only had a lower edge, whereas the intervals 
for the invalid inferences of type B only had an upper edge. Similarly, the intervals for MT 
only had a lower edge, and those for AC only had an upper edge. Because of these differences 
between inferences, the question of whether the edge was on the upper or lower end of a 
coherence interval was not taken into account in this analysis. 
A further point to consider is that by the definition of the intervals for DM, nDM, and 
AC, as well as for the remaining inferences in the conditions in which their interval was a 
point value, the question of whether a conclusion probability was "on the edge vs. clearly on 
one interval side" cannot be crossed with the question of whether the conclusion probability 
was "inside or outside" the interval, because not all combinations of the values of the two 
variables exist. For example, for DM and nDM, conclusion probabilities that were inside the 
interval were always at the interval edge. For this reason, separate analyses were conducted to 
test the effects of the two factors.  
Let us call the distinction between a case in which the conclusion probability was at the 
edge of a coherence interval, and a case in which the conclusion probability was clearly on one 
side of the interval (whether this was inside or outside of it), the variable edge-clear. The 
pattern of results for this variable is displayed in Figure 6.4, separately for each inference and 
premise probability condition. Note that the maximum of the scale is .5 because given the 
chance rate of .5, this is the maximum possible value of above-chance coherence, 
corresponding to the responses of a hypothetical maximally coherent person.  
A linear mixed model for the effects of edge-clear, inference type, and premise 
probability on above-chance coherence (excluding AC and DA) showed that overall coherence 
was 14% higher than expected by chance (F(1, 752.818) = 325.039, p < .001). Above-chance 
coherence differed between inference types (EMMA = .229, EMMB = .077, EMMc = .121, F(2, 
9005.179) = 73.700, p < .001); and between premise probability conditions (EMM.5 = .117, 
EMM.8 = .115, EMM1 = .204, F(2, 15668.488) = 77.334, p < .001). Above-chance coherence 
was also found to be higher when the probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of 
the interval than when it was on the interval edge (EMMedge = .118, EMMclear = .173, F(1, 
15678.578) = 35.229, p < .001).  
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However, these main effects were qualified by a series of interactions. The effect of 
premise probability differed between inference types (F(4, 15668.739) = 14.511, p < .001). 
The effect of edge-clear also varied between inference types (F(2, 15679.852) = .27.417, p < 
.001). No other effects were significant (highest F = 1.374, lowest p = .253).  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Above-chance coherence for Experiment 5 as a 
function of premise probability and whether the probability of the 
conclusion was at the edge of the coherence interval or clearly on 
one side of it. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
Type A inferences. A follow-up analysis within each inference type showed that for 
inferences of type A, above-chance coherence was higher when the probability of the 
conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on the interval edge 
(EMMedge = .165, EMMclear = .272, F(1, 3052) = 52.392, p < .001). Above-chance coherence 
also differed between premise probability conditions (F(2, 3052) = 14.561, p < .001); 
however, this effect was qualified by an interaction between premise probability and inference 
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(F(1, 3052) = 9.681, p < .001). Premise probability had no effect for the equivalence of DM 
(EMM.5 = .151, EMM.8 = .128, EMM1 = .154, F(2, 1526) = .529, p = .589). Premise probability 
did have an effect for the contradiction of nDM (EMM.5 = .248, EMM.8 = .236, EMM1 = .394, 
F(2, 1526) = 28.071, p < .001): In line with the pattern in Figure 6.4, above-chance coherence 
for this inference was larger with certain than with uncertain premise probabilities (for 1 vs. .8, 
F(1, 981) = 49.398, p < .001; for 1 vs. .5, F(1, 981) = 44.080, p < .001; for .8 vs. .5, F(1, 981) 
= .194, p = .660).  
Overall, for both DM and nDM, above-chance coherence was larger when the probability 
of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was at the edge. In 
addition, for nDM, but not for DM, above-chance coherence was larger when the probability 
of the premise was certain than when it was uncertain.  
Type B inferences. A follow-up analysis for inferences of type B, differentiating 
between valid and invalid inferences, showed that above-chance coherence was higher for the 
valid than for the invalid inferences (EMMvalid = .101, EMMinvalid = .049, F(1, 2815.637) = 
11.912, p = .001). Above-chance coherence differed between premise probability conditions 
(EMM.5 = .061, EMM.8 = .064, EMM1 = .101, F(2, 9278.382) = 6.923, p = .001); but there was 
no main effect of edge-clear (EMMedge = .075, EMMclear = .075, F(1, 9278.382) = .001, p = 
.978).  
However, the above main effects were qualified by several interactions. The effect of 
premise probability differed for valid and invalid inferences (F(2, 9278.382) = 189.342, p < 
.001); as did the effect of edge-clear (F(1, 9278.382) = 8.488, p = .004). These effects were in 
turn qualified by a three-way interaction between validity, premise probability and edge-clear 
(F(2, 9278.382) = 4.153, p = .016). 
Follow-up analyses to the three-way interaction indicated that for the valid inferences, 
above-chance coherence was higher when the probability of the conclusion was clearly on one 
side of the interval than when it was on the interval edge (F(1, 4611.027) = 4.925, p = .027). 
However, above-chance coherence also varied between premise probability conditions (F(2, 
4611.027) = 164.708, p < .001), and there was an interaction between edge-clear and premise 
probability (F(2, 4611.027) = 4.369, p = .013).  
In line with the pattern in Figure 6.4, coherence was at chance levels when premise 
probability was .5 (EMM = .007, F(1, 291.042) = .164, p = .686), and this finding did not 
differ between inferences (F(2, 556.795) = .641, p = .527). No other effects were significant 
(highest F = .641, lowest p = .527).  
When premise probability was .8, coherence was again at chance levels (EMM = .020, 
F(1, 292.241) = 1.257, p = .263). This result again did not differ between inferences (F(2, 
576.969) = .395, p = .674). However, in spite being at chance levels in general, coherence 
nonetheless tended to be higher when the probability was clearly on one side of the interval 
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than when it was at the interval edge (F(1, 1338.246) = 5.856, p = .016, X
2
(3) = 8.354, p < 
.05)
10
. No other effects were significant (highest F = 1.262, lowest p = .283).  
Finally, when premise probability was 1, responses were clearly coherent above chance 
levels (EMM = .254, F(1, 295.596) = 223.439, p < .001). This result did not differ between 
inferences (EMM&E = .264, EMM&Or = .257, EMMIfOr = .240, F(2, 696.544) = .290, p = .749). 
Above-chance coherence was again higher when the probability of the conclusion was clearly 
on one side of the interval than when it was at the interval edge (EMMedge = .227, EMMclear = 
.280, F(1, 1341.916) = 9.055, p = .003). No other effects were significant (highest F = .533, 
lowest p = .587).  
Overall, we see that for the valid inferences of type B, above-chance coherence was 
higher when the probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than 
when it was on the edge, and this effect did not differ between the three inferences. However, 
coherence was only reliably above chance levels in the first place when the probability of the 
premise was certain. Coherence did not differ from chance levels in the two conditions with 
uncertain premise probabilities. 
An analysis for the invalid inferences of type B showed that above-chance coherence 
differed between premise probability conditions (EMM.5 = .106, EMM.8 = .100, EMM1 = -.060, 
F(2, 4608.851) = 56.256, p < .001). Above-chance coherence also differed between inferences 
(EMM&I = .119, EMMOr& = .057, EMMOrIf = -.030, F(2, 1044.578) = 15.786, p < .001). Finally, 
there was a non-reliable trend for above-chance coherence to be higher when the probability of 
the conclusion was at the edge of the interval than when it was clearly on one side of it 
(EMMedge = .062, EMMclear = .035, F(1, 4608.851) = 4.013, p < .045, X
2
(9) = 7.087, p > .250). 
No other effects were significant (highest F = .784, lowest p = .457).  
Follow-up analyses to the effect of premise probability showed that for the premise 
probability condition of .5, overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .106, F(1, 
285.153) = 51.123, p < .001), but the extent to which this was the case differed between 
inferences (EMM&I = .159, EMMOr& = .128, EMMOrIf = .030, F(2, 508) = 8.135, p < .001). It 
was above-chance levels for &I (F(1, 113.737) = 36.946, p < .001) and for Or& (F(1, 114.150, 
p < .001), but not for OrIf (F(1, 114.934) = 1.577, p = .212). There was no main effect of 
edge-clear (F(1, 1334.317) = .031, p = .861) nor an interaction between edge-clear and 
inference (F(2, 1334.317) = .497, p = .609).  
A similar pattern was observed for the premise probability condition of .8: overall 
coherence was again above chance levels (F(1, 301.428) = 44.758, p < .001) but the extent of 
the effect differed between inferences (EMM&I = .149, EMMOr& = .133, EMMOrIf = .022, F(2, 
537.852) = 8.446, p < .001). It was above chance levels for &I (F(1, 113.761) = 32.349, p < 
                                                          
10
 Here the more robust likelihood-ratio test was used to try to disambiguate an instance of a 
discrepancy between a significant F test for the fixed effect, an a non-significant t-test for the parameter 
(the beta-value of the effect). This can happen because of the different distributional assumptions of the 
two tests, especially when the number of data points is relatively small, as in the present comparison.  
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.001) and for Or& (F(1, 113.809) = 24.811, p < .001), but was at chance levels for OrIf (F(1, 
116.684) = .670, p = .415). There was again no main effect of edge-clear (F(1, 1349.676) = 
2.240, p = .135) nor an interaction between edge-clear and inference (F(2, 1349.676) = .105, p 
= .900).  
Finally, in the premise probability condition of 1, overall coherence was below chance 
levels (F(1, 342.521) = 7.155, p = .008), but this result again differed between inferences 
(EMM&I = .031, EMM Or& = -.072, EMM OrIf = -.143, F(2, 1019.623) = 8.555, p < .001). 
Overall coherence did not differ from chance levels for &I (F(1, 126.833) = .480, p = .490) 
nor for Or& (F(1, 125.562) = 2.709, p = .102), but coherence was below chance levels for OrIf 
(F(1, 129.363) = 14.670, p < .001). There was again no significant effect of edge-clear (F(1, 
1339.323) = 3.748, p = .053) nor an interaction between edge-clear and inference (F(2, 
1339.323) = .410, p = .664). 
Overall, for the invalid inferences &I and Or& coherence was above chance levels when 
the probability of the premise was uncertain, but was at chance levels when the probability of 
the premise was certain. The effect of premise probability for OrIf was similar, but coherence 
was lower for this inference: it was at chance levels when premise probability was uncertain, 
and below chance levels when premise probability was certain. No other effects were 
significant. In particular, it made no difference for above-chance coherence whether the 
probability of the premise was at the edge of the interval or clearly on one side of it.   
Type C inferences. A follow-up analysis for inferences MP and MT of type C showed 
that above-chance coherence differed between premise probability conditions (EMM.5 = .060, 
EMM.8 = .084, EMM1 = .266, F(2, 3052) = 66.946, p < .001); and it was higher when the 
probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on the 
edge (EMMedge = .101, EMMclear = .172, F(1, 3052) = 19.859, p < .001). However, the above 
main effects were qualified by three interactions. The size of the effect of edge-clear was 
larger for MP than for MT (F(1, 3052) = 9.473, p = .002). The extent to which above-chance 
coherence was larger for MP than for MP (reported in the previous section on overall above-
chance coherence) differed between premise probability conditions (F(2, 3052) = 7.290, p = 
.001). And there was a three-fold interaction between edge-clear, inference, and premise 
probability condition (F(2, 3052) = 6.208, p = .002).  
In follow-up analyses for each premise probability condition, the model failed to 
converge for the case of a premise probability of .5 when random effects were included. 
Therefore the analyses for the three premise probability conditions were conducted using only 
fixed effects.  
 For the premise probability condition of .5, overall coherence was above chance levels 
(F(1, 1090) = 15.565, p < .001), but the extent to which this was the case was higher for MP 
than for MT (F(1, 1090) = 10.479, p = .001). There was no main effect of edge-clear (F(1, 
1090) = 2.303, p = .129); but edge-clear interacted with inference (F(1, 1090) = 12.536, p < 
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.001). Separate analyses for each inference showed that for MP, overall coherence tended to be 
above chance levels (EMM = .109, F(1, 545) = 26.922, p < .001); and it was higher when the 
probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on the 
edge (EMMedge = .032, EMMclear = .185, F(1, 545) = 13.351, p < .001). In contrast, for MT 
coherence was not above chance levels (EMM = .011, F(1, 545) = .241, p = .624); and it made 
no difference whether the probability of the conclusion was at the edge of the interval or 
clearly on one side of it (EMMedge = .041, EMMclear = -.020, F(1, 545) = 1.964, p = .162).  
A follow-up analysis for the premise probability condition of .8 showed that overall 
coherence was above chance levels (F(1, 1090) = 31.361, p < .001); but was again higher for 
MP than for MT (F(1, 1090) = 36.728, p < .001). Above-chance coherence was higher when 
the probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on 
the edge (F(1, 1090) = 13.00, p < .001); but this effect was qualified by an interaction between 
edge-clear and inference (F(1, 1090) = 4.949, p = .026). Separate analyses for each inference 
revealed the same pattern as for a premise probability of .5: For MP, coherence was above 
chance levels (EMM = .174, F(1, 545) = 72.891, p < .001); and it was higher when the 
probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on its 
edge (EMMedge = .087, EMMclear = .261, F(1, 545) = 18.223, p < .001). In contrast, for MT 
coherence was at chance levels (EMM = -.007, F(1, 545) = .099, p = .753); and there was no 
effect of edge-clear (EMMedge = -.028, EMMclear = .014, F(1, 545) = .893, p = .345).  
A follow-up analysis for the premise probability condition of 1 showed that overall 
coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .266, F(1, 1090) = 421.890, p < .001). The extent 
to which coherence was above chance levels did not differ between inferences (EMMMP = 
.282, EMMMT = .249, F(1, 1090) = 1.615, p = .204). Above-chance coherence was higher 
when the probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was 
on its edge (EMMedge = .236, EMMclear = .295, F(1, 1090) = 5.179, p = .023); and the size of 
this edge-clear effect also did not differ between inferences (F(1, 1090) = 1.070, p = .301).  
Overall, when the probability of the premises was certain, above-chance coherence was 
equally high for MP and MT; and it was higher when the probability of the conclusion was 
clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on its edge. However, coherence differed 
for the two inferences when the probability of the premises was uncertain. With uncertain 
premises, coherence for MP remained above chance levels, and it remained higher when the 
probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on its 
edge. In contrast, when premise probability was uncertain, coherence for MT was no longer 
above chance levels, and it no longer made a difference whether the probability of the 
conclusion was on the edge of the interval or clearly on one side of it. 
Discussion. Taken together, the results illustrated in Figure 6.4 provide a number of new 
insights into quantitative questions about above-chance coherence for the 10 inferences 
investigated.  Although responses to the 10 inferences were coherent above chance levels 
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when averaging across predictors, the extent to which this was the case differed strongly 
between inferences and between premise probabilities. Coherence was always above chance 
levels for the inferences of DM and nDM of type A, and for MP, in line with the finding 
reported in the first section of the results that when averaging across predictors, above-chance 
coherence was highest for nDM and MP. For the remaining inferences, above-chance 
coherence seemed to depend strongly on whether premise probability was certain or uncertain. 
For nDM, coherence was higher when the probability of the premise was certain, and for 
inferences &E, &Or, IfOr, and MT coherence was only above chance levels when the 
probability of the premise was certain. In sharp contrast, for &I and Or& coherence was only 
above chance levels when the premise was uncertain, while for OrIf coherence was at or 
below chance levels across conditions.  
One possible explanation for this pattern is as follows. For the equivalence and 
contradiction of type A, whose coherence interval is always a point value, the probability of 
the premise has no effect on interval width, and therefore made no difference for participants' 
ability to construct a coherent response. For the inferences of type B and C, for which the 
coherence interval is generally an area within the probability range whose location is 
codetermined by premise probability, participants tended to be somewhat careful or 
conservative in their judgments, not endorsing a high probability for a conclusion unless they 
were highly confident in it.  
For the valid type B inferences in this experiment, a tendency to be careful or 
conservative would increase the number of responses that are "too low", i. e. that fall below 
the coherence interval, except when the probability of the premise is 1. In this special case in 
which there is certainty about the premises, equally high conclusion probabilities are more 
likely to be viewed as justified.  
For the invalid type B inferences in this experiment, the same tendency to be careful or 
conservative would lead to more frequent coherent responses for uncertain premise 
probabilities because in these cases the coherence intervals lie lower. In contrast, it would lead 
to more frequent incoherent responses for a premise probability of 1, because in this case 
people may more often misclassify higher conclusion probabilities as being too high, when in 
fact any conclusion probability is coherent.  
A tendency to be careful or conservative would arguably makes sense in everyday life, 
where we often have to make judgments on the basis of little information, because it would 
help us avoid jumping to conclusions and making unwarranted generalisations. However, it 
would be premature to draw any conclusion about a general tendency to be cautious or 
conservative on the basis of the present findings. This is because the materials used in the 
experiment were explicitly designed to render participants' judgments careful or conservative, 
as part of an effort to create a context in which the distinction between valid and invalid 
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inferences becomes relevant. It seems more plausible at this stage to conclude that the 
manipulation in the materials was successful.  
Whatever reason participants may have had to give conservative responses, the observed 
pattern of differences between inferences provides no evidence that a tendency to be careful or 
conservative was associated with a higher sensitivity to the difference between induction and 
deduction, expressed through a difference in coherence between valid and invalid inferences. 
Leaving aside AC and DA, whose results are difficult to interpret, coherence was higher for 
the valid inferences &E, &Or and IfOr than for the invalid inferences &I, Or&, and OrIf. But 
coherence was also higher for the invalid inference of nDM than for the valid inference of 
DM.  
The pattern of results in this and the previous analysis also provides no evidence of a 
general difference in the degree of above-chance coherence between inference types: 
Coherence was most reliably above chance levels for DM, nDM, and MP, which differ in the 
type they were classified into. However, the present analysis does suggest a contrast between 
inferences of type A on the one side, and inferences of type B and C on the other, regarding 
the factors that affect above-chance coherence for them. In particular, coherence for the 
equivalence and contradiction (type A) was less influenced by differences in premise 
probability than coherence for the one-premise inferences describing set-subset relations (type 
B), or the more complex two-premise inferences (type C). Differences like this may provide 
information about the algorithms involved in processing these inferences, but much more 
research would have to be carried out to be able to pinpoint them.  
Regarding the effect of edge-clear, the results show that for 7 of the 10 inferences 
investigated (DM, nDM, &E, &Or, IfOr, MP, and MT), coherence was higher when the 
probability of the conclusion was clearly on one side of the interval than when it was on the 
edge, provided that above-chance coherence was high enough to allow the measurement of 
relative differences within it. For the remaining three inferences (&I, &Or, and OrIf), no effect 
of edge-clear was observed. Thus, there was evidence for an effect of edge-clear in the 
expected direction for the majority of the conditions tested, but not for all conditions. A 
possible reason for why it was not observed for the invalid type B inferences &I, &Or, and 
OrIf may be that in the premise probability conditions in which coherence was above chance 
levels for these inferences, the coherence interval was very wide, and wide intervals may 
reduce the extent to which it is informative to know whether a conclusion probability is at the 
edge or clearly on one side. However, this is just a potential explanation for the finding, which 
would have to be investigated further.   
The overall corroboration of the prediction that coherence would be higher when the 
probability of the conclusion is clearly on one side of the interval than when it is at the interval 
edge is evidence that the observed effect of coherence is real: that it actually reflects a 
sensitivity at some level to the constraints of coherence, as opposed to being a coincidental by-
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product of some unrelated aspect of reasoning. If people are sensitive to coherence, but have 
degrees of belief that are less precise than a point probability, then one would naturally expect 
their coherence performance to change as a function of the location of interval boundaries. 
The following section examines a further factor that may play a role for the degree to 
which participants' responses were coherent above chance levels: whether the probability of 
the conclusion was inside or outside the interval.  
 
Inside vs. outside 
Let us call the effect on above-chance coherence of whether a conclusion probability was 
inside or outside the coherence interval, the inside-outside effect. The pattern of results for this 
effect is displayed in Figure 6.5, separately for each premise probability condition. As in the 
previous analysis, the value of .5 on the y axis is the maximum possible value of above-chance 
coherence, which would be obtained by a hypothetical perfectly coherent person. The figure 
illustrates that by the definition of their intervals, the probability of the conclusion of the 
invalid type B inferences (&I, Or&, and OrIf) could not lie outside of the interval when the 
probability of the premise was 1, because in this case the interval is the probability range. This 
implies that unlike the analysis of the effect of edge-clear, the effect of inside-outside cannot 
be fully crossed with premise probability. For this reason, the effect of inside-outside was 
assessed in two separate analyses. The first was for when premise probability was uncertain, 
and included the same 10 inferences as in the previous section. The second analysis was for 
when premise probability was certain, and included the seven inferences DM, nDM, &E, &Or, 
IfOr, MP, and MT. The latter are the inferences of type A plus the valid inferences of types B 
and C.  
Uncertain premises. A linear mixed model was conducted for the effects of inside-
outside, inference type, and premise probability (.5, .8) on above-chance coherence. Given that 
the independent effects of premise probability and inference type were already examined in 
the previous two sections, this section reports only effects in which inside-outside was 
involved. Above-chance coherence was higher when the probability of the conclusion was 
outside rather than inside the interval (F(1, 10331.241) = 90.320, p < .001). However, the 
extent to which inside-outside had an effect differed between inference types (F(2, 10341.304) 
= 120.124, p < .001). This interaction was in turn qualified by a marginal three-way 
interaction between inside-outside, inference type, and premise probability (F(2, 10227.772) = 
3.281, p = .038).   
Type A inferences. Follow-up analyses showed that for the inferences of type A, overall 
coherence was 23% higher than expected by chance (F(1, 351.519) = 229.918, p < .001). 
Above-chance coherence was higher when the probability of the conclusion was inside rather 
than outside the interval (EMMinside = .314, EMMoutside = .146, F(1, 1962) = 51.069, p < .001). 
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The effect of inside-outside did not differ between premise probability conditions (F(1, 1962) 
= 1.933, p = .165).  
Type B inferences. For the inferences of type B overall coherence was around 9% higher 
than expected by chance (F(1, 497.139) = 63.767, p < .001). In contrast to the pattern for the 
inferences of type A, above-chance coherence was higher when the probability of the 
conclusion was outside rather than inside the interval (EMMoutside = .203, EMMinside = -.032, 
F(1, 6001.636) = 450.345, p < .001). The effect of inside-outside was higher for the invalid 
than for the valid inferences (F(1, 601.636) = 26.878, p < .001).  
Figure 6.5 suggests that the higher effect of inside-outside for the invalid inferences 
results from the fact that coherence was higher for the invalid than for the valid inferences 
when it was above chance levels, and that it was above chance levels only in the condition in 
which the probability of the conclusion was outside the interval. Follow-up analyses 
corroborated this pattern. For the valid inferences &E, &Or and IfOr, overall coherence was 
around chance levels (EMM = .032, F(1, 292.717) = 4.098, p = .044). Coherence was higher 
when the conclusion probability was outside rather than inside the interval (EMMinside = -.056, 
EMMoutside = .121, F(1, 2974.381) = 131.182, p < .001), and inside-outside did not interact 
with premise probability (F(1, 2974.381) = 1.327, p = .249). A separate analysis for the inside 
and the outside condition confirmed coherence to be above chance levels only in the latter 
(outside condition: EMM = .124, F(1, 286.962) = 36.083, p < .001. Inside condition: EMM = -
.059, F(1, 290.187) = 6.810, p = .010). 
For the invalid type B inferences &I, Or&, and OrIf, overall coherence was around 13% 
higher than expected by chance (F(1, 293.156) = 87.832, p < .001). Coherence was again 
higher when the conclusion probability was outside rather than inside the interval (EMMinside = 
-.013, EMMoutside = .279, F(1, 2974.315) = 373.288, p < .001), and inside-outside did not 
interact with premise probability (F(1, 2974.315) = .256, p = .613). A separate analysis for the 
inside and outside conditions again showed that coherence was above chance levels only in the 
latter (Outside condition: EMM = .281, F(1, 284.621) = 235.086, p < .001. Inside condition: 
EMM = -.015, F(1, 288.747) = .499, p = .480).  
Type C inferences. Finally, an analysis for inferences MP and MT of type C showed that 
overall coherence was 7% higher than expected by chance (F(1, 270.934) = 26.107, p < .001). 
As for the inferences of type B, coherence was higher when the conclusion probability was 
outside rather than inside the interval (EMMinside  = -.050, EMMoutside = .181, F(1 1962) = 
114.309, p < .001). The size of the effect of inside-outside was higher when premise 
probability was .5 than when it was .8 (F(1, 1962) = 7.811, p = .005).  
Follow-up analyses showed that for MP and conclusion probabilities outside the interval, 
coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .217, F(1, 111.056) = 92.169, p < .001); and was 
higher when premise probability was .5 than when it was .8 (EMM.5  = .252, EMM.8 = .181, 
F(1, 654) = 5.437, p = .020). For MP and conclusion probabilities inside the interval, 
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coherence did not differ from chance (EMM = -.005, F(1, 120.267) = .016, p = .899). 
Coherence was higher when premise probability was .8 than when it was .5 (EMM.5 = -.069, 
EMM.8 = .060, F(1, 218) = 7.232, p = .008), but coherence was still at chance levels in the 
premise probability condition of .8 (F(1, 109) = 1.573, p = .212; this effect was calculated 
using only fixed predictors because the lower sample size would otherwise have led to failure 
of convergence). 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Above-chance coherence for Experiment 5 as a 
function of premise probability and whether the probability of the 
conclusion was inside or outside of the interval. Error bars show 
95% CIs. 
 
For MT and conclusion probabilities outside the interval, overall coherence was above 
chance levels (EMM = .144, F(1, 109) = 19.212, p < .001), and did not differ between premise 
probability conditions (EMM.5 = .161, EMM.8 = .128, F(1, 327) = .763, p = .383). For MT and 
conclusion probabilities inside the interval, coherence was below chance (EMM = -.095, F(1, 
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109) = 7.708, p = .006), and again did not differ between premise probability conditions 
(EMM.5 = -.099, EMM.8 = -.090, F(1, 545) = .101, p = .751).  
In summary, for inferences DM and nDM of type A, above-chance coherence was larger 
when the probability of the conclusion was inside the interval. In contrast, for the inferences of 
type B, as well as for MP and MT of type C, above-chance coherence was larger, and in fact 
only above chance levels, when the probability of the conclusion was outside the interval.  
These findings are in accordance with those of the analysis of edge-clear, and can also be 
explained through the hypothesis that participants tended to be careful or conservative in their 
responses. A tendency for participants to respond "no, this conclusion probability is not 
consistent with the probability of the premise(s)" unless they can be highly confident that it is 
consistent, would lead to increased performance in cases in which the probability of the 
conclusion was outside the interval, and decreased performance in cases in which it was inside 
the interval. As for the analysis of edge-clear, such a tendency seemed to be present for all 
inferences except those of type A, whose coherence interval is always a point value regardless 
of premise probability.  
Certain premises. A second linear mixed model analysis for the effects of inside-outside 
and inference type on above-chance coherence was performed for the seven inferences DM, 
nDM, &E, &Or, IfOr, MP, and MT in the condition in which premise probability was certain. 
Overall coherence was on average 29% higher than expected by chance (F(1, 704.015) =  
543.347, p < .001). Contrary to the finding for uncertain premises, above-chance coherence 
was higher when the probability of the conclusion was inside rather than outside the interval 
(EMMinside = .322, EMMoutside = .256, F(1, 3263.176) = 20.715, p < .001). The size of the effect 
of inside-outside differed between inference types (F(2, 3263.176) = 12.693, p < .001).  
A follow-up analysis to the interaction showed that for inferences of type A, overall 
coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .274, F(1, 299.331) = 207.002, p < .001). There 
was no main effect of inside-outside (F(1, 872) = 1.958, p = .162), but inside-outside 
interacted with inference (F(1, 872) = 25.379, p < .001). For DM, above-chance coherence 
was larger when the probability of the conclusion was inside rather than outside the interval 
(EMMinside = .234, EMMoutside = .144, F(1, 436) = 5.028, p = .025). In contrast, for nDM, above-
chance coherence was larger when the probability of the conclusion was outside rather than 
inside the interval (EMMinside  = .280, EMMoutside = .438, F(1, 436) = 30.309, p < .001). 
Looking back at Figure 6.5, this means that whereas the effect of inside-outside remained 
constant across premise probability conditions for DM, it reversed for nDM between the 
conditions with uncertain and with certain premise probability. 
An analysis for inferences &E, &Or, and IfOr of type B showed that overall coherence 
was above chance levels (EMM = .300, F(1, 376.419) = 275.954, p < .001). Above-chance 
coherence tended to be higher when the probability of the conclusion was inside the interval 
(EMMinside = .368, EMMoutside = .232, F(1, 1341.842) = 40.905, p  < .001), but the size of the 
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effect of inside-outside differed between inferences (F(2, 1341.842) = 3.619, p = .027). 
Follow-up analyses to this interaction showed that the effect of inside-outside was significant 
for &E and for &Or (for &E: EMMinside = .427, EMMoutside = .218, F(1, 436) = 36.479, p < 
.001; for &Or: EMMinside = .381, EMMoutside = .250, F(1, 436) = 12.764, p < .001), but 
marginally failed to reach significance for IfOr (EMMinside = .298, EMMoutside = .229, F(1, 436) 
= 3.148, p = .077). 
For MP and MT of type C, overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .300, F(1, 
291.204) = 209.502, p < .001). Above-chance coherence was higher when the probability of 
the conclusion was inside rather than outside the interval (F(1, 872) 14.095, p < .001), but the 
extent of this effect was larger for MP than for MT (F(1, 872) = 16.180, p < .001). A further 
examination of the interaction revealed that the effect of inside-outside was present for MP 
(EMMinside = .445, EMMoutside = .245, F(1, 436) = 33.997, p < .001), but not for MT (EMMinside 
= .252, EMMoutside = .259, F(1, 436) = .032, p = .857).  
Discussion. Overall, the effect of inside-outside differed markedly between the 
conditions of uncertain and of certain premise probability. For DM and nDM of type A, were 
the probability of the conclusion is always a point value equal either to the probability of the 
premise or to its complement, above-chance coherence was generally higher when the 
probability of the conclusion was inside (i. e. when it was on) the interval. The only exception 
to this was observed for nDM when premise probability was 1, were the effect of inside-
outside reversed. There seems to be no immediate explanation for this exception, but one way 
to investigate it further would be to zoom in to the study of equivalences and contradictions, 
using more than one inference of each kind, and to implement a negations paradigm for them 
(Evans & Handley, 1999; Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). However, such an analysis goes 
beyond the scope of this project.  
For inferences &E, &Or, IfOr, MP, and MT in the uncertain premise probability 
conditions, coherence was only above chance levels when the probability of the conclusion 
was outside the interval. This pattern reversed (except for MT) when premise probability was 
certain: here responses were coherent above chance levels in both conditions, but more so 
when the probability of the conclusion was inside the interval. An explanation for this 
contrast, as described above, is that participants had a tendency to give cautious, conservative 
responses, not willing to state that the probability of a conclusion was consistent with the 
probabilities of the premises unless they were highly confident that this was the case. In the 
exceptional situation of certain premise probabilities, being conservative serves no function 
because there is maximal information about the occurrence or non-occurrence of the events 
described by the premises. In this case participants may have found it easier to judge whether a 
given event followed from the premises than whether it did not follow (c. f. the concept of 
contrast classes for understanding reasoning with negations, Oaksford et al., 2000; Schroyens, 
Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2000).  
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The finding that when premise probability was uncertain and the probability of the 
conclusion was inside the interval, responses were only coherent above chance levels for DM 
and nDM, provides additional evidence that coherence was higher and more consistent across 
conditions for the contradiction of nDM than for MP. Further, the finding that coherence for 
the equivalence and contradiction (DM and nDM) was affected less and in a different way by 
whether the probability of the conclusion was inside or outside the coherence interval than the 
remaining inferences may indicate a difference in the mechanisms involved in processing the 
two inference types. It may be that the detection of set-subset relations (inferences of type B) 
requires an ability to detect equivalences and contradictions (inferences of type A), but 
requires additional processing steps that are not required for understanding equivalences and 
contradictions. The differences in factors affecting coherence between the one-premise 
inferences of type B and the two-premise inferences of type C seem less marked. However, 
much more research would be required to be able to draw conclusions about the generality and 
form of differences between these inference types. 
 
 
General discussion 
 
The findings in this experiment are among the first quantitative observations that have been 
made about response coherence. This necessarily makes them partly explorative, and may 
result in the generation of more hypotheses than it was possible to test. Nonetheless, the 
results also provide a number of new insights on people's sensitivity to coherence and on 
factors affecting it.  
Coherence was found to be highest for the contradiction of nDM, followed closely by 
MP. Coherence remained above chance levels, albeit to a lower extent, for the inferences of 
DM, &E, &I, &Or, Or&, IfOr, and MT. In contrast, coherence was not reliably above chance 
levels for OrIf, and it was below chance for AC and DA. 
Coherence was more stable across conditions for the equivalence and contradiction of 
type A (DM and nDM) than for the other inferences, possibly because the location and width 
of the intervals for the former is more decoupled from premise probability.  
Among the one-premise inferences describing set-subset relations (type B) and the more 
complex two-premise inferences (type C), coherence was higher for the valid inferences when 
premise probability was certain, and coherence was higher for the invalid inferences when 
premise probability was uncertain. However, this cannot be explained as an effect of validity, 
because coherence for the invalid inference of nDM was not higher for uncertain premise 
probability. If anything, Figures 6.4 and 6.5 suggest this inference to be more aligned with the 
valid inferences of type B in this regard.  A simpler explanation of this pattern seems to be that 
it reflects a tendency to give cautious or conservative responses. Such a tendency would lead 
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to the observed differences for inferences of type B and C, where valid responses were 
associated with a higher and narrower coherence interval, and invalid responses with a lower 
and wider coherence interval. It would have no effect on inferences of type A, where no such 
association of premise probability with the location and width of the interval is present. It 
seems plausible to assume that participants had a tendency to give cautious responses because 
this was actively encouraged through the way the materials were constructed.  
The construction of the materials as encouraging cautious and reflective responding was 
chosen with the aim of increasing the chances of finding an effect of validity if there is one. It 
seems implausible to assume that the difference between valid and invalid inferences is 
relevant in any context. But it may become more relevant in situations in which there is a 
higher risk associated with inferring conclusions that go beyond what is given by the premises. 
Such situations were operationalized as situations in which much is at stake and yet careful, 
cautious reasoning is called for. The pattern of results suggests that this manipulation was 
successful in inducing cautious responses. At the same time, there was no evidence that these 
responses were more or less coherent for valid than for invalid inferences. The present 
experiment was therefore unable to establish whether validity plays a role in reasoning over 
and above coherence. If it plays a differential role, then there is no evidence that this role is 
reflected in a difference in the coherence of people's responses to the two groups of inferences. 
However, the findings provide strong support for sensitivity to coherence across a range 
of inferences of different types, including MP and MT and so not only one-premise inferences. 
This evidence was not just direct through the observation that responses were coherent at 
above chance levels, but also came from the effect of edge-clear: the observation that the 
ability to establish whether a conclusion probability is coherent was higher when this 
probability was clearly on one side, or clearly on the other side, of the interval than when it 
was on the interval edge. This finding is in line with the observation made in Experiments 3 
and 4 that participants' responses were more coherent when the scale of measurement was 
coarser (e. g. + - 5% of an exact probability value) even after adjusting for corresponding 
changes in chance rate coherence. However, in Experiments 3 and 4 this benefit was observed 
mainly for DM and nDM, whereas the method used to assess the precision of participants' 
intuitions about coherence in this experiment revealed an effect more generalised across 
inferences. 
The fact that it is possible to measure the precision or "coarseness" of participants' 
degrees of belief seems to give probability theory a methodological advantage over alternative 
non-binary proposals (e.g. Politzer & Baratgin, 2016; Spohn, 2013), which build a 
theoretically predefined degree of "coarseness" higher than that of a point probability into the 
instrument used to measure participants' uncertain beliefs. The present findings provide 
evidence that people's beliefs are indeed less precise than a point probability, but they allow 
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this degree of precision to be explored empirically. Information on this question can then feed 
in to algorithmic level proposals for uncertain reasoning.  
One limitation of the experiment is that no conclusions could be drawn for AC and DA 
because coherence was below chance levels for them, whereas it would have been above 
chance levels under the assumption that the conditional they contain was interpreted as a 
biconditional. An assessment of coherence for these inferences would require an explicit 
control of the correlation between p and q, in order to better pinpoint the interpretation 
participants are making of the conditional, and allow the computation of coherence for each 
interpretation.  
A further limitation was that with only five conclusion probabilities for each combination 
of inference with premise probability, it was not always possible to capture all theoretically 
relevant locations of conclusion probabilities relative to the coherence interval. More 
conclusion probabilities would have been difficult to implement in this experiment given the 
strong differences in the intervals for the 12 inferences investigated. But further experiments 
could focus on fewer inferences and in exchange have more trials within each condition of the 
design. This would also make it possible to test in a meaningful way whether the incoherent 
responses people make for a given inference are more often over- or underestimations of their 
conclusion probability.  
In follow-up experiments it would also be useful to assess the coherence of responses for 
more neutral materials that do not encourage cautious or conservative responding – or even 
materials that encourage liberal responding. This would make it possible to test the 
explanation suggested here for some of the effects found, and assess their generality. 
A further way in which the present results can be complemented and extended is by 
assessing the coherence of people's responses to the same inferences, while varying the task 
instructions given. 
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EXPERIMENT 6: 
HIGHER VS. LOWER THAN THE PREMISE PROBABILITIES 
 
The present experiment was similar to experiment 5 in that it investigated the same 12 
inferences, with the same given premise probabilities and with a binary response format. 
However, the task given to participants differed. Participants in this experiment were given no 
conclusion probability to evaluate, but were instead asked to judge whether it was possible for 
the probability of the conclusion to lie above or below a given value. As in Experiment 5, this 
task was purely deductive because it could be fully answered on the basis of only knowledge 
of the coherence intervals for an inference.  
No specific prediction was made about possible differences in coherence between the 
questions of whether the likelihood of the conclusion can be higher and whether it can be 
lower than a given value. The aim of the experiment was rather to assess differences in 
coherence between individual inferences, and between groups of inferences, using an 
alternative method of measurement.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 42 participants from the recruitment pool of Birkbeck, University of London 
completed the experiment. Seven cases were excluded because they failed at least one of two 
test questions aimed to make sure that they were reading the materials. The final sample 
consisted of 35 participants. None of them had trial reaction times of 3 seconds or less, and all 
indicated having at least "very good" English language skills. Participants' median age was 23 
(range 18-65). The majority of participants were students, 71.4% undergraduate and 14.3% 
postgraduate. 8.6% stated they had finished 12
th
 grade, 2.9% that they had a technical/applied 
degree, and 2.9% that they had a doctoral degree. Participants' mean rating of task difficulty 
was 64%. 
 
Materials and design 
The experiment investigated the same 12 inferences as Experiments 3 to 5, shown in Table 6.1 
of Experiment 5. Each inference was presented three times, with different premise 
probabilities. The probabilities used were the same as in Experiment 5: The one-premise 
inferences (those of type A and B) had premise probabilities of 1, .8, and .5. The two-premise 
inferences (the conditional syllogisms of type C) had probabilities that were matched to those 
of the one-premise inferences not in their value, but in the sum of their premise uncertainty 
(where uncertainty = 1 – probability; Adams, 1998). With both premises of each two-premise 
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inference having the same probability, this implied that the two-premise inferences had 
premise probabilities of 1, .9, and .75. As an illustration of the relation between the 
probabilities for the one- and the two-premise inferences, consider the case of a two-premise 
inference whose premises both have a probability of .75. Then the sum of the uncertainties of 
the premises is (1 - .75) + (1 - .75) = .5, which is the same as the premise uncertainty (1 - .5) of 
a one-premise inference with a premise probability of .5.  
The three trials for each inference were presented in sequence embedded in the same 
context story. However, the objects and people referred to in the inferences differed between 
the three presentations. Each inference was randomly allocated to one of 12 context stories for 
each participant.  
The experiment was divided into two blocks, one for the one-premise inferences and one 
for the two-premise inferences. The reason for this was that participants received slightly 
different instructions for the two inferences groups. The instructions for the one-premise 
inference section read: 
 
In the following you will be shown a series of short stories. In each story an 
inference is drawn, and your task will be to judge whether it is possible, that is, 
consistent, for the conclusion of the inference to be more likely than the premise, and 
whether it is possible for the conclusion to be less likely than the premise. 
 
On each trial participants were asked two questions: "Can the conclusion be more likely than 
the premise?" and "Can the conclusion be less likely than the premise?" Both questions were 
used, instead of choosing one of the two to implement in the experiment, in order to obtain a 
wider picture of the data that could be generalized across possible response biases or negation 
effects, which if present could affect the two questions differently. The order of the two 
questions alternated randomly between participants, but was fixed within each participant. 
The above instructions were considered unsuitable for the two-premise inferences, 
because the latter have more complex coherence intervals that stand in a less direct relation to 
the probabilities of the premises. For the premise probabilities used, the above instructions 
would have meant that any response to these inferences was correct: it was always coherent 
for the probability of the conclusion to be either higher or lower than that of the premises, 
except in the trivial case of a premise probability of 1, for which no higher probability is 
defined.  
For this reason, a threshold probability of .5 was chosen instead for the two-premise 
inferences. With this threshold the valid inferences become separable from the invalid 
inferences because for the premise probabilities used, the probability of the conclusion of the 
valid inferences MP and MT could only be higher than .5, whereas that of the invalid 
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inferences AC and DA could be both higher or lower (see Figure 6.1 of Experiment 5).  The 
instructions for the two-premise inferences read: 
 
In the following you will be shown a series of short stories. In each story an 
inference is drawn, and your task will be to judge whether it is possible, that is, 
consistent, for the conclusion of the inference to be more likely than 50%, and 
whether it is possible for the conclusion to be less likely than 50%. 
 
On each trial in this section, participants were asked the corresponding two questions: 
"Can the conclusion be more than 50% likely?" and "Can the conclusion be less than 50% 
likely?" 
In both blocks participants provided their responses by clicking with the mouse on one of 
two radio buttons with the headings "no" and "yes", respectively.  
The tasks for the one- and the two-premise inferences are not equivalent, and it may be 
advisable to make comparisons between them with caution. However, an advantage of using a 
threshold of 50% for the two-premise inferences is that it may render responses to these 
inferences more comparable, in relative terms, to the responses in Experiment 7, which also 
used a binary response format but differed in its specific task instructions.   
The context stories in which each inference was embedded followed the same 
construction principles as in Experiment 5. Six of the stories were nearly identical to those of 
Experiment 5, and six new stories were created, again with varying topics (houses after an 
earthquake, minefield, computer virus, armed robber, poisoned food, and flooded underground 
system). The stories were pseudonaturalistic, that is, they referred to concrete but fictional 
situations for which it is difficult to draw on world knowledge to assess the probabilities of the 
events involved. Further, the stories were constructed with the aim of creating situations in 
which "a lot is at stake" and which at the same time call for careful, reflective reasoning. It 
was hypothesized that in such situations it may become more relevant for people to distinguish 
valid from invalid inferences, if there are situations in which people distinguish between them 
in the first place. Therefore, using stories with these characteristics may make it easier to 
detect any differential effect of validity over and above coherence. The frame below shows a 
sample trial for the inference of nDM and a premise probability of .8. The 12 stories used can 
be found in Appendix E.  
Within each block, the order of occurrence of the three trials for each inference, as well as 
the order of occurrence of the inferences, varied randomly for each participant. The order of 
the blocks alternated randomly for each participant.  
With 12 inferences and 3 premise probability conditions, the experiment had 36 trials, 
plus two catch trials (one in each block) to make sure participants were reading the materials. 
The catch trials were similar in format to the regular trials, but the text of the inferences was 
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replaced with text stating that they were a control trial to make sure participants were paying 
attention, and asking them not to respond, but to instead click "next" to continue with the 
experiment.  
 
Imagine you are part of a team of aid workers who are removing the mines from the Dunlar 
fields, where a war took place recently. You have to act very thoroughly in order to make sure 
the area is cleared and safe again for the residents. You are reviewing the latest data on the 
fields with the team. 
Based on the information gathered until now: 
 
Premise: You think it's 80% likely that: 
The moss field and the gravel field are cleared. 
 
Conclusion: Therefore, how likely can the following be? 
The moss field is not cleared or the gravel field is not cleared. 
 
Can the conclusion be more likely than the premise?     (no)     (yes) 
Can the conclusion be less likely than the premise?        (no)     (yes) 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a lab room of the Department of Psychological 
Sciences of Birkbeck, University of London. The experimenter remained in the room while 
participants read the instructions and went through three practice trials involving different 
inferences and scenarios from those in the main experiment. The entire session took 
approximately 22 min to complete.  
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the values of observed and above-chance coherence for each inference when 
aggregated over the predictors, excluding a control condition that is treated separately below. 
In the control condition, the question for the one-premise inferences was whether the 
probability of the conclusion could be higher than a premise probability of 1. To give a 
coherent response for this question, it is enough to know that probabilities cannot be higher 
than 1, and so its inclusion in the figure would have unduly inflated response coherence for 
these inferences.  
Figure 6.7 displays the data separately for each premise probability condition and for the 
two questions asked (whether the probability of the conclusion can be higher, resp. lower, than 
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the probability of the premise). As in Experiment 5, the uniform chance rate of 50% implies 
that the maximum possible value of above-chance coherence was 50%, and that the pattern of 
coherence across inferences was the same for observed and above-chance coherence. 
 
Overall above-chance coherence 
The pattern of results across inferences was similar to that of Experiment 5, with above-chance 
coherence highest for MP and nDM, and coherence not being above chance for AC and DA. 
However, the confidence intervals in Figure 6.6 suggest that in the present experiment 
coherence was above chance levels for OrIf – for which it had been at chance levels in 
Experiment 5. Conversely, coherence for IfOr now seems to be at chance levels – whereas it 
had been above chance levels in Experiment 5. In addition, coherence now appears to be at 
chance levels for DM, for which responses had been reliably above chance in Experiments 3 
to 5. Further, among the inferences of Type A and Type B, it appears that coherence was 
higher for the invalid than for the valid inferences.  
 
 
Figure 6.6. Observed and above-chance coherence for the 
inferences in Experiment 6, excluding the data from the 
condition in which premise probability was 1 and the 
question was whether the probability of the conclusion 
could be higher. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
A first set of comparisons between inferences corroborated the above pattern. Above-
chance coherence did not differ significantly between MP and nDM (EMMMP = .400, EMMnDM 
= .343, F(1, 70) = 1.595, p = .211). However, the values for nDM, &I, Or&, and MT differed 
only marginally between each other (EMM&I = .300, EMMOr& = .262, EMMMT = .190, F(3, 
200 
 
140) = 2.391, p = .071), and together were lower than that of MP (EMM = .274, F(1, 175) = 
7.343, p = .007).  
Above-chance coherence did not differ significantly between DM, &E, &Or, and OrIf 
(EMMDM = .114, EMM&E = .133, EMM&Or = .114, EMMOrIf = .124, F(3, 140) = .048, p = .986), 
and the overall value for these inferences was lower than the overall value for nDM, &I, Or&, 
and MT (EMMformer = .121, EMMlatter = .274, F(1, 280) = 26.013, p < .001).  
Similarly, the overall values for IfOr, AC, and DA did not differ significantly from each 
other
11
 (EMMIfOr < .001, EMMAC = .024, EMMDA = .048, F(2, 595) = .483, p = .617), and 
together were lower than the values for DM, &E, &Or, and OrIf (EMMformer = .024, EMMlatter 
= .121, F(1, 1435) = 14.469, p < .001).  
Finally, individual tests (including only fixed effects given the smaller sample sizes 
involved) were conducted for the inferences for which Figure 6.6 suggested above-chance 
coherence to be marginal. Coherence was above chance levels for DM (F(1, 210) = 11.576, p 
= .001), for &E (F(1, 210) = 16.077, p < .001), for &Or (F(1, 210) = 11.576, p < .001), and for 
OrIf (F(1, 210) = 13.717, p < .001). But coherence was at chance levels for IfOr (F(1, 210) < 
.001, p = 1), for AC (F(1, 210) = .477, p = .490), and for DA (F(1, 210) = 1.922, p = .167).  
As in Experiment 5, the responses that were classified as incoherent for AC and DA 
would have been classified as coherent under the assumption that their conditional premise is a 
biconditional, i. e. that there is a correlation between the antecedent p and the consequent q 
rendering the relation between them bidirectional. This interpretation of the overall lack of 
above-chance coherence for AC and DA is supported by the pattern in Figure 6.7: The 
confidence intervals in this figure show that coherence was generally above chance levels for 
the question of whether the probability of the conclusion can be higher than 50%, and below 
chance levels for the question of whether the probability of the conclusion can be lower than 
50%. The observed difference between the two conditions is exactly what one would expect 
from a biconditional interpretation. Under a biconditional interpretation AC and DA would be 
valid, and as a result their conclusion probability could be above 50%, but not below 50%. In 
contrast, with a conditional interpretation the two inferences are invalid, and their confidence 
intervals are nearly uninformative (c. f. Figure 6.1 of Experiment 5), rendering conclusion 
probabilities both above and below 50% coherent. Hence, if participants are being coherent 
when asked whether the probability of the conclusion can be higher (by saying "yes, it can be 
higher") but incoherent when asked whether it can be lower (by saying "no, it cannot be 
lower"), they are responding as if they were following a biconditional interpretation. As 
mentioned in Experiment 5, evidence for such an interpretation has been found intermittently 
                                                          
11
 Whereas the previous comparisons of this section included random intercepts for participants and for 
materials, this specific comparison included only a random intercept for participants. The attempt to 
include a random intercept for materials led to failure of convergence.   
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in previous studies (e. g. Barrouillet & Gauffroy, 2015; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016; but see 
Oberauer, Weidenfeld, et al., 2007; Singmann et al., 2014).   
This explanation does not apply to the absence of above-chance coherence for IfOr. The 
inference of IfOr is valid whether the conditional it contains is interpreted as uni- or 
bidirectional. To see why, consider again that a biconditional is equivalent to the conjunction 
of two conditionals: q if and only if p = if p then q & if q then p. By the valid rule of and-
elimination (inference 3 in Table 6.1), this conjunction implies either of its conjuncts, i. e. the 
biconditional implies the conditional. By p-validity we know that when a statement p implies 
another statement q, P(p)  P(q). Thus we have P(biconditional)  P(conditional)  
P(disjunction), and with it: P(biconditional)  P(disjunction).  
The absence of above-chance coherence observed for IfOr in this experiment suggests 
that the lower coherence found for the inference in Experiments 3 and 4 was not just an 
artefact caused by lower premise probabilities assigned to it, but a genuine failure to take 
coherence constraints into account. Given that findings of an absence of above-chance 
coherence were the exception rather than the rule in the present experiments, it seems 
preferable to look for an explanation for why coherence broke down in this specific case rather 
than to take it as evidence for a lack of sensitivity to coherence in general.  
As mentioned earlier, a possible explanation for the absence of above-chance coherence 
found for IfOr is that the negation in the antecedent of the conditional made the inference 
more difficult to process. An account of such a negation effect would be given by the contrast 
class theory of negations together with the definition of the Ramsey test (Evans & Over, 2004; 
Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford et al., 2000). The contrast class account of negations describes 
negations in a probabilistic, set-theoretic way: the probability of a negated statement (e. g. "no 
cup of coffee") is the "contrast class" or "complement set" to the probability of the affirmation 
of the statement ("a cup of coffee"). Given that concepts, to be informative, often refer to 
rather specific objects, like a cup of coffee, a chair, or a person, the class of objects that are 
thereby not referred to, i. e. their complement set, is often larger than the set that is being 
affirmed. For example, the class of all objects that are not chairs (e. g. cups of coffee, dogs, 
underground stations) is larger than the class of objects that are chairs. Applied to the 
conditional in the IfOr inference, this means knowing that p is not the case is less informative 
than knowing that p is the case: if p is false there is still an infinite number of possibilities of 
what could be the case instead. As a consequence, it may be more difficult to build a mental 
representation of the antecedent on the basis of which to perform the Ramsey test. An 
additional difficulty may arise once the Ramsey test has been performed, because the 
hypothetical state of affairs in which p is false has to be related to the state of affairs in the 
conclusion in which p may be true. This means that the reasoner's focus of attention cannot 
remain within the mental simulation created through the Ramsey test, but has to set the 
202 
 
outcome of that simulation aside to consider the broader set of possibilities that include the 
truth of p.   
This is however only one possible explanation, whose adequacy would have to be tested 
in follow-up experiments. Further, for any explanation attempted it is relevant to take into 
account that coherence for this inference is not reliable: It was found to be above chance levels 
in Experiments 1 and 5, above chance levels in some conditions of Experiments 3 and 4, and 
at chance levels in the present experiment. One way to examine further this variability would 
be to test whether coherence for the inference is higher when using real world materials, and 
whether it is higher for people with higher working memory capacity. One way to assess the 
role of negations within it would be through the use of the negation paradigm (Espino & 
Byrne, 2013; Evans et al., 1995; Evans & Handley, 1999). Part of this paradigm was 
implemented in Experiment 1 (Cruz et al., 2015) but did not lead to meaningful differences in 
above-chance coherence between conditions.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Above-chance coherence for Experiment 6, separately for each premise probability 
and question condition. Higher: question of whether the probability of the conclusion can be 
higher than that of the premise (resp. for the two-premise inferences, whether it can be higher 
than .5). Lower: question of whether the probability of the conclusion can be lower than that 
of the premise (resp. for the two-premise inferences, whether it can be lower than .5). Error 
bars show 95% CIs.  
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Higher vs. lower 
Figure 6.7 shows the values of above-chance coherence separately for the question of whether 
the probability of the conclusion can be higher than that of the premise (resp. for the two-
premise inferences, whether it can be higher than 50%) and for the question of whether the 
probability of the conclusion can be lower than that of the premise (resp. for the two-premise 
inferences, whether it can be lower than 50%). Let us call this variable higher-lower. 
As mentioned above, the condition in the lower right panel of Figure 6.7 has a special 
status for the one-premise inferences (types A and B). Here participants were asked to assume 
that the probability of the premise is 1, and to judge whether the probability of the conclusion 
can be higher. Of course, no probability can be higher than 1, and so this question can be 
answered independently of the logical structure of the inferences. It was therefore used as a 
control condition assessing whether participants understood the instructions and took the 
upper probability bound into account.  
Overall, above-chance coherence in the control condition was high and reliably above 
chance levels (F(1, 280) = 392.475, p < .001), providing evidence that participants had no 
problem in understanding the instructions. The degree of above-chance coherence did not 
differ significantly between the one-premise inferences (F(7, 280) = 1.737, p = .1, only fixed 
effects included). However, above-chance coherence was not at ceiling either (F(7, 280) = 
40.379, p < .001). The relative values of above-chance coherence in the remaining conditions 
arguably appear more consequential when compared to the benchmark of results in this 
condition than when compared to the maximum possible value of above-chance coherence of 
.5.  
As before, the absence of above-chance coherence found for AC and DA is difficult to 
interpret because there is reason to believe that it could reflect a coherent response based on an 
alternative interpretation of the conditional premises. Responses to these two inferences were 
therefore not included in the subsequent analysis.  
The analysis was divided into three sections. The first section assessed above-chance 
coherence for the two higher-lower question conditions, focussing on the two uncertain 
premise probability conditions. The second section compared above-chance coherence 
between the certain and the uncertain premise probability conditions, focussing on the 
question of whether the probability of the conclusion can be lower than the probability of the 
premise. Finally, in a third section above-chance coherence for MP and MT was compared for 
the three premise probability conditions and the two higher-lower conditions.  
1. Analysis for the uncertain premise probability conditions. A linear mixed model 
was computed for the effects of inference type, premise probability (.8, .5), and higher-lower 
on above-chance coherence, with random intercepts for participants and scenarios. Overall 
coherence was 20% higher than expected by chance (F(1, 350) = 108.509, p < .001). The 
degree to which coherence was higher than expected by chance differed between inference 
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types (EMMA = .182, EMMB = .115, EMMC = .289, F(2, 350) = 8.485, p < .001): Above-
chance coherence was higher for the inferences of type C than for the inferences of type A 
(F(1, 525) = 8.891, p = .003, X
2
(4) = 11.182, p < .025) and than for the inferences of type B 
(F(1, 1085) = 29.882, p < .001). Above-chance coherence was also slightly higher for the 
inferences of type A than for those of type B (F(1, 1085) = 4.086, p = .043). No other effects 
were significant; in particular, there was no main effect of higher-lower (EMMhigher = .217, 
EMMlower = .174, F(1, 1050)  = 3.160, p = .076, X
2
(6) = 8.143, p < .250). 
Type A inferences. Figure 6.7 suggests that the differences in above-chance coherence 
between inference types concern not only the overall size of the effect, but that the effect also 
differed between individual inferences. A follow-up analysis focussing on the inferences of 
type A (including only a random intercept for participants, as adding a random intercept for 
items would have led to convergence problems) showed that above-chance coherence was 
higher for nDM than for DM (EMMDM = .050, EMMnDM = .314, F(1, 245) = 26.679, p < .001). 
Above-chance coherence was also marginally higher for the question of whether the 
probability of the conclusion could be higher than for the question of whether it could be 
lower (F(1, 245) = 4.385, p = .037). However, these two main effects were qualified by an 
interaction between inference and premise probability (F(1, 245) = 8.594, p = .004); and by a 
three-way interaction between inference, premise probability, and higher-lower (F(1, 245) = 
10.309, p = .002).  
Further examination of the three-way interaction showed that when the question was 
whether the probability of the conclusion could be higher, and premise probability was .5, 
overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .214, F(1, 35) = 15.441); but it was higher 
for nDM than for DM (EMMDM = .071, EMMnDM = .357, F(1, 35) = 8.974, p = .005). The same 
pattern was observed in the higher question condition with a premise probability of .8 (overall 
above-chance coherence: EMM = .257, F(1, 35) = 19.352, p < .001. Effect of inference: 
EMMDM = .129, EMMnDM = .386, F(1, 35) = 12.115, p = .001), and in the lower question 
condition with a premise probability of .8 (overall above-chance coherence: EMM = .129, F(1, 
35) = 7.580, p = .009. Effect of inference: EMMDM = -.157, EMMnDM = .414, F(1, 35) = 
37.838, p < .001): in the three cases coherence was above-chance levels overall, and higher for 
nDM than for DM. In contrast, in the case of the lower question condition with a probability 
of .5, overall coherence was at chance levels (EMM = .129, F(1, 35) = 3.571, p = .067), and 
did not differ between inferences (EMMDM = .157, EMMnDM = .100, F(1, 35) = .405, p = .529).  
Figure 6.7 suggests that in the three cases in which overall coherence was above chance 
levels, it was so only due to nDM, and that coherence for DM remained at chance levels across 
conditions. This was confirmed statistically: the largest effect for DM was in the lower 
question condition with premise probability of .5, for which it did not reach significance 
(including only fixed effects: EMM = .157, F(1, 35) = 3.836, p = .058).  
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Overall, coherence was found to be above chance levels in three out of four conditions for 
nDM, whereas it remained at chance levels across conditions for DM. Going back to Figure 
6.6, coherence for nDM was not only above chance levels in most cases, but the overall degree 
to which it was above chance levels was also among the highest of the 10 inferences 
investigated. The overall high coherence obtained for the inference is in accordance with the 
findings of Experiments 3 to 5.  
However, it is interesting that coherence for nDM was at chance levels in the condition in 
which the question was whether the probability of the conclusion could be lower than the 
premise probability of .5. In this specific condition, responses to the inference are only 
coherent when participants always respond "no": even though the inference is a contradiction, 
the probability of the conclusion has to be equal to the probability of the premise. This 
procedural requirement for coherence might have irritated participants, leading to the contrast 
in the results between this and the other conditions.  
The finding that coherence was at chance levels for DM across conditions contrasts with 
that of experiments 3 to 5, in which coherence had been found to be reliably above chance for 
the inference. An explanation for this difference may again be procedural: in the present 
experiment, responses to DM were only coherent when participants always responded "no": 
Given that the inference was an equivalence, the probability of the conclusion could be neither 
higher nor lower than the probability of the premise. It may have been irritating for 
participants that the coherent response was always "no" for this inference, while the response 
allocation varied for the remaining inferences.  
The findings for DM and nDM showed no systematic effect of higher-lower on above-
chance coherence: Responses for DM generally remained invariant across conditions, and 
responses for nDM differed only for a particular combination of higher-lower with premise 
probability.   
Type B inferences. An analysis of the effects of premise probability (.5, .8), higher-lower, 
and validity on above-chance coherence focussing on the inferences of type B (again including 
only a random intercept for participants) showed that above-chance coherence was higher for 
the invalid than for the valid inferences (EMMvalid = .002, EMMinvalid = .229, F(1, 805) = 
52.152, p < .001). However, the effect of validity was qualified by an interaction between 
validity and higher-lower (F(1, 805) = 15.030, p < .001) which was in turn qualified by a 
three-way interaction between validity, higher-lower, and premise probability (F(1, 805) = 
18.775, p < .001).  
Follow-up analyses to the interaction (using only fixed effects due to the small sample 
sizes involved in the comparisons) showed that in the condition in which the question was 
whether the probability of the conclusion could be higher and premise probability of .5, 
overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .138, F(1, 210) = 22.412, p < .001), but 
was larger for the invalid than for the valid inferences (EMMinvalid = .367, EMMvalid = -.090, 
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F(1, 210) = 61.401, p < .001). The negative estimated marginal means for the valid inferences 
imply that coherence was actually only above chance levels for the invalid inferences.  
The same pattern of results was obtained in the condition in which the question was 
whether the probability of the conclusion could be higher and the premise probability was .8 
(Overall coherence: EMM = .095, F(1, 210) = 8.400, p = .004. Effect of validity: EMMvalid = -
.024, EMMinvalid = .214, F(1, 210) = 13.125, p < .001) and in the lower question condition with 
a premise probability of .8 (overall coherence: EMM = .138, F(1, 210) = 18.788, p < .001. 
Effect of validity: EMMvalid = .005, EMMinvalid = .271, F(1, 210) = 17.515, p < .001). In the 
three cases overall coherence was above chance, but it was in fact only significantly higher 
than chance for the invalid inferences.  
In contrast, in the lower question condition with a premise probability of .5, overall 
coherence was above chance (EMM = .090, F(1, 210) = 7.133, p = .008), and there was no 
difference between valid and invalid inferences (EMMvalid = .119, EMMinvalid = .062, F(1, 210) 
= .711, p = .400).  
In summary, overall coherence was above chance levels for the inferences of type B, but 
it was generally only significantly so for the invalid inferences. The exception was in the 
lower question condition with a premise probability of .5: in this case coherence was above 
chance levels and no difference between valid and invalid inferences was found. The 
observation that above-chance coherence tended to be higher for invalid inferences coincides 
with the results for the inferences of type A, where above-chance coherence tended to be 
higher for the invalid inference of nDM than for the valid inference of DM. The observed 
difference cannot be explained by the fact that for the premise probabilities studied, the 
coherence interval tended to be wider for the invalid than for the valid inferences. This is 
because the number of "yes" trials were nonetheless equal for valid and invalid inferences of 
this type, and because the effect of validity was clearly present also in the condition in which 
the question was whether the probability of the conclusion could be higher and the premise 
probability was .5, in which the intervals for valid and invalid inferences were equally wide. 
However, no clear effect of validity was found in Experiment 5 for these inferences, and 
Figure 6.7 suggests that in the present experiment, the effect was absent in the lower question 
condition when premise probability was .5, but also when premise probability was 1. 
There was no systematic effect of higher-lower for the inferences of type B. Instead, the 
form of the effect of higher-lower changed between inferences and premise probability 
conditions.  
Type C inferences. An analysis of the effects of inference, premise probability (.8, .5), 
and higher-lower on above-chance coherence focussing on MP and MT of type C (again 
including only a random intercept for participants) showed that above-chance coherence was 
higher for MP than for MT (EMMMP = .386, EMMMT = .193, F(1, 245) = 23.093, p < .001). 
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There was also a non-significant trend for an effect of premise probability (EMM.8 = .329, 
EMM.5 = .250, F(1, 245) = 3.833, p = .051). 
Overall, above-chance coherence was larger for MP than for MT across experimental 
conditions, in line with the pattern observed in Figure 6.7 and consistent with the findings of 
the previous experiment. The higher-lower question condition again played no role for this 
outcome (F = .285, p = .594). 
2. Analysis for the lower question condition. The second analysis focussed on responses 
to the question of whether the probability of the conclusion can be lower than that of the 
premise, comparing the results of the previous analysis for this question with the case in which 
the premise probability was 1. A linear mixed model was computed for the effects of inference 
type and premise probability (1, .8, .5) on above-chance coherence, with random intercepts for 
participants and materials. Overall responses were coherent around 19% more often than 
expected by chance (EMM = .185, F(1, 350) = 71.563, p < .001). Above-chance coherence 
differed between inference types (EMMA = .148, EMMB = .116, EMMC = .290, F(2, 350) = 
6.251, p = .002). But there was no difference in above-chance coherence between premise 
probability conditions (EMM1 = .206, EMM.8 = .198, EMM.5 = .149, F(2, 700) = 1.889, p = 
.152); nor an interaction between premise probability and inference type (F(4, 700) = .517, p = 
.723). Hence, it made no significant difference for the coherence of responses whether the 
probabilities of the premises were certain or uncertain.  
In line with this result, the overall pattern in Figure 6.7 looks similar for the certain and 
uncertain premise probability conditions. However, for the inferences of type B with certain 
premise probability, the figure suggests there to be no difference in above-chance coherence 
between valid and invalid inferences. Given the theoretical interest of this question, it was 
followed up statistically. The analysis (which included only fixed effects) showed that there 
was indeed no difference between valid and invalid inferences when premise probability was 1 
(EMMvalid = .157, EMMinvalid = .081, F(1, 210) = 1.300, p = .255). This means that the overall 
results for the effect of validity among inferences of type B are mixed: above-chance 
coherence was higher for the invalid inferences in three conditions, and there was no effect of 
validity in two conditions. These mixed results replicate those of the previous experiments, 
and together provide no evidence of a general effect of validity on above-chance coherence. 
The differences in above-chance coherence observed seem more likely due to more specific 
features of the inferences studied.  
The results provide no evidence for an effect of conservativeness, as was suggested in 
Experiment 5. A conservative response tendency would have meant that participants more 
often said "no, it cannot be higher" and "yes, it can be lower". This would have led to higher 
coherence for the invalid inferences in both question conditions, contrary to what was 
observed. The findings also provided no evidence for a general tendency to respond "yes" or 
to respond "no". A tendency to say "yes" would have led to higher coherence for the valid 
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inferences in the higher question condition, and a tendency to say "no" would have led to 
higher coherence for the valid inferences in the lower question condition, neither of which was 
observed. 
3. Analysis for MP and MT across conditions. Finally, the third analysis takes 
advantage of the fact that for MP and MT, all experimental conditions were comparable, 
including that in which the question was whether the probability of the conclusion can be 
higher and the probability of the premises was 1. It also makes sense to have a separate 
analysis for these two inferences given that the questions asked for them differed slightly from 
those for the one-premise inferences, having as a reference not the probability of the premise 
but a probability of .5.  
An analysis for the effects of inference, premise probability, and higher-lower on above-
chance coherence, including random intercepts for participants and scenarios, showed that 
overall coherence was around 30% higher than expected by chance (EMM = .295, F(1, 70) = 
80.635, p < .001). Above-chance coherence was higher for MP than for MT (EMMMP = .400, 
EMMMT = .190, F(1, 70) = 10.153, p = .002). No other effects were significant (highest F = 
2.587, lowest p = .077, for the effect of premise probability).  
The finding of high above-chance coherence for MP, but also generally reliable above-
chance coherence for MT, is in accordance with the findings of the previous experiments, and 
provides a more optimistic picture of role of coherence for complex two-premise inferences 
than had been suggested by earlier findings (Evans et al., 2015; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009; 
Singmann et al., 2014). 
 
 
General discussion 
 
This experiment used an alternative task to that in experiment 5, while coinciding with the 
previous experiment in using a binary response format that makes it possible to perform 
quantitative comparisons of above-chance coherence between inferences. The results 
corroborate and extend those of the previous experiment in key respects.  
Overall above-chance coherence was again found to be highest for nDM and MP, with 
coherence for MT and the type B inferences being lower but in their majority still above 
chance levels. This finding adds to the previous evidence that in general coherence is a 
psychologically meaningful normative constraint for reasoning.  
Coherence for AC and DA again followed a pattern consistent with the assumption that 
participants are giving coherent responses based on a biconditional interpretation of the 
conditional premises involved. The lack of above-chance coherence observed for them is 
therefore difficult to interpret. As mentioned in Experiment 5, a useful next step in assessing 
above-chance coherence for these two inferences would be to vary the correlation between the 
209 
 
antecedent and consequent of the conditional, or measure participants' subjective assessment 
of this correlation, and then compute response coherence taking this information into account.    
Coherence for DM was found to be at chance levels across conditions in this experiment, 
in spite of having been reliably above chance levels in experiments 3 to 5. A possible reason 
for this is that in the present experiment, the only coherent response for DM in all trials was 
"no". Because it is an equivalence, the probability of the conclusion can never be higher or 
lower than the probability of the premise. This inference specific constraint might have 
irritated participants, who perhaps expected the normative response to vary more across trials 
as it did for the other inferences. Some participants might have also found it difficult to 
consistently respond "no" in front of an equivalence, which might rather suggest the answer 
"yes, these two probabilities are the same" or "yes, this inference is correct". The fact that the 
coherent response to DM was "no" on all trials was a consequence of the design. It would of 
course not have been a good choice of design if this feature had been present throughout. 
However, its presence for one inference made it possible to study what happens with the 
coherence of responses in this case, while still being able to measure coherence for other 
cases. Further experiments would have to be conducted to assess whether it were such 
procedural aspects of the present task that led to a failure of coherence for the inference. 
The findings provide no evidence that above-chance coherence differed as a function of 
the higher-lower question condition. It also played no role whether the probability of the 
premises was certain or uncertain. Furthermore, in line with the results of Experiment 5, there 
was no consistent effect of validity on above-chance coherence. Responses were higher for the 
invalid inference of nDM than for the valid inference of DM, but they were among the highest 
for the valid inference of MP. Similarly, among the inferences of type B above-chance 
coherence was higher for invalid inferences only in three out of five experimental conditions. 
The present results suggest that where an effect of validity was observed, it is more likely a 
result of inference or condition specific factors than the reflection of a general difference in 
coherence between valid and invalid inferences.  
A further finding of interest is that coherence was not lower for uncertain than for certain 
premise probabilities. This finding goes counter to the belief held in the binary paradigm in 
reasoning research, that to reasoning deductively, it is necessary to assume the premises to be 
certain. As mentioned in the introduction, a typical distinction made in previous studies is 
between an inference being either "deductive" or "probabilistic", implying that what is 
deductive is not probabilistic, and vice versa (e. g. Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010; 
Singmann et al., 2014; Trippas et al., 2017; Verschueren et al., 2005). The present finding 
provides empirical support for the proposal that this dichotomy is not necessary when the 
deductive concepts investigated are generalised to the probability range. Certain truth and 
falsity are then just two endpoints on a scale for degrees of belief, and it is possible to study 
deduction and induction together in a unified probabilistic framework.  
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The use of a binary response format in Experiments 5 and 6 makes it possible to compare 
their findings more directly to an experimental condition with binary paradigm instructions. 
This was done in the following experiment.  
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EXPERIMENT 7: 
CERTAIN PREMISES AND BINARY PARADIGM INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This experiment explores the coherence of people's responses in a situation in which not only 
the response format is binary, but in addition the instructions are those of the binary paradigm 
of reasoning: to assume the premises to be true "for the sake of argument", and decide whether 
under this assumption the conclusion necessarily also has to be true. The experiment used the 
same 12 inferences and the same materials as Experiment 6. This made it possible to compare 
the results of the two experiments more directly, and assess to what extent binary paradigm 
instructions, inspired on the concept of validity in classical logic, make a difference for 
people's reasoning over and above the assumption of certainty in the premises. Whereas in 
Experiment 6 the condition in which the premises had probability 1 represented one particular 
case among the range of premise probabilities that would have been possible, in the present 
experiment probabilities do not come into play at all: the only possibilities considered are truth 
and falsity, and what the assumption of one piece of information being true implies for the 
truth or the falsity of other pieces of information.  
When comparing the data of the present experiment with that of Experiment 6, supporters 
of the binary paradigm would predict people's responses to be more coherent under binary 
paradigm instructions (Exp. 7) than under probabilistic instructions (Exp. 6). This is because 
in the binary paradigm probabilistic reasoning is equated with inductive reasoning, and only 
reasoning about certain truth and falsity is treated as deductive.   
In the probabilistic approach, coherence would be predicted to be similar under 
probabilistic and binary instructions because from a probabilistic perspective certain truth and 
falsity are similar to probabilities of 1 and 0: they are not qualitatively different from other 
probabilities but represent limiting cases on a common scale.  
For particular inferences like or-introduction, responses may be more coherent under 
probabilistic than under binary instructions, because the use of probabilistic instructions 
asking participants directly for their degrees of belief reduces the role of pragmatic factors 
involved in asserting something in discourse (Cruz et al., 2017; Grice, 1989; Politzer & 
Baratgin, 2016). But to the knowledge of the author there are no clear arguments suggesting 
that similar pragmatic issues would be involved in the inferences investigated here. 
Further, there are factors for which a premise probability of 1 does make a difference in 
the probabilistic approach. For example, in Costello & Watts' (2016) model for estimating the 
likelihood of events through noisy Bayesian sampling from memory (see also Sanborn & 
Chater, 2016), it is difficult to estimate a probability of 1 in an unbiased way when the 
estimation process is noisy. But for present purposes, it seems safe to assume that such a form 
of probability estimation would nonetheless result in responses being coherent more often than 
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expected by chance, and so would not be expected to result in qualitatively different 
conclusions being drawn when comparing the two instruction types.   
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 46 participants from the recruitment pool of Birkbeck, University of London 
completed the experiment. Two participants were excluded because they failed a catch trial 
aimed to assess whether they were reading the materials. Further six were excluded because 
they indicated having previous knowledge of formal logic
12
. One participant was excluded 
because of reporting less than "good" English language skills. A further participant was 
excluded for having one or more trial reaction times of less than three seconds. The final 
sample consisted of 35 participants. They had a median age of 25 years (range: 18-52). Most 
participants had some college education, with 33 (91%) indicating that they were students or 
had completed a university degree (20 an undergraduate, 11 a postgraduate, and 1 a doctoral 
degree). Participants' median percentage rating of task difficulty was 25%. 
 
Materials and design 
The inferences and scenarios were exactly the same as those of Experiment 6 (see Appendix 
E), as was the overall structure of the experimental design. However, at the beginning of the 
experiment participants were given the following instructions:  
 
In the following you will be shown a series of short stories, in each of which an 
inference will be drawn. You will be asked to assume that the premises of the 
inference are true. Even if the premises may be uncertain in the real world, it is 
important that you assume, for the sake of argument, that they are certainly true. You 
will then be asked whether, assuming the premises are true, the conclusion 
necessarily has to be true as well. 
 
On each trial participants were given the same premises and conclusion as in Experiment 6, 
but with no information on premise probability. They were then asked: "Assuming that the 
premise(s) is (are) true, does the conclusion also have to be true?" Participants gave their 
response by clicking on one of two radio buttons labelled "no" and "yes", respectively. Below 
is an example of a trial for the &I inference:  
 
                                                          
12
 Four indicated having visited a university course in formal logic, one read an academic book on 
formal logic, and one had a Master's in linguistics which included training in formal semantics. 
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Imagine you are part of a team of technicians surveying the underground system of the city of 
Limro. A severe flood has started to affect part of the underground. You need to analyse 
carefully which areas are flooded so that you can evacuate the passengers and avoid the flood 
spreading further. Consider the following inference: 
 
Premise: 
The red line is flooded. 
 
Conclusion: 
Therefore, the red line and the yellow line are flooded. 
 
Assuming that the premise is true, does the conclusion also have to be true?     (no)     (yes) 
 
The experiment consisted of a single block of 12 trials presented in random order, with 
the pairing of the 12 inferences with the 12 scenarios randomised for each participant. In 
addition, the experiment included a catch trial aimed to assess whether participants were 
reading the materials. As in Experiment 6, the catch trial was similar in format to the regular 
trials, but the text for the premises and conclusion of the inferences was replaced with text 
stating that it was a test question to make sure participants were paying attention, and asking 
them not to respond, but instead click "next" to continue with the experiment.  
 
Procedure 
Participants took part individually in a quiet testing room of the Department of Psychological 
Sciences of Birkbeck, University of London. The experimenter remained in the room while 
participants read the instructions and went through the first practice trials, which referred to 
different inferences and materials than in the main experiment. The entire session took 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
As in the previous experiments, a response was classified as coherent when it fell within the 
coherence interval, and as incoherent if it fell outside of it. This was equivalent to classifying 
"yes" responses as coherent for valid inferences and "no" responses as coherent for invalid 
inferences. Observed coherence again corresponded to the proportion of coherent responses in 
each condition. Given the binary response format, the chance rate was again 50%, and above-
chance coherence was computed by subtracting this value from observed coherence. The 
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overall values of observed and above-chance coherence for each inference are shown in Figure 
6.8.   
 
 
 
The confidence intervals in the figure show that coherence was clearly above chance 
levels for 5 of the 12 inferences: nDM, &E, &I, Or&, and MP. It seemed to be at or below 
chance levels for the remaining 7 inferences.  
To assess these differences statistically, two contrasts were created: one for the inferences 
for which coherence was clearly above chance (the high coherence inferences group, 
composed of inferences nDM, &E, &I, Or&, and MP), and the other for the inferences for 
which coherence seemed to be at or below chance levels (the low coherence group, composed 
of inferences DM, &Or, IfOr, OrIf, MT, AC, and DA).  
An analysis for the effect of the so defined inferences groups on above-chance coherence 
was conducted using only fixed effects, because inclusion of random effects led to failure of 
convergence for some comparisons. Overall coherence was around 23% higher than expected 
by chance (F(1, 420) = 122.187, p < .001). The extent to which coherence was above chance 
levels differed between the two groups (EMMhigh = .437, EMMlow = .014, F(1, 420) = 107.210, 
p < .001). Analyses for each group of inferences confirmed that coherence for the high 
coherence group was above chance levels (F(1, 175) = 572.147, p < .001). The extent to which 
this was the case did not differ between inferences (F(4, 175) = .342, p = .849). Coherence for 
the low coherence group did not differ from chance (F(1, 245) = .209, p = .648); and this 
result did not differ between inferences (F(6, 245) = 1.874, p = .086). Figure 6.8 suggests that 
 
Figure 6.8. Observed and above-chance coherence for the 12 
inferences of Experiment 7. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
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above-chance coherence for IfOr might have been marginal, but its confidence interval 
included the null, and it was not significant when tested individually (F(1, 35) = 2.478, p = 
.124).  
 
 
Figure 6.9. Above-chance coherence for binary instructions (Exp. 7) and 
probabilistic instructions (Exp. 6) when the question was whether the 
probability of the conclusion can be lower than the probability of the premise 
(resp. for the two premise inferences, whether it can be lower than 50%). 
The lower left corner of each panel shows the premise probability condition 
in Exp. 6 with which the data from Exp. 7 was compared to. Error bars show 
95% CIs. 
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Figure 6.10. Above-chance coherence for binary instructions (Exp. 7) and 
probabilistic instructions (Exp. 6) when the question was whether the 
probability of the conclusion can be higher than the probability of the premise 
(resp. for the two premise inferences, whether it can be higher than 50%). The 
lower left corner of each panel shows the premise probability condition in 
Exp. 6 with which the data from Exp. 7 was compared to. Error bars show 
95% CIs. 
 
The above results show that overall coherence was above chance levels for fewer 
inferences under binary paradigm instructions in this experiment, than under probabilistic 
instructions in any of Experiments 3 to 6. The five inferences for which coherence was above 
chance include inferences of each of the three types defined, and they include both valid and 
invalid inferences, so that it can be ruled out that coherence was lower in this experiment 
specifically for one of these subcategories of inferences. Interestingly, Figure 6.8 also shows 
that for the five inferences for which coherence was clearly above chance levels, the degree of 
above-chance coherence was very high, close to the ceiling value of .5. It may be that the use 
of binary instructions has the effect of making the response pattern more binary as well, such 
that responses for which above-chance coherence tended to be high in the previous 
experiments are now coherent even more frequently, and responses for which coherence was 
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less high but still above chance levels in the previous experiments, are now coherent at chance 
levels.  
Apart from the above observation, the pattern of results replicates the finding in 
Experiments 3 to 6 that coherence was higher for nDM than for DM, and that it was among the 
highest for MP. On the other hand, coherence among the two-premise conditional syllogisms 
was only above chance levels for MP, whereas in the previous experiments it had also been 
above chance for MT.  
Figure 6.9 compares above-chance coherence in this experiment with the three premise 
probability conditions of Experiment 6 in which the question was whether the probability of 
the conclusion can be lower than the probability of the premise (resp. for the two-premise 
inferences, whether it can be lower than 50%). Because there were 35 participants in both 
experiments, each data point in the Figure is based on the same number of responses. Figure 
6.10 shows the corresponding comparison for the question in Experiment 6 of whether the 
probability of the conclusion can be higher than that of the premise (resp. for the two-premise 
inferences, whether it can be higher than 50%). The condition in Experiment 6 for the higher 
question condition and a premise probability of 1 is not included in Figure 6.10, nor in the 
statistical analysis, because it amounted to the trivial question of whether a given probability 
can be greater than 1.  Its inclusion would thus have unduly inflated above-chance coherence 
for probabilistic instructions. 
The figures show that the pattern of responses to AC and DA in both Experiments 6 and 7 
was not coherent above chance levels, but would have been so under a biconditional 
interpretation, rendering any findings for them difficult to interpret. The results for these two 
inferences were therefore not included in the subsequent analysis.  
The analysis is divided into five parts, one for each pairing of the data from Experiment 7 
with one of the non-trivial conditions from Experiment 6. A single analysis comparing the five 
relevant conditions of Experiment 6 with the results of Experiment 7 would have been difficult 
because the conditions in Experiment 6 were tested within participants, whereas the data from 
Experiment 7 come from a different sample of participants. The grouping of participants into 
only two samples is not enough to create a higher level of analysis in a linear mixed model, 
and it was not possible to include random slopes for participants in such an analysis either. 
The five analyses correspond to the five panels of Figures 6.9 and 6.10, respectively. They 
include only fixed effects, because inclusion of random effects led to failure of convergence 
for some of the comparisons.  
 
Binary (Exp. 7) vs. lower question with P(prem) = 1 (Exp. 6) 
An analysis of the effects of experiment (6, 7) and inference type on above-chance coherence 
showed that overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .225, F(1, 700) = 133.953, p 
< .001). Above-chance coherence differed between inference types (EMMA = .221, EMMB = 
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.169, EMMC = .286, F(2, 700) = 3.636, p = .027). But it did not differ between the two 
experiments (EMM6 = .206, EMM7 = .244, F(1, 700) = .957, p = .328); and there was no 
interaction between experiment and inference type (F(2, 700) = 1.590, p = .205).  
Overall, responses in Experiment 7, under binary paradigm instructions, were not more 
coherent than responses in Experiment 6 in the condition in which premise probability was 1 
and the question asked was whether the probability of the conclusion could be lower. 
 
Binary (Exp. 7) vs. lower question with P(prem) = .8 (Exp. 6) 
An analysis of the effects of experiment and inference type on above-chance coherence 
showed that overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .204, F(1, 700) = 129.653, p 
< .001). Above-chance coherence differed marginally between inference types (EMMA = .193, 
EMMB = .179, EMMC = .038, F(2, 700) = 3.414, p = .033). But there was no main effect of 
experiment (EMM6 = .198, EMM7 = .244, F(1, 700) = 1.401, p = .237); nor an interaction 
between experiment and inference type (F(2, 700) = 1.996, p = .137).  
Overall, it made no difference to above-chance coherence whether people were given 
binary paradigm instructions, or probabilistic instructions with premise probabilities of .8 and 
the question of whether the conclusion probability could be lower. 
 
Binary (Exp. 7) vs. lower question with P(prem) = .5 (Exp. 6) 
An analysis of the effects of experiment and inference type on above-chance coherence again 
showed that overall responses were coherent above chance levels (EMM = .197, F(1, 700) = 
98.193, p < .001). Above-chance coherence tended to be higher in Experiment 7 than in 
Experiment 6 (EMM6 = .149, EMM7 = .244, F(1, 700) = 5.747, p = .017, X
2
(3) = 10.912, p < 
.02) (the effect is significant and adds to the fit of the model, but the confidence interval for 
the beta value includes the null). No other effects were significant (highest F = 1.98, lowest p 
= .139, for the effect of inference type).  
Overall, above-chance coherence tended to be higher in Experiment 7 than in Experiment 
6 in the condition in which premise probability was .5 and the question was whether the 
conclusion probability could be lower than this.  
 
Binary (Exp. 7) vs. higher question with P(prem) = .8 (Exp. 6) 
An analysis of the effects of experiment and inference type on above-chance coherence 
showed that overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .236, F(1, 700) = 148.345, p 
< .001). Above-chance coherence differed between inference types (EMMA = .257, EMMB = 
.157, EMMC = .293, F(2, 700) = 5.990, p = .003); but it did not differ between the two 
experiments (EMM6 = .227, EMM7 = .244, F(1, 700) = .203, p = .652). Further, there was a 
marginal, non-significant interaction between experiment and inference type (F(2, 700) = 
2.863, p = .058).  
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An examination of the pattern underlying the interaction trend showed that for the 
inferences of type A, there was no effect of experiment (EMM6 = .257, EMM7 = .257, F(1, 
140) < .001, p = 1), and experiment did not interact with inference (F(1, 140) = .722, p = 
.397). For the inferences of type B, above-chance coherence was higher in Experiment 7 than 
in Experiment 6 (EMM6 = .095, EMM7 = .219, F(1, 420) = 7.508, p = .006) but this effect was 
qualified by an interaction between experiment and validity (F(1, 420) = 6.397, p = .006). For 
the valid inferences &E, &Or, and IfOr, above-chance coherence was higher in Experiment 7 
than in Experiment 6 (EMM6 = -.024, EMM7 = .224, F(1, 210) = 14.328, p < .001). But above-
chance coherence did not differ between the two experiments for the invalid inferences &I, 
Or&, and OrIf (EMM6 = .214, EMM7 = .214, F(1, 210) < .001, p = 1). For inferences MP and 
MT of type C, there was again no main effect of experiment (EMM6 = .329, EMM7 = .257, 
F(1, 140) = 1.283, p = .259), and experiment did not interact with inference (F(1, 140) = 
1.283, p = .259).  
In summary, there was no main effect of experiment, and only a marginal, non-significant 
trend of an interaction between experiment and inference type. An examination, for the sake of 
completeness, of the pattern underlying the interaction trend revealed that experiment had no 
effect on above-chance coherence for the inferences of type A, for the inferences of type C, 
and for the three invalid inferences of type B. It was only among the three valid inferences of 
type B that above-chance coherence was higher in Experiment 7 than in Experiment 6.  
Overall, the results for this condition give no indication of a reliable difference in above-
chance coherence between the two experiments.  
 
Binary (Exp. 7) vs. higher question with P(prem) = .5 (Exp. 6) 
An analysis assessing the effects of experiment and inference type on above-chance coherence 
showed that overall coherence was above chance levels (EMM = .226, F(1, 700) = 134.966, p 
< .001). No other effects were significant (highest F = 2.233, smallest p = .108, for the effect 
of inference type).  
Overall, it made no difference to above-chance coherence whether participants were in an 
experiment with binary paradigm instructions or in one with probabilistic instructions and 
premise probabilities of .5, responding to the question of whether the probability of the 
conclusion could be higher than this premise probability.  
 
 
General discussion 
 
The present experiment builds on the evidence of experiments 3 to 6, showing that overall, 
people's responses are coherent above chance levels for a range of inferences of different 
complexity, across a wide range of materials. Using binary paradigm instructions, Experiment 
220 
 
7 corroborated the earlier findings with probabilistic instructions that coherence is among the 
highest levels for the contradiction of nDM and for MP. It also echoed the earlier findings of 
an absence of above-chance coherence for AC and DA. Given the overall clear evidence of 
sensitivity to coherence constraints, the consistent deviation from coherence for AC and DA 
suggests that participants are interpreting the materials differently from the interpretation used 
to compute coherence for them. In particular, they are in line with earlier findings suggesting 
that people sometimes interpret the conditionals involved in inferences as bidirectional, e. g. as 
establishing a correlation between the antecedent p and the consequent q (Baratgin et al., 
2013; Barrouillet & Gauffroy, 2015; but see Oberauer, Weidenfeld, et al., 2007; Singmann, 
Klauer, & Over, 2014). Further studies are necessary to test whether this interpretation holds, 
by establishing whether response coherence varies systematically as a function of changes in 
the correlation between p and q.  
Coherence was found to be above-chance levels for fewer inferences under binary 
instructions than under probabilistic instructions. For the conditional syllogisms, this was seen 
by the fact coherence for MT was above chance levels in Experiment 6, but not in Experiment 
7. This paints a more positive picture of above-chance coherence for conditional syllogisms 
than had been suggested by earlier studies (Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 2014), as well 
as of deductive reasoning under uncertainty more generally.  
Of central interest in this section was the direct comparison of above-chance coherence 
for the two types of instruction, using the same response format and the same materials. 
Across the five comparisons made, there was no evidence that above-chance coherence was 
higher under binary instructions than under probabilistic instructions, whether the probabilistic 
instructions stated the probabilities of the premises to be certain or uncertain. A difference was 
observed only in two cases, and in both it was only marginal resp. unreliable.  
In the first case, above-chance coherence tended to be higher under binary instructions 
when compared with the condition in which premise probability was .5 and the question was 
whether the probability of the conclusion could be lower than this. However, note that there 
was no difference in above-chance coherence when the condition with binary instructions was 
compared with that in which premise probability was .5 and the question was whether the 
probability of the conclusion could be higher than this. A possible explanation for this pattern 
is as a negation effect: it may be more difficult to think of the probability of events being 
lower than .5, because this is analogous to thinking of the probability of their negation being 
higher than .5. However, this explanation would have to be tested in further experiments.  
The second difference observed was a non-significant trend of an interaction between 
inference type and experiment when the condition with binary instructions was compared with 
the condition in which premise probability was .8 and the question was whether the 
probability of the conclusion could be higher than this. Following up the interaction trend for 
the sake of completeness, showed that for this comparison there was no difference in above-
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chance coherence between the two experiments for the inferences of type A, type C, and the 
invalid inferences of type B. But above-chance coherence was higher under binary instructions 
for the three valid inferences of type B. This highly localised and unreliable difference 
provides no indication of a general effect of instruction type on above-chance coherence.  
The general absence of a difference in above-chance coherence between the conditions 
with binary and with probabilistic instructions constitutes strong evidence against the claim 
that deduction only occurs in the realm of reasoning about certainty, and that reasoning from 
uncertain information is inherently inductive.   
The experiments in this chapter focussed on comparing the mean values of above-chance 
coherence between inferences and between inference groups (e. g. between the three inference 
types defined, and between valid and invalid inferences) using different measurement 
methods. A further relevant feature of people's sensitivity to coherence is response variance. 
The previous chapter included a brief investigation of whether participants' conclusion 
probability judgments vary more strongly when the coherence interval for the conclusion is 
wide than when it is narrow. The following chapter looks at the question of an effect of 
response variance from a different perspective, assessing the possibility of it having an effect 
on response confidence. It also assesses people's general sensitivity to parameters determining 
the variance of distributions.  
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CHAPTER 7. EXPERIMENTS 8 and 9: RESPONSE VARIANCE 
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EXPERIMENT 8: 
COHERENCE INTERVAL WIDTH AND RESPONSE CONFIDENCE 
 
Investigating the constraint of coherence, it makes sense to ask not only whether people are 
sensitive to the location of a coherence interval on the probability scale, but also whether they 
respond differentially as a function of the width of the interval. To the knowledge of the author 
this has not been attempted before. Experiments 3 and 4 assessed this question by examining 
differences in the standard deviation of responses as a function of interval width, but found no 
relation between the two. This form of assessment was based on the hypothesis that there may 
be a higher variability in responses when the interval is wider.  
Experiment 8 addressed the question of a sensitivity to the location and width of 
coherence intervals using different, further methods. People's sensitivity to the location of an 
interval was assessed by computing above-chance coherence and by examining the pattern of 
mean conclusion probability judgments, as in Experiments 3 and 4, but also by examining the 
distribution of conclusion probability judgments relative to the location of the interval. 
People's sensitivity to the width of the interval was assessed by examining the pattern of mean 
conclusion probability judgments, and the distribution of conclusion probability judgments as 
a function of interval width. Similar to the examination of standard deviations of responses in 
Experiments 3 and 4, these two methods were based on the assumption that wider coherence 
intervals are associated with a higher response variance. A third method of assessing people's 
sensitivity to interval width was based on the idea that the width of the interval may affect 
people's confidence in their probability judgments. 
Experiment 9 was a control experiment to help interpret the results of Experiment 8. It 
tested whether people are sensitive to changes in the variance of a frequency distribution, 
using the same response variables as Experiment 8: probability judgments and judgments of 
response confidence. If in Experiment 9 people's confidence in their probability judgments do 
not change as a function of the variance of a frequency distribution, then it will be more 
difficult to attribute any association between judgments of response confidence and interval 
width in Experiment 8 to a sensitivity to changes in the number of coherent response options.  
Experiment 8 investigated five inferences that differed in how the width and location of 
their coherence intervals changes as a function of the probabilities of the premises. The 
inferences were MP, DA, and-to-if (&If, also called two-premise centering), de morgan (DM), 
and the negation of de morgan (nDM). Their logical form and the function for their coherence 
interval are shown in Table 7.1. 
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Varying location and width of coherence intervals 
 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the way in which the coherence intervals for inferences 1 to 3 change as a 
function of their premise probabilities. One can see that for MP and DA, the probability of the 
major premise determines the location of the interval, and the probability of the minor premise 
determines the width of the interval. However, the effect of premise probabilities on the 
coherence interval for the conclusion goes in opposite directions for the two inferences. For 
MP, the higher the probability of the major premise, the higher the location, and the higher the 
probability of the minor premise, the smaller the width. For DA, in contrast, the higher the 
probability of the major premise, the lower the location, and the higher the probability of the 
minor premise, the larger the width.  
 
Table 7.1. The inferences used in Experiment 8. 
# Name Form Coherence interval for the probability of the conclusion 
1 Modus 
ponens (MP) 
if p then q, p  
q 
𝑃(𝑞) ∈ [𝑃(𝑞|𝑝)𝑃(𝑝), 𝑃(𝑞|𝑝)𝑃(𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑝)] 
2 Denial of the 
antecedent 
(DA) 
if p then q, not-
p  not-q 
𝑃(¬𝑞) ∈ [(1 − 𝑃(𝑞|𝑝))(1 − 𝑃(¬𝑝)), 1
− (𝑃(𝑞|𝑝)(1 − 𝑃(¬𝑝))]  
3 And-to-if 
(&If)/ 
Two-premise 
centering  
p, q  if p then 
q 
𝑃(𝑞|𝑝) ∈ [max (0,
𝑃(𝑝) + 𝑃(𝑞) − 1
𝑃(𝑝)
) , min (
𝑃(𝑞)
𝑃(𝑝)
, 1)] 
4 de morgan 
(DM) 
not(p & q)  
not-p or not-q 
𝑃(¬𝑝 𝑜𝑟 ¬𝑞) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑝 & 𝑞) 
5 not de 
morgan 
(nDM) 
p or q  not-p 
& not-q 
𝑃(¬𝑝 & ¬𝑞) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑝 𝑜𝑟 𝑞) 
 
For &If, it is the consequent premise q that determines the location of the interval, 
whereas the antecedent premise p determines interval width. The direction of the effect is 
thereby similar to that of MP. The higher the probability of the consequent premise, the higher 
the location of the interval, and the higher the probability of the antecedent premise, the 
narrower the interval.  
The last two inferences in Table 7.1 have only one premise. The first is an equivalence 
and the second a contradiction. Therefore, for these two inferences the coherence interval for 
the conclusion will always be a point value. In the case of the equivalence the point value will 
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equal the probability of the premise, and in the case of the contradiction it will equal the 
complement of the probability of the premise.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Coherence intervals for MP (upper row), DA (middle row), and and-to-if (lower 
row) as a function of premise probabilities. The shaded areas in the graphs represent the 
coherence intervals. 
 
 
Measuring people's sensitivity to location and width 
 
The contrasting relation between the probabilities of the premises and the coherence intervals 
for the conclusion of these inferences provides a novel opportunity to test the degree to which 
people are sensitive to coherence intervals. This was done using four methods, two of them 
targeting both the location and the width of the interval (distribution and mean values of 
conclusion probability judgments), one targeting only the location (above-chance coherence), 
and one targeting only the width (response confidence). 
 
Distribution of conclusion probability judgments 
The first method consisted in examining the distribution of conclusion probability judgments 
relative to the width and the location of coherence intervals. It involved assessing whether the 
location of response distributions followed changes in the location of the interval, and whether 
the distributions were flatter when the interval was wider, and more peaked when the interval 
was narrower. This comparison of the distribution of conclusion probability judgments to the 
coherence interval for an inference was not possible in Experiments 1 to 4, because the fact 
that in these experiments participants were asked to provide their own estimates of the 
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probability of the premises implied that the coherence interval differed for each participant 
response. It was also not possible in Experiments 5 to 7, because these experiments used a 
binary response scale. Experiment 8 allowed for this by using a continuous response scale 
while at the same time fixing the premise probabilities that determine the coherence interval to 
a limited number of values.  
The examination of response distributions was descriptive, not inferential: an inferential 
analysis based e. g. on kurtosis would have been difficult because the distributions were not 
always unimodal. Beyond the assessment of whether the overall location and width of 
response distributions varied with the coherence interval, an inspection of response 
distributions can help uncover possible further factors affecting responses, which may then 
feed into hypotheses for future experiments.    
 
Above-chance coherence 
The second method used to assess people's sensitivity to the location of coherence intervals 
was the computation of above-chance coherence, using the same procedure as in the previous 
experiments. The aim here was not to compare coherence between inferences, but merely to 
establish whether coherence was above chance levels for each inference. This is because any 
results on interval width can only be interpreted as sensitivity to coherence constraints if 
people's responses are reliably coherent in the first place.  
 
Mean conclusion probability judgments 
The third method of assessing people's sensitivity to the location and width of coherence 
intervals was the analysis of differences in mean conclusion probability judgments as a 
function of interval width and location. The predictions for these differences, derived from the 
patterns observed in Figure 7.1, were as follows.  
For MP, sensitivity to the location of the interval leads to the expectation of higher 
conclusion probability judgments, the higher the probability of the major premise. Taking into 
account the width of the interval, this effect is expected to be larger when the probability of 
the minor premise is also high.  
For DA, sensitivity to the location of the interval leads to the expectation of higher 
conclusion probability judgments, the lower the probability of the major premise. Taking into 
account the width of the interval, this effect is expected to be larger when the probability of 
the minor premise is also low.  
For &If, sensitivity to the location of the coherence interval leads to the prediction that 
conclusion probability judgments will be higher, the higher the probability of the consequent 
premise. Taking into account the width of the interval suggests that this effect will be larger, 
the higher the probability of the antecedent premise.  
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For DM and nDM, where the coherence interval is a point value, sensitivity to coherence 
simply leads to the prediction that, for DM, mean conclusion probability judgments will be 
higher when the probability of the premise is high, and that for nDM, mean conclusion 
probability judgments will be lower when the probability of the premise is high.  
 
Judgments of response confidence 
The third method of assessing people's sensitivity to the width of coherence intervals was 
based on the idea that interval width may have an effect on people's judgments of response 
confidence. For MP and DA, one would expect this effect to take the form of a 
correspondence between response confidence and the probability of the minor premise, 
because it was the minor premise that determined interval width.  
For &If, one would instead expect a correspondence between response confidence and the 
probability of the antecedent premise p, because it was this premise that determined interval 
width.  
Finally, no correspondence between response confidence and premise probability would 
be expected for DM and nDM, given that interval width was independent of premise 
probability for these inferences.  
A correspondence between premise probability and response confidence could be positive 
or negative. In either case it would constitute an additional source of evidence of sensitivity to 
coherence constraints, but the direction of the effect is of theoretical interest in itself. A 
positive relation between response confidence and interval width, such that response 
confidence increases as the interval widens, would suggest that participants' aim in responding 
is to lie within the interval, and that the exact position within it is less important. That is, it 
would suggest that participants are mainly trying to be coherent, as opposed to trying to solve 
also the inductive problem of where best to place their response within the interval. This is 
because the wider the interval, the easier it is for any given value to lie within it.  
Alternatively, there could be a negative relation between response confidence and interval 
width, such that response confidence decreases as the interval becomes wider. This would 
suggest that participants are engaging in both the deductive task of rendering their responses 
coherent, and the inductive task of finding the most plausible point estimate, given the 
information they have, among those points that are coherent. Finding the single most plausible 
estimate is more difficult when there are more options available (i. e. when the interval is 
wide) without more information on which to base one's decision. A search for the most 
plausible estimate can be viewed as a search for the mean or mode of a distribution, as 
opposed to a mere search for a region of permissible responses. The search for an optimal 
point value may have been suggested by the fact that the task required participants to provide a 
point estimate. 
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The hypothesis about a relation between interval width and response confidence was 
undirected in this experiment. If a relation is found, then this could be examined further in 
follow-up experiments with a directed hypothesis, in which one could also try to test aspects 
of the possible interpretations given above. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 45 participants from the participant pool of Birkbeck, University of London 
completed the experiment. Of these, 4 were removed because they failed a catch trial asking 
them not to respond but to instead just click "next" to continue with the experiment. Further 5 
participants were excluded because they had one or more trial reaction times of less than 3 
seconds.  The final sample consisted of 36 participants. They had a mean age of 35.32 years 
(range 20-76), and most had undergone some college education: 47.2% reported having an 
undergraduate university degree, and 44.4% a postgraduate degree (2.8% reported having a 
technical/applied degree, and 5.6% to have finished 12
th
 grade). All participants indicated 
having at least "very good" English language skills. The mean percentage rating of experiment 
difficulty was 67%.  
 
Design and material 
The experiment followed a within participant design with inference (the five inferences in 
Table 7.1) and premise probability as independent variables, and with point probability 
estimates for the conclusion, and confidence judgments in these estimates (both measured in 
percent), as dependent variables.  
The premise probabilities used were .9 (high), .5 (medium), and .1 (low). For the two-
premise inferences, there were 9 different combinations of premise probability (high-high, 
high-medium, high-low, medium-high, medium-medium, medium-low, low-high, low-
medium, and low-low). Each two-premise inference was presented nine times, once with each 
combination of premise probabilities. Each one-premise inference was also presented nine-
times, three times with each premise probability. Trials with the same one-premise inference 
and the same probability were still distinguishable from one another through changes in the 
non-words used in their contents. 
Participants were introduced to the task with a pseudonaturalistic scenario about 
researchers investigating bird species on an island, shown in the frame below. Participants 
then worked through four practice trials involving different inferences to those tested. With 5 
inferences and 9 probabilities, the main experiment had 45 trials, plus two catch trials to 
ensure participants were paying attention. 
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Imagine you are part of a team of researchers investigating the birds on the island of Liaku. 
You want to find out what kind of seeds different species on the island eat. For this, you have 
attached cups with different seeds to some trees on the island, together with a video camera to 
monitor which birds eat which kind of seed. The camera does not work very well at night, so 
that some of your images are more precise than others. You are trying to interpret the data you 
gathered with the team. 
 
On each trial, participants were presented with an inference and information on the 
premise probabilities. They were then asked to judge how likely the conclusion could be, by 
clicking on a percentage scale with the anchors "0% likely, certainly false" and "100% likely, 
certainly true".  
As noted in Experiment 3, the use of a continuous response scale makes it difficult to 
compare response coherence between inferences and between premise probabilities. However, 
this was not a problem in the present experiment, which was not so much concerned with a 
comparison between inferences as with a general assessment of whether responses followed 
coherence constraints across inferences. Such an assessment is necessary to be able to interpret 
the results on interval width, in particular those on response confidence, as resulting from 
coherence constraints. Given this situation, a continuous scale was preferred over a binary one 
because it made it possible to assess the distribution of responses. It also seemed more natural 
because it allowed participants to generate their own probability judgments, as opposed to 
evaluating probabilities only given by the experimenter.  
 
The observations you have gathered until now suggest the following: 
Premise 1:  It’s 90% likely that: 
If the next Baila bird you film eats aib seeds, then it will eat dun seeds. 
 
Premise 2:  It’s 50% likely that: 
The next Baila bird you film will not eat aib seeds.  
 
Conclusion:  Therefore, how likely can the following be? 
The next Baila bird you film will not eat dun seeds.  
 
How much confidence do you have in your answer?  
 
A second question on the same page asked how much confidence participants had in their 
answer, using a percentage scale with the anchors "no confidence at all" and "complete 
confidence". An example of a trial for the DA inference is provided in the frame above. 
230 
 
Each trial featured different non-words for the birds and seeds, and the non-words were 
allocated to the trials randomly for each participant. The order of the trials was also varied 
randomly for each participant.  
The catch trials had the same format as an ordinary trial, but the text of the inferences to 
be evaluated was replaced with a statement saying they were a control trial to make sure 
participants were paying attention, and asking them not to respond, but to instead click next to 
continue with the experiment.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet testing room of the Department of 
Psychological Sciences of Birkbeck, University of London. The experimenter stayed in the 
room while the participants went through the instructions and practice trials in case they had 
any questions. The entire experimental session took approximately 40 minutes to complete.  
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The results are divided into four sections, concerned with the distribution of conclusion 
probability judgments, above-chance coherence, mean conclusion probability judgments, and 
judgments of response confidence, respectively.   
 
Distribution of conclusion probability judgments 
The use of a continuous response scale makes it possible to examine the distribution of 
conclusion probability judgments in terms of the extent to which they appear sensitive to 
changes in the location and width of coherence intervals. In addition, an exploratory 
examination of response distributions can sometimes provide relevant information about 
possible factors affecting responses, and so help construct hypotheses for subsequent 
experiments.    
The distributions for each inference are displayed in Figures 7.2 to 7.5. The horizontal 
lines beneath the distributions indicate the location of the coherence interval that matches their 
colour. Note that the y axis has a maximum of 5 in Figures 2 and 5, but a higher maximum in 
Figures 3 and 4 to accommodate the sharp peak in responses in the latter conditions.  
Figure 7.2 shows the distributions of responses for MP. Overall, the peaks of the 
distributions fall within the coherence intervals, albeit leaned somewhat towards their lower 
bounds. In the middle and the right panel there also seems to be a correspondence between 
interval width and distribution variance: the distributions have sharper peaks when the interval 
is narrow. In contrast, in the left panel, where the probability of the major premise was .1, 
mean responses were generally low regardless of the probability of the minor premise.   
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Figure 7.2. Distribution of conclusion probability judgments for MP as a function of premise 
probabilities. The horizontal lines beneath the distributions indicate the location of the 
respective coherence intervals.  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Distribution of conclusion probability judgments for DA as a function of premise 
probabilities. The horizontal lines beneath the distributions indicate the location of the 
respective coherence intervals. 
 
Figure 7.3 displays the distributions of responses for DA. One can see that there was also 
a correspondence between the distribution peak and the location of the coherence interval. 
However, a correspondence between distribution variance and interval width appears to be 
present only when the interval was very wide, being reflected in flat distributions for these 
cases. Further, there seemed to be a matching effect such that when both premises had a 
probability of .5, the majority of responses were also close to .5. This tendency to match had 
no negative effect on the coherence of responses because a conclusion probability of .5 was 
coherent when both premises had a probability of .5.  
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Figure 7.4. Distribution of conclusion probability judgments for &If as a function of 
premise probabilities. The horizontal lines beneath the distributions indicate the location of 
the respective coherence intervals. 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Distribution of conclusion probability judgments for the 
inferences of DM and nDM, as a function of premise probabilities. 
The horizontal lines below the distributions show the location of the 
coherence interval for the condition that matches their colour.   
 
The distributions in Figure 7.4 are for &If. As in the previous figures, the distribution 
peaks generally lie within the coherence interval. An exception was the condition in which the 
antecedent premise had probability .5 but the consequent premise had probability .9. In this 
condition, participants tended to assign to the conclusion a probability near .5, even though the 
coherence interval demanded a probability nearer to .9. 
Of particular interest in Figure 7.4 is the contrast observed between the distributions in 
the left and right panels. In the left panel, the coherence interval was the unit interval, and so 
any response was coherent. If people's responses were only guided by coherence, one would 
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expect a flat distribution in this case, as was found for DA. Instead, we see that judgments of 
conclusion probability were more often on the lower than on the upper half of the scale, and 
that the form of the distributions differed strongly between conditions. Given the absence of 
deductive constraints, the differences in the form of the distributions must have been 
determined by inductive considerations.  
In contrast, in the right panel, where the coherence intervals are very narrow, the 
distributions are very similar to one another and seem to be guided mainly by the location of 
the intervals.  
The same pattern as in the right panel of Figure 7.4 was found in Figure 7.5, which shows 
the distributions of responses for DM and nDM, whose coherence intervals are point values. 
Here too we see that although many responses missed the only coherent value on the scale, 
their distribution appeared to be determined mainly by the location of this value, which was 
inversed for the valid and the invalid inference.  
This again suggests that the scope for inductive determinants of conclusion probability 
judgments is limited by the scope of deductive considerations of coherence: inductive 
considerations can play a large role when there is room for them, as in the right panel of 
Figure 7.4, but the deductive constraint of coherence seems to take precedence.  
The pattern in Figure 7.5 is slightly more pronounced for nDM than for DM, in line with 
the finding from Experiments 5 and 6 of more frequent coherent responses for invalid than for 
valid one-premise inferences.  
 
Above-chance coherence 
The procedure for computing observed and above-chance coherence was the same as in the 
previous experiments. The mean values of observed and above-chance coherence for each 
inference are displayed in Figure 7.6. The figure collapses responses across premise 
probability conditions because as outlined in Experiments 3 and 4, it is difficult to compare 
coherence rates across these conditions when they differ in chance rate coherence. The 
analysis of above-chance coherence in this experiment is limited to the question of whether 
coherence was above-chance levels at all for each inference.   
The confidence intervals in Figure 7.6 indicate that coherence was indeed above-chance 
for all inferences. The fact that the subtraction of the chance rate from the observed rate had a 
far larger effect for MP, DA, and &If than for DM and nDM makes sense given that the width 
of the interval (and with it the chance rate) for DM and nDM was a point value.  
The pattern in Figure 7.6 was corroborated in a linear mixed model for the effect of 
inference on above-chance coherence, with random intercepts for participants and scenarios: 
overall responses were coherent above-chance levels (F(1, 180) = 181.75, p < .001). The 
degree of above-chance coherence differed between inferences (F(4, 180) = 3.67, p = .007). 
However, individual comparisons showed that it was significant for each inference (for MP: 
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F(1, 36) = 43.47, p < .001; for DA: F(1, 36) = 47.60, p < .001; for &If: F(1, 36) = 59.73, p < 
.001; for DM: F(1, 36) = 27.47, p < .001; for nDM: F(1, 36) = 51.61, p < .001).  
 
 
Figure 7.6. Observed and above-chance coherence for the 5 inferences of the Experiment. 
Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
Mean conclusion probability judgments 
A series of linear mixed models assessed, for each inference, the effects of premise 
probabilities on conclusion probability judgments, with random intercepts for participants and 
scenarios. Mean conclusion probability judgments for each condition are shown in Figures 7.7 
and 7.8.  
For MP, conclusion probability judgments were higher for higher values of the major 
premise (F(2, 288) = 50.35, p < .001); and for higher values of the minor premise (F(2, 288) = 
40.40, p < .001). The effect of the probability of the major premise on conclusion probability 
judgments was stronger when the probability of the minor premise was also high (F(4, 288) = 
5.12, p = .001). These findings are in accordance with the predictions.   
For DA, conclusion probability judgments were lower for higher values of the major 
premise (F(2, 288) = 5.27, p < .001), in accordance with the predictions. However, conclusion 
probability judgments were higher for higher values of the minor premise (F(2, 288) = 4.28, p 
= .02). If anything this effect was expected to go in the opposite direction. There was no 
interaction between the effects of the first and the second premise on conclusion probability 
judgments (F(4, 188) = .55, p = .70), contrary to the predictions. This pattern of results 
suggests that participants were sensitive to the location of the coherence interval for this 
inference, but not to interval width – an interpretation in line with the response distributions 
shown in Figure 7.3.   
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For &If, conclusion probability judgments were higher for higher values of the 
consequent premise (F(2, 288) = 55.32, p < .001). Conclusion probability judgments were also 
higher for higher values of the antecedent premise (F(2, 288.18) = 13.29, p < .001). The 
interaction between the effects of the first and the second premise on conclusion probability 
judgments went in the expected direction, but did not reach significance (F(4, 288.18) = 2.03, 
p = .09). Overall these results are in accordance with the predictions.  
 
 
Figure 7.7. Conclusion probability judgments for MP, DA, and &If, as a function of 
premise probabilities. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Conclusion probability judgments for DM 
and nDM as a function of premise probabilities. The 
three lines in each panel display the three repetitions 
of each premise probability condition for these 
inferences. Error bars show 95% CIs.  
 
For DM, conclusion probability judgments were higher, the higher the probability of the 
premise (F(2, 288) = 36.77, p < .001). For nDM, conclusion probability judgments were 
lower, the higher the probability of the premise (F(2, 288) = 115.72, p < .001). The findings 
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for both inferences are in accordance with what would be predicted on the basis of sensitivity 
to coherence. But they provide no evidence for a role of interval width over and above a role 
of interval location.  
Overall, the results for mean conclusion probability judgments suggest that people were 
reliably sensitive to the location of the coherence interval. Evidence for a sensitivity to interval 
width was more equivocal, being present for MP and marginally for &If, but not for DA.  
 
Judgments of response Confidence  
The relation between interval width and judgments of response confidence was assessed in a 
series of linear mixed models for each inference, with random intercepts for participants and 
scenarios. Mean judgments of response confidence for each inference and premise probability 
condition are shown in Figures 7.9 and 7.10.  
For MP, there was no relation between response confidence and the probability of the 
minor premise (F(2, 288) = 4.82, p = .009), contrary to the hypothesis. However, there was a 
relation between response confidence and the major premise (F(2, 288) = 4.82, p = .009), 
which was qualified by an interaction between the effects of the major and the minor premise 
(F(4, 288) = 3.38, p = .01). Follow-up analyses showed that when the probability of the major 
premise was .9, confidence was higher for higher values of the probability of the minor 
premise (F(2, 72) = 9.36, p < .001). But there was no effect of minor premise probability on 
confidence judgments when the probability of the major premise was .5 (F(2, 72) = 1.99, p = 
.14) nor when the probability of the major premise was .1 (F(2, 72) = .13, p = .88). Overall, 
the findings provide no evidence for a relation between interval width and response confidence 
for MP.  
For DA, no effects were significant (main effect of the minor premise: F(2, 288) = 2.496, 
p = .08; main effect of the major premise, F(2, 288) = 2.38, p = .10; interaction: F(4, 288) = 
.924, p = .45). Hence there was also no evidence for a relation between interval width and 
response confidence for this inference. 
For &If, there was no relation between the antecedent premise and response confidence 
(F(2, 288) = 1.88, p = .16), nor a relation between the consequent premise and response 
confidence (F(2, 288) = 1.29, p = .28). An interaction between the effects of the probability of 
the antecedent and the consequent premise (F(4, 288) = 3.46, p = .009) indicated that there 
was no relation between the probability of the antecedent premise and response confidence 
when the probability of the consequent premise was .9 (F(2, 72) = 1.09, p = .34) nor when it 
was .1 (F(2, 72.178) = 2.16, p = .122). However, when the probability of the consequent 
premise was .5, then response confidence was higher when the probability of the antecedent 
premise was also .5 (for the difference between the conditions with probabilities of .5 and of 
.1: p = .024; for the difference between the conditions with probabilities of .5 and of .9: p = 
.001; for the difference between the conditions with probabilities of .1 and of .9: p = .59). 
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Hence there was also no evidence for a relation between interval width and response 
confidence for &If.  
 
 
Figure 7.9. Mean judgments of response confidence for MP, DA, and &If, as a function of 
premise probabilities. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
 
Figure 7.10. Mean judgments of response confidence 
for DM and nDM as a function of premise 
probabilities. The three lines in each panel display the 
three repetitions of each premise probability condition 
for these inferences. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
For DM and nDM, whose coherence intervals are a point value, no relation between 
premise probability and response confidence was predicted. For DM, response confidence was 
higher for higher values of the probability of the premise (F(2, 288) = 10.78, p < .001). For 
nDM no relation between premise probability and response confidence was observed (F(2, 
288) = 1.81, p = .17).  
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It was not possible to calculate random slopes for participants in these analyses. However, 
a graphical examination of the pattern of individual responses for each inference gave no 
indication of the presence of subgroups with different profiles that could have cancelled out an 
effect in the overall analysis.  
In summary, confidence judgments varied with premise probability in some conditions 
and in different ways, but they were not found to be related to the width of the coherence 
interval.  
 
 
General discussion 
 
There was consistent evidence that people are sensitive to the location of the coherence 
intervals of the five inferences investigated, across the inspection of response distributions, the 
analysis of above-chance coherence, and the analysis of the pattern of mean conclusion 
probability judgments.  
The evidence from conclusion probability judgments for a sensitivity to the width of the 
coherence interval was more mixed. The response distributions suggested that when the 
interval was very narrow, as in the right panel of Figure 7.4 and in Figure 7.5, responses are 
guided mainly by the location of the interval, with little difference in the form of response 
distributions. When the interval is wider, there is more space for inductive criteria to play a 
role in narrowing down responses to a certain area on the probability scale. Such inductive 
criteria sometimes play a role, as in the left panel of Figure 7.4, but not invariably so – as 
exemplified by the flat distributions in Figure 7.3 for the wide interval conditions, and by the 
distributions in Figure 7.2. Coherence intervals seem to constrain responses to within their 
range, and within those constraints, inductive criteria may or may not narrow down responses 
further in a systematic way, depending on the contents and context of the inference.  
The pattern of mean conclusion probability judgments provided evidence for a role of the 
width of the coherence interval for MP, no role for DA, and a marginal role for &If, consistent 
with the observed response distributions for these inferences.  
In general, there was reliable evidence of sensitivity to the location of coherence 
intervals, but only partial evidence of sensitivity to interval width. However, a lack of 
sensitivity to interval width by no means implies a lower sensitivity to coherence. Rather, it 
suggests the hypothesis that coherence is an important constraint that takes precedence over 
inductive considerations, but that within the constraints of coherence, the distribution of 
responses may be narrowed down to a higher or lower degree by inductive factors – provided 
that the coherence interval is wide enough for this.  
However, an alternative interpretation of the lack of a consistent effect of interval width 
on either conclusion probability judgments or judgments of response confidence is that people 
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have general difficulties in processing information on the variance of a distribution. This 
alternative was investigated further in Experiment 9.  
 
 
EXPERIMENT 9: 
SENSITIVITY TO THE VARIANCE OF DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
This experiment set out to investigate whether people are sensitive to the variance of a 
distribution, using the same outcome variables as Experiment 8: probability judgments and 
response confidence. It was hypothesised that if people are sensitive to the variance of a 
distribution, they should be sensitive to changes in factors that affect this variance, such as 
sample size.  
The experiment had two conditions, a sample condition and a population condition. In the 
sample condition, participants' judgments of the probability that an instance from a population 
had a certain feature, given the proportion of instances with that feature in a sample, was 
expected to equate this proportion, regardless of sample size. The reason is that, in the absence 
of further information, the proportion in the sample is the best estimate of the proportion in the 
population, even if it is only a small sample. However, participants' confidence in the above 
probability judgments was expected to be higher for higher values of sample size. For larger 
sample sizes, the proportion of cases with a certain feature in a sample is a better estimator of 
the proportion of instances with that feature in the population, given the lower error variance it 
is associated with.  
The population condition was a control condition in which participants' were asked to 
judge the likelihood that an instance from a population has a certain feature, as before, but the 
information provided as a basis for this judgment was not the proportion in a sample, but the 
proportion in the population itself. Participants' probability judgments in this condition were 
expected to equate the proportion in the population, as before. But participants' confidence in 
the above probability judgments was not expected to vary as a function of population size, 
because regardless of the size of the population, the information on which to base probability 
judgments is equally precise. This condition was included in the design to control for possible 
confounding factors related to the size of a set itself, whether the set refers to a sample or to a 
population. For example, it could be that in general, people are more confident when making 
judgments about small than about large set sizes. Such an effect would be visible in the 
population condition, and could then be used to help interpret the results for the sample 
condition. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 255 participants completed the online experiment (125 in the sample condition and 
130 in the population condition). All indicated at the end of the experiment that they took part 
seriously, as opposed to just clicking through, but 6 were excluded because they failed a catch 
trial asking them not to respond but to instead click next to continue with the experiment. 
Seven participants were excluded because they had trial reaction times of 3 seconds or less; 
and five because they indicated having less than "good" English language skills. The final 
sample had 237 participants (114 in the sample group and 123 in the population group). Their 
mean age was 36 years (median = 33, range = 18 - 74). Most of them had some college 
education, with 19.4% indicating that they finished 12
th
 grade, 10.5 reporting a 
technical/applied degree, 47.7 an undergraduate university degree, and 15.2 a postgraduate 
degree (5.5% reported a degree lower than 12
th
 grade, and 1.3% a doctoral degree). 
Participants' median rating of task difficulty was 14% in the sample group, and 9% in the 
population group. 
 
Design and materials 
The experiment followed a mixed design with condition (sample, population) as between 
participant variable, and set size (10, 100, 1000) and proportion (.9, .7, .5) as within participant 
variables. With three set sizes and three proportions, the experiment consisted of 9 trials, plus 
a catch trial that was similar in format to the other trials, but in which the content of the 
statement to be evaluated was replaced by a statement saying that it was a control question to 
make sure participants' were paying attention, and asking them not to respond but to instead 
just click next to continue with the experiment.  
Participants were given a short pseudonaturalistic scenario in which a protagonist wanted 
to find out the proportion of a certain feature in a population, and gathered information on nine 
occasions for this. The set size and proportion information for each trial corresponded to the 
information gathered by the protagonist on a particular occasion. Participants' task was to 
assess how likely it was for an instance of the set to have a certain feature. This judgment was 
made on a continuous scale with the anchors "0% likely/certainly false", and ""100% 
likely/certainly true". Further below on the same page, participants were asked to rate how 
much confidence they had in their answer. This judgment was also made on a continuous 
scale, this time with the anchors "no confidence at all", and "complete confidence". The two 
response scales differed in their visual appearance to prevent carry-over effects from one to 
the other. The frame below is an example of a trial in the sample and in the population 
conditions, for a set size of 10 and a proportion of .9:  
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Sample: 
A tree disease has spread to the orange plantations of the farmers of Orisau. 
An agronomist went to some of the fields and took random samples of trees 
on each field, to record the number of affected trees among them. 
 
On Field one the agronomist took a sample of 10 trees, and observed that 9 of 
them were affected. 
How likely was it for a random tree on Field one to be affected? 
 
How much confidence do you have in your answer? 
---------------------------- 
Population: 
A tree disease has spread to the orange plantations of the farmers of Orisau. 
An agronomist went to some of the fields and recorded the number of trees 
on each field, and the number of affected trees among them. 
 
Field one had 10 trees and 9 of them were affected. 
How likely was it for a random tree on Field one to be affected? 
 
How much confidence do you have in your answer? 
 
Within each participant, the scenario remained constant across the 9 trials. There were 9 
scenarios in total, which were randomly allocated to each participant, and can be found in 
Appendix F.  The order of occurrence of the set size and proportion information also varied 
randomly for each participant.  
 
Procedure 
Participants received general instructions followed by three practice trials, involving a 
different scenario and partly different proportions from those in the main experiment. After 
going through the nine experimental trials, participants provided demographic information, 
and indicated whether they had taken part seriously or had just "clicked through". The final 
page provided debriefing information. The experimental session lasted on average 5.6 
minutes. 
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Results and discussion 
 
Mean probability judgments and judgments of response confidence are displayed in Figure 
7.11 for each condition. The pattern of responses is in accordance with the predictions: 
probability judgments closely conformed to the proportions given in both the sample and the 
population condition. Whereas confidence judgments were uniformly high in the population 
condition regardless of set size, confidence judgments in the sample condition seemed to 
increase with increasing sample size.  
The pattern in Figure 7.11 was assessed in two linear mixed model analyses for the 
effects of sample size, proportion, and condition (sample vs. population), with a random 
intercept for participants. The first model assessed the effect of these variables on probability 
judgments, and the second on judgments of response confidence.  
 
 
Figure 7.11. Mean probability judgments and judgments of 
response confidence for the conditions of Experiment 9. 
Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
Probability judgments 
The analysis for probability judgments revealed no main effect of sample size (F(2, 1896) = 
1.866, p = .16), and sample size did not enter into any interaction. This is in accordance with 
the predictions.  
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Trivially, there was a main effect of proportion (F(2, 1896) = 78943.94, p < .001), such 
that probability judgments were higher when the proportion of instances for which a certain 
feature held was higher. There was also a marginal effect of condition (F(1, 237) = 4.44, p = 
.036): probability judgments were slightly higher in the population (EMM = .70) than in the 
sample condition (EMM = .69). Further, there was an interaction between proportion and 
condition (F(2, 1896) = 6.77, p = .001): For a proportion of .9, judgments were slightly lower 
in the sample condition (EMM = .874) than in the population condition (EMM = .897). 
Judgments for a proportion of .7 and of .5 were almost identical in both conditions (for a 
proportion of .7: EMMpopu = .698; EMMsample = .691. For a proportion of .5: EMMpopu = .499; 
EMMsample = .498).  
 
Confidence judgments 
The analysis for confidence judgments revealed a main effect of condition: mean confidence 
judgments were higher in the population condition than in the sample condition (F(1, 237) = 
8.46, p = .004). There was also a main effect of sample size (F(2, 1896) = 57.11, p < .001): 
confidence judgments were higher for larger sample sizes. However, these two main effects 
were qualified by an interaction between condition and sample size (F(2, 1896) = 36.21, p < 
.001): Confidence judgments increased with increasing sample size in the sample condition 
(F(2, 912) = 61.32, p < .001) but not in the population condition (F(2, 984) = 2.68, p = .69). 
This is exactly what had been predicted on the assumption that participants are sensitive to 
changes in the variance of distributions as a function of sample size.  
Further, there was a main effect of proportion (F(2, 1896) = 13.26, p < .001): response 
confidence was higher when the proportion of cases in which a feature held was .9 (EMM = 
.877) than when it was .7 (EMM = .850, p < .001) or .5 (EMM = .855, p < .001). There was no 
difference in confidence judgments between the proportions of .7 and .5 (p = .85).  
Finally, there was a three-way interaction between proportion, condition, and sample size 
(F(2, 1896) = 5.13, p = .006) indicating that the difference in the size of the effect of sample 
size between conditions was smaller when the proportion was .9.  
 
 
General discussion 
 
Overall, these findings are fully in accordance with the hypothesis that people are sensitive to 
differences in the variance of distributions as a function of sample size. They therefore provide 
evidence against the alternative hypothesis for the findings of Experiment 8 raised in the 
discussion section of that experiment. The lack of a consistent effect of the width of the 
coherence interval in Experiment 8 does not seem to be due to a failure to process information 
on the variance of a distribution. Rather, the evidence is that coherence intervals are not 
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processed as distributions, but as indicators of boundaries within which responses must lie to 
satisfy certain rationality constraints. Within those constraints, inductive criteria can affect the 
distribution of responses, narrowing it down further, depending on the presence of relevant 
factors from the content or context of the materials.  
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CHAPTER 8. EXPERIMENT 10: PROBABILITY PRESERVATION PROPERTIES 
 
Contents 
8.1 Method 
8.2 Results and discussion 
8.3 General discussion 
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The aim of this experiment is to assess the role that deductive validity plays in reasoning, over 
and above any role of coherence. More specifically, it follows Adams (1996) in 
conceptualising p-validity as a form of probability preservation. When introducing the 
theoretical background of the probabilistic approach, it was mentioned that Adams 
distinguishes four forms of probability preservation, which in order of strictness are certainty 
preservation (= binary validity), high probability preservation (= p-validity), positive 
probability preservation, and minimum probability preservation.  
As mentioned earlier, the probabilistic account of conditionals advocated in this thesis 
proposes that the conditional probability in the Equation, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), is primitive 
within the probabilistic logical system, and is arrived at through the psychological process of 
the Ramsey test, rather than being derived from unconditional probabilities using the ratio 
formula, P(p & q)/P(p). This treatment of the conditional probability as primitive is in line 
with the coherence based probabilistic logic proposed by followers of de Finetti (Coletti & 
Scozzafava, 2002; de Finetti, 1970/1974; Gilio, 2002; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009; see also the 
concept of Popper functions, Adams, 1996, note 1; Adams, 1998, Appendix 2; Popper, 2002). 
But it differs from Adams' (1996, 1998) approach, who followed Kolmogorov (1933/1950) in 
defining conditional probabilities through the ratio formula.  
The ratio formula has the disadvantage that the conditional probability P(q|p) is undefined 
when P(p) = 0. Adams proposed that the probability of the conditional if p then q be set to 1 in 
this case. Let us call this Adams' stipulation. It implies that P(q|p) = P(not-q|p) = 1 when P(p) 
= 0, which seems contradictory (Adams, 1998, Appendix 2). It also renders it impossible to 
model counterfactuals. Clearly, counterfactuals are not always certainly true, but can have the 
full range of probabilities.  
A third consequence of Adams' stipulation that is directly relevant to this experiment is 
that the ordering of the strictness of probability preservation properties depends on it. The 
coherence based approach has a more principled way of dealing with false-antecedent cases 
than this stipulation. It proposes that when the probability of the antecedent is 0, the 
probability of the conditional can be anywhere in the probability range. The value it will take 
for a person on any particular occasion will be determined by the content of the conditional 
and the person's associated background knowledge. This conceptualisation of the conditional 
corresponds to that in the Jeffrey table, and allows the use of the Ramsey test to assess the 
probability of the conditional. A consequence is that, under this definition of the conditional, 
certainty preservation coincides with high probability preservation. To see why, consider the 
inferences discussed in Edgington (1995, p. 286), shown in Table 8.1.  
In Adams' probabilistic logic, the inferences in the first column are both certainty and 
high probability preserving. The inferences in the second column are also certainty preserving, 
because whenever the premises have probability 1, the conclusion also has probability 1. But 
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they are not high probability preserving, because whenever the probability of the premises lies 
below 1, by however small an amount, the probability of the conclusion can be 0.  
The reason for why the inferences in the right column are certainty preserving is that the 
case in which they would have failed to be so is that in which the antecedent of the conditional 
has probability 0. Since in this case the probability of the conditional is set to 1 by default, the 
possibility of a failure of probability preservation is precluded.  
 
Table 8.1. P-valid inferences with categorical conclusions and their p-invalid 
counterparts with conditional conclusions. Taken from Edgington (1995). 
Binary valid & p-valid Binary valid but p-invalid 
p, q, therefore p p, therefore if q then p 
p or q, not-p, therefore q p or q, therefore if not-p then q 
not(p & q), p, therefore not-q not(p & q), therefore if p then not-q 
if p then q, if q then r, p, therefore r if p then q, if q then r, therefore if p then r 
if p then q, not-q, therefore not-p if p then q, therefore if not-q then not-p 
 
In contrast, because in the coherence approach the conditional can take any value when 
the probability of the antecedent is 0, the case in which certainty preservation would fail for 
the inferences in the right column is not precluded: these inferences are not certainty 
preserving in the coherence based approach. Consider for example the first inference: p, 
therefore if q then p. We may judge that p certainly holds in the actual world. But the world in 
which the probability of q is zero may be different from the actual world, and p may not hold 
in this different world. Suppose it is certain that I am in the lab and doing research. From this 
it does not follow that if I were in the café upstairs, then I would be doing research, because 
although the probability that I am now in the café is 0, if I were to be in the café, it is unlikely 
I would be doing research.  
A consequence of this is that, whereas in Adams' approach high probability preservation 
is a stricter criterion than certainty preservation (because all inferences that are high 
probability preserving are also certainty preserving, but not all inferences that are certainty 
preserving are also high probability preserving), in the coherence based approach certainty 
preservation and high probability preservation are equivalent. Therefore, the four probability 
preservation properties of inferences outlined in Adams (1996) collapse to three probability 
preservation properties in the coherence based approach: certainty preservation/high 
probability preservation, positive probability preservation, and minimum probability 
preservation. 
The present experiment tested two inferences from each of these three probability 
preservation categories, together with two invalid but probabilistically informative inferences, 
and two invalid and probabilistically uninformative inferences. Table 8.2 lists the 10 
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inferences investigated, ordered according to the increasing degree of strictness of the 
probability preservation properties that hold for them.  
All the inferences in Table 8.2 have two premises. The reason for this is that any one-
premise inference that is high probability preserving will also be positive and minimum 
probability preserving. Therefore any effect of the difference between high, positive, and 
minimum probability preservation can only be studied with inferences that have more than one 
premise.  
 
Table 8.2. The 10 inferences investigated, grouped by their probability preservation properties. 
Property # Name Form Coherence interval 
(1) 
Probabilistically 
uninformative  
1 Paradox 
1 + r 
 r, q, therefore if p 
then (r & q) 
[0, 1] 
2 Paradox 
2 + r 
not-r, not-p, 
therefore if (r & p) 
then q 
[0, 1] 
(2) Not 
probability 
preserving 
 
3 not-MP p, if p then q, 
therefore not-q 
[(y – xy), (1 - xy)] 
4 not-MT not-q, if p then q, 
therefore p 
[0, min{y/(1-x), (1-y)/x}] 
(3) Certainty and 
high probability 
preserving 
5 And-
intro 
p, q, therefore p & q [max{0, P(p) + P(q) – 1}, 
min{P(p), P(q)}] 
6 MT if p then q, not-q, 
therefore not-p 
[max{(1-x-y)/(1-x), (x+y-1)/x }, 
1] 
(4) Positive 
probability 
preserving 
7 MP if p then q, p, 
therefore q 
[xy, xy + (1-y)] 
8 or-MP if p or q (or both) 
then r, p, therefore r 
[xy, xy + (1-y)] 
(5) Minimum 
probability 
preserving 
9 Proof by 
cases 
if p then q, if not-p 
then q, therefore q  
[min(x, y), max(x, y)] 
10 or-intro p, q, p or q(or both) [max{P(p), P(q)}, min{P(p) + 
P(q), 1}] 
Note. Where x and y are used, x = premise 1, y = premise 2.  
 
Further, the invalid inferences 3 and 4, not-MT and not-MP, are similar to the valid 
inferences 6 and 7, MT and MP, but they negate the conclusions of inferences 6 and 7. This 
means that they are not merely probabilistically informative in a way that does not preserve 
probability, like the inferences AC and DA would be. Inferences 3 and 4 have the additional 
constraint that the probability of their conclusion must equal 1 – the probability of the 
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conclusion of their valid counterparts 6 and 7, respectively. Thus, whenever the probability of 
6 and 7 is high, the probability of 3 and 4 must be low. Contrast this with inferences 1 and 2: 
For them the probabilities of the premises pose no constraints at all on the probability of the 
conclusion, which may then be high or low on inductive grounds depending on background 
knowledge and the specific content expressed by the inferences. 
The additional constraint in inferences 3 and 4 singles them out as a specific subclass of 
informative but invalid inferences. One could call the subclass of informative but invalid 
inferences whose conclusion negates a deductive consequence of the premises, or negates one 
or more of the premises themselves, contradictory to convey this additional constraint. Put 
briefly, this subclass of inferences can be said to have conclusions that are the "opposite" of 
the premises.  
The simplest example of a contradictory inference is arguably p, therefore not-p. Here 
one can see clearly that the probability of the conclusion is informative because it has to be 1 – 
the probability of the premise. It cannot be any probability, and not even any probability lower 
than the probability of the premise. In the special case in which the premise p has probability 
1, the conclusion must have probability 0, which is the "opposite" of its valid counterpart, p, 
therefore p, whose conclusion must in this case have probability 1.  
For the present experiment this means that the "opposite" of the valid inferences 5 and 6 
were the contradictory inferences 3 and 4 rather than the uninformative inferences 1 and 2. 
Contradictory inferences were chosen to represent the class of informative but invalid 
inferences in order to establish a larger contrast in the probability preservation properties 
between valid and invalid inferences. Inferences AC and DA were not used because their 
status as valid or invalid depends on the subjective correlation between the antecedent and 
consequent of the conditional in the major premise. As mentioned in previous experiments of 
the present thesis, this makes it difficult to interpret findings on AC and DA without also 
controlling for this correlation.  
The experiment set out to investigate whether the coherence of people's responses 
changes as a function of the strictness of the probability preservation properties of an 
inference, and whether inferences for which stricter probability preservation properties hold 
are considered of higher quality, specifically "more correct", than inferences for which less 
strict probability preservation properties hold. Any effect of probability preservation on these 
two measures would not be explainable through coherence alone. The information on response 
coherence was of interest in itself, but it also served as a form of control condition to aid in the 
interpretation of people's judgments of inference quality. If people's judgments of inference 
quality varied systematically with the strictness of the probability preservation properties of 
the inferences, but at the same time people's probability judgments were clearly incoherent for 
these inferences, then there would be reason to believe that the quality judgments were based 
on information other than the actual coherence constraints. Judgments of inference quality can 
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only be interpreted as informed by probability preservation properties if the conclusion 
probability judgments for the corresponding inferences are coherent. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 140 participants from English speaking countries completed the online experiment 
on the platform Prolific Academic, in exchange for approximately £5 per hour. All participants 
indicated at the end of the experiment that they had taken part seriously, as opposed to just 
clicking through. However, 15 were excluded because they failed to pass one or both of two 
catch trials asking them not to respond but to instead click next to continue with the 
experiment. Further 12 were excluded because they had one or more trial reaction times of 3 
seconds or less. The final sample consisted of 113 participants. Among them were 7 cases of a 
repeated IP address, but none of these used the same Prolific Academic ID. All participants 
indicated having at least "good" English language skills. Participants' mean age was 34 years 
(range 18 - 64), and most had some college education: 21% indicated that they had finished 
12
th
 grade, 11% a technical or applied degree, 53% an undergraduate university degree, and 
19% a postgraduate degree (6% indicated not having finished 12
th
 grade, and 3% that they had 
a doctoral degree). Participants' median rating of the difficulty of the experiment was 66%.  
 
Design and materials 
Participants were shown two inferences from each of the five probability preservation 
categories shown in Table 8.2. Each inference was presented on three consecutive trials. The 
first two trials displayed the inference with given premise probabilities, and the task was to 
judge on a percentage scale how likely the conclusion could be given the probabilities of the 
premises. The response scale had two anchors labelled "0% likely/definitely false" and "100% 
likely/definitely true" on the left and right ends, respectively. On one of these two trials, both 
premises had a probability of .9, and on the other both premises had a probability of .75. The 
order of the two trials was varied randomly for each inference and participant.  
On the third trial the inference was shown again without information about premise 
probabilities. Participants were asked to judge the quality of the inference in general, by 
indicating on a continuous visual analogue scale to what extent they thought that the inference 
was correct. This scale had three anchors ordered from left to right: "definitely incorrect", 
"don't know", and "definitely correct".  
Each inference was embedded in a different context story. The context story remained the 
same across the three trials of the inference, but minor details in the story (e. g. the names of 
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objects or locations) changed. An example of the contents of the three trials for the and-
elimination inference is shown in the frame below.  
 
Imagine you are part of a team of aid workers who are removing the mines from 
the Dunlar fields, where a war took place recently. You have to act very 
thoroughly in order to make sure the area is cleared and safe again for the 
residents. You are reviewing the latest data on the fields with the team. 
The information you have gathered until now suggests the following: 
-------- 
[trial 1:] 
Premise 1:  It’s 90% likely that: 
The oat field is cleared. 
Premise 2:  It’s 90% likely that: 
The barley field is cleared. 
Conclusion:  Therefore, how likely can the following be? 
Both the oat field and the barley field are cleared. 
-------- 
[trial 2:] 
Premise 1:  It’s 75% likely that: 
The moss field is cleared. 
Premise 2:  It’s 75% likely that: 
The gravel field is cleared. 
Conclusion:  Therefore, how likely can the following be? 
Both the moss field and the gravel field are cleared. 
-------- 
[trial 3:] 
Premise 1: 
The stone field is cleared. 
Premise 2: 
The rye field is cleared. 
Conclusion:   
Therefore, both the stone field and the rye field are cleared.  
Given the premises, to what extent is it correct to infer the conclusion? 
 
There were 10 different scenarios, which were randomly allocated to the 10 inferences for 
each participant. The full list of scenarios can be found in Appendix G. The order of 
occurrence of each inference varied randomly for each participant. With three trials per 
inference and ten inferences, the experiment had 30 trials, plus two catch trials. The catch 
252 
 
trials were similar in appearance to the experimental trials, but in place of the text of the 
inferences they stated that they were control trials to make sure participants were paying 
attention, and asked them not to respond but to instead click next to continue with the 
experiment.  
 
Procedure 
Participants received task instructions with an example, together with a request to take their 
time to think through the questions and answer as carefully as they could. They then worked 
through two practice trials involving inferences different from those assessed in the 
experiment. After completing the experimental trials, participants were asked for 
demographical information and whether they had taken part seriously. The last page provided 
debriefing information. The experimental session took on average 22.52 minutes to complete.  
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Coherence of conclusion probability judgments 
The analysis started with the computation of the coherence of participants' responses to each 
inference, because the interpretation of the judgments of inference quality depended on 
whether these judgments were made against a background of sensitivity to coherence 
constraints. 
The panels of Figure 8.1 display the distribution of conclusion probability judgments for 
each inference, giving an overall impression of the proportion of responses falling within the 
coherence interval in each condition. Note that the y axis ranges from 0 to 10 for all inferences 
except inference 10 in the condition with a premise probability of .75. In this latter case, the 
axis ranges from 0 to 80 to accommodate the sharp peak in participants' responses. 
The overall pattern in Figure 8.1 shows a clear sensitivity to coherence constraints for all 
inferences except inference 6, which is MT. Inferences 1 and 2 (in the upper left corner of 
Figure 8.1) are probabilistically uninformative, so that any response to them is coherent. 
Responses to these inferences are in accordance with this fact, showing wide distributions with 
various shallow peaks whose location changes across conditions.  
Inferences 3 and 4 (in the upper right corner of Figure 8.1) are informative but invalid. 
Responses to these inferences show a clear sensitivity to the location of the coherence interval, 
including a shift in the mean towards higher probability judgments when the premise 
probability was lower. This shift follows the shift in location of the interval, and shows that 
participants are not just giving heuristic responses based on a positive correlation with premise 
probabilities.  
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Figure 8.1. Density curves showing the distribution of conclusion probability judgments. The 
shaded area represents the coherence interval for each inference and premise probability.  
 
Inferences 5 to 10 are valid. With the exception of Inference 6, responses to these 
inferences also show a notable correspondence with the location of the coherence interval, 
including a responsiveness to small shifts in interval location that go in the opposite direction 
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to those for the invalid inferences.  Inferences 3, 4, 7, and 8 also show evidence of sensitivity 
to the width of the coherence intervals, having steeper distributions when the interval was 
narrower. In contrast, responses to inference 10 seem to be concentrated on the lower interval 
bound rather than across its range.   
The response pattern for inference 6, MT, seems to be the only one showing no apparent 
correspondence with the coherence interval. As mentioned in earlier, the observation of lower 
coherence for MT in some conditions and experiments but not others, in the presence of 
reliable coherence for other inferences across experiments, might reflect a failure of invariance 
for MT (Oaksford & Chater, 2013). In general, MT can be interpreted as a case of a reductio 
ad absurdum inference. The negation of the consequent stands in conflict with the joint truth 
of the conditional and its antecedent, so one's degree of belief in one of the two must be 
lowered. But which of the two is lowered may depend on the content and context of the 
utterance. Coherence constraints hold only statically, for a single point in time, or 
equivalently, they hold only under the assumption of invariance. If this assumption is not met, 
then one cannot speak of an incoherent response, but rather of a change in the set of 
probabilities for which coherence can be assessed. Nonetheless, for the purposes of the present 
experiment it was enough to determine whether coherence was above chance level for each 
inference.    
The statistical assessment of coherence followed the same procedure as in previous 
experiments. The observed rate of coherent responses is shown in the upper panel of Figure 
8.2 for the informative inferences. The rate of above-chance coherence for these inferences is 
shown in the lower panel of Figure 8.2.  
Drawing on the betting analogy, the heights of the bars shown in Figure 8.2 for observed 
coherence tell us how often participants won a bet on each inference, the bet being won (lost) 
when the probability given for the conclusion was coherent (incoherent). The height of these 
bars, relative to the upper end of the y axis (at 1), indicates the proportion by which responses 
were coherent compared to a maximally coherent person.  
The heights of the bars for above-chance coherence tell us how much participants earned 
through their bets. Zero earnings imply that performance was at chance levels. For example, if 
the chance rate was 50% and a person responded randomly, then observed coherence for that 
person would be .5, and above-chance coherence would be 0, in the long run. In other words, 
the person would win about half of the bets, but would not earn anything in the long run. This 
means that when coherence is above-chance levels there is evidence of "inside knowledge", 
which in this case is knowledge (at some level) of coherence constraints. But the amount of 
the earnings depends not only on the amount of insight knowledge, but also on the likelihood 
of winning a bet by chance. The higher the likelihood of winning by chance, the lower the 
maximum possible pay-out for a performance that goes beyond chance. Hence higher above-
chance coherence does not necessarily amount to higher insight knowledge.  The same holds 
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for observed coherence: A higher frequency of bets that are won does not necessarily indicate 
higher insight knowledge, because the chance rate of winning could be high as well. That 
makes it difficult to compare performance between inferences and experimental conditions, 
unless their chance rates are equated as in Experiments 5 to 7. This was not necessary in the 
present experiment because the question here was merely whether performance was above 
chance levels at all, i. e. whether or not participants showed insight knowledge for each 
inference, regardless of any differences in the amount of insight knowledge between 
inferences. 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Mean values of observed and above-chance 
coherence for the probabilistically informative inferences. 
Error bars show 95% CIs. 
 
The confidence intervals in the Figures show that coherence was indeed above-chance 
levels for each inference, even for inference 6, MT. This was corroborated through a linear 
mixed model for the effect of inference on ratings of above-chance coherence, with random 
intercepts for participants and scenarios. The analysis showed that coherence was above 
chance levels overall (F(1, 904) = 1027.50, p < .001), and that it was significant also in the 
case of the lowest value of above-chance coherence: that for inference 6 (F(1, 113) = 6.50, p = 
.012).  
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The significant effect for MT suggests that a subset of participants did interpret the 
inference as intended and provided invariant probability assignments to its premises. 
Nonetheless, the lower rate of coherence for this inference replicates findings from other 
Experiments in the present thesis, as well as findings from previous studies (e. g. Evans et al., 
2015, Singmann et al., 2014), rendering it worthwhile to investigate it further. In particular, it 
would be an advance to have an empirical assessment of the extent to which the lower 
coherence of MT can be explained through a failure of invariance. 
Overall, the finding that participants' conclusion probability judgments were sensitive to 
the coherence constraints of the inferences investigated makes it possible to interpret the 
ratings of inference quality as ratings informed by knowledge (at some level) of the 
probability preservation properties of the inferences. 
 
Judgments of inference quality 
The mean ratings of the extent to which participants considered the inferences correct are 
shown in Figure 8.3. The pattern in the figure shows a clear divide between quality judgments 
for valid and invalid inferences. Judgments for the two probabilistically uninformative 
inferences, 1 and 2, lie around the lower half of the scale. In contrast, judgments for the two 
informative, but invalid inferences are in the lower 25% of the scale, whereas judgments for 
the six valid inferences lie in the upper 25% of the scale. There seem to be only small 
differences in quality judgments between the six valid inferences, compared to the large 
distance between the judgments for them and those for the invalid inferences.  
The pattern in the figure was corroborated through a linear mixed model analysis for the 
effects of inference type - the five probability preservation properties in Table 8.1, labelled (1) 
to (5) - on judgments of inference quality, with a random intercept for participants (inclusion 
of further random effects led to failure of convergence). Judgments of inference quality 
differed between inference types (F(4, 2147.00) = 774.56, p < .001), with all individual 
comparisons between types significant (all ps  .001) except that between the positive and the 
minimum probability preserving inferences (p = .16). The lowest judgments were given to the 
invalid, informative inferences 3 and 4 (EMM = .172), followed by the invalid, uninformative 
inferences 1 and 2 (EMM = .457), followed by the high probability preserving inferences 5 
and 6 (EMM = .828), followed by the highest quality judgments for the positive probability 
preserving (EMM = .933) and minimum probability preserving (EMM = .893) inferences 7 to 
10.  
It is also apparent from the confidence intervals in Figure 3 that the difference between 
the invalid, informative inferences 3 and 4 on the one side, and the valid inferences 5 to 10 on 
the other, was larger than the differences between the different subcategories of valid 
inferences (high, positive, and minimum probability preserving). These differences in the size 
of the differences were corroborated in a linear mixed model in which a series of difference 
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scores for above-chance coherence were computed between inference categories, and used in 
place of the original scores for above-chance coherence. However, the outcome of this latter 
analysis is not reported in detail here (see Cumming & Finch, 2005; Masson & Loftus, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 8.3. Judgments of inference quality for the 
inferences investigated. The error bars show 95% CIs, 
and the grey lines in the background show the 
individual participant values. 
 
 
General discussion 
 
The results showed that using the same materials, quality ratings for the uninformative 
inferences 1 and 2 (which may vary on inductive grounds) lay around the lower half of the 
probability scale. In contrast, ratings for inferences 3 and 4, which minimised probability 
preservation, were in the lower 25% of the scale, and those for inferences 5 to 10, which 
preserved high probability, were in the upper 25% of the scale. The specific contrast found 
between the valid and invalid inferences provides strong evidence for the psychological 
significance of deductive validity as a feature of inference quality, and singles it out against 
other measures of probabilistic quality, particularly coherence alone. The philosophical 
literature, from classical times to recent work on probabilistic logic (Adams, 1996, 1998), has 
held that the property of deductive validity is of particular importance. But the present findings 
provide independent empirical justification for this special treatment in an account of the 
judgments of ordinary people. 
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The finding that the strongest contrast to the valid inferences 5 to 10 was given by the 
invalid but informative inferences 3 and 4, rather than by the uninformative inferences 1 and 2, 
is in accordance with the fact that unlike inferences 3 and 4, whose coherence intervals were 
constrained to low probabilities, the uninformative inferences were completely unconstrained 
deductively. This allowed them to vary freely in strength on inductive grounds depending on 
their specific content.   
In general, the study of the inferences in the present thesis suggests a more fine grained 
classification than the previously used categories of valid vs. invalid, and informative vs. non-
informative allow. Among the informative invalid inferences, there are contradictory ones that 
negate one or more of the premises, or negate deductive consequences of the premises. And 
there are others whose coherence interval is constrained by the premises to a similar degree as 
for valid inferences, but not in a way that preserves probability. Examples of this second 
subset of informative invalid inferences are AC and DA: As illustrated in Experiments 3 and 
4, the coherence intervals for these inferences allow for a high conclusion probability in some 
cases, and a low conclusion probability in others. Their subjective quality is therefore more 
strongly influenced by inductive criteria, and is more likely to vary from one content to the 
next. This variability may render them more similar to the uninformative than to the 
contradictory inferences. Conversely, among the valid inferences some are only high 
probability preserving, and others are also positive or even minimum probability preserving. It 
would be worth investigating further the extent to which these more specific categorisations 
play a role in people's judgments of inference quality. 
In summary, the results of this experiment provide a strong and new form of evidence for 
the empirical relevance of deduction in reasoning, in addition to the more general constraint of 
probabilistic coherence.  
A possible limitation of the experiment is that it did not choose premise probabilities that 
maximised the difference in the probability intervals between inference types (Adams, 1996). 
This was difficult to achieve in a comparison of 10 inferences. But in follow-up studies it may 
be useful to perform pairwise comparisons between inferences with differing probability 
preservation properties, in a way that maximises the differences in their coherence intervals. 
Such comparisons would allow for a more fine-tuned assessment of the effects of probability 
preservation on subjective inference quality.  
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With the advent of the probabilistic paradigm in the psychology of reasoning (Over, 2009), the 
question of what role, if any, deduction plays in real world reasoning, arose anew (Evans, 
2012; Evans & Over, 2013). The present thesis argues that the answer to this question depends 
in part on how deduction is defined. The definition of deduction from classical logic is binary, 
and produces what de Finetti called "the logic of certainty" (de Finetti, 1972; Elqayam & 
Over, 2013). When the premises are assumed to be certain, the conclusion of a classically 
valid inference must be certain as well. But suppose people have uncertain degrees of belief in 
the premises of an inference. What degree of belief would be reasonable for them to have in 
the conclusion? Classical logic cannot answer this question, for it cannot be applied to 
reasoning under uncertainty. If we retain its binary definition of deduction, the central 
hypothesis of the probabilistic approach, that most reasoning takes place from uncertain 
premises, implies that deduction has only a small role to play in most reasoning situations 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007).   
Using the classical definition of deduction, a number of empirical studies have found an 
effect of deduction in reasoning tasks, in addition to what has been called an effect of "belief" 
(Evans et al., 2010; Klauer et al., 2010; Markovits et al., 2015; Rips, 2001; Singmann & 
Klauer, 2011; Thompson, 1994; Trippas et al., 2017). In particular, people more often accept 
the conclusion of valid than of invalid inferences, in addition to accepting believable 
conclusions more often than unbelievable ones. The latter effect has been called belief bias, as 
it constitutes a departure from the normative response under binary logical instructions.  
The findings of effects of both "logic" and "belief" in reasoning have contributed to the 
development of dual-component theories (Evans, 2006; Klauer et al., 2010; Markovits et al., 
2015; Verschueren et al., 2005). When these theories assume a binary logical process that is 
contrasted with a "belief based" process, the "logical" process questions the basic hypothesis 
in the probabilistic approach that most real world reasoning is from uncertain premises. 
The present thesis argues for an alternative way of accounting for the findings on an 
effect of deduction that does not question the basis of the probabilistic approach. Rather than 
integrating a binary logical component on the one side, and a probabilistic, belief based 
component on the other, into a dual-component framework, it explores the integration of logic 
and probability itself.  
The central deductive concepts of classical logic, consistency and validity, can be 
generalised to cover degrees of belief: binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, and 
binary validity to probabilistic validity, p-validity (Adams, 1998; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; 
Gilio, 2002). This generalisation makes it possible to study deduction from uncertain premises 
(Stevenson & Over, 1995), so that there is no need to qualify the basis of the probabilistic 
approach.  
With this generalised notion of deduction, many findings on belief bias can be 
reinterpreted as effects of coherence. Participants in an experiment may be violating the 
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classical deductive instructions to assume the premises to be certain, and nonetheless be 
reasoning deductively, by estimating a coherent degree of belief in the conclusion of an 
inference on the basis of its logical form and of their uncertain degrees of belief in the 
premises. Not to follow binary instructions can be said to be a fault, but it is not necessarily a 
logical one.  
However, the fact that the definition of deduction can be generalised to cover degrees of 
belief does not imply that people actually use deduction in a probabilistic way. It could still be 
that when people engage in deduction, they do so in the classical binary way, and that 
reasoning from uncertain premises is inductive in practice even when it does not have to be so 
in theory. Whether people are sensitive to the constraints of coherence and of p-validity is an 
empirical question that has only recently started to be investigated, but which was the main 
focus of this thesis. 
The thesis investigated the role of coherence and p-validity in uncertain reasoning 
through ten experiments. Previous studies on the coherence of people's conclusion probability 
judgements had focussed on conditional syllogisms (Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 
2014). Responses to these two-premise inferences were found to be coherent above chance 
levels mainly for MP, and less reliably for DA. However, the chance rates in these studies 
were often very high (e.g. Singmann et al., 2014, Figure 3) and varied between inferences, 
making it more difficult to detect above-chance coherence when it is there, and to compare 
this coherence between inferences.  
 
 
The findings obtained across experiments 
 
The present experiments extended these findings, using different methodologies, across 23 
inference forms, summarised in Table 9.1. Some of these forms were investigated in different 
variants (e. g. inference 5), which were not counted as separate inferences. The table 
presupposes, in its validity column, that if refers to the probability conditional (Adams, 1998; 
Jeffrey, 1991).  
 
Coherent responses to MT 
For the conditional syllogisms, the results corroborated the earlier finding of above-chance 
coherence for MP, but found coherence to be reliably above chance levels for MT too. Of the 
six experiments in which both inferences were investigated, overall coherence was above 
chance in all cases for MP. For MT, coherence was above chance levels in all but two 
instances. The first was in Experiment 3, where it was at chance levels in the statements task 
but above chance levels in the inferences task. In Experiment 4, which replicated lab 
Experiment 3 on the internet, coherence was above chance levels across conditions. The 
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second instance was in Experiment 7: coherence for MT was at chance levels when 
participants were given binary paradigm instructions to assume the premises to be true, and 
then judge whether the conclusion also has to be true. This was in spite of the fact that 
coherence for MT was above chance levels for the same materials when given probabilistic 
instructions (Experiment 6).  
 
Table 9.1. The inferences investigated in the 10 experiments of the thesis. 
Type # Name Form Valid Exp 
A. One-premise 
equivalences and 
contradictions  
1 de morgan not(p & q)  not-p or not-q 1 3-8 
2 not de morgan p & q  not-p or not-q 0 3-8 
B. One-premise 
inferences with 
set-subset 
relations between 
premise and 
conclusion 
 
3 if-to-or if p then q not-p or q 1 1 
 if not-p then q  p or q 1 1,3-7 
4 or-to-if p or q  if not-p then q 0 1,3-7 
 not-p or q  if p then q 0 1 
5 one-premise 
or-introduction 
p  p or q 1 1 
 not-p  not-p or q 1 1 
 q  p or q 1 1 
 q  not-p or q 1 1 
6 and-elimination p & q  p 1 2-7 
 p & q  q 1 2 
7 one-premise  
and-introduction 
p  p & q 0 3-7 
8 and-to-or p & q p or q 1 3-7 
9 or-to-and p or qp & q 0 3-7 
10 and-to-if/ 
one-premise 
centering 
p & q if p then q 1 2 
C. Two-premise 
inferences 
11 and-to-if/ 
two-premise 
centering 
p, q  if p then q 1 2,8 
 12 MP if p then q, p q 1 3-
8,10 
 13 MT if p then q, not-q  not-p 1 3-
7,10 
 14 AC if p then q, q  p 0 3-7 
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 15 DA if p then q, not-p  not-q 0 3-8 
 16 two-premise  
and-introduction 
p, q  p & q 1 10 
 17 or-MP if p or q (or both) then r, p  r 1 10 
 18 two-premise  
or-introduction 
p, q  p or q (or both) 1 10 
 19 Proof by cases if p then q, if not-p then q  q 1 10 
Two-premise 
uninformative 
20 Paradox 1 + r r, q  if p then (r & q) 0 10 
 21 Paradox 2 + r not-r, not-p  if (r & p) then q 0 10 
Two-premise 
contradictory 
22 not-MP p, if p then q  not-q 0 10 
 23 not-MT not-q, if p then q  p 0 10 
Note. "Valid" = Validity, "Exp" = Experiment. 
 
These findings constitute strong evidence for a basic sensitivity to coherence constraints 
for MT. They also provide direct evidence for the descriptive adequacy of the proposal that the 
constraints of deduction are not limited to the special case in which premises are assumed to 
be certain.  
The methodology of Experiments 5 to 7 made it possible, not only to assess whether or 
not conclusion probability judgments are coherent above chance levels, but also to make 
quantitative comparisons of above-chance coherence between inferences. This was 
accomplished by a design that equated the chance rate of coherence across inferences and 
conditions. The experiments revealed that although responses to MT were generally coherent 
above chance levels, coherence was lower for MT than for MP, in line with the literature using 
binary paradigm instructions. In the probabilistic approach, the difference in the acceptance of 
the two inferences can be explained as a result of dynamic reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 
2013). Specifically, MT can sometimes be viewed as an instance of a reductio ad absurdum 
inference. The categorical premise not-q negates an element of the conditional premise if p 
then q, with the result that a high degree of belief in both premises is incompatible with a high 
degree of belief in the element p of the conclusion. But the conflict between if p then q, not-q, 
and p can be resolved in different ways. Depending on background beliefs, one person could 
see if p then q and not-q as a reason to disbelieve p, in line with MT, while another person 
could see not-q and p as a reason to disbelieve if p then q, engaging in dynamic reasoning. 
Logic does not itself tell us which statement should give way, so that without instructions to 
assume that both premises are certain, the choice can be made on inductive grounds. This 
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perspective makes it possible to account for the asymmetry between MP and MT in a rational 
way.  
 
Changing responses to AC and DA 
The coherence findings for AC and DA were more equivocal. In Experiment 3, coherence for 
both inferences was above chance levels in the statements task, but not in the inferences task. 
In Experiment 4 coherence was above chance levels for both inferences and both task 
conditions. However, coherence for both inferences was below chance in Experiment 5, and at 
chance in Experiments 6 and 7. In Experiment 8, coherence was above chance for DA (this 
experiment did not include AC). Leaving aside the statements tasks of Experiments 3 and 4, 
this means that coherence for AC was above chance in one out of five experiments, and 
coherence for DA was above chance in two out of six experiments. As mentioned before, a 
lack of above-chance coherence for these two inferences is difficult to interpret, because it can 
be explained away by a biconditional interpretation of the conditional premise – more 
precisely, by the assumption that the materials used sometimes suggested to participants that 
the antecedent and consequent of the conditional were positively correlated. In line with this, 
an analysis of the data in Experiment 3 showed that coherence was above chance levels under 
the assumption of a biconditional interpretation for the same responses that coherence was at 
chance levels under the assumption of a conditional interpretation. To be able to interpret the 
coherence results for these inferences, the two interpretations would therefore have to be 
disentangled, by controlling explicitly for the correlation between antecedent and consequent. 
Although such an experiment was beyond the scope of this thesis, the fact that it is needed to 
interpret the findings on AC and DA is nonetheless a more precise, and less pessimistic, 
standpoint than the suggestion from previous studies that responses are generally incoherent 
for these inferences (e.g. Singmann et al., 2014).  
Further studies of AC and DA, but also of MP, MT, and further two-premise inferences, 
could assess to what extent incoherent responses are responses that overestimate or 
underestimate the probability of the conclusion, given the probabilities assigned to the 
premises, and to what extent this depends on the risks and benefits suggested by the materials 
(Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). The hypothesis that there can be overconfidence in the 
conclusion of a valid inference could not even be formulated in the binary paradigm. But this 
hypothesis can extend the study of suppression effects, making it necessary to distinguish 
between the suppression of the conclusion of an inference, and the suppression of the 
inference itself (Over & Cruz, 2018).  
 
Conditionals, or-introduction, and the conjunction fallacy 
Experiments 1 and 2 not only extended the coherence results to further inferences, but also 
provided information about the meanings of the component statements, and of factors involved 
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in reasoning with them. An analysis of the or-to-if inference showed that people's responses 
were coherent above chance levels under the assumption that they interpret the conditional in 
the conclusion as the probability conditional, whereas they were coherent below chance levels 
under the assumption that they interpret the conditional as the material conditional, providing 
a novel form of evidence for the interpretation of conditionals in terms of the Equation.  
Coherence was reliably above chance levels across four variants of the inference of or-
introduction, suggesting that although it may be pragmatically infelicitous, under binary 
paradigm instructions, to state p or q when one could be more informative and precise by 
stating p, people readily treat the inference as valid when asked directly about their degrees of 
belief in premise and conclusion. This is in accordance with the view that the lower 
endorsement rates found for the inference under binary paradigm instructions are due to 
pragmatic effects (Cruz et al., 2017; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012), contrary to the recent 
proposal in a revision of mental model theory that the inference is in fact invalid (Johnson-
Laird et al., 2015).  
Further, Experiment 2 showed that although responses were reliably coherent for and-
elimination when using neutral materials (see also Politzer & Baratgin, 2016, for converging 
evidence), coherence for the same inference broke down when using the materials known to 
cause the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This was in spite of the arguably 
transparent task of inferring the probability of p from the probability of p & q. The finding 
underlines the strength, and at the same time the limited scope, of the fallacy.  
 
Comparing above-chance coherence between inferences 
It was pointed out in the thesis that it is difficult to make quantitative comparisons of above-
chance coherence between inferences when the chance rates of the inferences are not equal. 
The reason is that the chance rate is subtracted from the observed coherence rate to obtain the 
measure of above-chance coherence. The larger the chance rate, the lower the probability of 
detecting above-chance coherence when it is there; that is, the lower the sensitivity of the test 
for above-chance coherence. The chance rate corresponds to the width of the coherence 
interval, which in turn depends on the form of the inference, on whether the inference is valid 
or invalid, and on the premise probabilities. Without holding the chance rate constant, it is 
possible to compare inferences with regard to whether or not coherence was above chance 
levels for them (Cruz et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 2014), but further 
comparisons seem difficult to interpret.  
In Experiments 5 to 7, above-chance coherence was made comparable between inferences 
and conditions using two methods. In the first, participants were given a set of premise 
probabilities, each of which was presented with a number of conclusion probabilities. The task 
was to give a binary response as to whether a given conclusion probability was possible or not, 
given the premise probabilities. In the second method, participants were again given a set of 
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premise probabilities, and were asked whether the probability of the conclusion could be 
higher, and whether it could be lower, than the probability of the premise (in the case of one-
premise inferences) or than 50% (in the case of two-premise inferences). These binary 
response formats rendered the chance rate of a coherent response 50% across inferences and 
conditions.  
Using these methods, it was found that the inference for which above-chance coherence 
was highest was the contradiction not de morgan, followed closely by MP. Except for AC and 
DA discussed above, coherence for the remaining inferences was lower but still generally 
above chance. Two oddballs were the inferences from or-to-if and from if-to-or (inferences 3 
and 4 in Table 9.1). Coherence was at chance levels for or-to-if in Experiment 5, for if-to-or in 
Experiment 6, and for both in Experiment 7 (using binary paradigm instructions). Leaving 
aside the statements task of Experiments 3 and 4, and considering only the inferences task in 
those experiments, this means that coherence for or-to-if and if-to-or was above chance in four 
out of six experiments.  These inferences contain negations at the start of the premise or of the 
conclusion, and this could have made them more difficult to process. Responses to both 
inferences were above chance when measured across positions of the negation in Experiment 
1, but further studies would be necessary to establish why coherence was somewhat less 
reliable for these inferences.  
A further step would also be to investigate in more detail what makes the inferences of 
not de morgan and MP stand out in terms of the high rates of coherent responses to them. For 
example, one could test whether contradictions in general are detected more easily than other 
logical relations, or whether it is something specific to the negation of de morgan that is at 
play.  
Generally, the finding that across the inferences investigated, coherence was above 
chance levels in the great majority of cases, and failures of coherence were the exception 
rather than the rule, provides strong additional support for the hypothesis that people are 
sensitive, at some level, to the constraints of coherence over and above the binary constraints 
of consistency.  
 
The effect of an explicit inference task and working memory 
Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results of Evans et al. (2015) on the role of an explicit 
inference task for coherence. Somewhat surprisingly, coherence was already above chance 
levels in the large majority of cases in the statements task: when people were given the 
statements that made up the inferences in random order one at a time on the screen. An 
explicit inference task, in which the statements were arranged into inferences, and each 
inference presented one at a time on the screen, tended to increase coherence in the few cases 
in which it was not already above chance. However, there was an exception in Experiment 3 
for AC and DA, where coherence was above chance in the statements task but at chance levels 
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in the inferences task. It may be that in some cases, pragmatic factors related to the 
assertability of a statement as a conclusion drawn from other statements, or to the relation 
between statements that are difficult to integrate due to the presence of negations, can lead to 
reductions in coherence that would not arise when the statements are considered in isolation. 
Another possibility is that putting the conditionals in an explicit AC or DA inference task 
tends to increase the biconditional interpretation, since otherwise the inferences are invalid. 
But the finding could also simply reflect the fact that different groups were in the statements 
and inferences task, and some may have interpreted the materials for AC and DA as implying 
a correlation between antecedent and consequent, and others not. Further replications would 
be needed to establish the reliability of this finding. 
Experiments 3 and 4 also included an inferences task with working memory load. 
Responses in this condition generally differed little from those in the inferences task without 
working memory load. But where they differed, the load condition was associated with lower 
coherence rates, suggesting that the difference between the statements and the inferences task 
may be due in part to the differing demands they pose on working memory for calibrating 
beliefs across statements. However, the weak effect of the load condition is in line with the 
finding that coherence was in most cases already above chance in the statements task, so that 
the inferences task had only little to add that could be disrupted.  
The overall pattern suggests that people may have an implicit, spontaneous tendency to 
establish coherence between beliefs, but that in situations in which this fails, an explicit 
inference task, in which all relevant pieces of information are available simultaneously on the 
screen, and people can focus their attention directly on the relations between them, tends to be 
helpful. In any case, explicit inference is necessary when establishing relations between novel 
materials for which no beliefs are yet available.  
 
Certain vs. uncertain premises, probabilistic vs. binary paradigm instructions 
Experiments 6 and 7 made it possible to compare above-chance coherence for inferences with 
certain vs. uncertain premises, and for inferences with probabilistic vs. binary paradigm 
instructions, using the same inferences, materials, and response format. There was no evidence 
that coherence is lower when the premises are uncertain, nor that coherence is lower when 
probabilistic rather than binary paradigm instructions are used. This provides a novel, strong 
form of evidence that deduction from uncertain premises is possible, and is not restricted to 
reasoning from certainty. Certain truth and certain falsity did not appear qualitatively different 
from uncertain degrees of belief, but rather as endpoints on a common scale. 
 
Factors with no systematic effect on above-chance coherence 
In addition to the finding that coherence did not differ between certain and uncertain premises, 
nor between probabilistic and binary paradigm instructions, Experiments 3 and 4 found no 
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evidence of a systematic difference in people's responses to the reasoning tasks studied in an 
internet and in a lab setting, making it easier to generalise results between them, as well as 
between the experiments conducted in this thesis and the earlier lab results from Evans et al. 
(2015). In addition, Experiment 5 found no evidence for a difference in response coherence as 
a function of whether people were asked to judge whether a conclusion fell inside or outside 
the coherence interval. Across experiments, there also seemed to be no systematic difference 
in response coherence between one- and two-premise inferences. The differences in coherence 
between inferences rather appeared to be based on more specific factors, such as whether they 
contained negations or could be interpreted in alternative ways. Finally, across experiments 
there was no evidence that coherence differed between valid and invalid, i.e. between 
deductive and inductive, inferences. This result makes sense given that the constraints of 
coherence hold for both inference types, and deductive inferences merely have stronger 
constraints on the lower limits of their interval boundaries. The above negative results can help 
interpret and add precision to the positive findings observed in these experiments.  
 
The precision of people's degrees of belief  
Coherence intervals are usually measured using point probabilities, but there was evidence that 
people's degrees of belief are not that fine grained. Experiment 3 measured above-chance 
coherence using the exact point intervals, and compared this with above-chance coherence in 
which the interval boundaries were widened by 5% and by 10%, widening the chance rate of 
coherence accordingly. This made the measurement scale coarser, without making it 
necessarily more lenient. Above-chance coherence increased when widening the scale by 5%, 
i. e. when the number of points on the scale was reduced from 101 to 10, mainly for the 
equivalence of de morgan and the contradiction of not de morgan, for which the conclusion 
coherence interval is a point value. It had only little effect on the other inferences whose 
coherence intervals were already wider from the beginning.  Increasing the coarseness by 10% 
had no incremental effect. In Experiment 5, the question of the precision of people's degrees of 
belief was assessed in a different way, comparing response coherence for conclusion 
probabilities that were clearly inside or outside the interval, with conclusion probabilities that 
were at the interval edge. Above-chance coherence was higher for conclusion probabilities 
clearly on one side of the interval, and this effect was not restricted to de morgan and not de 
morgan but held more generally across inferences.  
It seems to make sense for degrees of belief to be generally coarser than point 
probabilities, given the uncertain nature of much of the information we receive in everyday 
situations, and the limits of our working memory for past instances of an event (c.f. Sanborn & 
Chater, 2016). The present thesis proposed two methods of quantifying this precision, or 
fuzziness, in people's beliefs. This precision will likely vary across content domains and 
domain expertise. But the ability to measure it for a given context, using the tools of 
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probability theory, can be useful for interpreting experimental findings, and seems to disable 
one of the arguments brought forward by advocates of computational level systems that are 
themselves coarser than probability theory, like ranking theory or the use of verbal, qualitative 
probability expressions (Politzer & Baratgin, 2016; Spohn, 2013). Such alternative systems 
have a built-in, fixed degree of coarseness that is decided a priori, the use of which makes it 
impossible to measure the actual coarseness of degrees of belief empirically. 
 
The variance of belief distributions 
In addition to assessing people's sensitivity to the location of coherence intervals, Experiments 
3, 4, 8, and 9 examined people's intuitions about interval width. Experiments 3 and 4 included 
an assessment of whether the variance of responses was larger when the coherence interval 
was wide than when it was narrow, using premise probability information to estimate interval 
width. The hypothesis was that response variance would be higher when the interval was 
wider, but no relation was found between the two. Experiment 8 assessed whether people's 
confidence in the correctness of their conclusion probability judgments (Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014) varied as a function of interval width. If confidence was lower for wider 
intervals, this might suggest that people are looking for a single optimal response within a 
distribution, e.g. corresponding to the distribution mean, which is more difficult to find when 
there are many options. If confidence was higher for wider intervals, this might suggest that 
people are focussing on the task of rendering their responses coherent, which is easier when 
the number of coherent response options is larger. But again no relation was found between 
the two.  
Experiment 9 helped interpret the results of Experiment 8, by suggesting that the absence 
of a relation between response confidence and interval width was not due to a lack of 
sensitivity for parameters determining distribution variance. Instead, it seems as if people, in 
the first instance, follow the deductive constraint of coherence, trying to give responses that 
fall within the interval; but that if the interval is wide enough, then inductive considerations 
may or may not narrow down the choice of response further. This interpretation was also 
suggested by an inspection of the distribution of responses for each inference. When the 
interval was narrow, the distribution of responses was also narrow and seemed to follow the 
location of the interval closely. When the interval was wide, the distribution of responses was 
flat in some cases, suggesting that people were mainly trying to be coherent, without 
narrowing down their responses further in any specific way. But in other cases the distribution 
of responses was strongly skewed towards one interval edge, or even multimodal, suggesting 
that additional inductive criteria were playing a strong role in narrowing down people's 
responses further in various ways. The response distributions computed in Experiment 10 led 
to similar impressions. Generally, these findings shed further light on the complementary roles 
of deduction and induction in reasoning from uncertain premises. 
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P-validity matters over and above coherence 
It can be difficult to assess the role of p-validity over and above the role of coherence in 
reasoning, because the relevant normative constraints are based on coherence in both cases. In 
this thesis it was proposed to describe p-validity, i.e. probability preservation, as a feature of 
coherence intervals. P-validity can be used to categorise inferences into two groups (deductive 
and inductive) according on whether or not their coherence intervals preserve probability from 
premises to conclusion. With this characterisation, the question is not whether people respect 
the normative constraints of p-validity in their conclusion probability judgments, because 
these normative constraints are set by coherence. The question is rather to what extent the 
distinction marked by p-validity between the two groups of inferences matters to people.  
Across experiments, there was no evidence that people distinguish between p-valid 
(deductive) and p-invalid (inductive) inferences in terms of the effort they invest in drawing 
them, because above-chance coherence did not differ systematically between p-valid and p-
invalid inferences. But Experiment 10 showed that people did distinguish between deductive 
and inductive inferences in their judgments of inference quality. Deductive inferences that 
preserved probability were judged more correct than inductive inferences that did not. Further, 
p-validity was treated as special among the different levels of probability preservation studied, 
with forms of probability preservation that were stricter than p-validity having only a 
negligible further impact on quality judgments. This corroborated empirically the special 
treatment long given to the distinction between deduction and induction in the philosophical 
literature.   
Experiment 10 also drew a distinction, for the inductive inferences, between the 
following cases. Inferences whose coherence interval is the uninformative unit interval (like 
the paradoxes of the material conditional); inferences with a coherence interval that is not high 
probability preserving but is constrained in a different way by the premises (such as AC); and 
inferences with a conclusion that is the negation of the conclusion of a valid inference, so that 
the conclusion is impossible when the premises are certain, and the conclusion is very 
improbable when the premises are very probable. It would be interesting to investigate further 
to what extent these more fine-grained distinctions play a role in people's evaluations of 
inference quality.  
It would also be worth developing further ways of assessing to what extent, and in which 
contexts, people treat deductive and inductive inferences differently (c.f. Trippas et al., 2016). 
In general one can expect the difference to matter in some contexts, but not in others. 
Probability preservation adds reliability to the conclusion probability of an inference across 
individual instances. This reliability may be important in situations when, as in some of the 
experimental materials, much is at stake and careful consideration is called for to avoid 
jumping to conclusions. But in other contexts it may be more helpful to respond quickly, 
without hesitating to jump to conclusions, e.g. because only an approximate answer is needed 
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or possible given the available information, and the reasoner must move on to address the next 
task. If we relied only on deduction in everyday reasoning, even if it is probabilistic, we might 
regularly freeze in the absence of sufficient criteria for drawing any conclusion. Moreover, as 
discussed in relation to Experiments 8 and 9, deduction and induction often seem to work hand 
in hand. Thus, instead of asking in which contexts deduction is relevant, it may be more useful 
to ask how the different contributions of deduction and induction can be measured in 
reasoning contexts in which they both play a role. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The binary deductive concepts of classical logical logic, consistency and validity, can be 
generalised to cover degrees of belief: consistency can be generalised to coherence, and 
validity to p-validity. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in formal logic does not 
imply that people will actually use deduction in a probabilistic way. The research presented in 
this thesis investigated the role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises through ten 
experiments. It found evidence that coherence and p-validity are not just abstract formalisms, 
but that people follow the normative constraints set by them in their reasoning. This is 
evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity as computational level 
principles modelling the tasks people set out to accomplish when reasoning. It has 
implications for the interpretation of past findings in the literature on the roles of deduction 
and degrees of belief, and it offers a perspective for generating new research hypotheses in the 
interface between deductive and inductive reasoning.  
 
 
Implications for belief bias and dual-component theories 
 
The evidence found in the thesis for coherence and p-validity, and with it for deduction from 
uncertain premises, opens the possibility that belief bias and suppression effects can, in some 
cases at least, be explained as resulting from rational reasoning processes. To be sure, it is 
incorrect to reject the conclusion that all cats are bats, when given instructions to assume it 
certain that all cats are rats, and that all rats are bats. But this does not imply that the rejection 
of the conclusion results from a non-deductive process. It could be that it instead occurs 
because people are used to taking into account the probability of the premises when reasoning, 
and try to give coherent responses given both their degrees of belief in the premises, and the 
logical structure of the inference. For example, consider the MP inference if this cat is a rat, 
then it is a bat. This cat is a rat. Therefore, this cat is a bat. Given the low probability of the 
premises, it is coherent to assign to the conclusion a low probability even though the inference 
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is probability preserving and so deductively valid. When P(if rat then bat) = P(rat) = .1, the 
maximum coherent probability one can assign to the conclusion of this MP inference is .11. 
There is then a sense in which one would be supressing the inference if one assigned to it a 
conclusion probability that is too high to be coherent given its logical structure, a situation that 
could not even be expressed in the binary approach (Over & Cruz, 2018). It may be that belief 
bias and suppression effects are still observed in a fully probabilistic setting. If so, then this 
would provide stronger evidence that people sometimes judge the probability of a conclusion 
taken on its own, regardless of its relation to the premises. But this is still an open question at 
present.  
The extension of deduction to probabilities also renders unnecessary the distinction 
between binary logical processes on the one side, and probabilistic belief based processes on 
the other, opening new avenues of research in the context of dual-component theories (De 
Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2011; Singmann et al., 2014; 
Trippas et al., 2017). It appears that the idea of probabilistic deduction can be integrated 
seamlessly in the dual-process account of Oaksford & Chater (2011), which is already fully 
probabilistic, as well as in the account of De Neys (2012; see also Trippas et al., 2017), which 
explicitly states that the term "logical intuitions" refers to intuitions about both binary logical 
and probabilistic relations. In the dual-source model of Klauer and colleagues (Klauer et al., 
2010; Singmann et al., 2014), the two sources of information proposed, logical form and 
content, can be easily mapped to the logical form of inferences and the probabilities of their 
premises, respectively, information on both of which is necessary to compute coherence 
intervals for the conclusions of inferences. This reinterpretation would be in line with the 
finding in Singmann et al. (2014) that a model based on coherence alone accounted equally 
well for the data than one based on coherence plus the pattern of results obtained for 
conditional syllogisms when using binary paradigm instructions.  
The dual-process theory of Evans and colleagues (Evans, 2006, 2007; Evans & 
Stanovitch, 2013) has sometimes suggested a distinction between rule based processes of type 
2, including binary logic, and probabilistic, heuristic based processes of type 1. But if as more 
recently suggested, the only feature distinguishing the two types of processes is the 
involvement of working memory (Evans & Stanovitch, 2013), then the distinction between the 
attribute of being logical on the one side and that of being probabilistic on the other again 
becomes unnecessary. The theory then seems to diverge from that of De Neys and colleagues 
mainly in the algorithmic level question of how the two types of processes interact.  
The accounts of Verschueren et al. (2005) and of Markovits et al. (Markovits et al., 2013) 
draw a distinction between inferences based on the probability of the conclusion, given the 
premises, and inferences based on the number of different types of counterexamples to the 
conclusion, given the premises. They attribute the use of conclusion probability information to 
type 1 processes, and the use of counterexample information to type 2 processes, and find an 
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effect of both on reasoning (see also Geiger & Oberauer, 2007, on the relation between the 
two kinds of information). The distinction between conclusion probability and counterexample 
information seems highly relevant for our understanding of how people arrive at a degree of 
belief about the premises and the conclusion of inferences. However, this appears to be an 
algorithmic level question. At the computational level, both conclusion probability and 
counterexample information can be used in a binary or probabilistic way, depending on 
instructions. The case made in this thesis is that when participants use it in a probabilistic way, 
their reasoning can still be deductive if it respects the deductive constraints of coherence (Over 
& Cruz, 2018).  
It may be that at the algorithmic level, people use different mechanisms to judge certainty 
preservation and probability preservation, and that this is in part driving effects of instruction. 
It may also be that the way people judge whether an inference is deductive or inductive is 
different from the way people judge the probability of a conclusion when it is considered on a 
case-by-case basis, regardless of its logical status. And it could be that all these mental 
operations occur both in an intuitive and in a reflective way, or that some are more often 
carried out intuitively and others reflectively. Overall, the generalisation of deduction to 
inferences from uncertain premises allows the formulation of more specific hypotheses about 
the components involved in dual-component theories. 
 
 
Limits of deduction and dynamic reasoning 
 
Even when people are sensitive to the constraints of coherence, and to the distinction between 
deductive inferences that preserve probability and inductive inferences that do not, the role of 
deduction in everyday reasoning may still be limited. An inherent limitation on the scope of 
deduction is that its constraints are static, restricted to a specific point in time, unless further 
assumptions are made. Given the probability of the premises, the probability of the conclusion 
must lie within a certain interval on the probability range to be coherent. But if the 
probabilities of the premises dynamically change over time, then that interval changes with 
them (Baratgin & Politzer, 2010; Douven, 2012; Hadjichristidis et al., 2014; Hartmann & 
Rafiee-Rad, 2014; Oaksford & Chater, 2013; Zhao & Osherson, 2010). If the probabilities of 
the premises do not change over time, then they are said to be invariant (Oaksford & Chater, 
2013), and the coherence interval computed for an inference remains in force. But the problem 
is that it is not usually p-valid to infer that invariance holds. It often takes an inductive 
inference to establish invariance. For short intervals of time, it can be inductively reasonable 
to infer that there are minimal changes in the circumstances relevant to the probabilities of the 
premises we are using in reasoning (Hartmann & Rafiee-Rad, 2014; Lewis, 1976; Stalnaker, 
1968). For example, when students in London today go out of their flats to use the 
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Underground, they can safely infer that their flats will still be there on their return. But this 
was an unreliable inference when the Underground was used as a bomb shelter during the 
London Blitz (see also Wittgenstein, 1991, on questioning information previously considered 
certain). The criteria people use for the dynamic revision of their beliefs during reasoning, and 
the place of deduction in this reasoning, is a remaining challenge for the new paradigm. 
 
 
Where next? 
 
Dynamic reasoning 
Moving forward from the research presented here, it will be important to investigate further 
how deduction and induction work together in the reasoning process. In a broader sense, this 
would also mean studying different types of inductive reasoning, and assessing what these 
types can tell us about reasoning as a whole.  
Following up from the previous section, one aspect of reasoning that would be worth 
studying further is dynamic reasoning. This could involve questions like the following. Under 
which conditions do participants' judgments conform to Jeffrey conditionalisation 
(Hadjichristidis et al., 2014; Stern, 2017; Zhao & Osherson, 2010; 2014) and its generalisation 
in the Kulback-Leibler divergence (Hartmann & Rafiee-Rad, 2014)? Are there some contexts 
in which people's belief revision seems to conform more closely to imaging than to 
conditionalisation (Bartgin & Politzer, 2010; Lewis, 1976; Zhao & Osherson, 2014)? Are 
there situations in which people do not seem to minimize the change in their beliefs upon 
receiving new information (Hartmann & Rafiee-Rad, 2014; Lewis, 1976; Stalnaker, 1968), but 
revise more than this minimum? A related question is whether updating more than the 
minimum is invariably a signal of prejudice and delusions (Dudley & Over, 2003), or whether 
there are situations in which it is normatively justified. 
To address questions of dynamic reasoning, it may be useful to complement the method 
of coherence computation (Capotorti et al., 2003; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002) with the 
method of constructing and manipulating Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1988; Sloman, 2005). The 
computation of coherence has the advantage that it is straightforward to carry out in situations 
of incomplete information. Conversely, the use of Bayesian networks has the advantage that it 
is straightforward to assess changes in probabilities (all else being equal) after receiving a 
piece of new information, including situations in which the coherence interval before and after 
receiving the information is the unit interval (McGee, 1985; Stern, 2017, June).  
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Counterfactuals, generals, and universals 
One way in which people's beliefs change over time as they receive new information is when a 
conditional, e.g. "If it rains today, the road will be muddy" becomes void as an indicative in 
the sense that there is no actual state of affairs that could confirm or refute it, and is replaced 
with a counterfactual, "If it had rained today, the road would have been muddy". The work in 
this thesis focussed on singular indicative conditionals, which were modelled by the Equation, 
P(if p then q) = P(q|p). But it would be important to assess to what extent the Equation can be 
generalised to counterfactual conditionals, and to indicative conditionals that refer not to 
singular events, but to law-like (causal or conceptual) relations, like "If it rains on dirt tracks, 
they get muddy" (Cruz & Oberauer, 2014; Oakford & Chater, 2010). There is, moreover, a 
close relation between counterfactuals and law-like generalisations, in that one way of 
characterising the latter is that they support the former (Chater & Oaksford, 2013; Edgington, 
2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2010a; Over, 2017; Pearl, 2000). A generalisation, expressed as a 
general indicative conditional, is counterfactual supporting when there is a positive 
correspondence between the probability of the indicative and the probability of the 
corresponding counterfactual. Some authors have proposed that the meaning of 
counterfactuals is similar to that of indicatives, and that both are assessed by the Ramsey test, 
but with different accounts of what that test would be (Edgington, 2008; Over, 2017; see also 
Pearl, 2013, on interventions and the Ramsey test). On the other hand, if law-like 
generalisations are conditionals for which there is a positive correspondence between the 
probabilities of the indicative and the counterfactual, then this suggests that such general 
conditionals are determined not just by P(q|p), but also by P(not-q|not-p), yielding a positive 
covariation between p and q (Cruz et al., 2016; Oaksford &  Chater, 2017; Oberauer, 
Weidenfeld, et al., 2007; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016).  
In any event, the relations between indicatives and counterfactuals, and between 
counterfactuals and generals, are an important area of future research. The distinction between 
singular and general conditionals also connects to the study of quantified statements, e.g. to 
the "singular" "all dirt tracks [in the surroundings] got muddy when it rained yesterday", vs. 
the "general" "all dirt tracks get muddy when it rains" (see also Popper's 2002 distinction 
between numerical and specific generality, and Ramsey's 1929 distinction between 
conjunctions and variable hypotheticals).  
Within Bayesian approaches, the quantifier "all" is often still represented using the 
material conditional (Adams, 1998; Howson & Urbach, 2006). But this appears to come at the 
cost of the paradoxes of the material conditional, which Bayesian approaches have so clearly 
argued against in the context of conditional statements. One might see this in the example of 
Raven's paradox (Hempel, 1945; Howson & Urbach, 2006). The paradox is often described 
using the hypothesis "All ravens are black". It is called a paradox because it was originally 
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described as a situation in which a seemingly counterintuitive conclusion followed from 
seemingly unproblematic and straightforward assumptions. These assumptions are: 
(1) Hypotheses of the form All R are B are confirmed by evidence of the form R & B.   
(2) Hypotheses that are logically equivalent are confirmed by the same evidence.  
The argument is that by (1), evidence of the form not-R & not-B confirms the hypothesis that 
All not-B are not-R. By contraposition, All not-B are not-R is supposed to be equivalent to All 
R are B, so that by (2) evidence of the form not-R & not-B also confirms the hypothesis that 
All R are B. It follows that for example the finding of a white sock, or of a red herring, 
provides corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that all ravens are black, which seems 
counterintuitive.  
Howson & Urbach (2006) argue that in the Bayesian approach, this is not really a 
paradox once one realises that confirming evidence comes in degrees. Both R & B and not-R 
& not-B confirm the hypothesis All Rs are B, but not-R & not-B does so to a far smaller extent. 
This is because the prior probability of observing something that is not black and not a raven 
is very high, and therefore less informative about the hypothesis in question (c.f. the rarity 
assumption, Oaksford, 2002).  
However, in the above analysis the application of (2) depends on the assumption that All 
R are B is logically equivalent to All not-B are not-A. This is the case when "all" is expressed 
using the material conditional, but not when it is expressed using the probability conditional 
because contraposition is invalid for the probability conditional: P(q|p) is not equivalent to 
P(not-p|not-q) (c.f. Jeffrey, 1964; Stalnaker, 1968). As mentioned before, when the conditional 
probability for the Equation is computed via the Ramsey test rather than via the ratio formula, 
contraposition fails even in the case in which the probability of the premise is 1 (Gilio, 1990; 
Jeffrey, 1991). This seems to imply that in a fully Bayesian analysis, which replaces the 
material conditional with the probability conditional not only in the case of explicit 
conditionals statements, if p then q, but also in the case of universals, all p are q, the 
counterintuitive nature of the paradox is justified. The paradox then resolves not by explaining 
why the seemingly counterintuitive result is normative, but by pointing out that the 
counterintuitive nature of the result is based on assumptions about the meaning of conditionals 
that are themselves highly counterintuitive. As an example of how the paradoxes of the 
material conditional create the same problems for universals as they do for natural language 
conditionals, consider the hypothesis All ravens on the moon are black. If this hypothesis is 
represented using a material conditional, then it must be confirmed with certainty, and also the 
alternative hypothesis All ravens on the moon are not-black must be confirmed with certainty, 
by the trivial fact that there are no ravens on the moon.  
A representation of universals that is in line with the Equation is the proposal P(all p are 
q) = 1 if and only if P(q|p) = 1, so that the statement is true when the conditional probability is 
1, and false otherwise (Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Cruz & Oberauer, 2014; Pfeifer, 2006). This 
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relation may express that a binary property holds for every single member of a set, for 
example, when the ten people in a room are wearing glasses, and not just 9 of the 10. An 
alternative would be to replace the classical logical expression "For all x(x is not a raven or x 
is black)" with the probabilistic expression "For all x(there is a specific conditional probability 
that x is black, given that x is a raven)", so that the statement is true when the given 
conditional probability applies to every single element of a set, and false if it applies only to a 
subset of its elements. In contrast to the probability of a conditional, the probability of the 
universal would then correspond not to the proportion of a set for which a property holds, but 
to the probability that the property holds for every single member of the set. When the 
property is "the coin lands heads", then this probability decreases exponentially with the 
number of tosses (Cruz & Oberauer, 2014).  
These are just initial thoughts for a probabilistic representation of universals (see Chater 
& Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer & Sanfilippo, 2017, for more developed 
accounts; and Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, as well as Baratgin et al., 2015, for a comparison 
with the assumptions of mental model theory). An ongoing challenge for the new paradigm is 
to provide a formal specification of these statements in a probabilistic predicate logic that 
would allow the formulation of coherence intervals for them.  
 
Coherence and rationality 
The finding that overall people tend to reason coherently from the premises to the conclusion 
of inferences, even if not in all cases, has wider practical implications that can only briefly be 
touched upon here. If people are coherent not only in their beliefs, but also between what they 
believe, what they want, and what they do (assuming external circumstances allow for this), 
then they can use this coherence to obtain clarity about what they can do to get what they 
want, given what they believe (Adams, 1998; Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 1993; Ramsey, 
1926).  
A central tool to achieve such clarity about decision making is Subjective Expected 
Utility (SEU, Chater & Oaksford, 2012; Jeffrey, 1990). On this account, the utility a person 
can expect of an action is calculated by assessing how desirable and probable the 
consequences of the action are, multiplying the desirability of each consequence with its 
probability, and summing up the resulting terms. The same can be done for an alternative 
action with its respective consequences, and one can then see which action has the highest 
subjective utility. 
Adams (1998) points out that this tool can only be useful when people's degrees of belief 
are good approximations of the relevant facts. If people's degrees of belief are distant from 
what is actually the case, then their actions based on those beliefs are less likely to help them 
get what they want. This creates a practical incentive for having beliefs that correspond to the 
facts, beyond the purely logical, and "internal", considerations of coherence and p-validity.   
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As discussed above, our beliefs about the facts are often uncertain. They depend, not only 
on our concrete experiences, but also on the theories we construct to understand and navigate 
these experiences. Does this imply that what counts as rational is always relative to our 
theories about the world at a particular point in time? Coherence between our beliefs, desires 
and actions is sufficient to apply the SEU formula. But is it sufficient for rationality, or does 
rationality also involve an ability to be receptive to our environment, so that we can learn from 
experience and revise our theories about what is the case to take new information into 
account? And are there ways of comparing personal theories about the world as more or less 
justified, given a body of shared knowledge at a particular point in time, as is done with 
scientific theories (Howson & Urbach, 2006)? These are difficult questions (Elqayam & Over, 
2016), but relevant to them are the increasing studies of the legal, moral, social, and 
environmental contexts of subjective probability and utility judgments (Hahn, Harris, & 
Corner, 2016; Lagnado & Gerstenberg, 2017; Misyak & Chater, 2014; Stanovich, West, & 
Toplak, 2013). These studies should broaden our understanding of human thought and action, 
and contribute to further integration of research on reasoning, learning, and decision making. 
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Appendix A 
Jeffrey tables for the probability biconditional.  
 
 
Table A2 shows the Jeffrey table for the probability biconditional, if p then q & if q then p, 
which adds the converse of the original conditional. Table A3 shows the Jeffrey table for 
another probability biconditional if p then q & if not-p then not-q, which adds the inverse of 
the original conditional. Table A1 shows the classical truth table for the material biconditional 
for comparison. The Jeffrey tables were derived from Gilio et al. (2016). 
 
 
Table A1. Truth table for 
the material biconditional. 
p, q 1 
p, not-q 0 
not-p, q 0 
not-p, not-q 1 
 
 
Table A2. The Jeffrey table for the probability biconditional if p then q & if q then p. 
 q|p p|q (q|p)&(p|q) 
p, q 1 1 1 
p, not-q 0 P(p|q) 0 
not-p, q P(q|p) 0 0 
not-p, not-q P(q|p) P(p|q) P[(q|p)&(p|q)] = P(p & q/p or q) 
 
 
Table A3. Jeffrey table for the probability biconditional if p then q & 
if not-p then not-q.  
 q|p not-q|not-p (q|p)&(not-q|not-p) 
p, q 1 P(not-q|not-p) P(not-q|not-p) 
p, not-q 0 P(not-q|not-p) 0 
not-p, q P(q|p) 0 0 
not-p, not-q P(q|p) 1 P(q|p) 
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Appendix B 
The materials used in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Table B1. The scenarios used in the experiment. 
Linda Linda is single, outspoken, and intelligent. She majored in Philosophy at 
university, was concerned with social justice, and was anti-nuclear. 
Nigel Nigel comes from a wealthy family and got a first class degree in Classics at 
Oxford, where he was president of the wine society. He campaigned for the ban 
on fox hunting to be repealed. 
 
 
Table B2. The 24 sentences used in the statements task, consisting of all premises and 
conclusions occurring in the inferences task.  
Booklet Statement type # Content 
Linda p or q 1 Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Green Party. 
 2 Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party. 
 3 Linda is a social worker or a youth worker. 
 4 Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
 if not-p then q 5 If Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, 
then she votes for the Green Party. 
 6 If Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, 
then she votes for the Conservative Party. 
 7 If Linda is not a social worker then she is a 
youth worker. 
 8 If Linda is not a social worker then she is a 
bank teller. 
 p 9 Linda is a social worker. 
 10 Linda is a youth worker. 
 11 Linda is a bank teller. 
 12 Linda votes for the Labour Party. 
 13 Linda votes for the Green Party. 
 14 Linda votes for the Conservative Party. 
 not-p or q 15 Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
 16 Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
 17 Linda does not work in the service sector or 
she is a social worker.  
 18 Linda does not work in the service sector or 
she is a bank teller. 
 if p then q 19 If Linda does votes, then she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
 20 If Linda votes, then she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
 21 If Linda works in the service sector, then 
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she is a social worker.  
 22 If Linda works in the service sector then 
she is a bank teller. 
 not-p 23 Linda does not vote. 
 24 Linda does not work in the service sector. 
Nigel p or q 1 Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
  2 Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
  3 Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant 
banker. 
  4 Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic 
food salesman. 
 if not-p then q 5 If Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he 
drives a Porsche. 
  6 If Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he 
drives a Ford Fiesta. 
  7 If Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he is 
a merchant banker. 
  8 If Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he is 
an organic food salesman. 
 p 9 Nigel drives a BMW.  
  10 Nigel drives a Porsche. 
  11 Nigel drives a Ford Fiesta. 
  12 Nigel is a corporate lawyer. 
  13 Nigel is a merchant banker. 
  14 Nigel is an organic food salesman. 
 not-p or q 15 Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Porsche. 
  16 Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Ford Fiesta. 
  17 Nigel does not work in the service sector or 
he is a corporate lawyer. 
  18 Nigel does not work in the service sector or 
he is an organic food salesman. 
 if p then q 19 If Nigel drives a car, then he drives a 
Porsche. 
  20 If Nigel drives a car, then he drives a Ford 
Fiesta. 
  21 If Nigel works in the service sector, then he 
is a corporate lawyer. 
  22 If Nigel works in the service sector, then he 
is an organic food salesman. 
 not-p 23 Nigel does not drive a car. 
  24 Nigel does not work in the service sector. 
 
 
Table B3. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 1. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Linda p or q if not-p 1h Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green Party. 
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A1 then q Therefore, if Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, 
then she votes for the Green Party. 
  1l Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Conservative 
Party  
Therefore, if Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, 
then she votes for the Conservative Party. 
 not-p or q  if 
p then q 
2h Linda does not work in the service sector or she is a 
social worker. 
Therefore, if Linda works in the service sector, then 
she is a social worker. 
  2l Linda does not work in the service sector or she is a 
bank teller.  
Therefore, if Linda works in the service sector then 
she is a bank teller. 
 if p then qnot-
p or q 
3h If Linda votes, then she votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  3l If Linda votes, then she votes for the Conservative 
Party. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
 if not-p then q 
p or q 
4h If Linda is not a social worker then she is a youth 
worker. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a youth worker. 
  4l If Linda is not a social worker then she is a bank teller. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
 pp or q 5h Linda votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes the Labour Party or the Green 
Party. 
  5l Linda votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party. 
 not-p not-p or 
q 
6h Linda does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or 
she is a social worker. 
  6l Linda does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or 
she is a bank teller. 
 qp or q 7h Linda votes for the Green Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Green Party. 
  7l Linda votes for the Conservative Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party. 
 q not-p or q 8h Linda is a social worker. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or 
she is a social worker. 
  8l Linda is a bank teller. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or 
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she is a bank teller. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
 
 
Table B4. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 2. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Linda 
A2 
p or q 
if not-
p then q 
1h Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green Party. 
Therefore, if Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then 
she votes for the Green Party. 
  1l Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Conservative Party.  
Therefore, if Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then 
she votes for the Conservative Party. 
 not-p or 
q  if p 
then q 
2h Linda does not work in the service sector or she is a social 
worker. 
Therefore, if Linda works in the service sector, then she is a 
social worker. 
  2l Linda does not work in the service sector or she is a bank 
teller.  
Therefore, if Linda works in the service sector then she is a 
bank teller. 
 if p then 
qnot-p 
or q 
3h If Linda works in the service sector, then she is a social 
worker. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or she is 
a social worker. 
  3l If Linda works in the service sector then she is a bank teller. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or she is 
a bank teller. 
 if not-p 
then q 
p or q 
4h If Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then she votes for 
the Green Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green 
Party. 
  4l If Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then she votes for 
the Conservative Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party. 
 pp or q 5h Linda votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green 
Party. 
  5l Linda votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party. 
 not-p 
not-p 
or q 
6h Linda does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or she is 
a social worker. 
  6l Linda does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or she is 
a bank teller. 
 qp or q 7h Linda votes for the Green Party. 
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Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green 
Party. 
  7l Linda votes for the Conservative Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party. 
 q not-p 
or q 
8h Linda is a social worker. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or she is 
a social worker. 
  8l Linda is a bank teller. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector or she is 
a bank teller. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
 
 
Table B5. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 3. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Linda 
B1 
p or q if not-p 
then q 
1h Linda is a social worker or a youth worker. 
Therefore, if Linda is not a social worker then she is a 
youth worker. 
  1l Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
Therefore, if Linda is not a social worker then she is a 
bank teller. 
 not-p or q  if p 
then q 
2h Linda does not vote or she votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, if Linda votes, then she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  2l Linda does not vote or she votes for the Conservative 
Party. 
Therefore, if Linda votes, then she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
 if p then qnot-
p or q 
3h If Linda works in the service sector, then she is a 
social worker. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector 
or she is a social worker. 
  3l If Linda works in the service sector then she is a bank 
teller. 
Therefore, Linda does not work in the service sector 
or she is a bank teller. 
 if not-p then q 
p or q 
4h If Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then she 
votes for the Green Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Green Party. 
  4l If Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then she 
votes for the Conservative Party. 
Therefore, Linda votes for the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party. 
 pp or q 5h Linda is a social worker. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a youth worker. 
  5l Linda is a social worker  
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a bank teller 
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 not-p not-p or 
q 
6h Linda does not vote. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  6l Linda does not vote. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
 q p or q 7h Linda is a youth worker. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a youth worker. 
  7l Linda is a bank teller. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
 q not-p or q 8h Linda votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  8l Linda votes for the Conservative Party. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
 
 
Table B6. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 4. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Linda 
B2 
p or q if not-p 
then q 
1h Linda is a social worker or a youth worker.  
Therefore, if Linda is not a social worker then she is 
a youth worker. 
  1l Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
Therefore, if Linda is not a social worker then she is 
a bank teller. 
 not-p or q  if p 
then q 
2h Linda does not vote or she votes for the Labour 
Party. 
Therefore, if Linda votes, then she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  2l Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
Therefore, if Linda votes, then she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
 if p then qnot-p 
or q 
3h If Linda votes, then she votes for the Labour Party.  
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  3l If Linda votes, then she votes for the Conservative 
Party. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
 if not-p then q p 
or q 
4h If Linda is not a social worker then she is a youth 
worker. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a youth 
worker. 
  4l If Linda is not a social worker then she is a bank 
teller. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
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 pp or q 5h Linda is a social worker. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a youth 
worker. 
  5l Linda is a social worker. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
 not-p not-p or q 6h Linda does not vote. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  6l Linda does not vote. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Pary. 
 q p or q 7h Linda is a youth worker. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a youth 
worker. 
  7l Linda is a bank teller. 
Therefore, Linda is a social worker or a bank teller. 
 q not-p or q 8h Linda votes for the Labour Party. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Labour Party. 
  8l Linda votes for the Conservative Party. 
Therefore, Linda does not vote or she votes for the 
Conservative Party. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
 
 
Table B7. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 5. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Nigel 
C1 
p or q if not-p 
then q 
1h Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche.  
Therefore, if Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he 
drives a Porsche. 
  1l Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta.  
Therefore, if Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he 
drives a Ford Fiesta. 
 not-p or q  if p 
then q 
2h Nigel does not work in the service sector or he is a 
corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, if Nigel works in the service sector, then 
he is a corporate lawyer. 
  2l Nigel does not work in the service sector or he is an 
organic food salesman. 
Therefore, if Nigel works in the service sector, then 
he is an organic food salesman. 
 if p then qnot-
p or q 
3h If Nigel drives a car, then he drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Porsche. 
  3l If Nigel drives a car, then he drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Ford Fiesta. 
 if not-p then q 4h If Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he is a 
merchant banker. 
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p or q Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant 
banker. 
  4l If Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he is an 
organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic 
food salesman. 
 pp or q 5h Nigel drives a BMW. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
  5l Nigel drives a BMW. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
 not-p not-p or 
q 
6h Nigel does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is a corporate lawyer. 
  6l Nigel does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is an organic food salesman. 
 q p or q 7h Nigel drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
  7l Nigel drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
 q not-p or q 8h Nigel is a corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is a corporate lawyer. 
  8l Nigel is an organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is an organic food salesman. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
 
 
Table B8. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 6. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Nigel 
C2 
p or q if not-p 
then q 
1h Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
Therefore, if Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he 
drives a Porsche. 
  1l Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, if Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he 
drives a Ford Fiesta. 
 not-p or q  if p 
then q 
2h Nigel does not work in the service sector or he is a 
corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, if Nigel works in the service sector, then 
he is a corporate lawyer. 
  2l Nigel does not work in the service sector or he is an 
organic food salesman. 
Therefore, if Nigel works in the service sector, then 
he is an organic food salesman. 
 if p then qnot-
p or q 
3h If Nigel works in the service sector, then he is a 
corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is a corporate lawyer. 
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  3l If Nigel works in the service sector, then he is an 
organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is an organic food salesman. 
 if not-p then q 
p or q 
4h If Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he drives a 
Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
  4l If Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he drives a Ford 
Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
 pp or q 5h Nigel drives a BMW. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
  5l Nigel drives a BMW. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
 not-p not-p or 
q 
6h Nigel does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is a corporate lawyer. 
  6l Nigel does not work in the service sector. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is an organic food salesman. 
 q p or q 7h Nigel drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
  7l Nigel drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
 q not-p or q 8h Nigel is a corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is a corporate lawyer. 
  8l Nigel is an organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is an organic food salesman. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
 
 
Table B9. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 7. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Nigel 
D1 
p or q if not-p 
then q 
1h Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant banker. 
Therefore, if Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he 
is a merchant banker. 
  1l Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic food 
salesman. 
Therefore, if Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he 
is an organic food salesman. 
 not-p or q  if p 
then q 
2h Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, if Nigel drives a car, then he drives a 
Porsche. 
  2l Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, if Nigel drives a car, then he drives a Ford 
Fiesta. 
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 if p then qnot-
p or q 
3h If Nigel works in the service sector, then he is a 
corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is a corporate lawyer. 
  3l If Nigel works in the service sector, then he is an 
organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel does not work in the service sector 
or he is an organic food salesman. 
 if not-p then q 
p or q 
4h If Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he drives a 
Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Porsche. 
  4l If Nigel does not drive a BMW, then he drives a Ford 
Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel drives a BMW or a Ford Fiesta. 
 pp or q 5h Nigel is a corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant 
banker. 
  5l Nigel is a corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic 
food salesman. 
 not-p not-p or 
q 
6h Nigel does not drive a car. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Porsche. 
  6l Nigel does not drive a car. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Ford Fiesta. 
 q p or q 7h Nigel is a merchant banker. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant 
banker. 
  7l Nigel is an organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic 
food salesman. 
 q not-p or q 8h Nigel drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Porsche. 
  8l Nigel drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Ford Fiesta. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
 
 
Table B10. The 16 inferences for the inferences task, booklet 8. 
Booklet Inference # Content 
Nigel 
D2 
p or q if not-p 
then q 
1h Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant banker. 
Therefore, if Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he 
is a merchant banker. 
  1l Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic food 
salesman. 
Therefore, if Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he 
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is an organic food salesman. 
 not-p or q  if p 
then q 
2h Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, if Nigel drives a car, then he drives a 
Porsche. 
  2l Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, if Nigel drives a car, then he drives a Ford 
Fiesta. 
 if p then qnot-p 
or q 
3h If Nigel drives a car, then he drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Porsche. 
  3l If Nigel drives a car, then he drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Ford Fiesta. 
 if not-p then q 
p or q 
4h If Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he is a 
merchant banker. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant 
banker. 
  4l If Nigel is not a corporate lawyer, then he is an 
organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic 
food salesman. 
 pp or q 5h Nigel is a corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant 
banker. 
  5l Nigel is a corporate lawyer. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic 
food salesman. 
 not-p not-p or 
q 
6h Nigel does not drive a car. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Porsche. 
  6l Nigel does not drive a car. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Ford Fiesta. 
 q p or q 7h Nigel is a merchant banker. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or a merchant 
banker. 
  7l Nigel is an organic food salesman. 
Therefore, Nigel is a corporate lawyer or an organic 
food salesman. 
 q not-p or q 8h Nigel drives a Porsche. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Porsche. 
  8l Nigel drives a Ford Fiesta. 
Therefore, Nigel does not drive a car or he drives a 
Ford Fiesta. 
Note. h = high plausibility for scenario, l = low plausibility for scenario. 
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Appendix C 
The materials used in Experiments 3 and 4. 
 
 
Table C1. Materials for inference 1: DM. 
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog does not have both three legs and 
blue fur 
The dog does not have three legs or the dog 
does not have blue fur 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog does not have both teeth and fur  
The dog does not have teeth or the dog does 
not have fur  
 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant does not have both an ostrich 
farm and a butchery 
The restaurant does not have an ostrich farm 
or the restaurant does not have a butchery 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant does not have both chairs and 
tables 
The restaurant does not have chairs or the 
restaurant does not have tables 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house is not both made of plastic and 
built on a tree 
The house is not made of plastic or the house 
is not built on a tree  
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house does not have both a roof and 
walls 
The house does not have a roof or the house 
does not have walls 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree does not both grow sideways and 
have bells in its branches 
The tree does not grow sideways or the tree 
does not have bells in its branches 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree does not have both a bark and 
branches 
The tree does not have a bark or the tree does 
not have branches 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove does not have both one leg and a 
green beak 
The dove does not have one leg or the dove 
does not have a green beak 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove does not have both feathers and a 
beak 
The dove does not have feathers or the dove 
does not have a beak  
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar does not have both a book store and a 
laundry 
The bar does not have a book store or the bar 
does not have a laundry 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar does not have both beer and wine 
The bar does not have beer or the bar does 
not have wine 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
The neighbourhood does not have both a 
waterfall and a silver mine 
The neighbourhood does not have a waterfall 
or the neighbourhood does not have a silver 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood does not have both 
people and cars 
The neighbourhood does not have people or 
the neighbourhood does not have cars 
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mine  
8. Anne walks through a random city, and passes 
by a bus from the local public transport 
system. How likely is it that  
The bus does not carry both horses and stones  
The bus does not carry horses or the bus does 
not carry stones  
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that 
The bus does not have both seats and 
windows 
The bus does not have seats or the bus does 
not have windows 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat does not both have three legs and 
have mud in its fur 
The cat does not have three legs or the cat 
does not have mud in its fur 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat does not have both claws and eyes 
The cat does not have claws or the cat does 
not have eyes 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park does not have both a cement floor 
and artificial plants 
The park does not have a cement floor or it 
does not have artificial plants  
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that 
The park does not have both trees and grass 
The park does not have trees or the park does 
not have grass 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle is not both made of bread and 
covered in sugar 
The bicycle is not made of bread or the 
bicycle is not covered in sugar 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle does not have both wheels and 
pedals 
The bicycle does not have wheels or the 
bicycle does not have pedals 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
The train station does not have both a theatre 
and a cinema 
The train station does not have a theatre or the 
train station does not have a cinema 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
The train station does not have both seats and 
a time table 
The train station does not have seats or the 
train station does not have a time table 
 
 
Table C2. Materials for inference 2: nDM. 
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has teeth and it has fur  
The dog does not have teeth or the dog does 
not have fur  
 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has three legs and it has blue fur 
The dog does not have three legs or the dog 
does not have blue fur 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has chairs and it has tables 
The restaurant does not have chairs or the 
restaurant does not have tables 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm and it has a 
butchery 
The restaurant does not have an ostrich farm 
or the restaurant does not have a butchery 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
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by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house has a roof and it has walls 
The house does not have a roof or the house 
does not have walls 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house is made of plastic and it is built on 
a tree 
The house is not made of plastic or the house 
is not built on a tree  
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree has a bark and it has branches 
The tree does not have a bark or the tree does 
not have branches 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree does grows sideways and it has bells 
in its branches 
The tree does not grow sideways or the tree 
does not have bells in its branches 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has feathers and it has a beak 
The dove does not have feathers or the dove 
does not have a beak  
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has one leg and it has a green beak 
The dove does not have one leg or the dove 
does not have a green beak 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar has beer and it has wine 
The bar does not have beer or the bar does not 
have wine 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar has a book store and it has a laundry 
The bar does not have a book store or the bar 
does not have a laundry 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood has people and it has cars 
The neighbourhood does not have people or 
the neighbourhood does not have cars 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
The neighbourhood does has a waterfall and 
it has a silver mine 
The neighbourhood does not have a waterfall 
or the neighbourhood does not have a silver 
mine  
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that 
The bus has seats and it has windows 
The bus does not have seats or the bus does 
not have windows 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus carries horses and it carries stones  
The bus does not carry horses or the bus does 
not carry stones  
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has claws and it has eyes 
The cat does not have claws or the cat does 
not have eyes 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has three legs and it has mud in its fur 
The cat does not have three legs or the cat 
does not have mud in its fur 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that 
The park has trees and it has grass 
The park does not have trees or the park does 
not have grass 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has a cement floor and it has 
artificial plants 
The park does not have a cement floor or it 
does not have artificial plants  
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle has wheels and it has pedals 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle is made of bread and it is covered 
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The bicycle does not have wheels or the 
bicycle does not have pedals 
in sugar 
The bicycle is not made of bread or the 
bicycle is not covered in sugar 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
The train station has seats and it has a time 
table 
The train station does not have seats or the 
train station does not have a time table 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
The train station has a theatre and it has a 
cinema 
The train station does not have a theatre or 
the train station does not have a cinema 
 
 
Table C3. Materials for inference 3: &E. 
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has teeth and it has fur 
The dog has teeth 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has three legs and it has blue fur 
The dog has three legs 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has chairs and it has tables 
The restaurant has chairs 
 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm and a 
butchery  
The restaurant has an ostrich farm 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house has a roof and it has walls 
The house has a roof 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house is made of plastic and it is built on 
a tree 
The house is made of plastic 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree has a bark and it has branches 
The tree has a bark 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree grows sideways and it has bells in its 
branches 
The tree grows sideways 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has feathers and it has a beak 
The dove has feathers 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has one leg and it has a green beak 
The dove has one leg 
 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
The bar has beer and it has wine 
The bar has beer 
 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
The bar has a book store and it has a laundry 
The bar has a book store 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood has people and it has cars 
The neighbourhood has people 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
The neighbourhood has a waterfall and it has 
a silver mine 
The neighbourhood has a waterfall 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
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passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus has seats and it has windows 
The bus has seats 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus carries horses and it carries stones 
The bus carries horses 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has claws and it has eyes  
The cat has claws 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that the cat 
The cat has three legs and it has mud in its fur 
The cat has three legs 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has trees and it has grass 
The park has trees 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has a cement floor and it has 
artificial plants 
The park has a cement floor 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that the 
bicycle  
The bicycle has wheels and it has pedals 
The bicycle has wheels 
 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle is made of bread and it is covered 
in sugar 
The bicycle is made of bread 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
The train station has seats and it has a time 
table  
The train station has seats 
 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
The train station has a theatre and it has a 
cinema 
The train station has a theatre 
 
 
Table C4. Materials for inference 4: &I.  
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has teeth  
The dog has teeth and it has fur 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has three legs  
The dog has three legs and it has blue fur 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has chairs  
The restaurant has chairs and it has tables 
 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm  
The restaurant has an ostrich farm and it has a 
butchery  
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house has a roof  
The house has a roof and it has walls 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house is made of plastic  
The house is made of plastic and it is built on 
a tree. 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree has a bark  
The tree has a bark and it has branches 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree grows sideways  
The tree grows sideways and it has bells in its 
branches 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
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by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has feathers  
The dove has feathers and it has a beak 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has one leg  
The dove has one leg and it has a green beak 
 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
The bar has beer  
The bar has beer and it has wine 
 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
The bar has a book store  
The bar has a book store and it has a laundry 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood has people  
The neighbourhood has people and it has cars 
 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
The neighbourhood has a waterfall  
The neighbourhood has a waterfall and it has 
a silver mine 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus has seats  
The bus has seats and it has windows 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus carries horses  
The bus carries horses and it carries stones 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has claws  
The cat has claws and it has eyes 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that the cat 
The cat has three legs  
The cat has three legs and it has mud in its fur 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has trees  
The park has trees and it has grass 
 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has a cement floor 
The park has a cement floor and it has 
artificial plants 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that the 
bicycle  
The bicycle has wheels  
The bicycle has wheels and it has pedals 
 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle is made of bread  
The bicycle is made of bread and it is covered 
in sugar  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
The train station has seats  
The train station has seats and it has a time 
table 
 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
The train station has a theatre 
The train station has a theatre and it has a 
cinema 
 
 
Table C5. Materials for inference 5: &Or. 
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has teeth and it has fur 
The dog has teeth or it has fur  
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has three legs and it has blue fur 
The dog has three legs or it has blue fur  
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2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has chairs and it has tables 
The restaurant has chairs or it has tables  
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm and it has a 
butchery  
The restaurant has an ostrich farm or it has a 
butchery  
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house has a roof and it has walls 
The house has a roof or it has walls  
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house is made of plastic and it is built on 
a tree 
The house is made of plastic or it is built on a 
tree  
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree has a bark and it has branches 
The tree has a bark or it has branches  
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree grows sideways and it has bells in its 
branches 
The tree grows sideways or it has bells in its 
branches  
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has feathers and it has a beak 
The dove has feathers or it has a beak  
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has one leg and it has a green beak 
The dove has one leg or it has a green beak  
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar has beer and it has wine 
The bar has beer or it has wine  
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
The bar has a book store and it has a laundry 
The bar has a book store or it has a laundry  
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood has people and it has cars 
The neighbourhood has people or it has cars  
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
The neighbourhood has a waterfall and it has 
a silver mine 
The neighbourhood has a waterfall or it has a 
silver mine  
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus has seats and it has windows 
The bus has seats or it has windows  
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus carries horses and it carries stones 
The bus carries horses or it carries stones  
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has claws and it has eyes 
The cat has claws or it has eyes  
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that the cat 
The cat has three legs and it has mud in its fur 
The cat has three legs or it has mud in its fur  
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has trees and it has grass 
The park has trees or it has grass  
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has a cement floor and it has 
artificial plants 
The park has a cement floor or it has artificial 
plants  
Michael walks through a random city and Michael walks through a random city and 
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passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that   
The bicycle has wheels and it has pedals 
The bicycle has wheels or it has pedals  
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle is made of bread and it is covered 
in sugar  
The bicycle is made of bread or it is covered 
in sugar  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
The train station has seats and it has a time 
table 
The train station has seats or it has a time 
table  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
The train station has a theatre and it has a 
cinema  
The train station has a theatre or it has a 
cinema 
 
 
Table C6. Materials for inference 6: Or&. 
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has teeth or it has fur  
The dog has teeth and it has fur 
 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has three legs or it has blue fur  
The dog has three legs and it has blue fur  
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has chairs or it has tables  
The restaurant has chairs and it has tables 
 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm or it has a 
butchery  
The restaurant has an ostrich farm and it has a 
butchery  
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house has a roof or it has walls 
The house has a roof and it has walls 
 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
The house is made of plastic or it is built on a 
tree  
The house is made of plastic and it is built on 
a tree  
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree has a bark or it has branches  
The tree has a bark and it has branches 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree grows sideways or it has bells in its 
branches 
The tree grows sideways and it has bells in its 
branches 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has feathers or it has a beak  
The dove has feathers and it has a beak 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has one leg or it has a green beak  
The dove has one leg and it has a green beak 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar has beer or it has wine  
The bar has beer and it has wine 
 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar has a book store or it has a laundry  
The bar has a book store and it has a laundry 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
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The neighbourhood has people or it has cars  
The neighbourhood has people and it has cars 
that  
The neighbourhood has a waterfall or it has a 
silver mine  
The neighbourhood has a waterfall and it has 
a silver mine 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus has seats or it has windows  
The bus has seats and it has windows 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus carries horses or it carries stones  
The bus carries horses and it carries stones 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has claws or it has eyes  
The cat has claws and it has eyes 
 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that the cat 
The cat has three legs or it has mud in its fur  
The cat has three legs and it has mud in its fur 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has trees or it has grass  
The park has trees and it has grass 
 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has a cement floor or it has artificial 
plants  
The park has a cement floor and it has 
artificial plants 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that   
The bicycle has wheels or it has pedals  
The bicycle has wheels and it has pedals 
 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle is made of bread or it is covered 
in sugar  
The bicycle is made of bread and it is covered 
in sugar  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
The train station has seats or it has a time 
table  
The train station has seats and it has a time 
table 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
The train station has a theatre or it has a 
cinema  
The train station has a theatre and it has a 
cinema 
 
 
Table C7. Materials for inference 7: IfOr. 
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog does not have teeth, then it has fur  
The dog has teeth or it has fur  
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog does not have three legs, then it has 
blue fur 
The dog has three legs or it has blue fur  
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant does not have chairs, then it 
has tables 
The restaurant has chairs or it has tables  
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant does not have an ostrich 
farm, then it has a butchery 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm or it has a 
butchery  
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
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by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house does not have a roof, then it has 
walls 
The house has a roof or it has walls  
 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house is not made of plastic, then it is 
built on a tree 
The house is made of plastic or it is built on a 
tree  
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree does not have a bark, then it has 
branches 
The tree has a bark or it has branches  
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree does not grow sideways, then it has 
bells in its branches 
The tree grows sideways or it has bells in its 
branches  
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove does not have feathers, then it has 
a beak 
The dove has feathers or it has a beak  
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove does not have one leg, then it has 
a green beak 
The dove has one leg or it has a green beak  
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
If the bar does not have beer, then it has wine 
The bar has beer or it has wine  
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
If the bar does not have a book store, then it 
has a laundry 
The bar has a book store or it has a laundry  
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
If the neighbourhood does not have people, 
then it has cars 
The neighbourhood has people or it has cars  
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
If the neighbourhood does not have a 
waterfall, then it has a silver mine 
The neighbourhood has a waterfall or it has a 
silver mine  
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that 
If the bus does not have seats, then it has 
windows  
The bus has seats or it has windows  
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus does not carry horses, then it carries 
stones 
The bus carries horses or it carries stones  
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
If the cat does not have claws, then it has eyes 
The cat has claws or it has eyes  
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that the cat 
If the cat does not have three legs, then it has 
mud in its fur 
The cat has three legs or it has mud in its fur  
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park does not have trees, then it has 
grass 
The park has trees or it has grass  
 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park does not have a cement floor, then 
it has artificial plants 
The park has a cement floor or it has artificial 
plants  
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that   
If the bicycle does not have wheels, then it 
has pedals 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
If the bicycle is not made of bread, then it is 
covered in sugar 
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The bicycle has wheels or it has pedals  The bicycle is made of bread or it is covered 
in sugar  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
If the train station does not have seats, then it 
has a time table 
The train station has seats or it has a time 
table  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
If the train station does not have a theatre, 
then it has a cinema 
The train station has a theatre or it has a 
cinema  
 
 
Table C8. Materials for inference 8: OrIf. 
High condition Low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has teeth or it has fur  
If the dog does not have teeth, then it has fur  
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
The dog has three legs or it has blue fur If the 
dog does not have three legs, then it has blue 
fur 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has chairs or it has tables  
If the restaurant does not have chairs, then it 
has tables 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm or it has a 
butchery  
if the restaurant does not have an ostrich 
farm, then it has a butchery 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a random house. How likely is it that 
The house has a roof or it has walls  
If the house does not have a roof, then it has 
walls 
 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a random house. How likely is it that 
The house is made of plastic or it is built on a 
tree  
If the house is not made of plastic, then it is 
built on a tree 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree has a bark or it has branches  
If the tree does not have a bark, then it has 
branches  
 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
The tree grows sideways or it has bells in its 
branches  
If the tree does not grow sideways, then it has 
bells in its branches 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has feathers or it has a beak  
If the dove does not have feathers, then it has 
a beak  
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
The dove has one leg or it has a green beak  
If the dove does not have one leg, then it has 
a green beak 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar has beer or it has wine  
If the bar does not have beer, then it has wine 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
The bar has a book store or it has a laundry  
If the bar does not have a book store, then it 
has a laundry 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood has people or it has cars  
If the neighbourhood does not have people, 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
The neighbourhood has a waterfall or it has a 
321 
 
then it has cars  
 
silver mine  
If the neighbourhood does not have a 
waterfall, then it has a silver mine 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that 
The bus has seats or it has windows  
If the bus does not have seats, then it has 
windows   
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
The bus carries horses or it carries stones  
If the bus does not carry horses, then it carries 
stones 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has claws or it has eyes  
If the cat does not have claws, then it has eyes 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
The cat has three legs or it has mud in its fur 
If the cat does not have three legs, then it has 
mud in its fur 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
The park has trees or it has grass  
If the park does not have trees, then it has 
grass 
 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that 
The park has a cement floor or it has artificial 
plants  
If the park does not have a cement floor, then 
it has artificial plants 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that   
The bicycle has wheels or it has pedals  
If the bicycle does not have wheels, then it 
has pedals 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
The bicycle is made of bread or it is covered 
in sugar  
If the bicycle is not made of bread, then it is 
covered in sugar 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
The train station has seats or it has a time 
table  
If the train station does not have seats, then it 
has a time table 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
The train station has a theatre or it has a 
cinema  
If the train station does not have a theatre, 
then it has a cinema 
 
 
Table C9. Materials for inference 9: MP. 
High-high condition High-low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog has teeth, then it can bite 
The dog has teeth 
The dog can bite 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog falls into a river, then it gets wet 
The dog falls into a river 
The dog gets wet 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has chairs, then it has tables 
The restaurant has chairs 
The restaurant has tables 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has a butchery, then it serves 
meat.  
The restaurant has a butchery 
The restaurant serves meat 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
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If the house has a roof then it has walls 
The house has a roof 
The house has walls 
If the house has a water mill, then it is next to 
a river.  
The house has a water mill 
The house is next to a river 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree has a bark then it has branches 
The tree has a bark 
The tree has branches 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree falls down, then it has broken 
branches 
The tree falls down 
The tree has broken branches 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove can fly then it has feathers 
The dove can fly 
The dove has feathers 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove flies into a bucket of brown paint, 
then it is brown 
The dove flies into a bucket of brown paint 
The dove is brown  
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
If the bar has beer then it has wine 
The bar has beer 
The bar has wine 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
If the bar has a book store, then it has a place 
to read 
The bar has a book store 
The bar has a place to read 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
If the neighbourhood has cars then it has 
people 
The neighbourhood has cars 
The neighbourhood has people  
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
If the neighbourhood has a waterfall, then it 
has a river 
The neighbourhood has a waterfall 
The neighbourhood has a river 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus has seats, then it has windows 
The bus has seats  
The bus has windows 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus carries a refrigerator, then it has a 
heavy load  
The bus carries a refrigerator 
The bus has a heavy load 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
If the cat has claws, then it can scratch  
The cat has claws 
The cat can scratch 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that the cat 
If the cat falls into the mud, then it is dirty 
The cat falls into the mud 
The cat is dirty  
("the" was removed in statements task) 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has trees then it has grass 
The park has trees 
The park has grass 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has dolphins then it has a pond 
The park has dolphins 
The park has a pond 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that the 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
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bicycle  
If the bicycle has wheels then it has pedals 
The bicycle has wheels 
The bicycle has pedals 
If the bicycle is made of silver, then it is 
expensive 
The bicycle is made of silver 
The bicycle is expensive 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
If the train station has seats then it has a time 
table  
The train station has seats 
The train station has a time table 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
If the train station is flooded, then it is closed 
The train station is flooded  
The train station is closed 
 
 
Table C10. Materials for inference 10: MT. 
High-high condition High-low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog falls into a sack of flour, then it has  
flour on its fur 
The dog does not have flour on its fur 
The dog does not fall into a sack of flour 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog has teeth, then it can bite 
The dog cannot bite 
The dog does not have teeth 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has an ostrich farm, then it 
serves ostrich.  
The restaurant does not serve ostrich 
The restaurant does not have an ostrich farm 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has chairs, then it has tables 
The restaurant does not have tables 
The restaurant does not have chairs 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house is made of glass, then it is 
transparent 
The house is not transparent 
The house is not made of glass 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house has a roof then it has walls 
The house does not have walls 
The house does not have a roof 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree falls on an electricity cable, then 
the electricity cable is damaged.  
The electricity cable is not damaged.  
The tree does not fall on the electricity cable. 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree has a bark, then it has branches 
The tree does not have branches 
The tree does not have a bark 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove flies into a bucket of green paint, 
then the dove is green.  
The dove is not green. 
The dove does not fly into a bucket of green 
paint. 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove can fly, then it has feathers 
The dove does not have feathers 
The dove cannot fly 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
If the bar has a library, then it has a silent 
area.  
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
If the bar has beer then it has wine 
The bar does not have wine 
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The bar does not have a silent area. 
The bar does not have a library 
The bar does not have beer 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
If the neighbourhood is flooded, then the 
basements of the houses are under water.  
The basements of the houses are not under 
water. 
The neighbourhood is not flooded. 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
If the neighbourhood has cars then it has 
people 
The neighbourhood does not have people 
The neighbourhood does not have cars 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus is made of chocolate, then it tastes 
sweet  
The bus does not taste sweet 
The bus is not made of chocolate 
 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus has seats, then it has windows 
The bus does not have windows 
The bus does not have seats 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
If the cat bites a bear then it has bear hairs in 
its mouth 
The cat does not have bear hairs in its mouth 
The cat does not bite a bear 
 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
If the cat has claws, then it can scratch 
The cat cannot scratch 
The cat does not have claws 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has zebras, then it has zebra 
footprints 
The park does not have zebra footprints 
The park does not have zebras 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has trees then it has grass 
The park does not have grass 
The park does not have trees 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
If the bicycle is made of bread, then it can be 
eaten 
The bicycle cannot be eaten 
The bicycle is not made of bread 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that 
If the bicycle has wheels then it has pedals 
The bicycle does not have pedals 
The bicycle does not have wheels  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
If the train station has a boat factory, then it 
has pieces of boats. 
The train station does not have pieces of 
boats.  
The train station does not have a boat factory.  
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
If the train station has seats then it has a time 
table 
The train station does not have a time table 
The train station does not have seats 
 
 
Table C11. Materials for inference 11: AC. 
High-high condition High-low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
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If the dog has teeth, then it can bite 
The dog can bite 
The dog has teeth 
If the dog falls into a sack of flour, then it has  
flour on its fur 
The dog has flour on its fur 
The dog falls into a sack of flour 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has chairs, then it has tables 
The restaurant has tables 
The restaurant has chairs 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has an ostrich farm, then it 
serves ostrich 
The restaurant serves ostrich 
The restaurant has an ostrich farm 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house has a roof then it has walls 
The house has walls 
The house has a roof 
 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes   
by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house is made of glass, then it is 
transparent 
The house is transparent 
The house is made of glass 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree has a bark, then it has branches 
The tree has branches 
The tree has a bark 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree falls on an electricity cable, then 
the electricity cable is damaged 
The electricity cable is damaged 
The tree falls on the electricity cable 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove can fly then it has feathers 
The dove has feathers 
The dove can fly 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If a dove flies into a bucket of green paint, 
then the dove is green 
The dove is green 
The dove flies into a bucket of green paint 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
If the bar has beer then it has wine 
The bar has wine 
The bar has beer 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that  
If the bar has a library, then it has a silent area 
The bar has a silent area 
The bar has a library 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
If the neighbourhood has cars then it has 
people 
The neighbourhood has people 
The neighbourhood has cars 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
If the neighbourhood is flooded, then the 
basements of the houses are under water 
The basements of the houses are under water 
The neighbourhood is flooded 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus has seats, then it has windows 
The bus has windows 
The bus has seats 
 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus is made of chocolate, then it tastes 
sweet 
The bus tastes sweet 
The bus is made of chocolate 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
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If the cat has claws, then it can scratch 
The cat can scratch 
The cat has claws 
If the cat bites a bear then it has bear hairs in 
its mouth 
The cat has bear hairs in its mouth 
The cat bites a bear 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has trees then it has grass 
The park has grass 
The park has trees 
 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has zebras, then it has zebra 
footprints 
The park has zebra footprints 
The park has zebras 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
If the bicycle has wheels then it has pedals 
The bicycle has pedals 
The bicycle has wheels 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that 
If the bicycle is made of bread, then it can be 
eaten 
The bicycle can be eaten 
The bicycle is made of bread 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
If the train station has seats then it has a time 
table 
The train station has a time table 
The train station has seats 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
If the train station has a boat factory, then it 
has pieces of boats 
The train station has pieces of boats 
The train station has a boat factory 
 
 
Table C12. Materials for inference 12: DA. 
High-high condition High-low condition 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog falls into a river, then it gets wet 
The dog does not fall into a river 
The dog does not get wet 
1. Mary walks through a random city and passes 
by a dog. How likely is it that 
If the dog has teeth, then it can bite 
The dog does not have teeth 
The dog cannot bite 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has a butchery, then it serves 
meat.  
The restaurant does not have a butchery 
The restaurant does not serve meat 
2. Daniel walks through a random city and 
enters a restaurant. How likely is it that 
If the restaurant has chairs, then it has tables 
The restaurant does not have chairs 
The restaurant does not have tables 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house has a water mill, then it is next to 
a river.  
The house does not have a water mill 
The house is not next to a river 
3. Lisa walks through a random city and passes 
by a family house. How likely is it that 
If the house has a roof, then it has walls 
The house does not have a roof 
The house does not have walls 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree falls down, then it has broken 
branches 
The tree does not fall down 
The tree does not have broken branches 
4. Ben walks through a random city park, and 
passes by a tree. How likely is it that 
If the tree has a bark then it has branches 
The tree does not have a bark 
The tree does not have branches 
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5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove flies into a bucket of brown paint, 
then it is brown 
The dove does not fly into a bucket of brown 
paint 
The dove is not brown 
5. Emil walks through a random city and passes 
by a dove. Howe likely is it that 
If the dove can fly then it has feathers 
The dove cannot fly 
The dove does not have feathers 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
If the bar has a book store, then it has a place 
to read 
The bar does not have a book store 
The bar does not have a place to read 
6. Berta walks through a random city and goes 
into a bar. How likely is it that the bar 
If the bar has beer then it has wine 
The bar does not have beer 
The bar does not have wine 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. 
If the neighbourhood has a waterfall, then it 
has a river 
The neighbourhood does not have a waterfall 
The neighbourhood does not have a river 
7. Brian walks through a random city and enters 
one of its neighbourhoods. How likely is it 
that  
If the neighbourhood has cars then it has 
people 
The neighbourhood does not have cars 
The neighbourhood does not have people 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus carries a refrigerator, then it has a 
heavy load 
The bus does not carry a refrigerator 
The bus does not have a heavy load 
8. Anne walks through a random city, and 
passes by a bus from the local public 
transport system. How likely is it that  
If the bus has seats, then it has windows  
The bus does not have seats 
The bus does not have windows 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that  
If the cat falls into the mud, then it is dirty 
The cat does not fall into the mud 
The cat is not dirty 
9. Milo walks through a random city and passes 
by a cat. How likely is it that the cat 
If the cat has claws, then it can scratch. 
The cat does not have claws 
The cat cannot scratch 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has dolphins then it has a pond 
The park does not have dolphins 
The park does not have a pond 
Laura walks through a random city and into a 
park. How likely is it that  
If the park has trees then it has grass 
The park does not have trees 
The park does not have grass 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that the 
bicycle  
If the bicycle is made of silver, then it is 
expensive 
The bicycle is not made of silver 
The bicycle is not expensive 
Michael walks through a random city and 
passes by a bicycle. How likely is it that  
If the bicycle has wheels then it has pedals 
The bicycle does not have wheels 
The bicycle does not have pedals 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that  
If the train station is flooded, then it is closed 
The train station is not flooded  
The train station is not closed 
Ines walks through a random city and passes 
by a train station. How likely is it that 
If the train station has seats then it has a time 
table 
The train station does not have seats 
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The train station does  not have a time table 
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Appendix D 
The materials used in Experiment 5.  
 
 
Table D1. The six context stories used in Experiment 5, together with a sample inference for 
each.   
 Context story Sample inference 
1 Imagine you are part of a team of researchers investigating the 
bird species on the island of Liaku. You are preparing a report on 
your current research, and the research quality of the report will 
determine whether you will be able to have enough funding to 
continue your work. It is important that you analyse the report in 
detail so that you can be sure that no claims are made that are not 
warranted by the data. You are reviewing the report with Lisa, 
another researcher in the team. 
Premise: The next 
Dayo bird she sees on 
Liaku will eat yam 
fish and auk fish. 
 
Conclusion: The next 
Dayo bird she sees on 
Liaku will eat yam 
fish. 
2 Imagine you are part of a team of epidemiologists that is working 
to find the source of a current cholera epidemic in the Taoli 
region. You are sampling the water from a number of wells to see 
whether they carry the virus or are safe for drinking. You need to 
analyse the water samples very thoroughly in order to give to the 
residents the information they need to regain control over the 
situation. You are reviewing the latest data with Paul, another 
epidemiologist in the team. 
Premise: Well A and 
well B have 
drinkable water. 
 
Conclusion: Well A 
has drinkable water. 
3 Imagine you are part of a team of astronomers that is coordinating 
a mission to Mars. You sent a computer robot to the planet, and 
are controlling its movements from earth, to gather important 
information. You need to be very careful in how you move it 
because if it falls over, it will not be able to send further data to 
earth. You are discussing its next movements with Emma, another 
astronomer in the team. 
Premise: It’s safe for 
the robot to move 
forward and to turn 
left. 
 
Conclusion: It’s safe 
for the robot to move 
forward. 
4 Imagine you are part of a team of engineers that is in charge of the 
security control of the huge water dam of Arom. One night during 
your shift, the security alarm suddenly goes on, indicating that 
there are cracks in the dam wall. This can be potentially very 
dangerous and you need to be careful in your evaluation of the 
situation. You go out with your colleague Brian to try to find 
where the cracks are located. 
Premise: The upper 
north area and the 
lower north area of 
the dam are sealed. 
 
Conclusion: The 
upper north area of 
the dam is sealed. 
5 Imagine you are part of a team of doctors who are working in an 
emergency hospital. Several patients are brought in by the 
ambulance with a variety of severe injuries. 
It is important that you act carefully on these cases because a 
wrong diagnosis could be fatal. You are reviewing their files with 
Miriam, another doctor in the team. 
Premise: Patient H. 
D. has a liver injury 
and a kidney injury. 
 
Conclusion: Patient 
H. D. has a liver 
injury. 
6 Imagine you are part of a group of detectives investigating a 
murder on a member of parliament. You are preparing a press 
Premise: The post 
officer and the driver 
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conference on the latest stage of your findings and analyses. It is 
important that you avoid criminalising any individual before you 
have gathered enough evidence to do so. You are reviewing the 
points you will make at the conference with Simon, another 
detective in the team. 
are implicated in the 
crime. 
 
Conclusion: The post 
officer is implicated 
in the crime. 
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Appendix E 
The materials used in Experiment 6.  
 
 
Table E1. The 12 context stories used in Experiment 6, together with a sample inference for 
each.   
 Context story Sample inference 
1 Imagine you are part of a team of researchers investigating the 
bird species on the island of Liaku. You are preparing a report 
on your current research, and the research quality of the report 
will determine whether you will be able to have enough 
funding to continue your work. It is important that you 
analyse the report in detail so that you can be sure that no 
claims are made that are not warranted by the data. You are 
reviewing the report with the team. 
Premise: The next Dayo 
bird you see on Liaku 
will not eat both yam 
fish and auk fish. 
 
Conclusion: The next 
Dayo bird you see on 
Liaku will not eat yam 
fish or will not eat auk 
fish. 
2 Imagine you are part of a group of detectives investigating a 
murder on a member of parliament. You are preparing a press 
conference on the latest stage of your findings and analyses. 
Your statements in this conference will have a strong impact 
on the perception that the court and the public will have of the 
case, and it is important that you avoid criminalising any 
individual before you have gathered enough evidence to do so. 
You are reviewing the points you will make at the conference 
with the team. 
Premise: The post 
officer and the driver are 
not both implicated in 
the crime. 
 
Conclusion: The post 
officer is not implicated 
in the crime or the 
driver is not implicated 
in the crime. 
3 Imagine you are part of a team of doctors who are working in 
an emergency hospital. Several patients are brought in by the 
ambulance with a variety of severe injuries. 
It is important that you act carefully on these cases because a 
wrong diagnosis could be fatal. You are reviewing their files 
with the team. 
Premise: Patient H. D. 
does not have both a 
liver injury and a kidney 
injury. 
 
Conclusion: Patient H. 
D. does not have a liver 
injury or he does not 
have a kidney injury. 
4 Imagine you are part of a team of engineers that is in charge 
of the security control of the huge water dam of Arom. One 
night during your shift, the security alarm suddenly goes on, 
indicating that there are cracks in the dam wall. This can be 
potentially very dangerous and you need to be careful in your 
evaluation of the situation. You go out with the team to try to 
find where the cracks are located. 
Premise: The upper 
north area and the lower 
north area of the dam 
are not both sealed. 
 
Conclusion: The upper 
north area of the dam is 
not sealed or the lower 
north area of the dam is 
not sealed. 
5 Imagine you are part of a team of astronomers that is 
coordinating a mission to Mars. You sent a computer robot to 
the planet, and are controlling its movements from earth, to 
Premise: It's not safe for 
the robot to both move 
forward and to turn left. 
332 
 
gather important information. You need to be very careful in 
how you move it because if it falls over, it will not be able to 
send further data to earth. You are discussing its next 
movements with the team. 
 
Conclusion: It's not safe 
for the robot to move 
forward or it's not safe 
for the robot to turn left. 
6 Imagine you are part of a team of epidemiologists that is 
working to find the source of a current cholera epidemic in the 
Taoli region. You are sampling the water from a number of 
wells to see whether they carry the virus or are safe for 
drinking. You need to analyse the water samples very 
thoroughly in order to give to the residents the information 
they need to regain control over the situation. You are 
reviewing the latest data with the team. 
Premise: Well A and 
well B do not both have 
drinkable water. 
 
Conclusion: Well A 
does not have drinkable 
water or well B does not 
have drinkable water. 
7 Imagine you are part of a team of engineers who have been 
called to the city of Barku after a severe earthquake. Your task 
is to go through the buildings that are still stading, to check 
which of them are stable enough for the people to go back in, 
and which are too dangerous for this. You have to examine 
each building carefully to minimise the risks for the 
population. You are reviewing a row of houses with the team. 
Premise: The green 
house and the blue 
house are not both 
stable. 
 
Conclusion: The green 
house is not stable or the 
blue house is not stable. 
8 Imagine you are part of a team of aid workers who are 
removing the mines from the Dunlar fields, where a war took 
place recently. You have to act very thoroughly in order to 
make sure the area is cleared and safe again for the residents. 
You are reviewing the latest data on the fields with the team. 
Premise: The oat field 
and the barley field are 
not both cleared. 
 
Conclusion: The oat 
field is not cleared or 
the barley field is not 
cleared. 
9 Imagine you are part of a team of computer scientists working 
at a communications company. You recently discovered a 
dangerous virus in your system, that threatens to steal the data 
of thousands of users. You need to analyse carefully what 
areas are affected to avoid this happening. You are reviewing 
the situation with the team. 
Premise: Drive A and 
drive B are not both 
affected. 
 
Conclusion: Drive A is 
not affected or drive B 
is not affected. 
10 Imagine you are part of a team of police officers who is trying 
to capture a group of armed robbers. The robbers entered an 
old factory building, but you are not sure where exactly they 
are. You need to analyse the information you have carefully to 
minimise the risks when entering the building. You are 
reviewing the situation with the team. 
Premise: The first 
robber did not both go 
up the stairs and enter 
the storage room. 
 
Conclusion: The first 
robber did not go up the 
stairs or the first robber 
did not enter the storage 
room. 
11 Imagine you are part of a team of cooks at a prestigious 
restaurant. Some of the clients just got sent to hospital with 
food poisoning. You have to find out which of the dishes are 
Premise: The potatoes 
and the rice are not both 
toxic. 
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toxic and which safe, in order to identify the cause and 
prevent further intoxications. You are reviewing the situation 
with the team. 
 
Conclusion: The 
potatoes are not toxic or 
the rice is not toxic. 
12 Imagine you are part of a team of technicians surveying the 
underground system of the city of Limro. A severe flood has 
started to affect part of the underground. You need to analyse 
carefully which areas are flooded so that you can evacuate the 
passengers and avoid the flood spreading further. You are 
reviewing the situation with the team. 
Premise: The red line 
and the yellow line are 
not both flooded. 
 
Conclusion: The red line 
is not flooded or the 
yellow line is not 
flooded. 
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Appendix F. 
The materials used in Experiment 9.  
 
 
Table F1. The scenarios used in Experiment 9, shown for the sample condition, a set size of 
10, and a proportion of .9. 
 Topic Content 
1 National park The administrators of Leodi national park admit different numbers of 
people each day based on conservation criteria, and all those who wish to 
get in must register their interest beforehand. 
A botanist took random samples of the number of applicants on a series of 
days, and recorded how many of them were admitted. 
On day one the botanist took a sample of 10 applicants, and observed that 
9 of them were admitted. 
2 Universities The universities in Irmau state determine the number of persons accepted 
each year based on the staff available for teaching. 
A researcher took random samples of the number of people who applied 
for mathematics, and how many of them were accepted, at some of the 
universities in the state. 
At university one the researcher took a sample of 10 applications for 
mathematics, and observed that 9 of them were accepted. 
3 Tree disease A tree disease has spread to the orange plantations of the farmers of 
Orisau. 
An agronomist went to some of the fields and took random samples of 
trees on each field, to record the number of affected trees among them. 
On Field %one% the agronomist took a sample of 10 trees, and observed 
that 9 of them were affected. 
4 Concert  An event manager of a concert hall wants to know how often the people 
who go to the concerts drink beer. 
To this end, the event manager took random samples of people attending a 
series of concerts, and recorded how many of them drank beer. 
At Concert one the event manager took a sample of 10 people, and 
observed that 9 of them drank beer. 
5 Apple bags A cooperative of apple farmers offers a certain number of its apples for 
sale each season at the local market. 
The coordinator of the cooperative took random samples of the apple bags 
offered for sale at the local market by the farmers, and recorded how 
many of these apple bags were sold. 
From farmer one the coordinator took a sample of 10 bags, and observed 
that 9 of them were sold. 
6 River 
crossing 
In order to get to Lindau, travellers must cross the Duni River. But the 
number of travellers that can cross on any one day depends on the number 
of boats available. 
One of the boat operators took a random sample of the people who wanted 
to cross on a series of days, and recorded how many of these were able to 
do so. 
On day one the boat operator took a sample of 10 travellers who wanted to 
cross the river, and observed that 9 of them were able to do so. 
7 Sun screen A dermatologist wants to find out how often the people on a beach use sun 
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screen. 
To this end the dermatologist took random samples of the people on the 
beach on a series of sunny days, and recorded how many of them used sun 
screen. 
On day one the dermatologist took a sample of 10 people, and observed 
that 9 of them used sun screen. 
8 Train luggage A train designer is investigating how many of the passengers travelling on 
the train between Arbei and Lindel carry luggage. 
To this end, the designer took random samples of the train passengers 
travelling between Arbei and Lindel on a series of days, and recorded how 
many of them carried luggage. 
On day one the designer took a sample of 10 passengers, and observed 
that 9 of them carried luggage. 
9 Coffee with 
sugar 
The waiter of a cafe wants to find out how often the clients put sugar in 
their coffee. 
To this end the waiter took random samples of the clients ordering a 
coffee, and recorded the number of times they put sugar in their coffee, on 
a series of days. 
On day one the waiter took a sample of 10 clients who ordered a coffee, 
and observed that 9 of them put sugar in it. 
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Appendix G 
The materials used in Experiment 10. 
 
 
Table F1. The scenarios in Experiment 10 together with a sample premise for each. 
Name Scenario Sample premise 
Bird Imagine you are part of a team of researchers investigating 
the bird species on the island of Liaku. You have gathered a 
range of data on the birds and are now starting to analyse it. 
You need to be careful to make sure that any conclusions you 
draw are warranted by the data. You are reviewing the 
findings with the team. 
If the next Dayo bird 
you see on Liaku 
eats yam seeds, then 
it will eat auk seeds. 
Murder Imagine you are part of a group of detectives investigating a 
murder on a member of parliament. You have brought 
together the information you have on the case and are trying 
to obtain new insights from it. You need to be careful to 
make sure you only draw conclusions that are justified by the 
evidence. You are discussing the situation with the team. 
If the post officer is 
implicated in the 
crime, then the 
driver is implicated 
in the crime. 
Injury Imagine you are part of a team of doctors who are working in 
an emergency hospital. Several patients are brought in by the 
ambulance with a variety of severe injuries. It is important 
that you act carefully on these cases because a wrong 
diagnosis could be fatal. You are reviewing their files with 
the team. 
If patient H. D. has a 
liver injury, then he 
has a kidney injury. 
Tube Imagine you are part of a team of technicians surveying the 
underground system of the city of Limro. A severe flood has 
started to affect part of the underground. You need to analyse 
carefully which areas are flooded so that you can evacuate 
the passengers and avoid the flood spreading further. You are 
reviewing the situation with the team. 
If the red line is 
flooded, then the 
green line is 
flooded. 
Robot Imagine you are part of a team of astronomers that is 
coordinating a mission to Mars. You sent a computer robot to 
the planet, and are controling its movements from earth, to 
gather important information. You need to be very careful in 
how you move it because if it falls over, it will not be able to 
send further data to earth. You are discussing its next 
movements with the team. 
If it's safe for the 
robot to move 
forward, then it's 
safe for the robot to 
rise up. 
Water Imagine you are part of a team of epidemiologists that is 
working to find the source of a current cholera epidemic in 
the Taoli region. You are sampling the water from a number 
of wells in this region to check whether they carry the virus 
or are safe for drinking. You need to analyse the water 
samples very thoroughly in order to give to the residents the 
information they need to regain control over the situation. 
You are reviewing the latest data with the team. 
If the well in Laka 
district has drinkable 
water, then the well 
in Yerlo district has 
drinkable water. 
Quake Imagine you are part of a team of engineers who have been 
called to the city of Barku after a severe earthquake. Your 
task is to go through the buildings that are still standing, to 
check which of them are stable enough for the people to go 
If the green house is 
stable, then the blue 
house is stable. 
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back in, and which are too dangerous for this. You have to 
examine each building carefully to minimise the risk for the 
population. You are reviewing a row of houses with the 
team. 
Field Imagine you are part of a team of aid workers who are 
removing the mines from the Dunlar fields, where a war took 
place recently. You have to act very thoroughly in order to 
make sure the area is cleared and safe again for the residents. 
You are reviewing the latest data on the fields with the team. 
If the oat field is 
cleared, then the 
barley field is 
cleared. 
System Imagine you are part of a team of computer scientists 
working at a communications company. You recently 
discovered a dangerous virus in your system, which threatens 
to steal the data of thousands of users. You need to analyse 
carefully what areas are affected to avoid this happening. 
You are reviewing the situation with the team. 
If drive A is 
affected, then drive 
B is affected. 
Armed Imagine you are part of a team of police officers who is 
trying to capture an armed robber. The robber entered an old 
factory building. You need to analyse carefully the 
information you have on its location to minimise the risk 
when entering the building. You are reviewing the situation 
with the team. 
If the robber went 
up the stairs, then he 
entered the storage 
room. 
 
 
 
